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SUMMARY
This thesis examines the work of the most important literary critics and theorists who were 
either members of, or closely associated with, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in 
the period between 1928 and 1939. Its main concern is to provide a systematic and critical 
account of the communist understanding of the politics of literature. Its wider objective is to 
assess the ways in which the “Party theorists” were influenced by the CPGB’s relationship with 
the world communist movement. The basic argument is that the work of the Party theorists had 
its roots in (1) the political strategies imposed on the CPGB throughout this period by the 
Communist International, and (2) the body of cultural doctrine enunciated by Soviet 
intellectuals at the famous Writers’ Congress in Moscow in 1934.1 argue that the Party theorists 
responded creatively to these external influences, usually (though not always) by drawing on 
ideas from the British tradition of cultural criticism to develop Soviet doctrine in distinctive 
ways. Moreover, in spite of its debt to Soviet theory, much of the British work on literature and 
culture was noticeably unorthodox -  sometimes consciously so, sometimes not. I argue that 
these ideas are consistent with the main principles of the so-called “revisionist” school of CPGB 
historiography which has emerged over the last 15 years.
Chapter One surveys the period between 1928 and 1933 when the CPGB adhered to the 
Communist International’s “Class Against Class” strategy. It focuses on (1) the work of the 
Anglo-Australian critic P. R. Stephensen, (2) the ideas about cultural crisis developed by John 
Strachey and Montagu Slater, and (3) the communist response to the prevailing fashion for 
cultural conservatism. Chapter Two provides an overview of the ideas explored at the Soviet 
Writers’ Congress in 1934. Chapters Three, Four and Five examine the work of Alick West, 
Ralph Fox and Christopher Caudwell, the three men who are usually regarded as the founders of 
Marxist literary theory in Britain. Chapter Six explores the consequences for British cultural 
Marxism of the Communist International’s “Popular Front” strategy against fascism. Its 
particular focus is the attempt of British communists to combat the influence of fascism by 
tracing the history of the “English radical tradition”.
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INTRODUCTION
Marxist ideas had a significant influence on at least three groups of literary critics and theorists 
in the Britain of the 1930s. The most famous was the so-called “Auden Circle”, several of 
whose members (Stephen Spender, C. Day Lewis and W.H. Auden himself) produced a large 
body of critical writing in the period between their conversion to Marxism in the middle of the 
decade and their shift away from it at the beginning of the Second World War.1 Similarly well- 
known to an academic audience is the handful of maverick scholars, notably William Empson 
and L.C. Knights, who drew briefly on Marxist and Marxisant sources in their efforts to extend 
the insights of “Cambridge English” in a radical direction.2 Yet the most impressive engagement 
with Marxist ideas was undertaken by the numerous writers who were either members of, or 
closely associated with, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), and whose work (now 
largely forgotten) had its roots in the ideas about literature and culture which emerged in the 
Soviet Union during the Stalin period. The aim of this thesis is to provide an overview of the 
critical and theoretical contributions of the latter group, though it will occasionally be necessary 
to refer to the other two groups for purposes of comparison and in order to identify influences.3 
The scholarly neglect to which the work of the communist writers has been exposed is 
astonishing. Nearly every historian of criticism accepts that Marxism was a dominant force in 
the literary culture of the 1930s, but few are willing to examine its impact in any detail. The 
relevant volume of Rene Wellek’s History o f Modem Criticism, easily the most important work 
of reference on the subject, devotes just two of its 400 pages to the work of only one of the 
Party theorists.4 The reasons for this neglect are probably bound up with the cultural politics of 
the Cold War.5 At a time in the 1950s and 1960s when one might have expected literaiy 
historians to provide a balanced assessment of the communist writers of the previous 
generation, the majority of British intellectuals were deeply hostile to the Soviet bloc and 
regarded Marxism as a barrier to genuine thought. It might also have been the case that what 
Ron Bellamy has called “McCarthy, sotto voce”6 deterred a number of more sympathetic writers 
from tracing the history of communist criticism, though this obviously fails to explain why the 
literary intellectuals who openly associated with the CPGB at this time were themselves 
neglectful of the heritage of the Thirties. At any rate, the note of scorn which has characterised 
most post-war writing on the Party theorists is well captured in the following passage from John 
Gross’s The Rise and Fall o f  the Man o f Letters: “Not even sympathizers.. .are likely to want to 
resurrect the English Communist criticism of the 1930s, and at this hour in the day it would be 
pointless to rake up the dogmatic pronouncements of Alick West, Philip Henderson, Jack 
Lindsay or the firing-squad of Left Review”.7
In the light of passages such as this, it is necessary to be absolutely clear about why the attempt 
to “rake up” the work of the CPGB’s literary intellectuals is in fact justified. Gross is certainly 
right to say that many of the Party theorists were inclined to be dogmatic, though dogmatism 
was often wrongly ascribed to their work because of its use of naively partisan language -  no 
generation of English critics has ever been more subservient to the deadening linguistic 
conventions of democratic politics. But at their best, there were about 15 pioneering writers 
(including two whom Gross impugned in the quoted passage) who moved beyond what Victor 
Paananen has called a “preliminary exploration of problems and possibilities”8 to provide a 
sophisticated application of Marxist ideas to the fields of literature and culture. One measure of 
their stature is the extent of their influence. The ideas of the Party theorists were central to the 
radical public sphere from which the most important creative writers of the 1930s took their 
inspiration, and their influence can clearly be detected in the work of Auden, Spender and even 
George Orwell.9 The attempt to identify a “radical tradition” in English culture which occurred 
at the time of the Popular Front against fascism (1935-1939) would later shape the much more 
extensive investigations of English radicalism undertaken by writers such as E.P. Thompson, 
Arnold Kettle and Christopher Hill.10 Moreover, as Paananen has pointed out, there are even 
similarities to be noted between the main theoretical approaches of the 1930s and those adopted 
by the writers who led the revival of Marxist literary theory in the Seventies and Eighties. If we 
want a clear picture of the sources which influenced such celebrated texts as Raymond 
Williams’s Marxism and Literature (1977) and Terry Eagleton’s Criticism and Ideology (1976), 
we have no choice but to give the “firing squad of Left Review” its due.
My aim in the rest of this Introduction is to prepare the ground for the examination of British 
communist criticism by (1) outlining the argument which provides the dissertation with its 
guiding thread, (2) contrasting my approach to that of earlier work on the cultural history of the 
Communist Party, and (3) making some preliminary observations about the relationship 
between the Soviet and British influences on the communist critics.
1 COMMUNIST PARTY HISTORY: THE NEW REVISIONISM
Our knowledge of the CPGB has been greatly enhanced over the last 10 years by the emergence 
of what some writers have described as a “revisionist” school of Party history, exemplified by 
such political historians as Andrew Thorpe, Matthew Worley, Kevin Morgan and Mike 
Squires.11 The guiding assumption of this thesis is that the central principles of the revisionist 
school are not merely crucial to our understanding of the CPGB’s political evolution, but also 
(in suitably modified form) to our understanding of its intervention in the cultural sphere as 
well. At the core of the new revisionism is a novel account of the relationship between the
British Party and the world communist movement. As is well known, the CPGB was a member 
between 1920 and 1943 of the Communist International or “Comintern” (Cl), the organisation 
which had been set up in Moscow in 1919 to co-ordinate the work of the various communist 
parties that came into existence in the wake of the October Revolution. The role of the Cl, 
which styled itself a “world communist party” and insisted that affiliated organisations such as 
the CPGB were merely “national sections”, was to determine the broad strategies which 
individual parties should pursue in their respective national contexts. The 16th of its 21 
conditions of membership famously asserted that “All decisions of the Communist International 
are binding on member parties.”12 The relationship between the Cl and the CPGB has usually 
been portrayed as a deeply authoritarian one. Two claims have tended to reoccur: first, that the 
Cl was dominated by Soviet politicians (especially Stalin) who subordinated the requirements 
of its nationals sections to the strategic interests of the USSR; and second, that strategic 
decisions were enforced in such a draconian fashion that national parties had no choice but to 
implement them, regardless of whether they made much sense in the local conditions in which 
communists were obliged to operate. Although there were numerous disagreements between the 
various pre-revisionist historians who wrote about the CPGB, the assumption that British 
communists were little better than “Moscow dupes” has united the work of Cold War liberals,13 
Trotskyists,14 non-Marxist socialists15 and even communists themselves.16 The great 
achievement of the revisionists, many of whom have had access to the substantial archives 
which have become available since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the 
CPGB, has been to demonstrate that in fact the relationship between the Cl and the British Party 
was never as rigidly hierarchical as orthodoxy insists. No one disputes that the Cl was the most 
important institution in the world communist movement, nor that it ultimately determined the 
strategies which the CPGB pursued. However, it has now been recognised that there were 
several ways in which the British communists could exercise a reciprocal influence on the Cl, 
even if they never possessed the degree of autonomy which they undoubtedly needed. It is 
certainly true that Soviet politicians were the dominant influence in the Cl, but it is equally true 
that British representatives in Moscow were able to make a significant contribution to the CI’s 
deliberations when the important decisions were made. Just as important is the recognition that 
there was never a time at which the CPGB simply adopted the CPs decisions in an uncritical or 
wholesale fashion. Because the mechanisms by which the Cl sought to control the British Party 
were never wholly reliable (a point that Andrew Thorpe has explored in some detail),17 it was 
relatively common for the British leadership simply to disregard aspects of Cl policy which it 
saw as either unimportant or unrealistic. Equally crucially, it was necessary for all Cl decisions 
to be adapted to local conditions by the British communists who were responsible for 
implementing them. The policies of the CPGB between 1920 and 1943 were therefore a product 
of the general principles enunciated by the Cl, combined with the detailed knowledge of
4national politics supplied by the British leadership and activists in the localities. Most 
surprisingly of all, the revisionist historians have also pointed out that British communists were 
not merely capable of rebelling against the Cl’s decisions (this was already known -  though 
rarely emphasised) but that their rebellion was occasionally important in persuading the Cl to 
reconsider its strategic line. The most famous example of this process, explored in detail by 
Kevin Morgan in his biography of Harry Pollitt,18 probably occurred when the British leadership 
unilaterally abandoned the Cl’s sectarian policy on trade unions in 1931, thereby hastening the 
end of the disastrous “Class Against Class” policy which had come into operation in 1928.
There is no straightforward parallel between the CPGB’s political work in the inter-war period 
and its intervention in culture. The most obvious difference was that there was no Party 
committee which had the power to enforce the cultural line being handed down from Moscow -  
the National Cultural Committee was not established until 1947.19 Nevertheless, a close 
examination of the Party’s early attempts to create a British strain of cultural Marxism, 
specifically in the areas of literary theory and literary criticism, yields three conclusions which 
are broadly continuous with those of the revisionist historians, and which can be summarised as 
follows:
(1) The work of the CPGB’s early literary intellectuals can only be understood with 
reference to the Party’s relationship with the world communist movement. Just as the 
decisions of the Cl determined the broad strategies which the Party pursued at a political 
level, so developments in the world movement shaped the intellectual context in which 
communist criticism at first took shape. On the one hand, the political decisions of the Cl 
often had important consequences for cultural work, even when (as in the case of the Class 
Against Class strategy) they appeared to lack a specifically cultural dimension. On the other 
hand, most communist criticism in the second half of the 1930s was profoundly influenced 
by the ideas propounded at the famous Soviet Writers’ Congress in 1934, when the Soviet 
government tried to impose a cultural policy on the entire world movement. The heart of 
this policy was the requirement that all communist artists should observe the conventions of 
“Socialist Realism”. Although the influence of what I refer to as “Soviet theory” was 
reinforced by certain later writings by Soviet intellectuals, the English translation of the 
speeches at the Writers’ Congress remained the most important document for British 
communists in the five years between 1934 and 1939.
(2) The main elements of Soviet theory were elaborated by British communists in 
distinctive ways. It was rare for British communists simply to parrot the ideas which had 
first received expression at the 1934 Congress. Their objective was usually to expand on the
theoretical and critical hints which the Soviet writers had thrown out, often (though not 
always) by augmenting them with ideas drawn from the British tradition of cultural 
criticism. This can perhaps be seen as the literary equivalent of the Party leadership’s 
attempts to adapt Cl decisions to local conditions. As I shall argue later in this Introduction, 
the conflation of British and Soviet ideas draws our attention to certain structural 
similarities between the two intellectual traditions.
(3) British adaptations of Soviet theory were often highly unorthodox. If the CPGB was 
sometimes inclined to resist the strategic decisions of the Cl, or else to interpret them in a 
highly idiosyncratic fashion, its literary intellectuals were similarly capable of producing 
work which subtly undermined the main elements of Soviet theory. It would be wrong to 
overestimate the element of outright rebellion in the writings of the British communist 
critics, but it is equally clear that (a) they sometimes advanced arguments which were 
incompatible with the fundamental ideas of Marxism, thereby illustrating the gravitational 
pull of non-Marxist ideas in British intellectual life, and (b) they can occasionally be read as 
an implicit expression of dissatisfaction either with Soviet theory or with wider aspects of 
communist strategy. In no sense was George Orwell justified in claiming that Party 
intellectuals took “their opinions from Moscow”, though he was perhaps closer to the mark 
when he complained that they took “their cooking from Paris”.20
No body of work as labyrinthine as the communist criticism of the 1930s should be distorted to 
fit a simple thesis. The above propositions should therefore only be regarded as the 
dissertation’s guiding thread. My broader objectives are to clearly establish what my chosen 
writers actually said (something which existing work in the field has not adequately achieved) 
as well as to expose their work to a critical analysis. This might be the point at which to preview 
the material I intend to cover. Communist criticism in Britain did not begin in 1928, the point at 
which the thesis opens. Several writers in the early 1920s had expressed their support for A.A. 
Bogdanov’s Proletcult movement in the Soviet Union -  the best known appear to have been 
William McLaine and Eden and Cedar Paul. The work of the English Bogdanovites was 
subsequently attacked in the journal Plebs by writers such as Ralph Fox, T.A. Jackson and 
William Paul.21 However, it was only in the late-1920s that British communists began to 
produce cultural and literary criticism in significant quantities. Their work at this time was 
profoundly influenced by the notorious “Class Against Class” policy, also known as the 
“general strategic rule of the Third Period”, which the CPGB pursued at the behest of the Cl 
between 1928 and 1933. Rooted in the assumption that world capitalism had entered a deep 
crisis from which recovery was unlikely to be possible, Class Against Class was a highly 
sectarian strategy which stipulated that the CPGB should prepare for the forthcoming revolution
6by ending co-operation with the forces of social democracy (especially the Labour Party) and 
withdrawing from the mainstream trade unions. Chapter One aims to highlight the links 
between Class Against Class and early forms of British cultural Marxism by examining (1) the 
writings of PR Stephensen, which powerfully captured the mood of extreme revolutionary 
febrility which settled on the Party at this time, (2) the attempt by John Strachey and Montagu 
Slater to reinforce the prevailing assumptions about capitalism’s terminal crisis by developing 
the idea of cultural crisis, and (3) the debate which occurred in the early 1930s between leading 
representatives of communism and cultural conservatism, notably A.L. Morton and F.R. Leavis, 
and which reflected a mood of disillusionment in the Party with the anti-intellectualism that was 
endemic to Class Against Class.
As we have already seen, communist criticism was revolutionised in 1934 when the Soviet 
government announced the main principles of its cultural policy at the Soviet Writers’ Congress 
held in Moscow. Chapter Two looks at the body of doctrine elaborated at the Writers’ Congress 
in some detail, arguing that it contained a “prescriptive” element (i.e. a description and defence 
of Socialist Realism), an “aesthetic” element (i.e. a reflectionist, anti-Kantian and anti-Formalist 
account of art which served to justify a political conception of literature), a “historical” element 
(i.e. an attempt to legitimise Socialist Realism by pointing to prestigious cultural precedents) 
and a “comparative” element (i.e. an attempt to argue that the culture of the USSR was infinitely 
superior to that of the capitalist nations, which had long since descended into “decadence”). In 
the British context, one of the most important developments at about the time of the Soviet 
Writers’ Congress was the establishment in 1934 of the literary journal Left Review, ostensibly 
the official publication of the British Section of the Writers International. Most of the shorter 
pieces of British communist criticism were to appear in Left Review between May 1934 and 
October 1938, and there are references to the journal in every chapter of the thesis.22 However, 
it is generally accepted that Marxist literary theory only really got underway in Britain with the 
publication in 1937 of three seminal books: Christopher Caudwell’s Illusion and Reality, Alick 
West’s Crisis and Criticism and Ralph Fox’s The Novel and the People.23 Chapters Three, Four 
and Five examine the careers of each of these writers, seeking to identify the precise nature of 
their debt to Soviet theory. Drawing on his great autobiography One Man in his Time, Chapter 
Three argues that Alick West managed to combine orthodoxy and dissidence in something like 
equal measure. Crisis and Criticism had many points of connection with Soviet theory, but 
many of the other writings contain an implicit critique of what West regarded as the cultural 
(and hence political) decline of the world communist movement. Chapter Four argues that 
Ralph Fox’s writings on the socialist novel were organised around a defence of the Soviet idea 
of positive heroism, but also claims that many of Fox’s arguments were inadvertently non- 
Marxist. Christopher Caudwell’s writings are not explored in detail in this thesis, not least
because they have been exhaustively examined by several other writers; but in Chapter Five I 
briefly sketch the outlines of a new interpretation of his work. The basic argument is that 
Caudwell took his theoretical bearings from several important elements in Soviet theory 
(something which has largely been overlooked by other commentators) but that he refracted the 
Soviet orthodoxy through the distorting mechanisms of his distinctively autodidactic mind. The 
result was a body of work of high unorthodoxy. Finally, Chapter Six moves away from Soviet 
theory to examine the wider political influences on British cultural Marxism, specifically the so- 
called “Popular Front” policy which the Cl adopted between 1934 and 1939. At the 7th Congress 
of the Cl in 1935, Georgi Dimitrov famously argued that fascist movements throughout the 
world had gained an advantage over the left by portraying themselves as the culmination of then- 
respective national traditions, and that communists should fight back by drawing public 
attention to the rich traditions of popular radicalism in their own countries. Although there was 
nothing especially unorthodox about the CPGB’s attempt to trace the history of the “English 
radical tradition”, much of which was concerned with identifying the elements of radicalism in 
the work of Britain’s most famous writers, we shall see that communist intellectuals had to 
develop many important ideas of their own in order to put flesh on the bones of Dimitrov’s 
instructions.
2 EARLIER WORK ON THE CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
How can the approach outlined above be distinguished from that of earlier work on the cultural 
history of the CPGB? Much of the existing literature can be divided into one of two categories: 
(1) that which overestimates the influence of the Soviet Union on the cultural work of the 
British Party, and (2) that which implies that the influence of the Soviet Union was o f little or 
no importance. The claim that British communists were little better than Stalin’s cultural 
stooges is usually made by writers who are experts in Literary Studies rather than the histoiy of 
communism, sceptical towards the left and less interested in the CPGB than in the wider literary 
culture of the Thirties. It can be found in either explicit or implicit form in such important works 
as Julian Symons’s The Thirties: A Dream Revolved (1960) and Samuel Hynes’s The Auden 
Generation (1976).24 Even Valentine Cunningham, whose celebrated book on British Writers o f 
the Thirties (1988) examines the work of the Auden Group in the context of all the literary 
trends of the age,25 occasionally says things like this: “British Marxists had put their shirts on 
Comrade Radek’s doctrines of Socialist Realism issued at the Moscow Writers’ Congress of 
1934”.26 By contrast, the second body of work, which has been accumulating slowly since the 
late-1960s, goes to the other extreme in its account of the relationship between the Soviet Union 
and the CPGB’s cultural workers. Frequently written by younger academics who are or were 
sympathetic to the Party (and often by people who associated with its “Eurocommunist” wing in
8the Seventies and Eighties), it rarely overlooks the role of the Soviet Union altogether, yet its 
central argument is that the CPGB’s cultural work was usually “forged from a combination of 
local cultural forces and Communist enthusiasm, and developed to correspond with indigenous 
events, disputes and traditions” (Matthew Worley)27. The most distinguished work in this vein 
can be found in four symposia which deal either directly or indirectly with the CPGB’s cultural 
history28 and in a number of essays and monographs which trace the Party’s approach to 
literature (e.g. David Smith, H. Gustav Klaus and Ingrid von Rosenberg),29 theatre (e.g. Colin 
Chambers and Jon Clark),30 film (e.g. Bert Hogenkamp and Stephen Jones),31 philosophy (e.g. 
Jonathan Ree and Edwin Roberts)32 and the visual arts (e.g. Robert Radford).331 will return in a 
moment to work which might appear to belong in this category but which actually expresses a 
slightly different perspective.
The tendency to deny the influence of the Soviet Union is very much a part of the small body of 
work which examines the history of communist criticism. With the exception of a single chapter 
in Raymond Williams’s Culture and Society 1780-1950 (1958)34 and brief introductory essays 
by David Margolies and Hanna Behrend,35 there are only two general surveys of Marxist 
criticism in Britain: Anand Prakash’s Marxism and Literary Theory (1994)36 and Victor N. 
Paananen’s British Marxist Criticism (2000). Surprisingly, neither of these books seems to have 
come to the attention of other researchers in the field, perhaps because the former has only been 
published in India and the latter only in the USA. Paananen’s book is Volume 22 of the 
Wellesley Studies in Critical Theory, Literary History and Culture. It is primarily an annotated 
bibliography and contains sections on four of the most important critics of the 1930s (Alick 
West, Christopher Caudwell, Jack Lindsay and A.L. Morton) as well as four subsequent writers 
(Arnold Kettle, Margot Heinemann, Raymond Williams and Terry Eagleton). Intended as a 
work of reference, it nevertheless advances a number of arguments which seek to rescue the 
Thirties critics from what E.P. Thompson famously called the “enormous condescension of 
posterity.”37 Paananen’s most interesting claim is that the approach of at least three of the 
Thirties critics (West, Caudwell and Lindsay) is comparable to that of their more prestigious 
successors, specifically in the way that it seeks to deflect our attention away from literary texts 
towards the process by which texts are created.38 Caudwell’s work on the economic function of 
poetry, West’s comparisons between creativity and production and Lindsay’s portrayal of 
culture as “productive activity” are all precursors (or so Paananen would have us believe) of 
such modem theoretical initiatives as Williams’s description of the utilisation of shared literary 
conventions by the individual writer. This argument is appealing in a number of ways (I return 
to it in Chapter Six) but it is also open to a number of criticisms. By placing so much emphasis 
on the ideas which bind the different generations of Marxist critics together, Paananen pays too 
little attention to the other areas of criticism in which British Marxists have distinguished
themselves. Moreover, the importance he ascribes to the analysis of literary production is 
perhaps excessive. Greeted as a major theoretical advance in the 1970s, the shift from “finished 
texts” to the “relations of cultural production” has remained too undeveloped to be of much 
theoretical value. How do we know what writers experience when they write? Is creativity a 
uniform process? What are the political advantages of focusing on the nature of literary 
production? Paananen comes no nearer to answering these questions than either Williams or 
Eagleton before him.
Prakash’s book is much more difficult to summarise. Consisting of brief essays on the six 
writers who dominated communist criticism between the Thirties and the Fifties (Caudwell, 
West, Fox, Edgell Rickword, George Thomson and Arnold Kettle), it is neither a historian’s 
book nor one which functions adequately as an introduction. Failing to discuss communist 
criticism in relation either to Soviet theory or to the politics of the world communist movement, 
it plunges into detailed criticism of its selected writers without first establishing exactly what 
they said. Insofar as it has a unifying thesis (broadly speaking, Prakash argues that communist 
criticism became more sophisticated but less politically engaged in the post-war period)39 it is 
one that lies outside the scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, Marxism and Literary Theory 
has two conspicuous merits. The first is the thoroughness with which it works through its 
critical comments, some of which are echoed in my own examination of West, Caudwell and 
Fox.40 The second is its recognition of the way that the Marxist orientation of British communist 
criticism was often undermined by the continued influence of non-Marxist forms of thought, 
specifically what Prakash terms the “liberal bourgeois tradition”.41 Although Prakash is not 
really interested in issues of orthodoxy and dissidence, his book nevertheless provides 
considerable evidence (at least if one is prepared to read between the lines) of the way that the 
collision between Soviet and English thought often had notably unorthodox consequences.
By trying to avoid the related errors of overestimating the influence of the Soviet Union and 
overstating the autonomy of the British communists, the present thesis seeks to take a different 
approach to the cultural history of the CPGB than either of these two bodies of work. My 
approach is much closer to that of a handful of writers who are usually bracketed with the 
second group (that is, the group which underplays the role of the USSR) but who anticipated the 
approach of the revisionist historians by some years. Working alongside the younger communist 
academics in the Seventies and Eighties were a number of much older writers, notably James 
Klugmann42 and Margot Heinemann,43 whose work on the cultural history of British 
communism drew extensively on their own long experience in the Party. The great virtue of 
their work was that it recognised the enormous importance of the USSR in shaping the context 
in which the British communists operated, while also drawing our attention, sometimes in a
highly anecdotal form, to the local factors which reinforced, modified or subverted the Soviet 
influence. For instance, Klugmann wrote humorously about the difficulties which the Party 
encountered during the period of the Popular Front, when the Cl’s instruction to develop new 
forms of “progressive” patriotism almost foundered on the conservatism inherent in most 
symbols of British identity.44 This approach was subsequently adopted by some of the younger 
writers, pre-eminently Andy Croft,45 whose work combines a detailed understanding of the 
history of the world communist movement with tireless research into the internal culture of the 
CPGB. If none of these writers can exactly be described as a card-carrying revisionist, it is only 
because (1) they have yet to provide a detailed analysis of the balance of Soviet and English 
elements in the cultural politics of the 1930s, and (2) they are sometimes inclined to revert to 
anti-Soviet orthodoxy and argue that the British communists were primarily concerned only to 
“mitigate” the influence of Soviet ideas.46 Their account of the culture of the 1930s has 
nevertheless been a central influence on the argument of this thesis.
3 SOVIET THEORY, THE BRITISH CULTURAL TRADITION AND THE ORIGINS 
OF MARXIST CRITICISM
There is one other general matter which needs briefly to be addressed before we move on to 
Chapter One. I have already indicated that one of my main claims in this thesis is that the 
British communists created a distinctive form of Marxist criticism by combining Soviet theory 
with ideas drawn from the English tradition of thought about literature and culture. This claim 
may well seem surprising to those who believe that Soviet and British thinking had absolutely 
nothing in common, the latter being seen as much less theoretical, partisan and dogmatic than 
the former. Perhaps the British communists would always have tried to prove that the two 
traditions were bom of common soil, even if there had been no good reason for doing so, but I 
would argue that Soviet and British approaches to culture evinced a number of surface 
similarities which provided prima facie evidence of their compatibility, and which prompted the 
British communists into recognising the possibility of creative synthesis.47 The most obvious 
was a shared belief in the existence of cultural crisis. Where the Soviet theorists insisted that 
capitalism had stripped modem culture of every last vestige of aesthetic and intellectual 
significance (see Chapter Two), a long list of British thinkers, some of them going back to the 
early 16th Century, provided different explanations for what they also regarded as an absolute 
decline of cultural standards. When the British communists read Bukharin, Gorky and Zhdanov 
on the spiritual poverty of bourgeois society, they surely recalled such celebrated instances of 
cultural pessimism as Sir Philip Sidney’s attack on the immorality of Elizabethan theatre,48 
Wordsworth’s onslaught on industrialism49 and Eliot’s defence of “tradition” against 
modernity.50 There was also a surprising parallel between British and Soviet thinking on the
issue of reforming popular culture. At the heart of Soviet theory was the assumption that the 
cultural health of modem societies would never be restored until the masses had overcome their 
addiction to commercial rubbish and embraced the work of the Socialist Realists, in the process 
learning how to abolish the market institutions that were the root cause of their malaise. No 
British thinker had ever put such faith in the power of art, but the same belief in the ability of 
working people to solve the problems of culture can be seen in Ruskin’s plea for a return to 
handicraft or Chesterton’s eulogies to his beloved “people of England”. On a more 
philosophical level, it is easy to see why the British communists might have experienced a 
shock of recognition when exposed to the rigorously mimetic theory of art with which the Soviet 
thinkers tried to defend their conception of literary realism. The debate on mimesis (that is, the 
assumption that art somehow “reflects” a pre-existing reality) had taken a particularly virulent 
form in Britain since the late-19th Century, not least because an influential group of writers and 
critics, most of them associated with the art-for-art’s sake movement, had expressed their 
opposition to mimetic doctrine in a deliberately scandalous and provocative form.51 Insisting 
that art was not so much a reflection of reality as the attempt to create new and more compelling 
worlds, apologists for art-for-art’s sake often implied that there was something irresistibly 
disreputable about their opposition to mimetic othodoxy. For instance, it was Oscar Wilde who 
famously pointed out that a non-mimetic perspective commits us to the proposition that creative 
writers are basically engaged in an extended act of “lying”.52 Because of this tendency for 
matters of aesthetic doctrine to become bound up with issues of morality, it was common for 
critics of the new aestheticism to express themselves with considerable sanctimony. Responding 
to Wilde and the other aesthetes, G.K. Chesterton went so far as to argue that their studied 
immorality was one of the main contemporary threats to the Catholic “orthodoxy” whose 
influence he wished to defend.53 In circumstances such as these, it is easy to see how the British 
communists might have regarded their support for Soviet theory as an expression of moral 
virtue. It could also be argued that the communists were spurred on in their attempts to fuse 
Soviet and English thought by the sheer eclecticism of an earlier generation of socialist writers. 
If we examine the pioneering writers who founded socialist criticism in Britain in the period 
between 1880 and 1910, it becomes clear that one of their most notable characteristics was a 
willingness to synthesise highly divergent traditions of thought. Edward Carpenter took ideas 
from Marx, Whitman and the Bhagavad Gita and ended up with his distinctive brand of 
mystical socialism;54 George Bernard Shaw drew on Marx, Ibsen and Nietzsche in his efforts to 
justify the elitist politics of the early Fabians,55 while even Oscar Wilde, the most surprising 
socialist of them all, employed the arguments of Kropotkin and Pater to buttress his assertion 
that revolutionary politics are wholly compatible with the solipsism of art-for-art’s sake.56 While 
many of these writers were looked upon with suspicion by their communist successors in the 
1930s, it is unlikely that their intellectual adventurousness had passed unnoticed.
One way of illustrating the continuities between Soviet and British thought is briefly to examine 
the earliest forms of Marxist criticism in Britain, since these exemplify many of the general 
points which I have just made. The crucial figures in this context are William Morris, Edward 
Aveling and Eleanor Marx Aveling, whose pioneering work of the 1880s and 1890s remained 
the only significant attempts to apply Marxist ideas to the study of literature and culture until 
the formation of the CPGB in 1920.57 As is well known, Morris’s work was rooted in his deep 
unease about what he identified as a crisis in Victorian high culture. Seeking to explain the 
precipitate decline in the high arts since the end of the Middle Ages (architecture was a special 
area of concern), Morris insisted that the quality of a nation’s high culture is ultimately 
dependent on the quality of its popular culture. If ordinary people are able to derive aesthetic 
pleasure from their work, then the body of serious art which rises above them is likely to be 
exalted, beautiful and high-minded. By the same token, it is only when all traces of aesthetic 
significance are removed from the labour process that the arts go into serious decline.58 The 
conclusion to which Morris came, heavily under the influence of such anti-industrial “sages” as 
John Ruskin and Thomas Carlyle, was that the root cause of England’s cultural malaise was the 
rise of industrialism and the destruction of handicraft. Whereas the older forms of craft 
production had catered to the worker’s need for beauty, rest and a sense of usefulness, 
industrialism had rationalised economic life to the point where the worker was merely an 
“appendage to a machine”. The recovery of high culture was therefore dependent on the 
abolition of industrial civilisation and the restoration of handicraft to a central position in 
Britain’s economic life. It was this conviction which led Morris and a handful of friends to 
establish Morris, Marshall, Faulkner & Company (also known as “The Firm”), the furniture 
company that became the focus of Britain’s Arts and Crafts movement in the last 40 years of the 
19th Century. At first, Morris seems to have believed that the revival of handicraft only required 
a transformation in arts education and a determined effort to explore Britain’s rich heritage of 
medieval artefacts. Fine artists were urged to put their skills in draughtmanship at the disposal 
of the new generation of craft producers, while the entire movement was encouraged to explore 
the furthest recesses of the English countryside in search of the most sumptuous examples of 
medieval handicraft, many of them buried away (or so Morris believed) in the silent alcoves of 
small churches.59 However, in the 20 years between the beginning of his artistic career and his 
first exposure to Marxism in the early 1880s, Morris increasingly came to believe that the 
revival of handicraft would not be accomplished until the entire capitalist order had been 
abolished. In a society which places such a premium on competition, it is simply not possible to 
reintroduce time-consuming techniques of production when the constant demand is for more 
goods at cheaper prices. And yet, instead of following Ruskin’s example and calling for the re­
establishment of the sort of non-market institutions which predated the rise of capitalism,
Morris began to argue that the society of the future should balance Marx’s emphasis on 
planning, common ownership and advanced industrialism with his own preference for the 
simplicities of craft production. In essays such as “A Factory As It Might Be” (1884)60 and in 
his utopian novel News from Nowhere (1890),61 he envisaged a future in which unpleasant jobs 
were taken over by sophisticated machines (though none of these machines was ever 
described)62 while the workers spent most of their time embellishing commodities with 
techniques handed down from the Middle Ages. Marxist criticism in Britain was therefore bom 
of an unlikely attempt to adapt the ideas of Marx to those of precisely the sort of “feudal 
socialists” whom he and Engels had satirised in The Communist Manifesto. 63
If Morris’s work illustrates the broad similarities between Soviet and British thought, then the 
literary criticism of Edward Aveling and Eleanor Marx Aveling, specifically their short book 
Shelley's Socialism (1888), provides an interesting anticipation of one of the most important 
critical procedures of the 1930s. Originally published in a private edition of 25 copies, Shelley's 
Socialism contained the first of what were intended to be two lectures -  the second has not 
survived. Its central thesis was that Shelley’s poetry and prose had prefigured many of Marx’s 
most important ideas, though the Avelings refused to make the point explicitly, settling instead 
for the less controversial observation that “Shelley was a socialist”.64 At a metaphysical level, 
Shelley enunciated an evolutionary understanding of the natural world whose central insights, 
despite being couched in a “pantheistic language”, bear a clear resemblance to those of 
dialectical materialism.65 He had a burning hatred for capitalism and always supported the 
common people in their struggles against the “tyrants” of the middle class, insisting that the 
relationship between employers and workers is an inherently “parasitic” one. He also blamed 
capitalism for environmental despoliation and the lengthening of the working day.66 Moreover, 
there are passages in his work which anticipate the theory of base and superstructure, showing 
how certain non-economic forms of oppression (e.g. political tyranny and religious bigotry) are 
ultimately rooted in “our commercial system”.67 Although the Avelings provided very little 
evidence for any of these claims (perhaps they did so in the lost second lecture), the interesting 
thing about their book was the explanation it proposed for the emergence of Shelley’s 
radicalism. Perhaps anticipating the objection that Shelley would have been unlikely to embrace 
socialism at a time when there was no organised socialist movement in Britain, the Avelings 
argued that he (Shelley) originally came to socialism by extending and subverting the principles 
o f liberalism. As a “child of the French Revolution” he initially embraced the ideals of liberty, 
equality and fraternity in purely “general terms”, only later seeking to apply them to the same 
capitalist system which bourgeois liberalism tried to protect:
To the younger Shelley 1’infame o f Voltaire’s ecrasez Vinfame was to a great extent, as with 
Voltaire wholly, the priesthood. And the empire that he antagonised was at first that o f  kingship 
and that o f personal tyranny. But even in his attacks on these he simultaneously assails the 
superstitious belief in the capitalistic system and the empire o f class. As time goes on, with 
increasing distinctness, he makes assault upon these, the most recent and most dangerous foes 
o f humanity.68
In effect, what the Avelings were arguing was that Shelley owed his socialism to the 
ambiguities and instabilities of bourgeois ideology. As we shall see, this proto-Gramscian 
recognition that the dominant ideology is always divided against itself was to reappear time and 
again in the Marxist criticism of the 1930s. It was especially important at the time of the 
Popular Front (see Chapter Six), when communist intellectuals were instructed by the Cl to 
identify a “radical tradition” in the history of English literature and culture. Since there is no 
evidence that the latterday communists had ever heard of Shelley’s Socialism, it is tempting 
(though also rather dangerous) to suggest that they were linked to the Avelings across 40 years 
by what Rupert Sheldrake would call a “morphic resonance”. The likelier explanation is that the 
tendency to analyse ideas in terms of contradiction and change is a natural reflex of the 
dialectical mind.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE CRITIC AS LEFT SECTARIAN: RESPONSES TO CLASS AGAINST CLASS
Marxist literary criticism was first produced in large quantities in Britain in the period between 
1928 and 1933, some 40 years after the pioneering efforts of William Morris, Edward Aveling 
and Eleanor Marx. This efflorescence of Marxist criticism was dominated by the Communist 
Party. Of the writers who came to prominence at the time, several were already members of the 
CPGB (P.R. Stephensen, A.L. Morton and Montagu Slater), several were on the verge of 
becoming members (Edgell Rickword, Douglas Garman and Alec Brown) while at least one 
(John Strachey) was widely regarded as what would later be called a “fellow traveller”. The 
argument of this chapter is that the work of these writers was heavily influenced by the 
notorious “Class Against Class” policy which the Cl imposed on its member parties in the five 
years after 1928.1 In the British context, Class against Class represented a sharp break with the 
“united front” policy which the CPGB had been following since its formation in 1920. Rooted 
in the assumption that world capitalism had entered a crisis from which recovery was more or 
less impossible, and that socialist revolution was therefore an immediate priority in all the 
advanced nations of the West, the essence of the new line was a deeply irrational hatred of the 
“reformist” left. After almost a decade of tireless work on the industrial front, communists were 
instructed to withdraw their support from the mainstream trade unions and establish unions of 
their own in which the militant instincts of the British workers would not be stymied by a “class 
collaborationist” leadership. They were also required to adopt an attitude of unyielding hostility 
towards the Labour Party (an organisation to which they had previously been intent on 
affiliating) in order that the CPGB might rapidly establish itself as the leading force in the 
British labour movement. Moreover, the non-communist left was not merely seen as a drag on 
social progress but as the conscious ally of European reaction. For much of the period between 
1928 and 1933, communists habitually referred to their former comrades in the Labour Party 
and the trade unions as “social fascists” -  socialist in name, fascist in nature.
A handful of writers have recently tried to revise our understanding of the Class Against Class 
strategy, claiming that it was neither as illogical nor as politically self-defeating as it might 
otherwise have seemed.2 But the broad consensus among historians is still that the years 
between 1928 and 1933 were probably the most disastrous of the CPGB’s history. Isolated from 
the rest of the Labour Movement by its own revolutionary purism, the Party saw its membership 
decline to 2555 (November 1930)3 and its influence dwindle almost to nothing. Perhaps the best 
that can be said is that Class Against Class did not inflict on Britain the sort of political
calamities which occurred on the Continent, where it divided the anti-fascist movement at the 
very moment when Hitler was making his bid for power. However, the revisionist historians are 
surely right in saying that the CPGB enjoyed a major upsurge in its cultural fortunes during this 
otherwise bleak period. Although the Party only managed to establish two trade unions of its 
own,4 neither of which proved very effective, it was markedly more successful in building 
cultural institutions which provided British workers with a “revolutionary” alternative to both 
mainstream culture and the leisure organisations of the wider labour movement. Between 1928 
and 1933 it either established or assumed control of the British Workers’ Sports Federation 
(BWSF), the Workers’ Theatre Movement (WTM) and a whole host of workers’ film societies.5 
In this sense, the extraordinary cultural triumphs of the period 1934-1939 had their roots in the 
sectarianism of Class Against Class, not in a sudden outburst of creativity occasioned by the 
politics of the Popular Front.
The purpose of the rest of this chapter is to demonstrate what historians such as Worley, 
Howkins and Samuel have tended to ignore, namely that Marxist literary criticism also became 
a major part of the CPGB’s cultural repertoire at this time. Section One examines the essays 
which the Anglo-Australian critic P.R. Stephensen wrote for The London Aphrodite between 
1928 and 1929; Section Two assesses the accounts of the “cultural crisis of capitalism” to be 
found in the work of John Strachey and Montagu Slater; Section Three surveys the sustained 
dialogue between communists and cultural conservatives which occurred over a period of about 
two years in the early 1930s. As we shall see, much of this work bears out the more 
sophisticated understanding of the relationship between Soviet and British communism which 
has emerged over the last decade. For every writer who seemed to be loyally providing the 
Class Against Class line with some kind of cultural ratification (Strachey), there were others 
who echoed it only in terms of mood (Stephensen) and others who rejected it altogether 
(Morton). Even when British communism was at its lowest ebb, then, its adherents were never 
simply following the Soviet line in a slavish or uncritical fashion. As the revisionist historians 
have pointed out, there was usually an ideological space in which the British communists could 
find some room for manoeuvre.
1 P.R. STEPHENSEN: A MARXIST FALLEN AMONG NIETZSCHEANS
In the first volume of his memoirs, Fanfrolico and After (1962), Jack Lindsay made the startling 
but little noticed claim that his friend P.R. Stephensen had “founded Marxist literary criticism” 
in the articles he wrote for The London Aphrodite between 1928 and 1929.6 It is not difficult to 
understand why he should have wanted to make such a claim. If Stephensen were indeed the 
man who first developed a Marxist account of literature, it follows that Lindsay (who co-edited
The London Aphrodite with Stephensen) played a major role in the creation of an entire field of 
Marxist studies. He must nevertheless have been well aware that the claim was false. Even if we 
assume that Lindsay was only referring to Marxist criticism in Britain, he certainly knew that 
the application of Marxist ideas to the study of literature and culture had been pioneered some 
40 years before Stephensen by writers such as Eleanor Marx, Edward Aveling and William 
Morris. Moreover, there is no obvious sense in which the articles in The London Aphrodite can 
even be described as unambiguously Marxist. Although Stephensen had joined the CPGB after 
arriving in England in 1926, and although (as we shall see) his articles clearly reflected the 
ambience of the Party during the Class Against Class period, his main objective in the late 
Twenties was to assimilate Marxism to a philosophical position with which it was basically 
incompatible, namely the sort of Nietzschean individualism for which Lindsay was then an 
apologist.7
In order to fully understand the work which Stephensen produced in the closing years of the 
1920s, it is necessary to say something about his relationship with Lindsay and the background 
to the establishment of The London Aphrodite.8 Bom in Queensland, Australia in 1901, the son 
of a politically-active shopkeeper, Stephensen first met Lindsay in 1919 when both men were 
undergraduates at the University of Queensland. Whereas Stephensen had already joined the 
Australian Communist Party and used his position as editor of the student magazine Galmahra 
to whip up political controversy, Lindsay saw himself as the intellectual spokesman for the 
quasi-Nietzschean philosophy which his father, the painter Norman Lindsay, had begun to 
adumbrate in books such as Creative Effort (1919).9 In 1925, four years after graduating with a 
brilliant first in Classics, Lindsay established the Fanfrolico Press with the sole aim of 
publishing books which advanced his father’s creed. A year later he moved to London after 
realising that Fanfrolico’s output would be better received in Europe than Australia. Stephensen 
joined him in London in 1928 to serve as the co-editor of The London Aphrodite, the journal 
which Lindsay hoped would insinuate his Nietzschean outlook into the minds of the 
metropolitan intelligentsia. The fact that Stephensen was prepared to work with Lindsay showed 
how far his commitment to Marxism was beginning to weaken. Although he joined the CPGB 
after arriving in Oxford on a Rhodes Scholarship in 1926, and although he continued to write 
for the communist press, he had evidently begun to feel that Marxism lacked a spiritual element 
which the Lindsays’ version of Nietzscheanism possessed in abundance.10 The essential 
principles of this philosophy were outlined by Lindsay in a series of essays in the new journal, 
notably “The Modem Consciousness: An Essay towards an Integration” in the inaugural issue 
(August 1928).11 The starting point was the assumption that the main problem facing modem 
culture is the breakdown of religious faith. How should people live once they realise that the 
universe is not the creation of a divine intelligence? If Nietzsche’s response to this question was
seen as more compelling than anyone else’s, the whole of modem philosophy was nevertheless 
regarded as a sort of preparation for Nietzsche. In a characteristic attempt to summarise a vast 
expanse of thought in the space of a few sentences, Lindsay argued that post-Renaissance 
philosophy moved through five stages in its progress towards Nietzschean insight: (1) The 
Renaissance philosophers accepted the reality of a world without God but could only propose 
Montaigne’s “passive disdain” as a method for coping with it, (2) Francis Bacon reinforced the 
shift towards atheism but shied away from assessing its significance for mankind because of 
“homosexual scepticism”, (3) David Hume employed the “abstractions” of modem science to 
“sever all the knots of divine law”, (4) Kant, though intending to bolster religious faith, 
paradoxically undermined it by providing arguments for the existence of God that buckled 
under the weight of their own complexity, and (5) Hegel put the idea of human evolution at the 
heart of philosophy by emphasising the importance of the historical process.12
Lindsay had several reasons for seeing Nietzsche as the culmination of this tradition. He began 
by arguing that the bedrock of Nietzsche’s philosophy was his “Dionysian” critique of received 
moral wisdom. In a chaotic universe from which all evidence of divine intelligence is absent, it 
makes no sense (or so Nietzsche argued) to encumber ourselves with a selfless morality that 
puts us at a disadvantage to those who are pitched against us in the struggle for existence. The 
wisest option is to abandon the very distinction between right and wrong and to assess all 
potential courses of action by a single criterion: To what extent do they enhance my power over 
other people?13 Moreover, by plunging into the chaos of existence with scant regard for moral 
niceties, we not only enhance our chances of personal survival but also engage the mechanisms 
of human evolution. The joyous embrace of a Dionysian lifestyle is the means by which a small 
minority of people will ultimately be transformed from men into supermen. Lindsay evidently 
saw this ideal of self-transcendence as the goal by which modem culture should be guided, and 
summarised the absence of self-division which it implied by speaking of the superman as one 
who experiences a “unity of the dynamic judgement”.14 If all this was relatively uncontroversial 
in terms of the prevailing interpretation of Nietzschean thought, Lindsay displayed a hint of 
unorthodoxy by paying particular attention to Nietzsche’s analysis of the relationship between 
the intellect and the instincts in the evolutionary process. His argument was that a number of 
writers had distorted the true nature of human evolution by indulging their own bias towards 
either rationalism or irrationalism. Some regarded the emergence of the superman as a 
predominantly intellectual process in which the individual retreats from a turbulent reality into a 
world of contemplation, whereas others minimised the role of the intellect and identified the 
“Dionysian tumult of experience” as the source of self-transcendence. According to Lindsay, 
Nietzsche had in fact demonstrated that the intellect and the instincts must always be made to 
work in harmony.15 The energy generated by the struggle for existence is the main force
propelling us towards a new way of life, but it can only function effectively if we create a 
“symbol of self-knowledge” which allows us to channel it in the right direction:
When the se lf finds its own core o f energy, which flows out o f this intellectual symbol into life, 
stimulated by some sudden harmony between itself and the stream o f the instincts, it will be 
filled with love and therefore with the need to perpetuate its own delighted harmony: to beget 
an image o f itself upon life... This harmony is the moment o f  Eternity, the conquest o f  Time. For 
it includes both the fluid mass and the abstract construction in a third thing, the dynamic form .16
The philosophical element in Lindsay’s work was supplemented by an ambitious attempt to 
survey the history of the arts, the purpose of which was apparently to encourage modem artists 
to adopt a distinctively Nietzschean aesthetic.17 We will concentrate here on his remarks about 
literature, since (as Laurence Coupe has pointed out) it was the literary culture of England that 
the Aphrodite most wished to change.18 For Lindsay, the challenge facing contemporary artists 
was to recapture the “full proud bustling force” that characterised most Western art during the 
Renaissance.19 (He implied that the basis of this force was the sudden outpouring of Dionysian 
energy which accompanied the breakdown of religious certainties, honed by the recognition that 
its disciplined use could enable human beings to transcend their limitations.) The arts began to 
experience a general decline in the 17th Century, largely because writers such as John Milton 
“tried to distort its (i.e. the Renaissance’s) rhythm with a Gothic dispersal of energy in 
torment”.20 In the three centuries since Milton’s death, or so Lindsay implied, certain writers 
have managed to recapture the objective foundations of artistic greatness (that is, they have 
successfully portrayed the dynamism and “imagic splendour” of external reality) but none has 
recaptured a sense of human beings responding to this dynamism by willing their own 
evolution. Surprisingly, Lindsay appeared to see a possible model for the future in the work of 
Sacheverell and Edith Sitwell, whose poetry attached a “pastoral-sweet rhythm”21 to visions of 
“gods walking in the harvest”.22 Yet the most startling feature of his survey of contemporary 
literature was its attack on modernism.23 According to Lindsay, modernism was little more than 
organised pessimism: “Convinced that life is futile, it wishes to reduce all beliefs and methods 
to a common intellectual Nirvana of tin”.24 The most savagely reductive of all the British 
modernists was probably James Joyce, whose method was to besmirch human nature by 
viewing it against a background of lavatorial squalor. In the absence of an interesting or 
inspiring message, the only outlet for Joyce’s creativity was the sort of manic wordplay which 
had brought his work to the brink of complete inaccessibility.25
Stephensen contributed six pieces of prose to The London Aphrodite. Apart from a brief 
“Editorial Manifesto” in issue one and the single-paragraph “Notice to Americans” in issue 
three,26 there were substantial essays on Bakunin27 and J.C. Squire,28 a dialogue on the recent
work of Aldous Huxley29 and a highly compressed attempt to supply a political/philosophical 
manifesto for the modem age.30 It was clear from all these pieces that Stephensen now 
completely endorsed the interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy to which Lindsay had 
introduced him. The goal of the individual in a post-religious age is to transform himself into a 
“Beyond man” by observing the principle that “blood is spirit”.31 Insofar as Stephensen tried to 
comment on Nietzsche’s ideas (as opposed to celebrating them in the sort of sub-Lawrentian 
language that implicitly rendered the ubermensch as a “whole-hogging exister”),32 he joined 
with Lindsay in warning against the dangers of seeing Nietzsche as either an austerely cerebral 
figure or a reckless explorer of the dionysian impulses. It was not true that Nietzsche had 
identified either the intellect or the instincts as the sole motor of human evolution. His signal 
contribution to modem thought (or so Stephensen implied) was to show how the intellect and 
the instincts could operate in tandem to propel mankind onto a new plane of self-mastery.33
Stephensen had two reasons for identifying a commitment to Marxist politics as an important 
concomitant of the Nietzschean outlook. The first was his belief that only a communist society 
can establish the material conditions in which the quest for self-transcendence might at last be 
allowed to flourish. Ours is an “Age of Wheels” in which “the wheels have caught us” and 
“whirl us centrifugally away from our centre”.34 The advanced technology that dominates the 
capitalist world (and here Stephensen was simply reproducing the central tenet of romantic anti­
capitalism) serves only to impede the cultivation of the spirit by delivering a succession of 
crippling blows to mankind’s sense of equilibrium. But the problem lies not so much with 
technology itself as with the circumstances in which technological change occurs. Because the 
distinguishing feature of the capitalist system is ferocious competition arising from a failure to 
co-ordinate production, it follows (or so Stephensen implied) that each new technological 
innovation will primarily have the effect of reinforcing the prevailing sense of deep insecurity. 
If human beings are to liberate themselves from these material anxieties and turn inwards in a 
spirit of Nietzschean introspection, they must establish a non-market order in which economic 
planning allows technological development to be smoothly integrated into the rhythms of 
everyday life: “...when the wheel runs more smoothly it may be easier to ride upon. One hopes 
so. Therefore let us have a communist revolution”.35 The extraordinary thing about this 
endorsement of communism was its shameless elitism. Stephensen took it for granted that the 
majority of working people were too traumatised by their experience of production to serve the 
revolutionary cause: “ Who could hope to unite these almost-automata for collective action 
against the wheel’s whirling?”36 In other words, it is the vanguard and not the mass which 
makes history. “Practical communists” like Lenin and Stalin were only successful because they 
formed themselves into a tightly-organised elite which “quickly, ruthlessly and efficiently” 
deposed the bourgeoisie with acts of extreme violence.37 Even in the society of the future,
Stephensen hinted, there will only be “individual communists” for whom self-transcendence is a 
viable goal.38
Stephensen’s second reason for supporting communism was the belief that revolutionary 
activity often creates circumstances in which the goal of self-transcendence can be furthered. At 
a time of extreme social polarisation, when the future course of society is settled on the 
barricades in an atmosphere of paranoic tension, it is invariably the case (or so Stephensen 
appeared to believe) that a minority of individuals will respond to the pressure by summoning 
new levels of physical, intellectual and emotional strength. Yet this can only occur if 
revolutionary activity is approached in a certain way. The individual whom Stephensen chose to 
invoke when illustrating his idea of the Nietzschean revolutionary was not Marx but Mikhail 
Bakunin, the founder of anarcho-communism, whom Marx had famously opposed in the 
factional battles that consumed the First International between 1864 and 1872.39 Describing 
Bakunin as a “fore-runner in deed” whereas Nietzsche had merely “postulated the fore­
runner”,40 Stephensen implied that there were two characteristics in particular which enabled 
him to approach the revolutions of his time not merely as engines of social progress but also as 
crucibles of personal development. The first was a capacity for self-dramatisation which has 
only been matched in the 20th Century by that of Leon Trotsky. Because he “dramatised his 
every action in terms of a preconception”, Bakunin was drawn irresistibly towards the sort of 
perilous circumstances in which new capacities are often incubated.41 Secondly, he also had an 
instinctive understanding of the way that a hunger for total destruction often results in the 
renewal of creativity. Without ever using the term himself, Stephensen made it clear that 
Bakunin’s approach to revolutionary activity was essentially what later cultural historians such 
as Greil Marcus have called a “negationist” one42 According to these writers, the hallmark of 
the negationist sensibility is the belief that political revolution only becomes possible when 
people believe that they are capable of changing everything. In order to provoke the masses into 
revolutionary activity, the negationist strives to create the impression that “natural facts” 
(everything from the weather to the structure of the human body) are as susceptible to change as 
“human constructs” such as politics, economics and ideology. Moreover, he expresses his belief 
in the possibility of total change by adopting an attitude of undiluted scorn towards the whole of 
his experience -  the negationist is ultimately the man who screams “no! no! no!” at everything 
which exists. This somewhat frenzied ethos was captured in several of the quotations from 
Bakunin and his contemporaries which studded Stephensen’s essay:
Let us rely upon the unquenchable spirit o f  destruction and annihilation, which is the perpetual 
spring o f new life. The joy  o f  destruction is a Creative Joy.43
The revolutionist is a man under a vow...He is ready to die, to endure torment, and with his own 
hands to KILL ALL who place obstacles in the way o f that revolution...So much the worse for  
him if  he has any ties o f  relationship, offriendship, or o f  love.44
Death to the old world! Long live chaos and destruction! Long live Death! Place fo r the 
future!45
Stephensen’s position was that this sort of demoniacal energy is effectively the hinge between 
the concerns of Marx and the concerns of Nietzsche. By imbuing the individual with the sense 
that nothing on earth can resist the desire for change, it not merely paves the way for socialist 
revolution but also allows a spiritual elite, that cohort of post-Christian visionaries whom 
Nietzsche saw as his natural constituency, to propel themselves towards a higher stage of 
evolution. Stephensen suggested that Bakunin probably derived his taste for negationism from 
the work of Hegel, which he first encountered while a student at Moscow University in the 
1830s. Unlike Marx, who understood that the Hegelian dialectic portrays qualitative 
transformation as the result of prior quantitative shifts, Bakunin seems to have interpreted 
Hegelianism as a straightforward expression of a sort of apocalyptic desire for a clearing of the 
temporal decks: “Only a Russian could have plumbed that well of pure idealism without leaving 
the world of action. Only a ‘barbarian newly awakened to civilisation’ (Wagner’s phrase) could 
have so far absorbed Hegel’s dialectic into his own fibres of concrete action as to apply 
‘Negation’ and ‘Overcoming’ to the contemporary society in terms of physical destruction and 
annihilation”.46 Stephensen’s approach to the broader tensions between Bakuninism and 
Marxism was noticeably ambiguous. On the one hand, perhaps attracted by the thought that he 
was offending against Party orthodoxy, Stephensen implicitly seemed to endorse many of the 
criticisms which Bakunin had levelled against Marx. Although he failed to mention the clashes 
between the two men over the strategic objectives of the First International, he did quote 
Bakunin’s lukewarm assessment of Marx after their first meeting in Brussels in 1848 (“...much 
more advanced than I was...I called him a vain man, perfidious and crafty”)47 and argued that 
one of the main reasons for the failure of Bakunin’s revolutionary ambitions was Marx’s 
“powerfully logical consistency”.48 Stephensen’s animus towards this element of “logical 
consistency” in Marxism can arguably be read as the expression of a typically Nietzschean 
disdain for totalising systems of thought. By describing the ways in which one element of a 
social formation is related to all the others, Marx was guilty (or so Stephensen implied) of 
crippling the revolutionary impulse by portraying the existing order in dauntingly homogeneous 
terms. If nothing else, this reminds us that the attack on the idea of totality long predates the 
work of Derrida, Lyotard and the other postructuralist thinkers who oppose the “logocentric” 
logic of modem thought. At the same time, however, Stephensen was also anxious to show that 
his admiration for Bakunin did not preclude support for the more sober traditions of communist 
politics. The negationist style of politics, he now implied, is essential to the business of
overthrowing the bourgeois state but a liability thereafter. Once the new society is in the process 
of being constructed, it is necessary to exchange the “romanticism” and “impetuousness” of a 
Bakunin or a Trotsky for the diy bureaucratic intelligence of the Stalinist elite: “To such a 
climax of realism even the most heroically-carried-through revolution must come. Here is no 
work for heroes, flaming at heads of phalanges. Exit the Bakunin-principle, exit Trotsky. Enter 
Stalin, up-stage, sits at desk quietly, works...”49
The amount of straight literary criticism in Stephensen’s articles was actually quite small. His 
main concern was to attack those contemporary writers whose ideas were most obviously 
incompatible with his own. He paid particular attention to the writings of George Bernard Shaw 
and D.H. Lawrence, since both men had promulgated a vision of human evolution which never 
(in Stephensen’s opinion) attained the necessary level of Nietzschean-Marxist sophistication. 
Stephensen was a close friend of Lawrence’s and arranged for the Mandrake Press to publish a 
number of his most controversial works, notably The Paintings o f D.H. Lawrence in 1929,50 but 
his ultimate verdict on his friend was that he was a “great literary genius” who nevertheless 
reflected the “hydrophobia of the lower middle-class”.51 The biggest problem with Lawrence’s 
work was that it posited the willing surrender to a “mindless Unconsciousness” (this presumably 
meant the sexual impulse)52 as the main engine of human evolution. If this emphasis on 
sexuality was broadly to be welcomed as an “affirmation of the blood’s reality”,53 it still had the 
disastrous effect of obscuring the crucial role of the intellect in generating and directing the 
evolutionary impulses: “He is all for feeling versus thinking, this pillar of dark blood!... [yet the] 
attack on Consciousness must be made with Consciousness. There is no other weapon...”54 
Lawrence compounded the problem by associating the surrender to instinct with a return to the 
culture of prehistoric societies, thereby concealing his evolutionary ambitions behind an absurd 
idealisation of the past.55 This backward-looking element in his philosophy also spilled over into 
his political programme, notably in his “modem Luddite” demand for the “smash-up o f the 
wheels” and the return to pre-industrial forms of production.56 Nor was he always reliable in his 
portrayal of class. While recognising that the biggest threat to human development lay in the 
deracinated culture of the upper classes, he spent too much time demonising the aristocracy (e.g. 
Lady Chatterley) and too little attacking the bourgeoisie.57 Stephensen’s comments on Lawrence 
were nevertheless considerably warmer than his comments on Shaw. Whereas Lawrence had 
made the understandable mistake of emphasising the instincts at the expense of the intellect, 
Shaw was guilty of the more heinous error of emphasising the intellect at the expense of the 
instincts. In spite of studying Nietzsche’s ideas and trying to popularise them in plays such as 
Back to Methuselah, Shaw clearly regarded the superman as a “loinless intellectual” who aimed 
to burst evolutionary boundaries through a process of pure cerebration.58 The interesting thing 
about this argument is that it closely parallels the main thesis of “George Bernard Shaw: A
Study of the Bourgeois Superman”, the essay by Christopher Caudwell that appeared in Studies 
in a Dying Culticre almost ten years after The London Aphrodite ceased publication. According 
to Caudwell, Shaw’s obsession with the “primacy of pure contemplation” was a typical 
expression of the so-called “bourgeois illusion of freedom” -  that is, the belief (allegedly 
endemic in capitalist societies and central to the emergence of cultural crisis) that freedom can 
only be achieved when “social restraints” are absent. Moreover, it was directly responsible for 
the two biggest failings of Fabian socialism: (1) the belief that only an intellectual elite can 
succeed in creating a new society, and (2) the belief that support for socialism can be achieved 
solely through the dissemination of propaganda.59 Although we have no evidence that Caudwell 
was familiar with Stephensen’s writings, it seems unlikely that so voracious a reader would not 
have come across it at one time or another, perhaps during his periods of intensive study in “the 
London libraries which he loved so much” (Robert Sullivan).60 It therefore seems entirely 
possible that The London Aphrodite was one of the famously voluminous sources which 
Caudwell drew on when developing his own brand of Marxist theory.
The other writer whose reputation Stephensen set out to demolish was the critic J.C. Squire. 
Although Squire (1884-1958) is now largely forgotten, he was probably the most influential 
middlebrow critic in England in the period between 1914 and 1939, beginning as the literary 
editor of the New Statesman and later becoming chief reviewer for the Observer and publisher 
of The London Mercury 61 As the main critical apologist for the Georgian poets, to whose third 
anthology he contributed a poem of his own, he was renowned for his hatred of modernism and 
his rubbishing of the early work of T.S. Eliot. Stephensen saw him as the embodiment of a 
stifling suburban respectability which had nothing to do with literature and everything to do 
with the insecurity of a self-made man who longed to be perceived as “genteel”.62 Squire, he 
argued, was an “Apotheosis of the Average” whose work was primarily concerned with 
“preserving the amenities of Oxford and of Waterloo Bridge”, inflating the reputations of 
“minor (respectable) poets and essayists of the past”, condemning the representation of 
sexuality in literature and the other arts,63 burnishing a superficial air of gentlemanliness (with 
all that implies in terms of “metropolitan self-assurance”, “sneering” and the denigration of 
“vigour”) and ensuring that “polemical expressions of definite opinion are avoided, save when 
everybody would approve {e.g. an attack upon bawdiness)”.64 In one of his few recognisably 
Marxist attempts to relate a trend in literature to its social context, Stephensen interpreted 
Squire’s influence as a symptom of the long-term decline of the British middle classes. If the 
leading English critics of the past were all men of genuine sensibility, this was because 
capitalism tends in its expansive phase to produce “merchant adventurer[s]” in the mould of Sir 
Francis Drake. Now that capitalism has become an obsolescent system, it is inevitable that most 
of the favoured critics will reflect the cultural poverty of the class from which they are drawn.65
But this does not mean that the damage which writers like Squire are capable of inflicting on the 
prevailing literary culture should be underestimated. On the one hand, simply by pouring scorn 
on any deviation from English respectability, they are likely to discourage young writers from 
producing work in which the struggle for human evolution is the primary focus. There is also 
the danger that their “dinner-party” brand of puritanism might ultimately provoke the demand 
for a tougher form of censorship. Noting that Squire and other other moralising journalists such 
as James Douglas had recently “succeeded in getting a book suppressed”66 (this was presumably 
a reference to the suppression of Radclyffe Hall’s novel The Well o f Loneliness in 1928),67 
Stephensen feared that the “struggle for freed expression” might soon have to be “fought all 
over again”.68 Yet his own defence of free speech was itself a remarkably elitist one, showing 
once again how far his conversion to Nietzsche had taken him from any faith he might once 
have had in the working class. Recognising that the call for censorship usually arises when a 
book is considered too sexually-explicit to be read by working people, he responded with three 
arguments: first, working people are too busy to read anything except cheap newspapers; 
second, their perception of sex has already been distorted by titillating material in the 
commercial press; and third, most literary works are anyway beyond their comprehension.69 
Quite aside from undermining his claim to be a Marxist, Stephensen’s use of these arguments 
also cast doubt on the extent to which he had genuinely effected a transvaluation of existing 
values. As a writer in the English tradition (albeit one with an Australian background) he might 
have been expected to oppose the puritanism of the age by invoking the “cognitive” defence of 
free speech outlined by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty (1859).70 (Mill famously argued that 
censorship can rarely be justified because we can never be sure that the works we propose to 
suppress do not in fact contain the truth.) By implying (or seeming to imply) that sexually- 
explicit works tell us nothing about the human condition, Stephensen conveyed an air of sexual 
neurosis that was not entirely different from the sort of thing he condemned in Squire.
In what ways did Stephensen’s work reflect the internal culture of the CPGB during the period 
of Class Against Class? Although Stephensen was clearly uninterested in striking orthodox 
poses, I would suggest that there were two ways in which his articles in The London Aphrodite 
connected with the wider mood of the Party. In the first place, their emphasis on negationism 
was arguably inspired by the extraordinary mood of revolutionary febrility which descended on 
a number of Party activists at this time. Judging from the work of the many historians who have 
written about the period, it would seem that there were occasions during the Class Against Class 
years when communists seemed solely motivated by a desire for chaos, especially in their 
behaviour towards other socialist organisations. Freed from the strategy of building a “united 
front” with members of the Labour Party, the ILP and the established trade unions, they vented 
their suspicion of their former comrades by denouncing them as “social fascists” and exposing
them to exceptionally violent rhetorical attacks. The mood of the times is summed up in the 
following passage from a letter which Rajani Palme Dutt sent to Harry Pollitt in 1932, offering 
Pollitt advice about a forthcoming debate with Fenner Brockway of the ILP: “NO 
POLITENESS! No mere ‘difference of opinion’. No parliamentary debate. No handshakes. 
Treatment is CLASS ENEMIES throughout. You speak for holy anger of whole international 
working class against the foulness that is Brockway. Make that whole audience HATE him”.71 It 
goes without saying that hardly any communists would have justified this sort of 
intemperateness by invoking the example of Bakunin. Nevertheless, it is easy to see how 
membership of a Party grown deranged with sectarian hatreds might have inclined Stephensen 
towards his embrace of negationism. The second element of his work that reflected the culture 
of the Class Against Class period was its explicit elitism. There is no evidence that ordinary 
Party members lost faith in the organised working class during the bleak years between 1928 
and 1933; but a surprising number of intellectuals seem to have agreed with Stephensen that the 
socialist revolution would ultimately be made by the vanguard acting independently o f  the mass. 
By resorting to what certain Marxists have called “putschism” (that is, the belief that a small 
group of strategists is gifted enough to change the whole direction of society without securing 
the help of wider forces), they were arguably motivated by the sheer frustration engendered by 
the central premise of Party policy, which held that the British working class was ready for 
revolution at a time when it was manifestly nothing of the sort. The obvious point of 
comparison with Stephensen’s work is J.D. Bernal’s notorious book The World, The Flesh and 
The Devil (1929), still regarded by many writers as the ne plus ultra of biotechnological 
utopianism. Bernal’s argument was that socialism had the potential to develop scientific 
knowledge to the point where “organic man” could be liberated from his biological limitations, 
not least by having his brain removed from his body and suspended in a synthetic cylinder. This 
sort of radical cyborgism would make it possible for disparate minds to be linked in a global 
network and bound together by intense feelings of oceanic consciousness. However, since the 
knowledge required to effect these changes is only comprehensible to a tiny elite (at most to the 
10% of people who have received a scientific education), it follows that the society of the future 
should be solely and unaccountably governed by a collective of scientists. To reinforce their 
power over the disenfranchised masses, it would probably be necessary for scientists to achieve 
a position of complete physical superiority by “mechanising” their outer shells, as well as 
permanently distracting the non-scientific mind from affairs of state by developing effective 
techniques of brainwashing. There might even come a time when scientists would emigrate in 
toto to a different planet, exercising their control over the scientifically illiterate across vast 
areas of space.72 The fact that Bernal could propagate these ultra-Stalinist fantasies while 
remaining a member of the CPGB (an organisation which he supported for the rest of his life) 
goes some way towards confirming the suspicion that wholesale elitism was central to the
intellectual culture of the Party in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Just as suggestive is the fact 
that Bernal resorted to a much more populist position when the Party abandoned Class Against 
Class, insisting for much of the 1930s that the close involvement of the masses was a 
prerequisite of the scientific superiority of the USSR. The same cannot be said of Stephensen, 
who drifted away from Marxism in the early 1930s and ended up as an apologist for the 
Australian far-right.
2 JOHN STRACHEY AND MONTAGU SLATER: THE IDEA OF CULTURAL CRISIS
The most obvious way in which the Class Against Class policy affected Marxist criticism was 
by foregrounding the idea of cultural crisis. Committed to the view that capitalism had entered a 
slump from which it would be impossible to recover, communist intellectuals now began to 
argue that the breakdown of economic order had also caused a catastrophic decline of standards 
in all areas of cultural activity. The idea that capitalism is profoundly inimical to cultural 
excellence was obviously not new to the Marxist tradition. It had been sketched out by Marx 
himself and developed by slightly later writers such as Franz Mehring and G.V. Plekhanov.73 As 
we shall see in subsequent chapters, it was also a central part of orthodox communist theory in 
the second half of the 1930s. However, in Britain at least, it was only during the period between 
1928 and 1933 (and primarily between 1932 and 1933) that it represented the main concern of 
Marxist criticism. The purpose of this section is therefore to examine the work of the two most 
fertile theorists of cultural crisis from the Class Against Class period, namely John Strachey and 
Montagu Slater. Although Strachey and Slater can be regarded as orthodox thinkers, in the 
sense that both were trying to provide cultural ratification for a political line imposed by the 
Communist International, it is clear that neither was simply reproducing a pre-existing set of 
ideas. In the absence of any available Soviet account of why bourgeois society had entered a 
period of cultural crisis, Strachey and Slater were obliged to develop their own account more or 
less ab initio. Just as British communists had to draw on their knowledge of local conditions in 
order to translate the Comintern line into a workable strategy, so Strachey and Slater deployed 
their considerable cultural erudition to flesh out the C l’s purely rhetorical assertions about the 
existence of cultural crisis. This once again bears out the revisionist point that the relationship 
between the Cl and its national sections was usually a genuinely dialectical one.
The bulk of John Strachey’s ideas were contained in Part 3 of The Coming Struggle fo r  Power 
(1932) and Literature and Dialectical Materialism (also 1932), the latter consisting of the text 
of a lecture delivered to the John Reed Society in New York.74 The Coming Struggle fo r  Power, 
still respected today for its prescient critique of Keynes, Hayek and a number of other 
economists who exercised a dominating influence on economic policy in post-war Britain, set
out to explore the impact of capitalist crisis on the separate spheres of religion, science and 
literature. Strachey argued that the crisis in religion took the form of a drastic reduction in the 
number of people who felt able to believe in God, and arose from growing public awareness of 
the social function of religious institutions. According to Strachey, the church has usually 
managed to uphold support for the existing order in two ways. In the first place, anxious to 
reconcile human beings to the extreme unpredictability of their physical environment, it has 
portrayed nature as the creation of a divine intelligence that is capable of being propitiated.75 
Secondly, it has strengthened the dominant ideology by threatening divine retribution on anyone 
who might be tempted to flout it.76 Strachey’s point was that religion can only function in this 
way if people remain unaware of what it is trying to do. Once the church is widely perceived as 
having a temporal as well as a spiritual agenda, support for its core metaphysical propositions 
begins to decline.77 The curious thing was that Strachey made no attempt to explain his belief 
that the Slump had brought precisely this sort of situation about, though presumably he might 
have argued that when the priestly class is confronted by the prospect of capitalism’s imminent 
extinction (as it certainly was after October 1929) it becomes so obsessed with the restoration of 
social stability that its spiritual concerns are simply forgotten. Nor did he explain why religious 
faith is necessarily threatened by the realisation that the church plays a social role. When we 
consider that Christianity was central to the definition of Britishness (or at least Englishness) for 
much of the period between the 7th and 19th Centuries, it seems unlikely that many believers 
ever regarded the church as a wholly spiritual institution with no interest in earthly affairs. For 
someone who wrote so insightfully about fascism in other contexts, Strachey also failed to 
recognise that the decline of Christianity had allowed fascist ideologues to sketch the outlines of 
a new religion based on quasi-occult notions of human evolution. By overlooking the extent to 
which the appeal of figures such as Hitler and Mussolini was as much spiritual as directly 
political, he greatly weakened his account of how communism might be expected to triumph 
over fascism in its battle to win the support of millions of people whose distaste for bourgeois 
democracy was now palpable. If Strachey had paid more attention to the writings of Oswald 
Mosley, the politician with whom he was most closely associated between 1924 and 1931,78 he 
might have recognised that the history of religion between the wars was characterised less by a 
collapse into atheism than by the phenomenon noted by G.K. Chesterton: “When men cease to 
believe in God, they don’t believe in nothing. They believe in anything”.79 The chapter on 
religion in The Coming Struggle fo r  Power can nevertheless be regarded as an important 
landmark in the history of the relationship between British Marxism and psychoanalysis. When 
Strachey examined the specific ways in which the “traditional claims of religious dogma” have 
been undermined in the modem age, he confined himself to reproducing Freud’s famous 
arguments in The Future o f an Illusion. Freud observed that people have usually resorted to one 
of three arguments when seeking to justify their religious beliefs: (1) religion is true because it
has been handed down to us by our “primal ancestors”, (2) there are “proofs” of religion in the 
sacred texts which we have inherited from our ancestors, and (3) it is blasphemous to even 
question the truth of religion And yet, Freud continued, none of these arguments can withstand 
the mood of scepticism that is inseparable from the ongoing process of modernisation. The 
“educated man” now accepts that “these ancestors of ours were far more ignorant than we” and 
that sacred texts all contain “contradictions, revisions and interpolations”. Moreover, he is 
inclined to regard the idea of blasphemy as nothing but the reflex action of an ideology which 
knows that its main tenets rest on an “uncertain basis”.80 Although there was nothing 
specifically psychoanalytic about these observations, it was quite unprecedented for a British 
Marxist to quote anything Freud had written with approval. Later in the 1930s, when the border 
between “Marxist science” and “bourgeois ideology” had been rendered more permeable by the 
rise of the Popular Front, Strachey’s attempt to fuse Marx and Freud would be taken to much 
more sophisticated heights by writers such as Jack Lindsay, Reuben Osborn and Christopher 
Caudwell.81
Strachey’s account of the crisis in modem science was among the first products of the so-called 
“social relations of science” movement which existed in Britain for much of the 1930s. The 
purpose of this movement, which consisted primarily of Marxist and Marxisant intellectuals 
such as J.D. Bemal, J.B.S. Haldane and C.H. Waddington, was to explore the nature of the 
relationship between scientific activity and the social and institutional contexts in which it 
occurs.82 Its origins are usually traced to the dramatic intervention of the Soviet delegation at the 
Second International Congress of the History of Science and Technology in London in 1931. 
Arriving in Britain in a state-of-the-art aeroplane that seemed to confirm the USSR’s most 
boastful claims about the quality of its scientific research, Soviet intellectuals such as Nikolai 
Bukharin and Boris Hessen electrified their younger British counterparts with a series of papers 
exploring the relevance of historical materialism to the understanding of scientific procedures. 
Strachey was not in attendance at the Congress (at least as far as we know) but appears to have 
taken a sustained interest in the emerging SRS movement as it began to define its principles in 
journals such as Nature in the last six months of 1931. His argument in The Coming Struggle 
fo r  Power was that science has been undermined by a radical divergence between the needs of 
the capitalist economy and the trajectory of scientific research. At a time of deep recession, 
especially the sort of recession from which there is no identifiable means of recovery, it is 
inconceivable that industry will be able to invest in the new forms of technology which 
advances in scientific research are continually making available.83 But this does not mean that 
research will suddenly cease. It is in the nature of science to continue accumulating knowledge 
without reference to the material needs of society. Because wasted knowledge is a sort of 
standing rebuke to the efficiency of the capitalist system, it is therefore inevitable that apologists
for the system will begin to demand a significant scaling back of scientific activity. Strachey 
argued that the new mood of hostility to science had already expressed itself in the spheres of 
politics, economics and philosophy. Quoting from a speech of February 1932 in which the 
French politician M Caillaux spoke of the need to “moderate the application of scientific 
discoveries to industry”, Strachey anticipated a time at which governments would routinely 
intervene to prevent scientists from pursuing certain areas of research.84 Equally alarming was 
the growing demand that capitalism should reduce its dependence on science by reverting to 
earlier forms of technology. Strachey pointed out that there was even a body of opinion, 
exemplified by a Nature editorial on “Unemployment and Hope”, which seemed to advocate the 
complete dismantling of the industrial economy and the reestablishment of market handicraft: 
“What is wanted is to go back to pre-industrial methods of production. Scrap your huge-scale 
factories: prohibit mass production by law: and return to ‘small-scale cottage industries, or 
handicrafts’, with a little gardening thrown in”.85 In the sphere of philosophy, Strachey detected 
a widespread attempt to undermine scientific certainties by emphasising the ultimate 
unknowability of the physical universe. His rather surprising example of a modem philosopher 
was Jan Smuts, later to achieve notoriety as the founder of apartheid, whose “doctrine of 
holism” was interpreted to mean that “everything is one indivisible whole, incapable of analysis, 
and therefore not susceptible of scientific investigation”.86
There were obvious weaknesses in Strachey’s account of the crisis in scientific culture. One of 
them was its tendency to exaggerate the strength of most of the forces that were supposedly 
trying to restrain scientific activity. The demand for government control of science was usually 
made by purely marginal figures, none of whom enjoyed any influence in official circles. 
Hostility to industrialism was largely the preserve of Distributist writers such as G.K. 
Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc whose period of significant influence had ended at least a decade 
earlier. Although the “holism” of Jan Smuts was indeed the product of an anti-scientific 
outlook, its importance to inter-war philosophy was scarcely comparable to that of the emergent 
school of logical positivism, inspired by Wittgenstein and led by A. J. Ayer, whose aim was not 
to bury scientific method but to hold it up as the only reliable means of cognition. But 
Strachey’s biggest error was probably his insistence on relating the crisis in science to an 
excessively narrow set of economic circumstances. By claiming that support for unfettered 
scientific research had been undermined by the onset of a deep recession (albeit one that 
appeared to be permanent) he ignored the issue of whether capitalism’s wider laws of motion 
should also be regarded as a threat to science. A more comprehensive account of the 
relationship between capitalism and science was provided later in the 1930s by the physicist 
J.D. Bemal, whose book The Social Function o f Science (1939) is rightly seen as the SRS 
movement’s most important achievement.87 Bemal argued that there are two significant ways in
which capitalism imposes unneccessary restrictions on the development of science: (1) it tends 
to privilege “pure” research over “applied” research, and (2) it makes it impossible to co­
ordinate research. His starting point was the assumption that scientists are at their most 
productive when pursuing practical objectives, and that the pursuit of knowledge for its own 
sake tends to give rise to a reduction of intellectual vitality. The problem with the market system 
is that it clouds our understanding of the enormous practical contribution that scientists are 
capable of making in a modem society. Because there is no guarantee that the commodities 
which are offered for sale on the market will actually find a buyer, there is often an enormous 
reluctance on the part of employers to invest in the expensive forms of new technology which 
science continually makes available. Moreover, it is increasingly common for the market to put 
scientific knowledge to profoundly anti-social uses. It is therefore unsurprising that scientists 
should underplay the importance of applied research and retreat into compensatory fantasies 
about the “disinterested” investigation of nature. The problem is compounded by the intellectual 
isolation which capitalist societies impose on their scientists. Research scientists who find 
employment in private companies are usually forbidden from collaborating with their 
counterparts in other organisations, since the knowledge they generate is invariably used to 
secure a commercial advantage over competitors. It is also rare for scientists in the public sector 
to co-operate with foreign colleagues who are working in similar fields, since modem 
governments tend to regard scientific superiority as one of the main means by which a state can 
achieve economic and political ascendancy over another. Bemal was convinced that scientific 
culture is trivialised by this lack of co-ordination. If scientists were able to work in unison and 
cast a collective eye over what they were doing, they would be able to distinguish between truly 
essential areas of research and those of purely ephemeral significance: this would “ ...enable 
intelligence to be turned away from tasks which can be better solved by machinery and routine 
methods to others of great intrinsic difficulty, which as yet no one has approached”.88 But this is 
simply not possible when a scientist’s research horizons are defined almost exclusively by the 
priorities of his own organisation. Bernal’s writings were suffused by the belief that the crisis in 
science would easily be overcome in a socialist society. Not only would the advent of economic 
planning make it possible for advances in technology to be utilised almost immediately, thereby 
creating an intellectual climate in which applied research was seen once again as the most 
important form of scientific activity; but the abolition of “marketplace anarchy” would engender 
a research culture in which scientists collaborated freely across sectoral and national boundaries. 
Although “Bemalism” was later subjected to a ferocious attack by writers such as Arthur 
Koestler and Michael Polanyi,89 the latter of whom saw its emphasis on applied research as a 
threat to intellectual freedom, its messianic sense of science’s importance can still serve as a 
useful corrective to the work of Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyarabend and the other relativist sceptics 
who have dominated the “cultural studies of science” over the last 40 years.
Strachey proved to be a far more insightful guide to literature than to either religion or science. 
His account of the crisis in modem literature occasionally displayed the sort of aesthetic 
intolerance that disfigured so much communist criticism in the 1930s; but the remarkable thing 
about it was the way it anticipated several of the most important themes in the work of the so- 
called “Western Marxists”. At least three aspects of Strachey’s writings on literature deserve 
particular attention: (1) his attempt to identify the characteristics which distinguish literature 
from the other arts, (2) his assertion that modem writers have lost the ability convincingly to 
evoke the transhistorical sources of human misery, and (3) his analysis of the fascisant elements 
which he perceived in the work of several leading modernists.
In a series of highly compressed remarks at the beginning of chapter 10 of The Coming Struggle 
fo r  Power, Strachey expressed the view that literature characteristically addresses areas of 
experience that tend to be ignored by the other arts. His distinction between literary and non- 
literary art was by no means a clear one, in part because of his liking for quasi-scientific 
metaphors; but it can perhaps be summarised as follows. Music, painting and sculpture are 
usually concerned with material of a recognisably elevated nature. Literature deals almost 
exclusively with ideas and experiences of a more demotic and undeveloped kind. The musician 
or artist is naturally drawn towards transcendent emotions, noble aspirations and dignified 
philosophical ideas; whereas the writer is much more at home with “thoughts, fantasies, 
concepts, ascertained facts and emotions, which (do) not fit into any other of the categories of 
human thought”.90 These differences are also reflected at the level of form. The non-literary arts 
usually seek to generalise about the human condition, providing ideas and images which 
illuminate (or claim to illuminate) each manifestation of the form of behaviour they happen to 
be addressing. Literature, per contra, resists the lure of generalisation and deals only with “a 
particular man or a particular woman at a given time or place”.91 Strachey made no attempt to 
elucidate the aesthetic or political significance of the opposition between literature and the other 
arts; but his remarks can clearly be related to some of the wider themes which began to 
preoccupy the so-called “Western Marxists” at about this time. One of the main features of 
Western Marxism has been its attempt to transcend reductionist accounts of the relationship 
between “social being” and “consciousness”. Rejecting the assumption that a society’s 
prevailing modes of consciousness simply reflect the interests of the ruling class, one strain of 
Western Marxism has tried to show how thoughts, feelings and intuitions that are broadly 
subversive of the status quo always exist alongside (even when they are assimilated to) 
materials of a more obviously “hegemonic” kind. As we shall see at several points in this thesis, 
British communists made a number of attempts in the 1930s to analyse the nature of social 
consciousness in a similar way, though it goes without saying that none achieved the
sophistication of an Antonio Gramsci or a Raymond Williams. What Strachey appeared to be 
doing in his remarks about literature was relating different art forms to distinctive levels of 
social consciousness. He seemed to imply that the non-literary arts, with their dignified 
materials and confident generalisations, give expression to what might be called the “official” 
consciousness of society (i.e. the outlook of the ruling class), whereas literature gives shape to 
the inchoate and primarily localised feelings of opposition which oppressed groups tend to 
experience spontaneously. To use the terminology developed by Raymond Williams in his 
Gramscian critique of the base/superstructure metaphor, literature reflects the “emergent” 
aspects of social consciousness while painting, music and sculpture reflect its “dominant” 
aspects.92 Since Strachey was presumably implying that the different levels of consciousness 
usually coexist within the same sensibility, it would clearly have been preferable if he had 
resisted the idea that they are somehow separated out at the moment of artistic expression. But 
the truly noteworthy thing was that he was addressing the self-divided nature of social 
consciousness in the first place. In addition there was perhaps one other way in which his 
remarks about literature paralleled the main concerns of Western Marxism. It was during the 
1930s that several writers, notably Theodor Adorno and his associates in the Frankfurt School, 
began to investigate the relationship between Western modes of rationality and the rise of 
totalitarianism. Their specific argument was that “instrumental reason” poses a threat to 
democratic culture by subordinating the investigation of concrete realities to the drive to 
identify law-governed regularities in both the natural and social worlds.93 When Strachey wrote 
admiringly about literature’s ability to focus our attention on particular instances rather than 
bloodless abstractions, he was arguably driven by the related need to find alternatives to a style 
of thought that was ultimately complicit with fascism. In the British context he can thus be 
regarded as a distant precursor of the so-called “new aestheticism”, primarily represented by 
Andrew Bowie and Jay Bernstein, which regards art’s ability to resist the homogenising logic of 
instrumental reason as the source of its political power.94
The largest part of Strachey’s account of the crisis in literature addressed the inability o f modem 
writers to handle the theme of tragedy. Strachey argued that the greatest writers of the past were 
all preoccupied with those ineluctable aspects of human experience that cause great misery. By 
addressing such “unbearable necessities” as ageing, illnesss and death, they often managed to 
palliate human suffering by “offering to us the example and consolation of ill fortune faced 
consciously and stoically by undeceived men”.95 The problem with a great deal of modem 
literature is that it tends to confuse the corrigible with the incorrigible. Novelists such as Proust, 
Lawrence and Huxley obviously regarded their work as belonging to the “tragic tradition”; but 
in practice they dealt only with problems that were (1) of recent historical vintage, and (2) 
capable of being resolved. Proust and Lawrence were both primarily concerned with the
disappointments that accompany rampant snobbery. Characters such as Charles Swann or 
Mellors rise from comparatively humble backgrounds to the upper echelons of society, only to 
find that the culture of the aristocrats with whom they now mix is spiritually redundant.96 
Huxley was more concerned with the cultural inadequacies of the lower orders, devoting much 
of Brave New World to an anguished account of the “production of masses of low-grade 
workers” in a Fordist dystopia.97 The attempt to portray these historically-specific problems as if 
they were genuinely tragic (i.e. unavoidable sources of human misery) has had a devastating 
impact on literature’s emotional range. The emboldening sense of cosmic turbulence which 
characterised the literature of the past has now been replaced by an enfeebled “sense of 
depression”. It was this which led Strachey to suggest that the work of Proust, Lawrence, 
Huxley and their followers could best be described as belonging to the “world-weary school” of 
writing. Although Strachey made no attempt to explain why capitalism’s terminal crisis should 
have precipitated these developments (just as he failed to explain its responsibility for the crisis 
in religion), he was in little doubt as to why the world-weary school was dangerous. By lending 
an air of tragic inevitability to problems which human beings were eminently capable of 
resolving, it reinforced the belief that the social order as a whole was incapable of being 
changed.98 At the moment of its greatest crisis, literature was fulfilling what Roland Barthes 
would later describe as the main function of “myth”. It was translating culture into nature.99
Strachey used his enthusiasm for the tragic strain in world literature as the basis of an attack on 
what he regarded as one of the more damaging misconceptions about Marxism. Quoting from 
the scornful analysis of “Communistic Utopianism” in The Modem Temper by Joseph Wood 
Krutch, he argued that Krutch was representative of the many intellectuals who persist in seeing 
Marxism as a naive form of social constructionism.100 Their basic claim (or so the argument 
went) is that Marxists tend to regard economic structures as the only determining influence on 
human behaviour, and therefore believe that “perfect happiness” can easily be achieved through 
the simple expedient of establishing a communist society. In response, Strachey insisted that the 
philosophy of dialectical materialism is simply incompatible with utopian illusions about the 
perfectibility of man. Far from being blind to the “fundamental maladjustments...between the 
human spirit and the natural universe” which are liable to cause misery in any period of history, 
Marxists have never done more than assert that communism will enable human beings to 
confront these maladjustments at a “different” and “higher” level.101 These remarks, scanty 
though they were, made Strachey one of the pioneers of the small school of Marxist thinkers 
whose optimism about the possibility of social change is balanced by a materialist pessimism 
about humanity’s “biological destiny”. If the most important of these thinkers is probably the 
Italian philologist Sebastiano Timpanaro, whose book On Materialism enjoyed a brief vogue in 
the 1970s,102 it is nevertheless in the aesthetic philosophy of Herbert Marcuse that we find the
most obvious parallels to Strachey’s writings on literature. Some of Marcuse’s later works, 
notably The Aesthetic Dimension from 1978, could even be used to critique Strachey’s rather 
monomaniacal emphasis on the role of tragedy in literature. Whereas Strachey sometimes gave 
the impression that the evocation of “unbearable necessities” had been the only important 
element in the Western tradition, Marcuse made the much more subtle case that the power of art 
(not only literature) derives from its complex intermingling of an “affirmative” social vision 
with a tortured awareness of the “metasocial” constraints on human happiness. According to 
Marcuse, the first purpose of art is to employ formal means to transfigure our awareness of our 
social environment. The world presented to us in the great works of art is recognisably the 
world in which we live, but it is also unrecognisably different: its surfaces possess an unfamiliar 
aesthetic lustre and its characters exhibit the “desublimated subjectivity” which Marcuse 
famously regarded as the ultimate goal of social revolution.103 Struck by the terrible contrast 
between the mediocrity of everyday life and the “promise of happiness” held out by art, we are 
possessed by the desire to create a new world that is more consonant with the artist’s vision. But 
art is not to be regarded as a vehicle of mindless utopianism. Its other great purpose is to temper 
the political enthusiasms which it might otherwise risk unleashing. By focusing on precisely the 
sort of biological predicaments which Strachey had emphasised, it “serves to warn against the 
‘happy consciousness’ of radical praxis” and reminds us that no social order can ever protect us 
from anguish.104 Moreover, its preoccupation with illness, ageing and death also has the effect 
o f sharpening its subversive edge. When the spectre of avoidable social misery is viewed 
against the background of unavoidable biological suffering, our willingness to compromise with 
a flawed social reality is undermined: “It (death) is the final remembrance of things past -  last 
remembrance of all possibilities forsaken, of all that could have been said and was not, of every 
gesture, every tenderness not shown. But death also recalls the false tolerance, the ready 
compliance with the necessity of pain”.105 If Strachey’s discussion of the tragic element in 
literature might have benefited from some of Marcuse’s sophistication, it is also worth noting 
that there were several occasions on which he (Strachey) flatly contradicted his vaunted realism 
about the limits of human happiness. One passage in The Coming Struggle fo r  Power, which 
Strachey felt obliged to defend vigorously in Literature and Dialectical Materialism, went so 
far as to suggest that communist society might yet engender a scientific culture so advanced that 
it could “postpone death indefinitely”.106 Presumably the function of literature in such a society 
would not be to reconcile human beings to their biological fate; but rather (reversing Barthes’s 
formula) to dramatise the process by which science strove to translate nature into culture.
The other aspect of the crisis in literature which Strachey addressed in detail was the existence 
of what he took to be a fascisant strain in the work of several modem writers. Borrowing the 
term from an essay by Michael Gold, one of the American Communist Party’s most influential
literary critics in the 1930s, Strachey argued that large swathes of modem literature served to 
express “The Fascist Unconscious”. This work was not explicitly fascist in outlook, nor were its 
authors necessarily aware that they were conveying a political perspective; but it nevertheless 
betrayed certain attitudes and prejudices that can legitimately be regarded as “the mental soil out 
of which fascism grows”.107 Although Strachey illustrated his theme by referring to the now 
forgotten poem “Frescoes for Mr Rockefeller’s City” by Archibald MacLeish, much of what he 
said about MacLeish can arguably be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the work of more important 
conservative modernists such as Eliot, Yeats and William Faulkner. The main assumption of the 
argument was that MacLeish possessed a “strong, though perhaps unconscious, belief in what 
are called the standards and traditions of a gentleman in the tradition of the old American 
stock”.108 This presumably meant that he yearned for the pre-industrial world of the antebellum 
South as completely as Eliot identified with the European “tradition” or Yeats mourned the 
passing of the Protestant aristocracy in Ireland. Yet his poems were full of passages in which the 
Southern gentleman’s poise was superseded by “caddish” attitudinising of a sort more often 
associated with fascist ideologues. “Frescoes for Mr Rockefeller’s City” was an intensely 
patriotic poem, evidently sincere and free of Kiplingesque bombast; but its patriotism was 
palpably on the verge of curdling into chauvinism. MacLeish’s main technique for expressing 
his love of America was to launch a scornful attack on expatriate artists such as Henry James 
who valued the “tidier stream” of European culture more highly than the rumbustiousness of the 
new world.109 There was even a stanza in which he drew bizarre parallels between the American 
landscape and a reclinining female nude, prompting Strachey to detect an undertow of sexual 
febrility that was scarcely compatible with a mature appreciation of the national culture.110 
MacLeish’s portrayal of the American landscape was also linked to a distinctively proto-fascist 
attempt to shore up existing hierarchies by stigmatising the dispossessed. Like many other 
works produced by cultural conservatives with a hatred of industrialism, “Frescoes for Mr 
Rockefeller’s City” eulogised the “wide open spaces” that had disappeared with the rise of the 
urban slum. But its passages of pastoral uplift were accompanied by heavy-handed satires on 
“Jewish, or immigrant, revolutionaries”,111 whose perceived spiritual bankruptcy was implicitly 
seen as a consequence of prolonged exposure to the claustrophobic realities of the American 
city.112 Strachey’s insight into the way that MacLeish used spatial metaphors to dehumanise 
entire categories of people was not extended to the work of other writers; but the reader is 
inevitably reminded of one of Eliot’s more infamous excursions into anti-semitism:
My house is a decayed house,
And the Jew squats on the window-sill, the owner,
Spawned in some estaminet o f  Antwerp,
Blistered in Brussels, patched and peeled in London.113
If Strachey’s gloomy account of modem culture is still one of the more famous examples of 
Marxist criticism from the early 1930s, the same cannot be said of the largely forgotten work on 
modernist painting which Montagu Slater published at about the same time. Nevertheless, there 
is a case for saying that Slater had a clearer understanding of the essentials of modernism than 
most other communist writers in either the USSR or Britain. In his essay “The Spirit of the Age 
in Paint”, contributed to Volume Two of Edgell Rickword’s symposium Scrutinies in 1931, 
Slater recognised that modernism had its roots in a rejection of the belief that painting can 
somehow achieve complete realism in its depiction of external reality. Convinced that it is 
basically impossible to create an illusion of three dimensionality in a two-dimensional medium, 
the leading modernists aimed to create work which drew attention to the autonomous or non- 
representational status of the painted image.114 Slater’s attitude towards this project was a 
somewhat ambivalent one. On the one hand, in line with orthodox arguments about the 
existence of cultural crisis, he seemed to believe that modernist assumptions had gone a long 
way towards ruining the visual arts. Anticipating an argument that Tom Wolfe would make 
famous some 40 years later in The Painted Word (1978), he implied that the first problem with 
modernism was its tendency to subordinate practice to theory. Since the visual language 
employed by the leading artists of the age could only be understood by those already familiar 
with the theoretical principles on which it was based, it was virtually impossible for a modem 
painting to appeal to the average viewer.115 Moreover, since the discourse of modernism was 
heavily “aesthetic” in its orientation (that is, more concerned with general philosophical 
principles than with specific problems of painterly practice), it tended to rob the artist of the feel 
for “particulars” which lies at the heart of great art.116 There was also a sense in which the idea 
of aesthetic autonomy had impoverished the content of modem painting. Having been told that 
their chosen medium is entirely lacking in mimetic potential, modem artists were reluctant to 
address their most deeply cherished concerns for fear of failing to do them justice. Slater 
underscored the point by quoting a passage by Roger Fiy, the pre-eminent theorist of 
“significant form”, which noted that “Cezanne was violently drawn to the female form as a 
model” but “simply did not dare” to portray it on canvas.117 However, these pessimistic remarks 
were balanced by a more sanguine set of predictions about the future of modernism. At times, 
Slater seemed willing to acknowledge that when modem artists used two-dimensional forms in 
their work (or when they resorted to some other technique for drawing attention to the non- 
representational status of what they were doing), they were simply engaging in a necessary 
attempt to strip down the language of painting before building it up again. Furthermore, he 
implied that modernism would expand in at least two directions once its destructive phase was 
completed. In the first place, inspired by the cubist attempt to simultaneously represent the same 
objects from a number of different perspectives, many artists would aim to depict the 
“geometrical scaffolding”118 which -  in their opinion -  accounted for the coherence of the
natural world.119 By contrast, the second form of modernism would involve a retreat into inner 
space. Quoting the work of the German psychologist Hermann Bahr, Slater argued that our 
spatial perceptions undergo a strange transformation when space is approached through the 
medium of the mind’s eye. There is firstly a pronounced sense of synaesthesia, with the visual 
and tactile faculties seeming to translate themselves into each other, while space as a whole 
seems to acquire what Slater called a “mystic apprehension of solidity”.120 One of the goals of 
the next generation of modernists should therefore be “ ...the imitation of objects in space, if by 
that you choose to understand the objects of the inward eye in that peculiar sort of space in 
which memory and imagination move”.121 Slater referred to very few artists in his essay, but it 
is tempting to speculate about whom he had in mind when he made these predictions. If the 
reference to geometrical regularities puts us in mind of the tradition of Russian abstraction 
which began with Malevich and culminated with the Constructivists in the 1920s,122 then the 
talk of inward eyes and mystical solidity surely recalls the surrealist attempt to combine 
objective reality with the world of dreams. The fact that Slater could refer even obliquely to 
these artists illustrates the room for manoeuvre which Marxist criticism still enjoyed in the early 
1930s. Within a few short years, when the USSR had imposed its cultural doctrines on the rest 
of the world communist movement, few writers would have dared to invoke either 
constructivism or surrealism except in a spirit of deep hostility.
3 LEFT-LEAVISISM? THE ENCOUNTER WITH CULTURAL CONSERVATISM
As a number of historians have noted, the shift towards the Class Against Class policy 
unleashed a virulent mood of anti-intellectualism in the British Communist Party.123 If the Party 
was usually inclined to venerate intellectuals beyond their station, seeing them in some ways as 
a symbol of the self-fulfilment that would become possible under socialism, there was 
nevertheless a brief period between 1928 and 1933 when they were widely dismissed as petit- 
bourgeois backsliders with little or no value to the revolutionary movement. The most famous 
expression of this anti-intellectualism occurred in two articles by Rajani Palme Dutt, himself the 
Party’s most obsessively cerebral leader, in the journal Communist Review in 1932. Responding 
to the Anglo-Russian critic D.S. Mirsky and the economist Maurice Dobb, both of whom had 
proposed the establishment of a “society for intellectual workers” in the CPGB, Dutt warned 
that intellectuals are peculiarly susceptible to ideological deviations and insisted that “the first 
role of intellectuals who have joined the Party is to forget they are intellectuals and act as 
Communists, that is fully enter into the Party fight”.124 It is not entirely clear why Class Against 
Class should have engendered this hostility to “workers by brain”, though one explanation is 
perhaps the mood of destructive febrility which seemed to go hand in hand with the policy of 
opposing other left groups (see the above section on P.R. Stephensen). Finally given permission
to express their frustration with erstwhile comrades in the Labour Party, the ILP and the trade 
unions, there was arguably a sense among communist militants that thinking was simply 
incompatible with the negationist frenzy required to expose the “social fascists”. It is perhaps 
also true that the necessity of rationalising an irrational policy led many communists to doubt 
the value of reason itself. Yet the effects of all this on the intellectual culture of the Party were 
not entirely negative. Most obviously, the new mood of anti-intellectualism seems to have 
prompted certain communist thinkers to turn outwards and engage with wider trends in 
academic and intellectual life. For much of the period between 1920 and the late 1960s, the 
majority of Party intellectuals led notably hermetic careers -  they published articles in the Party 
press, wrote books for the Party publishing house (Lawrence and Wishart) and addressed 
gatherings of Party members. However, in the few brief years of their internal disgrace, they 
were seemingly much keener to write for non-Marxist publications and construct alliances with 
non-Marxist thinkers. In the area of cultural criticism, the new mood of expansiveness fuelled a 
remarkable attempt to forge a rapprochement with some of the leading representatives of 
cultural conservatism, specifically F.R. Leavis and his co-thinkers on the journal Scrutiny. The 
high point of this attempt was the debate between Leavis and A.L. Morton which occurred in 
Scrutiny between 1932 and 1933, when Morton tried to convert the Leavisites to Marxism by 
pointing to the ideological similarities between the two camps. At about the same time, a 
number of writers who had been associated with cultural conservatism through their 
involvement with the journal Calendar o f Modern Letters (the most important were Edgell 
Rickword, Douglas Garman and Alec Brown) began to move towards Marxism and recorded 
their disenchantment with cultural conservatism in a series of essays and reviews.125 These are 
the matters which will concern us for the rest of this chapter.
Conservative ideas about culture have played an important role in the so-called “Culture and 
Society” tradition in Britain since at least the Augustan period, underpinning the work of such 
diverse thinkers as Johnson, Burke, Coleridge, Ruskin, Carlyle and Arnold. But the form of 
cultural conservatism which most influenced the British communists was the one associated 
with the emergence of modernism after the First World War. Its most important critical 
spokesmen were probably T.E. Hulme, T.S. Eliot and Wyndham Lewis, though the latter was in 
many respects a somewhat marginal figure. The task of insinuating it into academic culture fell 
largely to F.R. Leavis and his followers in the early 1930s.126 Although these thinkers disagreed 
with each other over a wide range of issues, it can still reasonably be said that their cultural 
doctrines were bound together by two common features: (1) the defence of what can broadly be 
called the “classical” sensibility in art against what can broadly be called the “romantic” 
sensibility, and (2) distrust of modernity and the ascription of cultural superiority to premodem 
societies. The defence of classicism was first undertaken by Hulme in a series of essays
collected in the posthumous volume Speculations (1924).127 Acknowledging his debt to the 
French novelist Charles Maurras, later the founder of the semi-fascist movement L ’ Action 
Francaise, Hulme implied that the essence of the classical outlook is the frank recognition of 
the fallen nature of man. Because the classical artist is acutely conscious of the capacity for evil 
which lurks at the heart of human nature, and since he realises all too vividly how strong 
emotion can spill over into uncontrollable aggression, he naturally favours a mode of sensibility 
which places “restraint” above the expression of passion.128 This puts him at odds with the 
romantic artist, whose taste for Sturm und Drang reflects a naive and dangerous Rousseauian 
belief in the natural goodness of human beings. Classicism is also divided from romanticism by 
its quite different understanding of the relationship between mind and environment. Whereas 
the romantic artist invariably tends towards an extreme form of philosophical idealism, 
conveying the narcissistic illusion that the mind can somehow exert a direct influence over its 
material surroundings, the classicist portrays a universe in which mind and matter are 
permanently divided by an impassable metaphysical gulf.129 This gloomy dualism, intended to 
shore up a sense of mankind’s limitations, influences die style of the work of art at a number of 
different levels. The texture of the classical work is usually “dry and hard”, eschewing the 
distinctive sense of glutinous emotionality which features in much romantic art and which 
Hulme perhaps associated with the narcissism of the pre-oedipal period. It also displays an 
almost neurotic insistence on describing the surfaces of the world in minute detail, thereby 
acting as a powerful reminder of the sheer difficulty of bending reality to human purposes. 
Hulme’s definition of classicism was extended by Eliot in two crucial ways. In the first place, 
acknowledging that an emphasis on restraint lies at the heart of all great literature, Eliot 
famously implied that the classicist seeks to discipline the emotions by effecting a reconciliation 
of thought and feeling. Instead of allowing the emotions to float anarchically free from all other 
mental functions, the artist must adapt them to the process of thinking and thereby imbue 
thought with its own emotional and sensual satisfactions. The problem with the great bulk of 
modem literature is that writers have undergone a “dissociation of sensibility”, with the result 
that thought and feeling have now been completely prised apart. Eliot hinted at what he meant 
when he said of the metaphysical poet John Donne that “his every thought smelled like a rose”. 
It was Eliot’s attempt to explain this state of affairs which led him to his second great 
contribution to the theory of classicism, namely his influential account of the “impersonal” 
nature of creativity. His initial move was to associate classicism with a specific social 
background. If the classical ideal was at its height in the long period between the birth of the 
Homeric epic and the middle of the 17th Century, this was because pre-modem societies 
provided an institutional, moral and cultural context in which the orderly mind could flourish. 
With their rigid hierarchies, religious certainties and inviolable moral prejudices, they naturally 
produced men and women who favoured a balance of thought and feeling over the unrestrained
expression of emotion. It was therefore inevitable that the disappearance of pre-modem 
societies would bring the collapse of the classical ideal in its wake. Weighed down by their 
liberal preoccupations with equality and moral autonomy, modem societies have disordered the 
public mind and engendered a literary culture to match. It follows that modem literature can 
only achieve greatness if the writer eschews any idea of self-expression. Rather than using his 
own experiences as the basis of his work, the writer must set his dissociated sensibility to one 
side and strive to emulate the “tradition” of classical greatness which dominated an earlier and 
better age:
...the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his bones, 
but with a feeling that the whole o f the literature o f Europe from Homer and within it the whole 
o f the literature o f  his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous 
order. This historical sense, which is a sense o f the timeless as well as o f the temporal and o f  
the timeless and o f the temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional. And it is at the 
same time what makes a writer most acutely conscious o f his own place in time, o f his own 
contemporaneity.130
Poetry is not a turning loose o f emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression o f  
personality, but an escape from personality.131
Leavis extended the ideas of Hulme and Eliot in a number of ways when he introduced them 
into the academic study of literature in the early 1930s, both in a series of books of his own and 
in the journal Scrutiny. The aspect of his work most relevant to us is his elaboration of Eliot’s 
hints about the nature of popular life in the pre-modem period. When Eliot tried to explain why 
pre-modem societies were more likely to produce great artists than their industrial successors, 
he suggested that one of the reasons was their possession of a common culture which cut across 
class boundaries. Works of literature were enjoyed by people from right across the social 
spectrum, not merely by an intellectual elite.132 What Leavis set out to do was provide some 
historical ballast for Eliot’s theory, examining the lives of ordinary people in the “organic 
communities” of the past in order to explain their elevated tastes. Drawing on George Sturt’s 
book The Wheelwright’s Shop, a highly nostalgic account of life in a rural English village in the 
early 19th Century, Leavis argued that the cultural excellence of the peasantry was made 
possible by the satisfactions of pre-industrial labour. Whereas the modem industrial worker is 
so dispirited by his job that he spends his leisure hours in a state of “decreation” (that is, 
recuperative passivity), the peasant felt naturally impelled to extend the creative ethos of his 
everyday work into all other areas of his life. Reading Shakespeare and Bunyan was a natural 
response to cultivating the land or attending to the needs of livestock. Faced with the suggestion 
that his vision of rural labour was grossly idealised, Leavis resorted to many of the stock 
arguments of romantic anti-capitalism in order to convince his critics. Before the onset of 
capitalist rationalisation, he argued, the labourer performed whole tasks which appealed to both
the senses and the intellect. Membership of a small community allowed him to monitor the 
consequences of his everyday activity. The unchanging structures of non-market production 
instilled a powerful sense of the continuity of generations. The rhythms of work corresponded to 
the cycle of the seasons, conveying a profound sense of elemental harmony. And the ubiquity of 
untamed nature served as a salutary reminder of human limitations. These ideas received their 
most impassioned expression in Culture and Environment (1932), the book which Leavis wrote 
with Denys Thompson to introduce the perspectives of the Scrutiny group to sixth-form students 
of English. It is still widely regarded as the foundation text of British Cultural Studies.133
It is easy to see why a number of communist intellectuals should have been attracted to cultural 
conservatism in the early 1930s. Leavis’s vision of unalienated rural labour may have offended 
against a strict reading of the materialist conception of history; but in its way it still seemed 
congruent with the Marxist belief that aesthetic significance would be restored to manual labour 
once market institutions had been abolished. There were also parallels between the conservative 
emphasis on classicism and the atmosphere of scholarly asceticism which characterised 
communist culture at this time. Moreover, as Perry Anderson famously made clear in 
“Components of the National Culture” (1968), it could even be argued that conservative 
intellectuals were united with their Marxist counterparts by a shared hostility to prevailing 
academic conventions. At a time when most British intellectuals eschewed the “totalising” 
modes of analysis prescribed by classical sociology, both groups were at least making a 
rudimentary attempt to locate culture within its broader social contexts.134
The writer who best illustrated the links between Marxism and cultural conservatism in the 
early thirties was probably A.L. Morton, later the author of the seminal book A People’s History 
o f England (1936). Morton had been an activist in the CPGB since 1928, but was also a friend 
of T.S. Eliot’s and an occasional contributor to such broadly conservative journals as the 
Criterion (owned and edited by Eliot) and the Calendar o f Modem Letters,135 At any rate, it was 
Morton who was responsible for the one serious attempt to propose an alliance between the 
communists and the cultural conservatives.136 The attempt was made during the brief debate 
between Morton and Leavis which occurred in the pages of Scrutiny in 1933.137 Leavis launched 
the debate after taking exception to an article of Morton’s in the Criterion.138 In “Poetry and 
Property in a Communist Society” (October 1932), Morton had responded to an essay by the 
Catholic intellectual Gallox which described capitalism as the economic system most obviously 
consistent with Christian principles. Much of Morton’s response was taken up with a series of 
observations about the status of private property in a communist society;139 but the remarks 
which grabbed Leavis’s attention concerned the role of the artist under both capitalism and 
communism. The heart of Morton’s argument, which he justified by invoking a theory of
cultural crisis similar to that of Strachey, was that it is only spasmodically possible to create 
great art under capitalism, whereas artistic excellence is as integral to communism as material 
abundance and the absence of class rule. The evidence of history, Morton seemed to argue, 
shows that significant art can only be produced under two circumstances: (1) when the artist has 
enough leisure to hone his creative gifts, and (2) when the existing economic system is in a state 
of material expansion. Although capitalism still supports a “leisure class” of artists who are 
allied to the bourgeoisie, its long-term decline means that most contemporary art is 
“decadent”.140 The great virtue of communism is that it develops the material preconditions of 
cultural excellence to an unprecedented degree. Instead of conferring a significant amount of 
leisure on a small elite, it creates a “leisure society” in which each man has enough spare time to 
expand his natural powers of self-expression. By ensuring that the means of production are 
continuously improved, it also creates the sense of permanent economic expansion that alone 
permits the imagination to soar.141 Furthermore, in a passage which suggested that his approach 
to culture was still rooted in the classic liberal opposition between private and public, Morton 
speculated that the artist under communism would be sufficiently indifferent to social relations 
to subsist in a solipsistic world of pure sensibility:
Poets will still have their problems and difficulties, different from ours but perhaps as great. 
They will solve them in their own way. Paradoxically, they may easily be more individual 
difficulties than our own since they are less likely to concern the relationship o f the poet to 
society, a question which, though it presents itself individually to each one, is really only an 
obstacle to be overcome before the difficulties proper to the poet can be approached.142
Leavis decided to write about Marxism after reading Morton’s essay in conjunction with 
Trotsky’s Literature and Revolution (1924), Edmund Wilson’s Axel’s Castle (1931) and an 
essay on T.S. Eliot by the Russian critic D.S. Mirsky. The result was a short piece called 
“Under Which King, Bezonian?”, published as an editorial in Scrutiny in December 1932. At 
this point, Leavis had not yet developed the outright hostility towards Marxism which 
characterised some of his later work. He was willing to admit that “there seems to be no reason 
why supporters of Scrutiny should not favour some kind of communism as the solution of the 
economic problem”, though he added that “it does not seem likely...that they will be orthodox 
Marxists”.143 Yet his basic assumption was that Marxism must ultimately be regarded as a threat 
to cultural excellence, not only because of its political objectives but also because of its major 
theoretical tenets. If we accept that industrial society is profoundly inimical to the creation of 
great art, and if we further accept that culture can only be safeguarded by a determined effort to 
identify with tradition, it follows that a socialist revolution would necessarily result in a 
deterioration of the cultural situation. Tradition is too much of a “delicate organic growth” to 
withstand any attempt to tear up society from its roots.144 Nor is it possible to believe that a
mature communist society would establish conditions in which a new culture might flourish. As 
the study of pre-industrial societies makes clear, great art is only created when a “real culture” is 
“shared by the people at large”;145 but ordinary people only take an interest in the arts when 
their work provides them with sufficient stimulation. The problem with the society envisaged by 
Morton is that it would not so much restore meaning to labour as abolish labour altogether, 
thereby creating an entire populace of “rootless” dilettantes: “Without being critical of Mr. 
Morton’s generalizations one may ask: What will ‘social functions’ be in a leisure community -  
a community, that is, in which the ‘productive process’ is so efficient as no longer to determine 
the ordering of life?... Whether such a rootless culture... can be achieved and maintained may be 
doubtful”.146 When he turned to the more theoretical aspects of Marxism, Leavis paid particular 
attention to the doctrine of base and superstructure and its supposedly central category of 
“bourgeois culture”. His initial objection to this category was simply that it represented a form 
of cultural abuse. By implying that every work since the dawn of the capitalist age has somehow 
reflected the outlook of the ruling class, we run the risk (or so Leavis seemed to believe) of not 
merely misrepresenting the works themselves but also inducing widespread cynicism about the 
purpose of cultural activity.147 More interestingly, he also grounded his suspicion of the idea of 
bourgeois culture in a wider critique of instrumental reason. At the heart of much cultural 
doctrine in the inter-war period was the belief that the prestige of science (or at least the model 
of science associated with the Enlightenment) had created circumstances in which an emphasis 
on abstraction took precedence over a proper concern for “concrete particularities”. This was 
held to be disastrous on both aesthetic and political grounds. Some writers, o f whom Leavis was 
one of the most distinguished examples, argued that beauty resides only in particular things and 
not in generalisations; whereas others (notably Continental Marxists such as Theodor Adorno) 
insisted that a disdain for particularity ultimately gives rise to the abolition of individual liberty. 
Leavis’s implication in “Under Which King, Bezonian?” was that the category of bourgeois 
culture is itself a product of the fetishisation of science, since its effect is to divert our attention 
from a heterogeneous reality towards a historically dubious “law” of cultural production:
To be concerned, as Scrutiny is, fo r  literary criticism is to be vigilant and scrupulous about the 
relation between words and the concrete. The inadequacies o f Mr. Wilson and Prince Mirsky as 
literary critics are related to their shamelessly uncritical use o f vague abstractions and verbal 
counters. What is this “bourgeois culture ” that Mr. Eliot represents in company, one presumes, 
with Mr. Wells, Mr. Hugh Walpole, Punch, Scrutiny, Dr. Marie Stopes and the Outline for Boys 
and Girls? What are these “classes”, the conflict between which a novelist must recognize 
“before he can reach to the heart o f any human situation ”?148
Morton responded to Leavis in a highly compressed essay entitled “Culture and Leisure”, 
published in Scrutiny in March 1933. Although he claimed that “it is impossible for me to go 
into the greater number of the issues raised in Under Which King, Bezonian?” ™9 he actually
managed to respond to most of Leavis’s major arguments about the political and theoretical 
inadequacies of Marxism. At the level of politics, he claimed that Leavis had overestimated the 
extent to which a socialist revolution represents a clean break with the past. Because the society 
of the future is necessarily one that builds on the “achievements of earlier periods”, it is quite 
wrong to imagine that socialist politics entail a destructive attitude towards the existing corpus 
of great works. Leavis was guilty of pessimism when he claimed that tradition is too fragile to 
withstand major political changes, even if we assume that the changes are likely to be 
undesirable: “History proves that anything which is of cultural value, far from being a ‘tender 
organic growth’ possesses a quite amazing tenacity”.150 In an interesting example of the wilful 
distortion which communist writers now habitually employed when considering the work of 
Leon Trotsky, Morton argued that “Trotsky’s misleading formulations” in Literature and 
Revolution bore much of the responsibility for the fallacy that socialists disdained the culture of 
the past, even though the chapter to which he appeared to be referring (“Proletarian Culture and 
Proletarian Art”) went out of its way to assert the importance of bourgeois culture in the 
construction of a socialist society.151 (Francis Mulhem made a similar point in The Moment o f  
Scrutiny.)152 When it came to the likely structure of communist civilisation, Morton accused 
Leavis of misconstruing the reference to a “leisure society” in his earlier essay in the Criterion. 
Agreeing that a society in which everyone had been freed from the necessity to work would 
inevitably suffer from cultural inertia, he insisted that the goal of communism was not so much 
the abolition of work as the creation of circumstances in which the “distinction between work 
and leisure has disappeared”.153 But this does not mean that work under communism will 
somehow acquire the characteristics of leisure under capitalism. Since intellectual and aesthetic 
significance is likely to be restored to the labour process by the advent of planned production, it 
will no longer be necessary for men and women to pass their spare time in a state of passive 
recuperation -  work and leisure will both be characterised by the active pursuit of self- 
fulfilment.154
If these remarks were a comparatively rare acknowledgement by a thirties communist that 
socialism has existential as well as economic objectives (and also an early indication of how 
much Morton had been influenced by William Morris),155 they were less important than 
Morton’s response to the Leavisite critique of the theoretical aspects of Marxism, particularly 
the doctrine of bourgeois culture. Morton’s initial move was to insist that the Marxist theory of 
culture is by no means as reductive as Leavis had implied. Noting that Leavis had tried to 
summarise the Marxist position by saying that culture is ultimately a by-product of the 
“methods of production”, he argued that a “small verbal point” had prevented him (Leavis) from 
fully understanding the doctrine of base and superstructure. According to Morton, the preferable 
phrase would have been “mode of production”.156 Whereas the word “methods” implies that
economic activity is “rigidly determined” and therefore incapable of being influenced by culture 
or indeed by anything else, the word “mode” does the precise opposite -  it implies that 
economic behaviour is sufficiently “fluid” to be altered by the cultural forms it has itself called 
into existence. Once we realise that culture is able to influence the economic base as well as 
merely reflecting it, Morton implied, our hostility to terms such as “bourgeois culture” 
invariably begins to disappear, since we come to recognise that their function is historical and 
not judgemental. That is, we recognise that their main purpose is to help us understand the 
relationship between cultural formations and the broader social system, not to convey the view 
that the only purpose of culture is to legitimise an exploitative set of class relations.157 However, 
for all this verbal subtlety, the decisive moment of “Culture and Leisure” came when Morton 
shifted his attention to the issue of aesthetic judgement:
When we talk o f “bourgeois culture” we refer to the sum o f the ideological superstructure 
characteristic o f  the present historical period, in which the bourgeoisie is the ruling class. This 
includes much that the Editors o f  Scrutiny would perhaps prefer to call a lack o f  culture. The 
novels o f D. H. Lawrence and the methods o f salesmanship described in Mr. Denys Thompson’s 
article Advertising God do not, indeed, seem to have much in common at first sight... Bourgeois 
culture, then, is the result o f a historic process, and cannot be accepted as uniformly valuable 
or rejected as entirely valueless. The purpose o f  Scrutiny seems to be to combat the harmful 
elements o f  the bourgeois “culture complex ” and to preserve what is valuable. This is entirely 
praiseworthy: the only question we have to ask ourselves is: what are the most hopeful means 
towards this end? 158
At first sight, these sentences might simply appear to assert rhetorically what Morton had failed 
to prove theoretically. By endorsing the cultural forms which Leavis and his followers admired 
and scorning the forms which they evidently despised, Morton’s clear intention was to show 
that the category of bourgeois culture poses no threat to the cultivation of “critical 
discrimination” and that Marxists are just as adept as cultural conservatives at distinguishing the 
“valuable” from the “valueless”. And yet the real interest of the passage lies elsewhere, 
specifically in the fact that it anticipates two of the most important features of the work 
produced by cultural Marxists later in the decade. In the first place, it exemplifies what certain 
writers have described as the failure of the British communists to challenge the canonical 
certainties of the wider literary culture. Whereas Marxist writers in Europe and the USA were 
beginning to challenge the very distinction between “high” and “low” culture (or at least 
acknowledging that popular culture is often worthy of critical respect), their counterparts in 
Britain were only willing (or so it is often argued) to seek a re-evaluation of writers and artists 
who had already been admitted into membership of the canon. It was considered appropriate to 
argue that the radicalism of a Bunyan or a Milton had yet to be fully appreciated, but not to 
insist that popular verse, folk songs or commercial newspapers might also be the bearers of 
cultural value. This lack of intellectual nerve is often ascribed to the isolation of the British
Marxists from their more adventurous continental counterparts, but Morton’s article suggests 
another explanation -  the desire to please (or at least not unduly offend) the leading 
representatives of academic criticism. When Andy Croft argued that writers such as Morton, 
Garman and Rickword “took a kind of left-Leavisism into the Party”,159 perhaps what he had in 
mind was not the slightly implausible claim that the substantive ideas developed by the 
communists were basically similar to those of the Leavisites, but rather that Leavis and his 
followers had so entrenched the opposition between “minority civilisation” and “mass culture” 
that the communists were too nervous to challenge it. However, it is also clear that the perceived 
need to endorse the distinction between high and popular culture was not entirely 
counterproductive. If anything, it forced the British communists towards one of their most 
important theoretical innovations: the claim (or at least the implication) that there is something 
inherently polysemic about many of the more complex uses of ideology. In his efforts to justify 
his hostility towards commercial forms, Morton argued that the primary function of the “mass 
production novel or the tabloid press” is to ensure that ordinary people are “doped into 
acquiescence in a system of organized exploitation”.160 The clear implication was that more 
elevated forms somehow function differently, containing elements that not only legitimise the 
status quo but occasionally serve to undermine it. As we shall see in Chapter Six, this belief in 
the janus-faced nature of prestigious cultural forms was to reappear during the later attempt to 
identify a radical tradition in British culture, when it was often argued that Christianity, 
liberalism and even the ideology of classical education all contained traces of subversive 
thinking which had inclined the British people towards the cause of revolution.
The other crucial feature of Morton’s article was what Francis Mulhem has described as its 
“conciliatory” tone.161 There were no traces in “Culture and Leisure” of the polemical arrogance 
which tarnishes so much Marxist writing on opposing ideologies. Instead of dismissing the 
Leavisites as purblind apologists for a decaying social order, Morton courteously invited them 
to reconsider their attitude towards Marxism, noting that the similarities between the two camps 
were greater than their divergences. In a classic attempt to win an opponent’s sympathy by 
repositioning one of his most totemic pieces of terminology, he argued that the Leavisites and 
the communists both ascribed considerable importance to the idea of the “organic community”; 
but insisted that it was wrong to associate it solely with an irrecoverable past. While the organic 
community had certainly existed in the past (though in the period of primitive communism and 
not in the Middle Ages) it would ultimately be re-established in a higher form with the victory 
of socialism.162 Furthermore, Morton seemed happy to accept that the Leavisites would take a 
long time to shift their position. When he wrote that “...Scrutiny is far too valuable a weapon 
against the Philistine to be left permanently in the position of the two heroes who ‘wept like 
anything to see such quantities of sand’” (emphasis mine),163 he appeared to envisage a lengthy
period in which communists and Leavisites would co-exist within the pages of the same journal, 
only converging after “Mr. Leavis....thinks things over again...(and asks) whether the struggle 
to ‘maintain the tradition of human culture’ can really be carried far on a basis of ignoring the 
struggle of the classes with which it is inseparably connected”.164 As I have suggested earlier, 
this extraordinary tactfulness was surely prompted by the miserable experience of communist 
intellectuals during the period of Class Against Class. Treated like a pariah by his own people 
and thrown into self-doubt by the Party’s rampant anti-intellectualism, Morton instinctively put 
solidarity with other intellectuals above the desire for political purity. At the same time, as 
Mulhem reminds us, there was also a sense in which the Leavis/Morton debate reflected the 
anxiety which intellectuals in general experienced as the crisis of the 1930s began to take shape:
What is...interesting...is that such a demarche should have been attempted at all. It might be 
said that the thematic resemblances between the two outlooks were sufficient to create an 
intermediate zone which, given the ideological disorientation o f the intelligentsia in the 
climacteric o f the early thirties, was large and open enough to permit “territorial” gains by one 
side or the other. At all events, some such belief was apparently held by both parties.165
It seems unlikely that many readers of Scrutiny were converted to Marxism by Morton’s 
arguments. Nevertheless, a surprising number of young intellectuals did make the transition 
from cultural conservatism to communism in the first two or three years of the 1930s.166 The 
most prominent were Edgell Rickword, Douglas Garman and Alec Brown,167 each of whom 
went on to play a major role in the literary culture of the CPGB.168 The three men already knew 
each other through their involvement with The Calendar o f Modern Letters (1925-1927), the 
journal which Leavis took as his model when editing the early issues of Scrutiny}69 Rickword 
and Garman were the editors of the journal (along with Bertram Higgins), while Brown was an 
occasional contributor. The Calendar seems to have been established because Rickword, 
Garman and Higgins believed that Eliot’s Criterion was not doing as much as it should to 
advance the causes of modernism and classicism. As such, its 18 issues contained a number of 
lengthy pieces by the likes of Lawrence, Joyce, Wyndham Lewis and Forster. It was also one of 
the first journals to bring the techniques of “practical criticism” advocated by I. A. Richards to a 
comparatively large audience -  it often sold as many as 7000 copies per issue. Indeed, as John 
Gross has pointed out, the Calendar often took its emphasis on the importance of criticism to 
extreme lengths, with one editorial proclaiming that “ ...It is no longer useful to distinguish 
between an act of imagination and an act of criticism...it is possible to say that the criticism in 
Mr. Eliot’s ‘Sacred Wood’ not only is a more valuable work than Mr Lawrence’s latest novel, 
but takes precedence of it, makes it obsolete”.170 However, even though the desire to advance 
Eliot’s philosophy was crucial to the magazine’s foundation, the conservative thinker who came 
to dominate its pages was actually Wyndham Lewis. Garman and Rickword were both
converted to Lewis’s virulently chauvinistic brand of cultural conservatism at some time in the 
mid-1920s (possibly after reading The Art o f Being Ruled in 1925),171 thereafter peppering their 
work with denunciations of “slug humanitarianism” and “mean-spirited equalitarianism”.172 
When Rickword, Garman and Brown began to move towards communism in the early 1930s, 
they drew a line under their previous beliefs by providing a number of implicit and explicit 
critiques of cultural conservatism in a variety of essays and reviews. This body of work is 
important because it demonstrates that there were definite limitations to the ecumenical ethos of 
Thirties Marxism. While it is true (as I have tried to show throughout this thesis) that the 
English critics often tried to supplement the Soviet influences on their work with ideas drawn 
from wider traditions, it is also the case that this process of ideological miscegenation was 
usually carried out surreptitiously (in the sense that ideological debts were rarely acknowledged) 
and that no system of thought was ever acknowledged as being the equal of Marxism. As the 
work of Brown, Rickword and Garman proves, it was also common for the English communists 
to launch virulent attacks on non-Marxist writers by whom they had manifestly been influenced. 
Apart from anything else, this helps to explain why Morton’s call for a formal alliance between 
the communists and the Leavisites was always doomed to failure.
The most interesting critique of cultural conservatism was developed by the novelist Alec 
Brown, though its main principles have to be extrapolated from a lengthy essay whose primary 
focus was less on cultural theory than on the work of an individual poet. In “The Lyric Impulse 
in the Poetry of T.S. Eliot”, an essay contributed to Volume Two of Edgell Rickword’s 
symposium Scrutinies in 1931, Brown tried to rescue Eliot from the rather apocalyptic image 
with which his early work had burdened him. His central argument was that there is a tension in 
Eliot’s poetry between its manifest content and its dominant mood. At the level of content it 
persistently evokes the whole range of predominantly biological phenomena, including ageing, 
illness and death, which are both ineluctable and the source of profound misery at all stages of 
human history.173 In order to emphasise the transhistorical nature of these phenomena, Eliot 
imbues characters from a variety of different periods and civilisations with much the same sense 
that ultimately “we are really in the dark” {Portrait o f a Lady). However, the air of tragedy is 
radically undermined (or so Brown argued) by Eliot’s talent for producing verse whose defining 
feature is a mood of extreme lyrical affirmation.174 This conflation of tragedy and lyricism was 
exemplified for Brown by the following extract from Mr Appolinax, whose final two lines were 
said to “really sing” in spite of depicting the inexorable drift o f drowned bodies towards the 
bottom of the ocean:
He laughed like an irresponsible foetus,
His laughter was submarine and profound
Like the old man o f the sea’s 
Hidden under coral islands
Where worried bodies o f drowned men drift down in the green silence,
Dropping from fingers o f su rf175
Significantly enough, Brown defined the “lyric impulse” in poetiy in terms which obviously 
owed a great deal to the work of I.A. Richards. Whereas Richards had described poetry in 
general as an “emotive” form which makes no real reference to external reality,176 Brown 
insisted that (1) “in a lyric...every element is given over to direct positive qualities”,177 and (2) 
the lyric is best regarded as a “cosmos in itself’ with “its own laws of behaviour”.178 Moreover, 
in an obvious echo of Richards’s quasi-therapeutic arguments about the function of poetry, 
Brown argued that the “maximally positive” mood of lyric poetry only emerges when the poet 
has come to terms with the unpleasant realities of human existence, especially the inevitability 
of his own death.179 Conscious that his gift for lyrical digression conflicted with his 
disenchanted vision of the human condition, Eliot devised a number of techniques (or so Brown 
implied) to hold his lyricism in check. The most important was his habit of implying that there 
is ultimately no distinction between mankind’s biological and social destinies. The impression 
created by many of his poems is that the entropic trajectory of the human body somehow set the 
pattern for the history of human institutions as well.180 In Prufrock and Other Observations 
(1917) and Poems (1920), making obeisance to what Brown termed “Goddess Drab”, Eliot 
conveyed his distaste for life in society by forging the images of urban misery which earned him 
his early notoriety (“The winter evening settled down/With smells of steaks in 
passageways”).181 By the time he wrote The Wasteland, when his approach to social issues was 
becoming more systematic, he had fully absorbed the pessimistic philosophy of history implicit 
in Sir James Frazer’s The Golden Bough, with its insistence that all societies are ultimately 
destined to fall into decline. The effect of this sort of political pessimism was reinforced by 
Eliot’s obsessively discursive style. According to Brown, whose taste for lengthy corroborative 
quotations swelled his essay to more than 50 pages, there are numerous poems in which Eliot 
interrupts the flow of lyricism by intruding a passage of philosophical or metaphysical 
speculation. Although accusations of excessive cerebrality have been levelled against 
modernism since its inception, the twist in Brown’s argument was that Eliot’s intellectualism 
would be more accurately regarded as pseudo-intellectualism. Look beneath the surface of his 
writing, Brown seemed to imply, and one often encounters a surprising paucity of thought. For 
instance, when he (Eliot) tried to explain his reference to the bells of Saint Mary Woolnoth 
striking “with a dead sound at the final stroke of nine”, the best he could manage in the 
footnotes to The Wasteland was “A phenomenon which I have often observed”.182 Brown’s 
rather heretical assessment of Eliot’s intellectual status can perhaps be seen as a quirky response
to Richard’s seminal observation that The Wasteland had achieved a “complete severance 
between poetry and all beliefs”.183
Although Brown was not explicitly concerned with cultural conservatism and did not mention 
Eliot’s theoretical writings, it is easy to see how a rudimentary critique of cultural conservatism 
can be extracted from his essay. Its most obvious implication was that conservatism is burdened 
by an insurmountable tension between its understanding of human nature and its conception of 
history. On the one hand, Brown seemed to be saying, conservatives justify their preference for 
an orderly and hierarchical society by invoking a pre-Enlightenment notion of human sinfulness 
-  human beings are naturally wicked and will always remain so, regardless of the particular 
society in which they happen to be living. On the other hand, they also seek to promulgate a 
highly idealised vision of the nation’s historical inheritance. Anxious to neutralise the liberal 
and egalitarian impulses which bourgeois democracy has installed at the heart of modem 
consciousness, conservatives portray the rural, monarchical and pre-rationalist past as the site of 
a perfectly realised form of social unity in which the national culture acquired its essential 
characteristics. When Brown focused on Eliot’s habit of depicting examples of human venality 
at all stages of human history, he unwittingly exposed the flaw in this strategy -  it is simply not 
possible to emphasise the virtues of tradition if one simultaneously bemoans the sinfulness of 
those who established it. Moreover, as Brown arguably implied when considering Eliot’s 
gloomy portrayal of life in society, there is a constant tendency among conservatives to 
surrender to outright political cynicism. By insisting so forcefully that the fallen nature of man 
is the fundamental datum of all political thought, they risk creating the impression that no 
human institution can ever be sufficiently untainted to act as a barrier against evil -  not even the 
church, the family or the state. It makes no sense to see authority as a bulwark against chaos if 
the people who exercise it are moral cretins. Brown’s essay can also be read as a critique of 
Eliot’s defence of classicism. Whereas Eliot saw classicism and romanticism as mutually 
exclusive forms of sensibility, Brown implied that the mind inevitably tends to translate one into 
the other in a process of what Jung might have called “enantiodromia”. If it was the classicist in 
Eliot who crafted the lugubrious reflections on the limitations of human nature, the sudden 
bursts of lyricism betrayed a streak of compensatory romanticism over which he patently had 
little control. Brown also seemed to suggest that Eliot’s dream of a non-dissociated sensibility 
was similarly incompatible with the laws of human psychology. By insisting that Eliot 
persistently deployed passages of pure cerebration as a counter to his own lyricism, he (Brown) 
portrayed reason and emotion as if they were implacable enemies in a battle for control of the 
mind. No form of reconciliation between the two can ever be countenanced, or so the argument 
seemed to go.
Edgell Rickword outlined his implied critique of cultural conservatism in an essay on Wyndham 
Lewis which appeared in the same volume as Brown’s essay on Eliot. At this time, shortly 
before his notorious conversion to fascism, Lewis was probably the most marginal of the 
cultural conservatives. He was as staunch as Eliot and Hulme in his defence of classicism, yet 
his spirited attempts to diagnose the forces in modem culture which undermine the classical 
ideal must often have seemed wilfully eccentric, not least because of his love of self­
dramatisation (he called himself “The Enemy”) and the somewhat scattershot quality of his 
prose. There were perhaps only two ideas which distinguished him from the other cultural 
conservatives, one of which derived from his notorious misogyny and the other from his deep 
hostility to the work of Henri Bergson.184 On the one hand, obsessed with the belief that the 
“softness” and “flabbiness” of the female sensibility are destructive of the classical ideal, he 
argued that the female mind has enjoyed a disastrous increase in influence since the dawn of the 
modem age.185 The most obvious sign of this increased influence is the emergence of 
democracy, which Lewis saw as inherently feminine in its indifference to intellectual 
excellence.186 Secondly, he also claimed that modem societies have experienced a precipitate 
decline as a result of being oriented more towards time than towards space. Insisting that the 
modem “time cult” is largely a consequence of Bergson’s doctrine of creative evolution, he 
argued that there is something fundamentally classical about a concern for the relative position 
of objects in space, whereas a preoccupation with time leads only to a romantic obsession with 
the destruction of physical boundaries.187 John Carey captured the essence of Lewis’s argument 
when he wrote that “ ...time sucked one into a soft, obnoxious intimacy where things were for 
ever ‘penetrating’ and ‘merging’...(while)...space offered a healthy outdoor scene, with things 
standing apart, ‘the wind blowing between them, and the air circulating freely’”.188 Although 
Rickword satirised many of these ideas in his contribution to Volume 2 of Scrutinies, the heart 
of his attack on Lewis (and hence on cultural conservatism more generally) was an incisive 
though implied point about the weakness of classicism. The problem with the classical outlook, 
Rickword seemed to suggest, is that it insists on seeing the intellect as a fundamentally 
beleaguered force, permanently under threat from wider mental phenomena such as the 
“Dionysian” emotions that we associate with great art. When the classicist seeks to defend the 
idea of “restraint” against the romantic ideal, his starting point is always the assumption that our 
ability to think is about to be laid waste by the mind’s unrulier dispositions. The problem with 
this “fear of emotion” is that it generates a sort of continuous expectation of cerebral disaster, 
which itself imposes enormous and unnecessary limits on the scope of thought.189 Rickword 
also implied that much of Lewis’s work demonstrates what happens when a powerful mind is 
crippled by intellectual anxiety. Lewis is an acute critic of the ills of modem civilisation, but he 
never makes a determined attempt to sketch a workable alternative (ironically, Rickword made 
this accusation in the year that Lewis voiced his support for Hitler).190 Moreover, he often
resorts to a callow pragmatism when assessing new ideas. Faced with the theory of relativity or 
the Freudian doctrine of the unconscious, his response is not “is this true?” but “is this 
desirable?”191 Notwithstanding his great gifts as a creative writer, many of his works place 
undue emphasis on the explication of abstract ideas, ignoring the essential truth that “the 
aesthetic faculty...must include the emotional, the Dionysian”.192 In later novels such as The 
Apes o f Man, Rickword implied, even his talents as a purely destructive thinker have been 
undermined by his failure to recognise the robustness of thought. Obsessed with the belief that 
human beings are everywhere losing the ability to think, he has begun to create characters who 
are little more than behaviourist caricatures, responding automatically and without reflection to 
external stimuli.193 By overestimating the extent to which the intellect is threatened by strong 
emotions, Lewis has effectively destroyed the thing he claims to be defending.
Rickword hinted at another reason for his growing disillusionment with cultural conservatism in 
a brief review of T.S. Eliot’s Selected Essays in Scrutiny (March 1933). According to Rickword, 
Eliot’s critical writings had undergone a fundamental change in the decade or so since essays 
like “Tradition and the Individual Talent”. Whereas the early essays were masterpieces of close 
reading, scrupulously analysing the formal means by which authors evoked a specific 
sensibility, the more recent work was largely concerned with issues of morality, religion and 
politics. Rickword believed that this transition from “literature” to “society” was much to be 
regretted. In a passage which once again reminds us of the overweening influence of I.A. 
Richards on the period’s young literary intellectuals, he insisted that (1) literature is the most 
powerful means of “redeeming the time” (that is, liberating the individual from mental chaos),
(2) “ ...as our writings are, so our thoughts are”, and (3) sensitivity to literary form is crucial to 
unlocking the aesthetic qualities of the individual work.194 By abandoning his peerless gift for 
practical criticism and turning instead to commentary on social affairs, Eliot had gravely 
compromised the moral power of his criticism. This attack on political criticism might have 
seemed surprising from a writer who had recently converted to Marxism, but it perhaps helps to 
explain why so many intellectuals were able to shift their allegiance from formalism to 
historical materialism with such apparent ease. If an appreciation of literary technique is indeed 
the sine qua non of personal redemption, then it surely makes sense to create a society in which 
a sense of technical accomplishment is restored to ordinary labour. In a socialist society, 
Rickword perhaps meant to imply, there will be no tension between the quest for redemption 
through art and the conditions of everyday life — both will be bound together by a shared 
concern for craftsmanship. As we shall see in Chapter Six, Rickword’s preoccupation with the 
reconciliation of mental and manual labour was later to take an even more utopian form.
There were echoes of Rickword’s argument in the work of Douglas Garman, his former 
editorial colleague on The Calendar o f Modern Letters. However, whereas Rickword had 
condemned Lewis for failing to sketch a plausible alternative to the chaos of liberal civilisation, 
Garman condemned three of the leading cultural conservatives for precisely the opposite reason. 
Reviewing four books by Lewis in the December 1932 edition of Scrutiny, he regretted the fact 
that Lewis, Eliot and Lawrence had moved beyond a purely “destructive” attitude to modem 
society and begun to outline a definite programme of political and cultural reform. Since the 
most savage critics of the existing order rarely have a clear idea of how society should be 
reorganised, their positive suggestions were necessarily unconvincing -  Eliot had retreated into 
a “backwater of Anglo-Catholicism”; Lewis had put his faith in an utterly inchoate notion of the 
“Not-self’; while Lawrence had achieved an “unedifying apotheosis” by sketching a social 
programme whose tenets were apparently too trivial even to be mentioned.195 Interestingly, 
Garman seemed to blame these developments on the gulf which has opened up in modem 
society between intellectuals and the “literate public”. When intellectuals feel wholly isolated 
from the reading public, or so he appeared to argue, they invariably try to win new readers by 
coining platitudinous ideas about the way in which life can be improved. If the relationship 
between writers and readers had been somewhat closer in the first place, the likes of Lawrence, 
Eliot and Lewis could simply have intensified their exhilarating attacks on modem civilisation 
and left the task of envisaging the future to better qualified thinkers.196
Garman’s most interesting attack on the prescriptive aspects of cultural conservatism was 
contributed to the first issue of Left Review (October 1934). In “What?..The Devil?”, responding 
to the arguments in Eliot’s notoriously anti-semitic After Strange Gods, he predicted that Eliot 
would soon be throwing in his lot with fascism. According to Garman, the decisive change in 
Eliot’s recent criticism was that the idea of tradition had been supplemented by an emphasis on 
“orthodoxy”. Worried that a correct understanding of the European heritage was inherently 
difficult to sustain, Eliot now believed that the defence of tradition should be entrusted to 
powerful institutions that could maintain the necessary level of ideological discipline. Although 
initially hopeful that the Anglo-Catholic church might assume such a role, it was only a matter 
of time before he transferred his allegiance to the fascist state. Apart from anything else, 
Garman implied, this was because his new ideas “closely parallel[ed]” those of the fascist 
movement, which also claimed to be defending a traditional way of life by augmenting the 
power of authority.197 Moreover, Eliot’s recent work had gone some way towards dismantling 
the idea that it is not possible to be an individualist and a fascist at the same time. By justifying 
the worship of authority with such an esoteric set of arguments, he had shown that even the 
most idiosyncratic of thinkers can ultimately grow comfortable with the idea of totalitarian 
conformity.198 If Garman’s essay hardly represented the last word on these matters, it arguably
inaugurated a critical obsession with the fascisant element in Eliot’s thought which continues to 
this day in the work of such writers as Anthony Julius, Tom Paulin and Christopher Ricks.
There is one further irony that needs to be noted. Although much of Garman’s work in the early 
1930s can be seen as a settling of accounts with cultural conservatism, there is evidence to 
suggest that his conversion to Marxism was hastened by a novel that was not merely 
conservative but arguably proto-fascist. This was Voyage au Bout de la Nuit by Louis- 
Ferdinand Celine, the French writer who became notorious later in the decade for his vocal 
support for Hitler. Reviewing the book in Scrutiny in September 1933, Garman described it as a 
misanthropic satire on modem society which achieved its effects by portraying human nature 
solely in terms of the “negative impulses”. Instead of endowing his characters with a realistic 
combination of benevolence and selfishness, Celine wrote as if they were entirely in the grip of 
“horror and disquiet and squalor”.199 For Garman, one of the novel’s most interesting aspects 
was the way it explained this level of moral blindness. Its central character, Ferdinand Bardamu, 
is fully aware of his predicament and “relates his misery and failures, not to an involved 
metaphysical scheme or historical process, but to an immediate fact: the fact that he belongs to 
the exploited class”.200 By resisting the temptation to “generalize” about Bardamu and focusing 
scrupulously on his particular experiences, Celine paradoxically elevated him into a 
“representative figure” for “a generation for which the economic is, increasingly, the question of 
primary importance”. 201 It would be unwise to ascribe too much importance to Garman’s 
reading of Voyage au Bout de la nuit, but it is easy to see how such a novel might have affected 
his political development. Proving that an emphasis on the primacy of economics is by no 
means incompatible with the creation of great art, it might well have helped to persuade him 
that Marxism was an ideology that a literary intellectual could embrace without fear. If so, it 
was a curious case of fascism engendering its polar opposite.202
4 CONCLUSION
There were two ways in which developments in the world communist movement influenced the 
work of British Marxist critics in the period between 1928 and 1939. The political strategies 
imposed by the Communist International invariably had implications for cultural criticism, 
some of them implicit and some of them explicit, while Soviet intellectuals developed a 
comprehensive theoretical framework for Marxist criticism in the years after 1934. The work 
examined in this chapter illustrates the influence of purely political factors on the British critics. 
All the writers I have chosen were responding in one way or another to the politics of the Class 
Against Class period, often in ways which bear out the argument that British communists were 
never quite as subservient to Moscow as orthodox historians have supposed. If the work of P.R.
Stephensen seemed highly eccentric in comparison with that of other British communists, it 
nevertheless did a good job of evoking the ethos of Class Against Class. Faced with a situation 
in which the CPGB’s cadres displayed a high level of destructive febrility, Stephensen forged a 
Nietzschean/Bakuninist style of criticism which emphasised the virtues of an uncompromisingly 
negationist attitude towards external reality. The work of John Strachey and Montagu Slater 
aimed to corroborate the main assumption of Class Against Class by showing that capitalist 
society was irredeemably decadent at the level of culture as well as politics and economics, yet 
it also proved that orthodoxy was no barrier to ingenuity — both writers fleshed out the idea of 
cultural crisis in ways which owed practically nothing to Soviet sources. By contrast, A.L. 
Morton’s work on cultural conservatism was bom of a much more unorthodox impulse. 
Appalled at the anti-intellectualism which went hand in hand with the new strategy, Morton 
tried to strengthen the position of the CPGB’s intellectuals by calling for an alliance with the 
Scrutiny right. By announcing their conversion to Marxism with a bitter attack on the cultural 
conservatism to which they had previously subscribed, Alec Brown, Edgell Rickword and 
Douglas Garman showed that Morton’s ambitions were probably unrealistic.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVOLUTIONARY TRADITIONALISM: SOVIET CULTURAL THEORY IN THE 
1930S
Although a British strain of cultural Marxism had been developed in the early 1930s by writers 
such as John Strachey, A.L. Morton and Edgell Rickword, it was not until slightly later 
(specifically after the abandonment of the Class Against Class policy in 1933) that a significant 
number of the CPGB’s intellectuals became engaged with cultural issues. Their work was 
powerfully influenced by two developments in the world communist movement. The first was 
the adoption by the Soviet government of an arts policy that was considered binding on all 
communist artists, not simply those who lived and worked in the USSR. The second (as we 
shall see in Chapter Six) was the emergence of the “Popular Front” strategy against fascism, 
which obliged communists to raise public awareness of the history of popular radicalism in their 
own countries. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the central principles both of Soviet arts 
policy and the body of cultural criticism that was used to legitimise it.
The policy adopted by the Soviet government in 1934 was the culmination of a long debate 
about the nature of revolutionary art which had started almost immediately after the October 
Revolution.1 The participants in the debate had polarised into two fairly distinct groups at an 
early stage. The first group, encompassing the members of such diverse artistic movements as 
Futurism, Constructivism and the so-called “montage cinema”, believed that the ideals of the 
new society could only be properly expressed in an art which reflected the technical innovations 
o f modernism.2 The second and less distinguished group (its key members were drawn from the 
AkhRR and RAPP) argued that modernism was inaccessible to the Soviet masses and that 
revolutionary artists should therefore confine themselves to the use of traditional forms.3 A few 
observers, notably Leon Trotsky in Literature and Revolution, spoke in favour of a pluralist 
culture and urged the Soviet government to adopt an attitude of relative neutrality in its 
treatment of the arts.4 For much of the early period it looked as if the Bolsheviks were throwing 
their weight behind the modernist camp. Narkompros, the government department with 
responsibility for education and the arts, gave massive subsidies to the avant-garde and 
appointed leading modernists to positions of special cultural influence -  for example, Chagall, 
Malevitch and El Lissitsky all became teachers at the famous art school at Vitebsk.5 The 
propaganda materials which conveyed the government message during the Civil War were 
dominated by Constructivist and Futurist styles. “No state”, as Robert Hughes once wrote, “had 
ever set down its ideals in such radically abstract images”.6 Yet the period of modernist
supremacy was to prove exceptionally shortlived. In 1925, mid-way through the experiment 
with the New Economic Policy, the Central Committee of the CPSU issued an important 
resolution {On The Party’s Policy In the Field O f Literature) which stipulated that Soviet artists 
should “make use of all the technical achievements of the old masters to work out an 
appropriate form, intelligible to the masses.”7 Seven years later, after a period in which the 
traditionalists had virtually hounded their modernist counterparts out of public life,8 the 
government abolished all artistic groups and established a single state-run organisation for each 
of the arts. It was this centralising reform which made possible the final suppression of 
modernism and enabled the government to enforce the main tenet of its new policy: that all 
Soviet artists should henceforth observe the conventions of “Socialist Realism”.
The doctrine of Socialist Realism was explored in detail for the first time at the Congress of the 
Union of Soviet Writers in 1934. The keynote addresses were given by Andrei Zhdanov (who 
was soon to assume the responsibility for enforcing cultural policy), Maxim Gorky, Karl Radek 
and Nikolai Bukharin. The English translation of the congress proceedings {Problems in Soviet 
Literature, published by Lawrence and Wishart in 1935) was the only substantive document on 
Soviet policy that British communists were able to consult during the 1930s.9 It can thus be 
regarded as the main source for anyone wishing to understand the intellectual context in which 
the CPGB’s cultural critics were obliged to operate. In the account that follows, I examine the 
cultural doctrine which it contained under four headings: prescriptive, aesthetic, historical and 
comparative.
1 THE PRESCRIPTIVE ELEMENT
The purpose of the prescriptive element in the 1934 speeches was to specify the central 
characteristics of Socialist Realism, ostensibly in the case of literature but also, mutatis 
mutandis, in the case of the other arts as well. It was Joseph Stalin who allegedly decided on the 
name Socialist Realism during a discussion on Soviet culture with Maxim Gorki and others in 
1932.10 None of the contributors to the Soviet Writers’ Congress provided a precise definition of 
it, but Andrei Zhdanov came closest when he said that the new art “means knowing life so as to 
be able to depict it truthfully in works of art, not to depict it in a dead, scholastic way, not 
simply as ‘objective reality,’ but to depict reality in its revolutionary development.”11 This 
definition, though vague, could essentially be broken down into two propositions about content 
and one about form. At the level of content, it insisted that Soviet art should contain a 
comprehensive portrait of the existing stage in the development of socialism, as well as a 
utopian anticipation of the communist society of the future (this latter element was usually
called “revolutionary romanticism”).12 At the level of form, it stipulated that artists should aim 
to make their work as accessible as possible by employing only “traditional” techniques.
When the Soviet theorists addressed the issue of how existing society could most effectively be 
portrayed, they instructed artists to obey the principle of ideinost (the view that art should 
interpret reality from a Marxist perspective) as well as that of klassovost (the view that art
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Both these principles were rooted in a wide-ranging critique of earlier forms of Soviet culture. It 
was made clear during the 1934 Congress that it was no longer acceptable for artists to express 
broad support for the October Revolution while eschewing a Marxist outlook. Bukharin devoted 
a lengthy passage to the work of several fellow-travelling poets who had come to prominence 
after 1917, condemning Blok and Yesenin for their mysticism and Bryussov for his reluctance 
to deal with contemporary events.14 A critical note was also adopted in a discussion of the 
avowedly Marxist writing which had been produced over the previous 17 years, with Bukharin 
suggesting that much of it had been vitiated either by crude sloganeering or by a narrow 
preoccupation with the fine detail of Soviet life.15 It was with these considerations in mind that 
Bukharin and his colleagues insisted that Socialist Realism should strive to express a synoptic 
vision of Soviet realities, on the assumption that art could only draw the population into 
political action by sharpening its understanding of the dialectical relationship between the 
various levels of the emerging social order. Gorky underscored the point by identifying several 
important themes which had yet to be addressed in Soviet literature, including the transformed 
role of women, the effects of industrialisation on the environment and the culture of the Soviet 
republics.16
Since the ability to think synoptically was seen as a precondition of further social progress, 
there was an obvious link between the principles of ideinost and klassovost and the question of 
revolutionary romanticism. In the speeches of 1934, especially that of Bukharin, the issue of 
how the anticipated glories of the communist future could be represented in art was approached 
in two ways. It was suggested, in the first place, that Soviet artists should adopt the lyricism 
associated with European Romanticism and apply it to their treatment of Soviet realities.17 If the 
everyday world of industrialisation, collective farms and other forms of “socialist construction” 
were seen to evoke a rhapsodic response, then the Soviet people would soon realise that their 
existing institutions contained the seeds of a future paradise. This sense of millennial 
expectation could be reinforced, secondly, by the depiction in all forms of art of what came to 
be known as “positive heroes”. The positive hero (or what some critics called the “type”) was 
portrayed as a sort of proletarian Ubermensch, physically powerful and intellectually dexterous, 
who had advanced to a new stage of evolution because of his heightened understanding of the
historical process.18 Because his central characteristic was an encyclopaedic grasp of all aspects 
of Soviet life, he was probably held by writers like Bukharin to prefigure a communist society 
in which the division of labour has been abolished and the individual expresses his creativity by 
fulfilling a diverse range of economic roles. The possible inspiration behind this idea was the 
famous passage from The German Ideology in which Marx and Engels, in one of their few 
comments on the likely nature of communism, spoke of the citizen of the future as one who 
would hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening and criticise after 
dinner.19
The idea of revolutionary romanticism raises obvious questions about the extent to which Soviet 
art was ever intended to be truly realistic. When we approach the issue of form, therefore, it is 
important to be clear that the Soviet theorists never employed the concept of realism in a strictly 
mimetic sense. Artists were instructed that their choice of form should always be governed by 
the principle of narodnost, which holds that the main obligation of art is to be immediately 
comprehensible to ordinaiy people. It was continually emphasised that mass influence could 
only be achieved through the use of such “traditional” forms as linear perspective in painting, 
rhyme and rhythm in poetry and the narrative conventions of the nineteenth-century novel in 
fiction. Yet there was no formal obligation on artists to reproduce the surface of the world with 
trompe Voeil precision.20 The emphasis at the 1934 Congress was on the importance of stylistic 
pluralism. The orthodox view was that the treatment of a theme must ultimately depend on the 
nature of the theme itself (we will return to this point when examining the doctrine of the unity 
of form and content); while Zhdanov, in a passage that belied his reputation for aesthetic 
intolerance, told Soviet writers that:
You have many different types o f  weapons. Soviet literature has every opportunity o f  employing 
these types o f weapons (genres, styles, forms and methods o f literary creation) in their diversity 
and fullness, selecting all the best that has been created in this sphere by all previous epochs.
From this point o f  view the critical assimilation o f the literary heritage o f all epochs,
represents a task which you must fulfil without fail, i f  you wish to become engineers o f human 
souls.21
If this passage is to be believed (and there is no reason to suppose that Zhdanov wrote it for 
purely tactical reasons), it follows that the theorists of Socialist Realism wished to establish an 
artistic culture in which a defining commitment to traditional forms was shown to be compatible 
with a fair amount of stylistic freedom. Although the bulk of Soviet art eventually turned out to 
be straightforwardly naturalistic, this probably had more to do with the influence of a small 
number of leading artists (Fadeyev, Gerasimov, Ostrovsky etc) than with any real measure of 
government intervention.22 Arguably this was an area in which Soviet artists imposed an 
orthodoxy on themselves.
Apart from sketching the broad characteristics of Socialist Realism at the level of both form and 
content, the prescriptive element in Soviet criticism also specified a series of reforms to the 
relations of cultural production in the USSR. There was considerable emphasis on the need to 
develop new forms of collaborative work which would enable Soviet artists to overcome the 
“bourgeois individualism” that afflicted their counterparts in the capitalist countries. The 
establishment of the Union of Soviet Writers was justified (insofar as it was justified at all) on 
the grounds that it would give established authors the opportunity to exert a beneficial influence 
on the USSR’s “hundreds” of “local beginners”.23 Gorky also wrote enthusiastically about the 
more structured modes of collaboration that had already been adopted throughout the USSR for 
the purpose of educating new writers. He referred to the massive encyclopaedias of local history 
which were then being published at a dizzying rate, most of which had been written by
beginners under the close supervision of well-known authors: “  this work will furnish them
[i.e. the beginners] with the widest scope for self-education, for raising their proficiency through 
collective work and through mutual self-criticism.”24 Yet all this paled into insignificance when 
compared to the most important organisational principle that was enunciated at the Writers’ 
Congress. This was the principle of partiinost (roughly translatable as “party-mindedness”) 
which stipulated that all artists had an ethical and political obligation to submit themselves to 
the guidance of the Communist Party. The Party would not merely have the right to prescribe 
the broad ideological orientation of a work (it had effectively done this for years), but also to 
make detailed recommendations about subject matter and style. It was obviously not possible to 
describe the administrative mechanisms by which the principle of partiinost would be 
implemented, since to do so would be to reveal the true nature of Soviet totalitarianism. The 
only passages which broached the issue were therefore characterised by a distinctive note of 
vague Stalinist uplift:
Under the leadership o f the Party, with the thoughtful and daily guidance o f the Central 
Committee and the untiring support and help o f Comrade Stalin, a whole army o f Soviet writers 
has rallied around the Soviet power and the Party. (Zhdanov)25
There has never been a state in the world where science and literature enjoyed such comradely 
help, such care fo r the raising o f professional proficiency among the workers o f art and science. 
(Gorky)26
Our entire Party, the Party o f Lenin and Stalin, has grown up and become hardened in the
struggle fo r  socialism Our artists should let this be fe lt and understood in their works.
(Stetsky)27
The Soviet theorists tried to legitimise the principle of partiinost with an appeal to authority. 
More specifically, they claimed that Lenin himself had endorsed the move towards state control
of the arts in his article “Party Organisation and Party Literature” (1905).28 Written in response 
to the limited measures of liberalisation that occurred in Russia after the abortive revolution of 
1905, Lenin’s article was a continuation of the work on democratic centralism which he had 
begun three years earlier in What is to be Done?29 Its chief concern was to identify the 
principles on which the revolutionary press should be based in the new conditions of “semi­
legality”. In the first place, Lenin argued, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party 
(RSDLP) should ensure that it retained control of the whole process of producing and 
distributing Party literature, from the initial stage of commissioning work to the final stage of 
selling it. The Party press should be run on strictly non-commercial lines. And, most 
importantly of all, the RSDLP should impose an absolute obligation on its writers to reflect its 
programme, resolutions, stategy and tactics in all the work they produced for its official 
publications.30 Lenin was impatient with the idea that he was advocating a form of censorship. If 
writers wished to express ideas that were inconsistent with the Party line, they were perfectly
free to do so in non-Party publications: “  we are discussing party literature and its
subordination to party control. Everyone is free to write and say whatever he likes, without any 
restrictions.”31 He also mocked the ideal of “absolute freedom” to which many Russian 
intellectuals seemed to aspire at the time, pointing out that no such freedom was possible in a 
society whose means of communication were monopolised by the bourgeoisie: “Are you free in 
relation to your bourgeois publisher, Mr Writer, in relation to your bourgeois public, which 
demands that you provide it with pornography in frames and paintings, and prostitution as a 
supplement to ‘sacred’ scenic art?”32
As Dave Laing has pointed out, many commentators on Lenin’s work have argued that there is 
nothing in “Party Organisation and Party Literature” that can reasonably be seen as a defence of 
a totalitarian arts policy. The essay makes practically no references to the creative arts (Lenin’s 
main concern was political writing) while its arguments about censorship are clearly applicable 
only to a revolutionary writer who is operating in a bourgeois-democratic society.33 Laing is one 
o f several writers who tends to disagree. He claims that Lenin’s contempt for the position of the 
writer under capitalism, combined with his failure to make a “clear cut distinction between the 
various kinds of writing”,34 made it “legitimate” for a later generation to cite him as an 
inspiration for the Stalinist cultural policy of the 1930s.35 What is not in doubt is that the Soviet 
theorists suppressed any hint of ambiguity in Lenin’s argument when they used it to justify their 
own position on the principle of partiinost. So it was that the founder of the Soviet state gave 
his posthumous imprimatur to the idea of Socialist Realism.36
2 THE AESTHETIC ELEMENT
The purpose of the aesthetic, historical and comparative elements in Soviet criticism was to 
provide intellectual support for a theory of Socialist Realism that might otherwise have been 
dismissed as crudely propagandistic. The aesthetic element, which sought to identify the 
philosophical ideas about art that were most consistent with Soviet policy, was chiefly the 
preserve of Nikolai Bukharin. In his paper “Poetry, Poetics and the Problems of Soviet Poetry”, 
Bukharin set out to do two things. The first was to sketch a reflectionist theory of art in which 
art’s power as a medium of political persuasion was related to its qualities of condensation and 
emotional expression. The second was to defend the doctrine of the unity of form and content 
against the ideas of the Russian Formalists.
Bukharin was specifically concerned with poetry when he formulated his ideas about aesthetics, 
though he implied that everything he said was broadly applicable to the other arts as well. In the 
course of a lengthy discussion, some of it devoted to a polemic against the “pure mysticism” of 
earlier Russian aestheticians, he effectively defined poetiy as a form which simultaneously 
reflects and condenses our sense experience, with the aim of expressing an emotional 
response.37 There were several ways in which this seemingly unexceptional definition was 
influenced by the need to legitimise Socialist Realism. By describing poetiy as a record of our 
actual experiences, Bukharin was trying to affirm what would later be called the “worldliness of 
texts” (the phrase is Edward Said’s)38 in the face of several theoretical trends which tended to 
obscure the links between art and society. The most important of these was modernism, with its 
emphasis on the “autonomy” of art; but Bukharin was probably also thinking about Saussurean 
linguistics (one of the key influences on the Formalist critics of the 1920s) which had famously 
described language as an arbitrary medium that effectively constitutes our experience rather 
than straightforwardly reflecting it.39 This elementary mimeticism was given depth by 
Bukharin’s emphasis on the role of condensation in artistic perception. While art is indeed a 
reflection of reality, he appeared to argue, it seeks to record only the most important aspects of 
our experiences and to eliminate everything else. In doing so it imbues its images with a 
“symbolic” capacity which allows them to refer to phenomena in general, not simply to the 
particular experiences in which they have their roots: “This “substitute” [i.e. the selected 
referent] becomes a “symbol”, an “image”, a type, an emotionally coloured unity, behind which 
and in the folds of whose garments thousands of other sensory elements are concealed.”40 
Moreover, thd technique of condensation means that art should be regarded not merely as a 
representation of sense experience but also as the expression of a definite point of view. Yet 
unlike science, which expresses its general truths in the form of rational propositions, art
involves a form of sensual thinking whereby images serve as substitutes for explicitly- 
formulated ideas.41 Art is a vehicle of doctrine, Bukharin seemed to be saying, though its 
understanding of the world is felt on the senses rather than registered by the intellect. His 
intention here was presumably to undermine the claim that the principle of ideinost would 
compromise the arts by subordinating the cultivation of sensibility to the expression of 
ideology.
If Bukharin saw the ability to convey doctrine at a sub-intellectual level as a crucial determinant 
of art’s political power, his more central emphasis was on the relationship between art and 
emotion. The chief function of poetiy, he argued, is “to assimilate and transmit experience and 
to educate character” (emphasis added),42 mainly by demonstrating the appropriate emotional 
responses both to the existing social order and to the possible societies of the future. When he 
tried to identify the sort of emotions to which art usually gives expression, he defined his 
position against the idea that the aesthetic faculty is an inherently disinterested one. According 
to the idea of disinterestedness, which had been central to philosophical aesthetics since at least 
the time of Karl Philipp Moritz,43 the artist invariably seeks to depict the world in a manner that 
is wholly devoid of “desire or will” (the phrase is Hegel’s).44 Instead of viewing external reality 
through the prism of self-interest, he surveys it in a spirit of pure contemplation. Bukharin 
reminded his audience that the idea of disinterestedness had been bent to a number of 
philosophical purposes in the previous 150 years. Kant had used it to justify his belief that 
aesthetic judgements can ultimately be placed on a universal, non-subjective footing. Hegel had 
used it to underscore the proposition that art is one of the main means by which the “world 
spirit” makes itself known to humanity. And Schopenhauer, in a move that greatly influenced 
Nietzsche, spoke of disinterestedness as one of the reasons why the arts could provide emotional 
sanctuary in a world otherwise dominated by the crude workings of “Will” 45
These ideas were obviously in conflict with the Soviet principle that the primary function of art 
is to stimulate desire for a new social system. Bukharin’s tactic was therefore to challenge the 
idea of disinterestedness by invoking its polar opposite. Art, he implied, should properly be 
regarded as one of the forms of human behaviour that expresses desire at its most 
uncompromising: its main emotional characteristic is that of “active militant force”.46 The point 
was defended historically rather than philosophically. It was perfectly common, Bukharin 
appeared to argue, for the work of the earliest artists to be judged in public by the mass audience 
at whom it was aimed. His main example was the so-called “poetic contests” held in ancient 
Greece, when “the poets were awarded crowns by the crowd.”47 Since the easiest way to secure 
the approval of the lower orders was to reflect the intensities of mass emotion, it followed that 
art was defined at it origins as an expression of untrammelled desire. No form that originated in
such circumstances, Bukharin implied, could ever have subsequently become a vehicle for the 
sort of disinterested contemplation that Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer had celebrated.
Having defined poetry in terms of the relationship between reflection, condensation and the 
expression of emotion, Bukharin concluded his analysis by examining the relationship between 
form and content in literature.48 His broad argument, in line with a long tradition in 
philosophical aesthetics, was that the unity of form and content is a crucial precondition of 
aesthetic significance. He appeared to mean two things by this, one of them entirely orthodox 
and the other more unusual. The orthodox claim was that a successful work of art will allow the 
way it says things (its form) to be determined by the things it chooses to say (its content), even 
though the former has the ultimate responsibility for breathing aesthetic life into the latter. 
Ralph Fox would later summarise this doctrine, which originated with Hegel and was largely 
endorsed by Marx,49 in the following way: “Form is produced by content, is identical and one 
with it, and, though the primacy is on the side of content, form reacts on content and never 
remains passive.”50 Bukharin’s more unusual claim, the one to which he paid most attention, 
was primarily concerned with what we might call the transparency of form. A particular formal 
strategy is only functioning effectively, he appeared to argue, if it allows immediate access to a 
work’s content. If it seems to exist independently of its content, becoming an object of 
perception in its own right, it will have failed in its primary task of communicating an 
aestheticised understanding of the world.51 The motivation behind this attitude was clearly an 
anti-modernist one. The formal innovations which modernism had pioneered, such as 
discontinuous composition in literature, atonalism in music and non-linear representation in 
painting, were often so startling that they appeared to contemporary observers to systematically 
divert attention from whatever it was that an artist wished to say. No such problem existed, or so 
Bukharin implied, with the more traditional forms employed by the Socialist Realists.
Bukharin’s attack on the technical innovations of modernism largely took the form of a lengthy 
critique of the Russian Formalists, the group of literary theoreticians who, under the leadership 
of such figures as Viktor Shklovsky, Roman Jakobson and Boris Tomashevsky, had exercised a 
massive influence on the Soviet avant-garde between 1917 and the end of the 1920s.52 Formalist 
theory was rooted in the belief that the function of literature (and of art more generally) is to 
“defamiliarise” our everyday habits of perception. Since our responses to external reality tend to 
become sullied by routine, literature’s purpose is to remind us of the sensory richness that 
surrounds us. The originality of the Formalists’ case lay in its explanation of how this occurs. 
Defamiliarisation is possible, they argued, because the forms that a work of literature employs 
are initially perceived in isolation from its content. When we first encounter a poem, for 
instance, our attention is drawn not to what it says but to the “heap of devices” (rhyme, metre,
imagery etc.) that differentiates it from non-literary uses of language. The effort to “see beyond” 
these devices is what moves us to concentrate our minds afresh on the richness of whatever it is 
that the poem describes. The purpose of much Formalist writing was therefore to identify the 
most powerful devices that literature has at its disposal. For instance, as Ann Jefferson has 
pointed out, the Formalists argued that poetry owes most of its aesthetic force to the fact that it 
(1) yokes together disparate sounds in an effort to “impede” pronunciation, (2) defies the 
conventions of syntax in order to facilitate the use of regular (or sometimes irregular) metre, and
(3) makes widespread use of what would later be called “multiple signifiers” -  that is, words 
which have more than one meaning.53 In their analysis of prose fiction, they emphasised the 
distinction between “fabula” (“the chronological series of events”)54 and “siuzhet” (“the order 
and manner in which they are actually presented in the narrative”).55 It is the tension between 
the two, or so the argument went, that encourages the reader to focus his attention less on the 
story he is being told than on the techniques of the storyteller.56
Bukharin’s critique of these ideas began with a slightly perfunctory attack on the ahistorical 
nature of Formalist analysis. Echoing a point that Leon Trotsky had made in Literature and 
Revolution,51 he argued that the Formalists were unable to account for the power of literary form 
because they had failed to examine the relationship between literature and society. More 
interesting were his comments on the likely artistic consequences of the theoretical emphasis on 
the autonomy of form. If intellectuals persist in claiming that form is inherently separable from 
content, Bukharin argued, they will end up creating a situation in which writers become wholly 
indifferent to meaning and produce works consisting exclusively of pure sound (the point was 
hammered home with the only joke to be made at the Writers’ Congress: “Down with Faust and 
long live ‘Dyr bull shirr’!”)58 The political stimulus behind this process was said to be the desire 
o f bourgeois writers to ignore the revolutionary ideas that were increasingly prominent in 
international literature.59 Apart from threatening the whole of literary culture with terminal 
collapse, the emergence of abstract literature would also have the effect of reinforcing two of 
the most reactionary ideologies in the contemporary world. By reducing literature to the 
elaboration of what were effectively private languages, it would engender support for a form of 
“individualism” that was practically solipsistic.60 And by depriving the intellect o f any element 
of meaning to which it might respond, it would give succour to precisely the sort of 
irrationalism that the fascist movement had sought to revive.61
3 THE HISTORICAL ELEMENT
The historical element in Soviet criticism was less fully developed at the time of the Writers’ 
Congress than either the prescriptive, aesthetic or comparative elements. But it was already
obvious that the Soviet theorists would be employing historical analysis in two main ways in 
order to legitimise the doctrine of Socialist Realism. They would be attempting, in the first 
place, to survey the history of the arts from the perspective of historical materialism. Secondly, 
they would be trawling through the past in order to locate artistic movements and cultural 
practices that could plausibly be described as precursors of Socialist Realism.
There was an obvious motive behind the attempt to apply historical materialism to the study of 
the arts. By demonstrating that social conditions had always played a powerful role in shaping 
artistic expression, the Soviet theorists intended to rebut the claim that Socialist Realism was 
necessarily philistine in its goal of combining art and politics. Yet very little substantive work in 
this area seems to have been produced in the USSR until the 1950s. It is true that the 
contributors to the 1934 Congress had a sort of reflexive tendency to characterise individual 
writers in terms of their social position, but the most that this involved was usually a very broad 
(and also very brief) attempt to sketch the parallels between a writer’s ideology and the major 
events of his time. For example, Dostoevsky’s pessimism was described by Gorky as the direct 
expression of czarism in decline;62 whereas Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front was 
seen by Radek as one of the most powerful exemplars of pacifist despair in the wake of the 
Great War.63 The consequence of this was that the materialist analysis of the arts became the 
one area of cultural discourse in which there was no Soviet orthodoxy for foreign communists to 
follow.64 It was therefore necessary for the international movement to use a number of earlier 
texts in the Marxist tradition as a source of theoretical guidance, among the most important of 
which were Marx’s and Engels’s scattered comments on topics such as realism, myth and the 
nature of literary commitment, Plekhanov’s essays on “art and social life” and Lenin’s articles 
on Tolstoy.65 The work of such writers as Mehring, Lafargue and Bogdanov was not much 
known outside its country of origin, at least in the early part of the 1930s. Trotsky’s work had 
been deemed off-limits for communists after his expulsion from the CPSU in 1928.
The attempt to find precursors for Socialist Realism was conducted on two levels. The initial 
concern of the Soviet theorists was to identify comparatively recent work (that is, work from the 
mid-nineteenth century onwards) which employed realistic or naturalistic forms to express a 
dissident perspective on Russian politics. The novelists who tended to get mentioned most 
frequently were Tolstoy, Chemyshevsky and Gorky; while the so-called “Wanderers” group 
(especially Repin and Yaroshenko) were celebrated for their revolt against Academic painting in 
the period after 1863.66 Yet at the time of the Writers’ Congress it was still unusual for this 
tradition of “Critical Realism” to be analysed in much depth. Better developed was what might 
be termed the anthropological element in the Soviet search for a radical cultural heritage. This
involved the startling claim that the expressive forms which had existed in primitive societies 
were often deeply prefigurative of Socialist Realism.
The most important example of anthropological analysis in the 1934 speeches was Gorky’s 
divagation on the nature of myth.67 Rejecting the idea that primitive man was essentially a sort 
of “philosophising idealist and mystic”68 (that is, someone wholly preoccupied with the 
influence of supernatural forces), Gorky argued that the primary function of myth was to 
express a plebeian yearning for the domination of nature. Myths, he pointed out, were full of 
scenes in which human beings employed fantastical methods in order to overcome the elements: 
some wore “seven-league boots” and strode across vast distances in a matter of seconds, others 
made magic carpets and learned how to fly.69 The effect of these scenes was at once 
psychological and practical. Apart from providing temporary respite from the uncomfortable 
realities of primitive labour, they also stimulated real improvements to the forces of production. 
“Men”, wrote Gorky in one of a number of examples, “conceived the possibility of spinning and
weaving a vast amount of fabric in one night [as a result of this] they created the primitive
hand loom”.70 A related feature of the mythological imagination was an awareness of the 
importance of representations. Myths often incorporated “exorcisms and incantations” which 
sought to influence nature by depicting the desired outcome of a particular form of economic 
activity. These were usually addressed to the gods, “heroes of labour” such as Hercules or 
Vassilisa the Wise, who were seen by Gorky as largely lacking in supernatural characteristics 
but distinct from ordinary humanity by virtue of their immense achievements in production.71
The parallels between Gorky’s understanding of myth and the Soviet conception of Socialist 
Realism are clear enough. Both forms were held to stimulate change by (1) projecting a vision 
of economic paradise, (2) emphasising the importance of representation, and (3) employing 
“heroes” whose most vivid characteristic was a genius for transforming nature. It is perhaps less 
clear why anyone should have wanted to draw such parallels in the first place. The answer 
probably lies in the assumption that human culture was somehow purer at the moment of its 
origin than at any time since. By emphasising the links between Socialist Realism and myth, 
writers such as Gorky were implying that the new workers’ state had recaptured the freshness of 
perception that inspired humanity at the start of its historical journey. As we shall see in Chapter 
Three, it was anthropological speculations of this sort which often roused the British 
communists to do some of their most challenging work.
4 THE COMPARATIVE ELEMENT
The purpose of the comparative element in the 1934 speeches was to legitimise Soviet culture 
by contrasting it favourably with the culture of the capitalist powers. Whereas the USSR was 
said to be breathing new life into culture at all levels (especially with the development of 
Socialist Realism), capitalism was condemned for reducing culture to a state of permanent 
crisis. This crucial doctrine of cultural crisis had two distinctive elements. The first was the very 
broad argument that the market economy had always exercised a poisonous influence on culture 
by virtue of being (a) aesthetically impoverished, (b) hostile to intellectual excellence and (c) 
corrupting in its effects on human nature. The second was the claim that the arts in capitalist 
society had undergone a particularly rapid decline in the period since the mid-nineteenth 
century. Both these elements need to be examined if we want to understand what turned out to 
be the most limiting aspect of Soviet criticism.
The idea of cultural crisis had deep roots in the Marxist tradition. Marx’s critique of capitalism 
was arguably aesthetic before it was economic (this was an issue on which Althusser famously 
had a lot to say); while his pessimism about the fate of the arts in market society often found 
expression in the form of aphorisms, asides and scattered critical judgements. However, it needs 
to be remembered that many of the texts in which he explored the idea of cultural crisis (notably 
the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844) were largely unknown to communist 
intellectuals in the 1930s.72 This helps to explain the somewhat ad hoc feel which characterised 
the comparative element in Soviet criticism, many of whose arguments seemed to have more in 
common with the tradition of romantic anti-capitalism than with Marxism.
When the Soviet theorists tried to identify the general reasons for what they regarded as the 
opposition between capitalism and culture, they began by arguing that cultural decline was the 
inevitable consequence of an economic system that had stripped the labour process of the last 
traces of aesthetic significance. The modem worker was portrayed as an unmotivated dullard 
who regarded his job as a means to an end (that of avoiding starvation) but never as a source of 
self-fulfilment. The problem was blamed on the mood of asceticism that was held to flow 
ineluctably from the process of capital accumulation. Since the bulk of employers have no 
choice but to hold down wages in order to secure an adequate stock of investment capital, it 
follows that bourgeois ideology will place considerable emphasis on the virtues of self-denial: 
“The less you eat, drink, buy books...the more you save, the greater grows your fortune which 
neither moth nor rust can corrupt -  your capital” (Marx).73 Yet the ethic of self-denial is wholly 
antithetical to the aesthetic impulse. The worker ceases to experience “joy in labour” because he 
is infected with an outlook that regards all forms of pleasure as fundamentally immoral.
Moreover, because the outlook of any given society is largely determined by the nature of its 
economic institutions, the aesthetic poverty that characterises the labour process will soon 
spread outwards to corrupt all other forms of human activity.74
The laws of accumulation were also central to Soviet accounts of the status of the intellect in 
market societies. It was Gorky who noted that capitalism tends to exert a deeply contradictory 
influence on intellectual culture. On the one hand, driven by the need to ensure continuous 
improvements to the means of production, it breeds the prejudice that instrumental reason is by 
far the most important of all the human faculties. The main consequences are a neglect of 
spiritual values and blind worship of material progress. And yet, paradoxically, capitalism is 
often quite incapable of exploiting the scientific developments which its own laws have called 
into being. The so-called “anarchy of the marketplace”, which makes it impossible to be sure 
that every commodity will necessarily find a buyer, has often discouraged (or at least delayed) 
investment in the more expensive forms of new technology (Gorky’s example was the failure of 
the French to utilise the steamship for many years after its invention). When scientific 
discoveries are neglected in this way, the result is a mood of cynicism about intellectual activity 
which threatens to spill over into the sort of violent irrationalism that fascism has tried to 
exploit.75 The situation is worsened by the free market’s subtly corrupting influence on human 
nature. A society based on competition, Gorky argued, is less likely to breed a race of rugged 
individualists than a people for whom deviousness, calculation and dishonesty are the stuff of 
everyday life.76 Proof of this is afforded by the sort of characters who have dominated both 
popular and elite literature since the dawn of the capitalist age:
From the figure o f Till Eulenspiegel, created at the end o f the fifteenth century, that o f 
Simplicissimus in the seventeenth century, Lazarillo de Tormes, Gil Bias, the heroes o f Smollett 
and Fielding, down to the “Dear Friend” o f Maupassant, to Arsene Lupin, to the heroes o f 
“detective ” literature in present-day Europe, we can count thousands o f books the heroes o f 
which are rogues, thieves, assassins and agents o f the criminal police. This is what constitutes 
genuine bourgeois literature, reflecting most vividly the real tastes, the interests and the 
practical “morals” o f its consumers11
But what of literature more generally? The Soviet theorists claimed that the crisis in bourgeois 
literature had begun in earnest with the emergence of the art-for-art’s-sake movement (and its 
doctrine of aestheticism) in the mid-nineteenth century.78 Gorky, who devoted several pages to 
the issue, seemed to believe that aestheticism is best understood as a deliberately antinomian 
response to the marginalisation of art.79 Appalled that capitalism should have consigned them to 
a position of relative unimportance in modem culture, the leading aesthetes (men such as 
Huysmans, Baudelaire and Wilde) tried to dramatise their disaffection from the wider society by 
conflating art with the transgression of existing morality. The pursuit of beauty was thus seen as
inseparable from “sexual dissidence” (the phrase is Jonathan Dollimore’s), experimentation 
with narcotics and the cultivation of a self-consciously demonic outlook. Because of this 
descent into ethical chaos, Gorky went on to imply, aestheticism swiftly became a breeding 
ground for a peculiarly noxious form of authoritarian politics. Although the aesthetes were 
ostensibly hostile to all forms of political engagement, their brand of amoral individualism has 
radiated outwards from the cultural sphere and exercised a disastrous influence on public life. 
The nearest political equivalent to the aesthete is the “mad animal” of fascist or Czarist 
persuasion who demonstrates his contempt for ordinary values by brutalising his opponents.80
Gorky made a brief attempt to apply these ideas to the particular case of Russia. He seemed to 
believe that Russian aestheticism had been exemplified by Fyodor Dostoevsky (this is one of 
the more bizarre judgements in Soviet criticism), whose protagonist in Memoirs from  
Underground embodied the aesthete’s “whining despair” in its most debased form.81 It was 
therefore unsurprising that Dostoevsky’s politics were among the most reactionary in 
nineteenth-century literature. He detested the democratic forces in Russian politics (his enduring 
hatred was for Vissarion Belinsky), supported Russian imperialism and regretted the abolition 
of serfdom in 1861. Since the majority of Russian intellectuals were profoundly influenced by 
Dostoevsky, it therefore follows (or so Gorky argued) that their retreat from democratic ideals 
after the revolution of 1905 was largely a response to his own political example. Aestheticism 
had conspired to frustrate the march of History.82
The analysis of more recent trends in bourgeois literature (those from 1914 onwards) was 
primarily undertaken by Karl Radek, whose paper on “World Literature” has generally been 
seen as the crudest and most vituperative contribution to the 1934 Congress. Surveying the most 
influential work from the earlier part of this period, his main complaint was that none of it 
responded properly to either the Great War (seen as a clash between rival imperialisms) or the 
October Revolution. At the outbreak of the War, so the argument went, the literary intelligentsia 
had effectively become recruiting officers for the bourgeois state, producing work that glorified 
nationalism and obscured the economic reasons for the fighting (Radek’s only example was 
Anatole France).83 Even when the majority of writers had turned against the War, they could 
only express their opposition by resorting to a form of political quietism. Some of them, such as 
Henri Barbusse in Under Fire, spoke of the war as a cosmic necessity which illustrated once 
again that humanity’s fate was essentially tragic.84 Others, such as Remarque in All Quiet on the 
Western Front, embraced a world-weary cynicism about human nature and turned to provincial 
life as a sanctuary from high politics.85 None of them acknowledged what Radek seemed to 
regard as obvious: that war would only end when socialism had triumphed over capitalism. 
When it came to the October Revolution, therefore, bourgeois writers had either described it as
a descent into barbarism (H.G. Wells), praised its spirit but dismissed its political content 
(Romain Rolland) or treated it as a continuation of capitalism by other means.86 The political 
ignorance which had seeped into world literature with the art-for-art’s-sake movement had thus 
reached its apogee.
Surveying the literature of the 1930s, Radek argued that the majority of bourgeois writers had 
now moved in one of two directions. Those who lived in Hitler’s Germany, Mussolini’s Italy or 
Pilsudski’s Poland had embraced the fascist aesthetic and become apologists for their respective 
regimes.87 Their counterparts in the bourgeois democracies had opted for the less barbaric but 
equally dangerous path of modernist experimentation. Radek saw modernism as an attempt to 
justify a retreat from political action at a time of accelerated social crisis. Using Joyce’s Ulysses 
as his example, he argued that its fundamental strategy was to convey the impression that 
humanity’s natural condition is one of unrelieved banality: “there is nothing big in life”.88 By 
seeking to represent the fine detail of everyday existence, wholly eschewing the selectivity that 
Bukharin had identified as a condition of great art, it sought to dissolve our nobler illusions 
about human nature in a tangle of meaningless conversations, pointless actions and lowering 
physical detail. When Joyce attempted to record every action that his protagonist Stephen 
Daedalus had committed over the course of 24 hours, he was guilty (or so Radek famously 
argued) of creating a work which amounted to nothing more than:
A heap o f dung, crawling with worms, photographed by a cinema apparatus through a 
microscope...89
Radek implied that one of Joyce’s central objectives was to encourage an attitude of 
“impartiality” towards the competing trends in contemporary politics, on the grounds that no 
amount of political action can rescue human beings from their fallen state. However, since the 
modem age is one in which “the fascists are trying to stamp out the remnants of culture and rob 
the workers of their last rights”(a point which Radek made in response to Wieland Herzfelde, 
who defended Joyce at the Congress),90 it follows that impartiality invariably functions in the 
modem world as an enemy of democracy.91 It is one of those forces which acts in what 
communists liked to call the “objective” interests of the ruling class. There is also a pronounced 
strain of irrationalism in the modernist outlook. Most modernist works are concerned less with 
the conscious than with the unconscious mind, which they seek to portray (in a manner which 
Radek presumably felt was wholly consistent with the fascist yearning for Sturm und Drang), as 
a more reliable guide to human nature than the detached operations of the intellect.92
Since one of my aims in the rest of this thesis is to examine the influence of Soviet cultural 
theory on the work produced by British Marxists in the 1930s, it might be helpful to summarise 
the foregoing material in the form of related points. Working within the four broad categories 
that we have identified (prescriptive, aesthetic, historical and comparative), the Soviet theorists 
gave particular emphasis to the following arguments:
• Socialist Realism, shaped by the principles of ideinost and klassovost, should aim to provide 
a synoptic perspective on the existing stage in the development of society.
• Socialist Realism should incorporate material which hints at the richness of the communist 
society of the future, especially by (1) adapting the romantic sensibility to the portrayal of 
existing realities, and (2) making use of “positive heroes”.
• Artists will only achieve mass influence (thereby observing the principle of narodnost) if 
they eschew modernist experimentation in favour of traditional forms. However, the 
commitment to realism does not imply a naturalistic approach to the depiction of external 
reality.
• Artists must stop regarding themselves as autonomous cultural workers and submit 
wholeheartedly to the guidance of the Communist Party. New forms of collective creativity 
must be developed to challenge the aesthetic individualism which is characteristic of 
capitalist culture.
• In the process of reflecting reality, the arts also condense our sense experiences in order to 
express a particular point of view. Artistic truths are registered by the senses rather than 
absorbed by the intellect.
• Art is not a “disinterested” medium of communication. Its ultimate purpose is to stimulate 
desire for change.
• Art can only function effectively if it achieves a dialectical unity between form and content.
Work which seeks to make form autonomous from content will ultimately give rise to
abstraction, solipsism and irrationalism.
• There is a tradition of “Critical Realism” in European culture which established some of the 
fundamental principles on which socialist art should be based.
• Myth can be regarded as a precursor of Socialist Realism. The investigation of primitive
culture is an important component of Marxist criticism, since it can help to identify the
essence of human culture.
• The capitalist mode of production is detrimental to human culture because it (1) deprives 
the worker of pleasure in his work, (2) undermines faith in the power of the intellect, and (3) 
corrupts human nature with its emphasis on competition.
• Bourgeois literature has undergone a precipitate decline since the middle of the nineteenth 
century, beginning with the emergence of the art-for-art’s sake movement and culminating 
with the birth of modernism.
5 THE BRITISH RESPONSE
At this point, to prepare the ground for the chapters which follow, it is worth repeating our 
broad argument about the extent of Soviet influence on British cultural Marxism in the second 
half of the 1930s. Our contention is that the ideas outlined above (along with a number of 
historical and cultural theses associated with the Popular Front strategy) provided the British 
communists with the defining assumptions of their own work on the prescriptive, aesthetic, 
historical and comparative elements of socialist cultural politics. But the British writers were 
rarely content merely to parrot the Soviet line. Their wider ambition was to extend orthodoxy in 
novel directions, often (though not always) by drawing on ideas that were already familiar from 
the so-called “Culture and Society” tradition in English criticism. .Arguably, their attempt to 
synthesise the two traditions reflected the conviction that the main concerns of Soviet theory 
were broadly similar to those which had preoccupied British thinkers (especially those on the 
left) since long before the USSR had been established.
The spirit in which British Marxists responded to Soviet theory was clearly illustrated on the 
rare occasions when they wrote directly about the 1934 Congress. One of the British 
representatives at the Congress was Amabel Williams-Ellis, an early editor of Left Review, who 
described her experiences in a long article for the journal in November 1934.93 It was clear that 
what most attracted her to Soviet culture was the impression that the leading authors had all 
secured a mass audience. At various times during the Congress, often in the middle of important 
speeches, proceedings would be halted so that delegates from different sectors of the Soviet 
economy (mining, agriculture, defence etc.) could express their thanks to the new generation of 
writers for the high quality of its work. There was even one afternoon on which the Congress 
adjourned to an outdoor stadium at the Park of Rest and Culture, where they witnessed a 
number of writers being cheered by 10,000 ordinary citizens. Williams-Ellis described these 
events without betraying the slightest suspicion that they were less spontaneous than the 
authorities had implied.94 Similarly, she also revealed a great deal about the kind of deference 
which foreign Marxists were expected to display in the presence of their Soviet hosts. During 
the discussion that followed Radek’s contribution on world literature -  described as “very able” 
-  she suggested that Radek had overestimated the influence of certain British writers (Shaw, 
Wells, Joyce) and underestimated the influence of others (Huxley in particular). It is not clear 
whether she received a direct response to her comments; but something seems to have happened
which convinced her that she and other critics of Soviet theory were suffering from a sort of 
residual petit-bourgeois prissiness about literary judgement. “The effect of the conference”, she 
wrote in a suitably chastened state, “will certainly be to help the creators in their age-old battle 
against the prigs.”95 It was an interesting example of the way that the cultural arguments of the 
1930s were often won by those who could lay claim to the greatest amount of proletarian 
authenticity.
On the other hand, as Valentine Cunningham as pointed out,96 there was at least one respect in 
which Williams-Ellis’s article included material which the Soviet authorities might have 
regretted. She devoted a lengthy passage to a speech by the novelist Ilya Ehrenbourg, author of 
Julio Jurenito, which had adopted an unusually critical line on existing examples of Socialist 
Realism. Ehrenburg, it was pointed out, had condemned the obsession with technology and 
neglect of emotion that characterised many Soviet novels, chastised younger writers for their 
avoidance of political controversy (“They carefully steer round themes which seem difficult”)97 
and questioned the wisdom of continually drawing parallels between the industrial worker and 
the creative artist.98 By the time that the congress proceedings were published in book form, the 
text of Ehrenbourg’s speech had been suppressed.
One of the other British writers who commented directly on the Writers’ Congress was 
Montagu Slater, who reviewed Problems o f Soviet Literature in Left Review in October 1935." 
Slater’s approach was to focus on a single similarity between Soviet and English criticism. The 
issue he chose was the analysis of form and its consequences for the public role of the writer. 
Slater implied that when Bukharin advocated the study of form (see above) he did so because he 
believed that it would enhance the writer’s ability to communicate with a mass audience. The 
more a writer knows about the technical aspects of his art, Bukharin has seemed to argue, the 
greater the likelihood that he will eschew formal obscurities and seek to perform a genuinely 
bardic function. Slater’s point was that the leading English proponents of formal scholarship 
had also perceived the links between the analysis of form and the extension of literary culture. 
Shortly after T.S. Eliot undertook the painstaking analysis of seventeenth-century verse forms, 
he became obsessed with music hall, jazz and other forms of popular entertainment. The result 
of this obsession was Eliot’s play Murder in the Cathedral, whose debt to popular narrative 
bespoke a “longing for an audience organised on something more than an academic basis.”100 
Slater’s other example of a formal scholar turned literary populist was Robert Graves, whose 
early exercises in practical criticism (most of them produced in collaboration with Laura 
Riding) had stimulated an interest in nursery rhymes, street songs and folklore. The only real 
difference between the Soviet and British writers (or so Slater implied)) was that the former 
lived in a society which encouraged their democratic aspirations, whereas the latter had been
frustrated in their attempts to bring literature to the masses by the elitism of the dominant 
cultural institutions.101
Slater’s argument was hardly a strong one. Neither Eliot nor Graves had ever made a serious 
attempt to produce work that would be accessible to a mass audience; nor (especially in Eliot’s 
case) did they necessarily believe that it would be desirable to do so. Graves was so appalled by 
Slater’s account of his work that he wrote a sarcastic letter to Left Review, published in 
December 1935, in which he claimed that:
The trouble with writers like Mr Slater is not that their political sympathies are misplaced, but 
that, by trying to rally literature, art and several other interests under the banner o f politics, 
they are bound to be more ignorant o f literature, art and so on than wise about politics.102
But the crucial thing about Slater’s article was not the accuracy of its critical judgements so 
much as its attitude towards Soviet criticism. By showing -  or claiming to show -  that the 
Soviet theorists were interested in much the same things as their English counterparts, it helped 
to create the intellectual context in which the CPGB’s cultural critics did their most important 
work. It is this body of work that we must now examine.
6 CONCLUSION
The Soviet Writers’ Congress of 1934 greatly increased the influence of the world communist 
movement on English Marxist criticism. Although the political strategies pursued by the 
Communist International had loosely set the intellectual agenda for English criticism in the 
period between 1928 and 1933, there was no real body of theoretical writings on which the 
CPGB’s critics were then expected to draw. The influence of political factors remained 
important after 1934 (as we shall see in Chapter Six) but there was now a highly integrated set 
o f cultural doctrines, organised around the idea of Socialist Realism, which provided the 
intellectual framework within which the British writers tried to operate. The influence of Soviet 
theory was particularly evident in the work of Alick West, Ralph Fox and Christopher 
Caudwell, the three writers who are usually regarded as the founding fathers of English Marxist 
literary theory. However, it would be wrong to see either West, Fox or Caudwell as a mere 
cipher for Soviet concerns. As we survey their work over the course of the next three chapters, it 
wil become clear that their response to Soviet ideas was often idiosyncratic to the point of 
outright unorthodoxy. Much of this unorthodoxy was the result of their attempt to supplement 
Soviet theory with ideas drawn from the Western tradition of cultural thinking.
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CHAPTER THREE
ALICK WEST; LOYALTY. DISSIDENCE AND THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY
The ideas explored at the Soviet Writers’ Congress of 1934 provided the intellectual raw 
materials for the development of Marxist literary theory in Britain. It is widely recognised that 
the three most important English theorists of the 1930s were Alick West, Ralph Fox and 
Christopher Caudwell,1 each of whom published his first theoretical work in 1937. (Both Fox 
and Caudwell had been killed in Spain before their books appeared.) One of the main purposes 
of the next three chapters is to show how the work of West, Fox and Caudwell was indeed 
shaped, albeit loosely, by the central tenets of Soviet theory. On the other hand, in line with the 
revisionist assumption that the relationship between the USSR and the rest of the communist 
movement was never monolithic, I will also argue that West, Fox and Caudwell all produced 
work that was often strikingly unorthodox. West was a communist of semi-dissident instincts 
whose suspicion of the world movement stemmed from its perceived abandonment of a 
communitarian vision of the human future. Although Fox was ostensibly the most loyal of Party 
intellectuals, he nevertheless produced a theory of the novel that was frequently inconsistent 
with the main principles of Marxism, not least because he failed to identify the distinctively 
“bourgeois” elements in the work of the English writers whom he used to flesh out the insights 
of the Soviet theorists. Caudwell was similarly cavalier in his attempts to supplement Soviet 
theory with a variety of trends in contemporary Western thought, though his own descent into 
unorthodoxy should also be linked to his autodidacticism.
Of the three “founding fathers” of Marxist literary theory in Britain, it was only Alick West 
(1895-1972) who survived into old age.2 One of the fruits of his longevity was a remarkable 
volume of memoirs, One Man in his Time, which he began writing in 1956 but only completed 
shortly before its publication in 1969.3 The book was clearly intended as a sort of loyalist’s 
critique of the politics of the world communist movement.4 After more than 40 years as one of 
the CPGB’s most respected intellectuals, West revealed that he had begun to doubt the Party’s 
strategic thinking almost as soon as he became a member in 1935, and that his doubts had 
persisted throughout the whole of the post-war period.5 His main criticism of the Party — and of 
world communism more generally -  can be fairly easily stated. West believed that the world 
movement had gone into decline because it had lost sight of the fact that the majority of people 
are drawn to communism by the promise of a revolution in culture, specifically one which 
downgrades individualism and encourages a heightened sense of community. Instead of fighting
to create a society in which human solidarity is the overarching principle, the majority of 
communist organisations had become preoccupied with issues of economics and politics to the 
exclusion of everything else. The price of this failure (or so West implied) was a growing sense 
of frustration among genuine communists which often resulted in spectacular outbursts of revolt 
against the dour apparatchiks who controlled the world movement. This provided the 
explanation for the sort of savage repression that occurred in Hungary in 1956 and 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. If international communism is ever to move beyond its authoritarian 
impasse, it therefore has no choice but to reconnect itself to the cultural vision which accounts 
for much of its appeal.6 Since West evidently regarded himself as a representative communist 
dissident, these arguments were largely conveyed through the medium of his own personal 
history. As we shall see, One Man in his Time is essentially a record of West’s own engagement 
with the idea of human solidarity. It traces his enthusiasm for the communitarian ideal to the 
experiences of his early childhood, evokes its central role in his conversion to communism 
(while making it clear that other factors were also important) and charts his disappointment on 
seeing it betrayed by his own Party. At the same time, however, it would be wrong simply to 
regard the book as a straightforward expression of internal opposition to the CPGB’s political 
and cultural decline. In its closing pages, writing movingly about the rich insights which 
membership of the Party had brought to his life, West made it clear that he remained a loyal 
member and that “I still believe that communism is necessary to the freedom of mankind”.7 As 
such, some 20 years before the emergence of a revisionist school of Party history, he displayed 
precisely the blend of loyalty and dissidence which the revisionist historians have since 
described as the central feature of communism in Britain.
There is an obvious danger in basing an account of West’s work on information drawn from his 
memoirs. In the absence of any biographical work on West, there is no means of knowing 
whether One Man in his Time provides an accurate account of its author’s life. The problem is 
compounded by the remarkably elusive nature of much of the writing. One Man in his Time is 
surely unique among autobiographies in being almost wholly devoid of explicit statements 
about its author’s character. Instead of using slabs of discursive prose to draw out the 
significance of the various events which he relates, West expects his readers to piece together an 
impression of his personality from the narrative alone. (This preference for “showing” rather 
than “telling” has had a disastrous effect on the reception of the book. With the exception of 
Maynard Solomon, whose remarks are anyway too compressed to be of much use,8 few of the 
people who have written about One Man in his Time has even mentioned its most important 
themes.) Nevertheless, I would suggest that there are two reasons why One Man in his Time 
should serve as a frame for any substantive discussion of West’s critical writings. The first is 
that it throws an enormous amount of light on the way that West’s critical and theoretical
assumptions were shaped by his personal response to developments in the world communist 
movement. Once we have read the book, the political subtext of many of the critical writings 
suddenly becomes clear -  at least if we make the effort to read between the lines. This suggests 
that it can largely be trusted as a record of West’s ideological development, even if its wider 
biographical reliability remains uncertain. Secondly, it is important to remember that West 
intended One Man in his Time as a contribution to the ongoing debate about the future direction 
of the communist movement. When he wrote about his overwhelming need for community, his 
belief that the communitarian ideal is best served by Marxism and his disappointment at the 
degeneration of world communism, he was advancing an argument which he hoped would be 
instrumental in setting the movement on a new course. In other words, the book deserves a 
place in any account of West’s critical writings because it is arguably his most important critical 
work. The first section of this chapter provides a reading of One Man in his Time which tries to 
show how the entire narrative is structured by West’s communitarian ideals. Section Two 
examines Crisis and Criticism, the major work of literary theory which West published in 1937, 
describing it as a largely orthodox book which nevertheless extends Soviet theory in some 
highly innovative ways. Sections Three and Four turn to the more unorthodox elements in 
West’s work, the former claiming that his essays and reviews of the 1930s were often an 
expression of his opposition to the “Popular Front” strategy, while the latter (the only section of 
the thesis which goes beyond the 1930s) describes his post-war writings as a disguised 
expression of hostility to the “reformist” politics embodied in the CPGB’s programme The 
British Road to Socialism.
1 BECOMING A COMMUNIST: A READING OF ONE MAN IN HIS TIME
As we have already seen, the biggest problem facing the reader of One Man in his Time is that 
the book is written more like a novel than an autobiography.9 Instead of explaining why the 
events he described were of such enormous personal significance, West seemed largely content 
to let them speak for themselves. My aim in this section is therefore to provide an outline of the 
book which relates its main events to what I take to be its central theme -  West’s overarching 
belief in the importance of community. The narrative of West’s life was effectively divided into 
three distinct phases: (1) his discovery of communitarian values while still a child, (2) his 
unhappy flirtation with individualism in the years between 1914 and 1926, and (3) his return to 
communitarianism in his years as an active communist. By showing how ideological insight 
was achieved early, disregarded for many years and then triumphantly regained, West was 
probably trying to portray his life in terms of a dialectical process of development.
Alick West was bom in Warwickshire on 4th March 1895, the son of an affluent but chronically 
unsettled engineer who had served as a missionary in India in the 1880s and later become a 
charity worker.10 After the death of West’s mother in 1900 the family moved to Highgate in 
London, where West attended Highgate School. He made it clear in One Man in his Time that 
the personal preoccupations that dominated his life had all taken root while he was still veiy 
young. The first was a persistent sense of self-division arising from his conscious mind’s 
interference with such involuntary areas of experience as emotion, aesthetic pleasure and 
intuition. When his father told him of his mother’s death (“Mother’s gone to stay with Jesus”) 
West was puzzled to discover that he was unable to surrender himself fully to his grief, since he 
seemed to be in the presence of “a little man inside me” who was monitoring his response.11 He 
presumably came to recognise that these feelings of self-consciousness are universal; but he 
also appeared to believe that he suffered from them more acutely than the majority of other 
people. At any rate they formed the basis of his other life-long neurosis, which can broadly be 
described as paranoia about the nature of authority. Since West believed that his own “little 
man” was cruel, unpredictable and incapable of being propitiated, he now projected these 
qualities onto anyone else who occupied a position of real or imagined power -  especially God, 
whom he saw as a cosmic tyrant handing down punishment without regard for moral goodness 
or piety. As a young boy he spent long hours worrying that a minor act of folly such as lying, 
losing a present or cribbing in an exam would lead to either himself or a member of his family 
being “taken”.12
It was the desire to escape the trauma of self-division which pushed West towards the one 
positive commitment that recurred throughout his work. This was a belief in the redemptive 
power of community. He seems to have believed from an early age that divisions in the self are 
ultimately related to divisions in society. The early pages of One Man in his Time showed him 
groping precociously towards a defining principle: If societies based on individualism are likely 
to cause the dissociation of basic mental functions, then communitarian societies (those in 
which “we are” takes precedence over “I am”) will be more likely to harmonise them. From the 
start he appears to have associated communitarian values with the culture of working people. 
On his own street in Highgate, studiously bourgeois, he was constantly struck by the “separating 
silence” that divided one family from another -  curtains were always drawn, children instructed 
to avert their gaze from other people’s windows.13 Yet in the streets of “slummy cottages” 
which he walked through on the way to school, the whole idea of privacy was apparently 
unknown. This was a culture of open doors and easy intimacy. West’s belief in the greater 
sociability of working people was reinforced by the summer holidays which he and his sister 
took on a farm in Warwickshire, where “Joe Smith, a vigorous redhaired man of about thirty,
liked to rub his ginger stubble against our cheeks until we screamed”.14 Some readers would 
perhaps identify an element of homoeroticism in descriptions such as these.
Fear of self-division and anxiety about authority, combined with the belief that these could be 
overcome by the healing power of collective experience, were the three forces which pushed 
West forward throughout the whole of the rest of his life. Yet his extraordinary experiences 
during the Great War began a phase of his development which in many senses proved 
aberrational. In September 1914, the month in which he was due to take up a place at Balliol 
College, Oxford, West was one of several thousand Britons interned by the German authorities 
in a prison camp at Ruhleben. (He had been in Germany on holiday and was unable to leave 
when war broke out in August.)15 His four years at Ruhleben had a revelatory effect upon him. 
The German authorities devolved the responsibility for running the camp to its inmates, who 
immediately established a network of societies reflecting their wide range of intellectual, 
cultural and professional interests. It was West’s involvement in the Dramatic Society which 
apparently led him to believe that he had found a cure for his earlier difficulties. While playing 
the role of Lavinia in Shaw’s Androcles and the Lion, he found that acting was the one activity 
that could erase his feelings of self-division -  the need to create a satisfying dramatic spectacle 
was so absorbing that the diverse areas of his mind seemed temporarily to work in harmony.16 
Moreover, while his faith in drama proved somewhat shortlived, the intellectual influences to 
which it exposed him exercised a much firmer grip on his imagination. Sometime in 1915, 
anxious to understand his experiences while acting, West read Nietzsche’s The Birth o f Tragedy 
and became an instant convert to its powerful vision of human self-development.17 He now 
seems to have thought of himself as a sort of apprentice Ubermensch, alone in a Godless 
universe, whose primary objective was to exercise the will-to-power by achieving a 
transvaluation of all values. The influence of Nietzsche was reinforced by readings of Ibsen and 
also of Max Stimer, the one-time adversary of Marx and Engels whose The Ego and His Own 
(1845) is often seen as the starting point of philosophical egoism as well as a key text in the 
history of anarchism. The irony of this shift in perspective can scarcely be overstated. Having 
arrived at Ruhleben as an instinctive communitarian, West was now a disciple of three of the 
most uncompromising individualists in the Western tradition. It would be more than a decade 
before he began to slough off his individualist convictions and embark once again on his search 
for community.
However, West made a point of emphasising that during this period (approximately 1915-1926) 
the type of individualist doctrines to which he subscribed became markedly different to those of 
Nietzsche, Ibsen and Stimer. West remained a passionate Nietzschean for most of his years at 
Ruhleben, only occasionally worrying that he had made the transition from timid believer to
aggressive atheist with useemly haste;18 but his beliefs changed rapidly after his release in 1918. 
Choosing to pass up his place at Oxford, apparently because of his growing disillusionment with 
the British establishment, he now spent three years (1919-1922) as a student of classics and 
modem languages at Trinity College, Dublin.19 While living in Dublin he also acted at the 
Abbey Theatre and struck up an acquaintanceship with “A.E.” (George Russell), the occult poet 
who had exercised so decisive an influence on the work of the early Yeats. There appear to have 
been two reasons for the distrust of Nietzschean philosophy which he acquired at this time. The 
first was his growing suspicion that Nietzsche was not so much a prophet of mental unity as an 
essentially pre-Freudian thinker who anticipated the distinction between the id, the ego and the 
superego. As such, his work contained a set of assumptions which reminded West of one of the 
things he feared most -  the division of the mind into opposing forces.20 Secondly, West also 
came to feel that his timid and introspective personality was wholly inconsistent with the 
Nietzschean emphasis on the transvaluation of all values. One evening, irritated by the chatter of 
the students who surrounded him in the college refectory, he consoled himself with the thought 
that he could, like Zarathustra, simply defy the rules and stage an indignant walkout. Then the 
revelation was borne in upon him: “I realized that I couldn’t. Being what I was, I would sit 
there. It had no sense to say with Zarathustra, “Become what you are”, for I was already myself, 
bound by cause and effect”.21
West graduated in 1922 and spent much of the next four years living a peripatetic life in 
continental Europe.22 He worked occasionally as an English tutor in Switzerland and registered 
for a PhD in German Literature at the University of Berlin, though his thesis was never 
completed. His break with Nietzsche seems to have ensured that this was a period of what can 
best be described as intellectual mortification. Having abandoned the optimistic individualism 
expressed in Thus Sprach Zarathustra, with its exhilarating belief in the possibility of human 
evolution, he now began to explore a more agonistic brand of individualism which yoked an 
emphasis on the atomised sensibility with a tragic vision of the human condition. It was as if 
West, in a fit o f anger at having succumbed to individualism in the first place, now felt obliged 
to atone for his intellectual lapse by immersing himself in doctrines that made him bitterly 
unhappy. His main influences were Freud (he had read The Interpretation o f Dreams and The 
Psychopathology o f Everyday Life while still at Ruhleben) and Oswald Spengler, whose work 
he now subjected to a highly unorthodox interpretation. Whereas fascist intellectuals throughout 
Europe had characterised Spengler as a theorist of cultural decline who regretted the passing of 
medieval stability and the rise of democratic chaos (Oswald Mosley was the British 
representative of this trend),23 West implied that it was quite wrong to interpret his apparent 
nostalgia for premodem society as a sign of communitarian sympathies. When he spoke of the 
circularity that had characterised the trajectory of Western civilization, what he chiefly had in
mind was the process by which the “Faustian” values had emerged, achieved dominance and 
then passed away. Decline o f  the West was ultimately an apologia for precisely the sort of heroic 
individualism which West had himself abandoned only a short time previously.24
If the work of Freud and Spengler had provided West with his only intellectual sustenance at 
this time, he might well have developed into one of the rootless nihilists whom Radek would 
later identify as the driving force behind modernism. And yet, even at the height of his flirtation 
with individualism, he remained open to a number of influences that helped to sustain the 
communitarian impulses he was otherwise trying to suppress. His interest in cultural 
conservatism, the most important of these influences, was stimulated by a close friend whom he 
had met at Ruhleben and subsequently lodged with in Berlin. Paul Farleigh had developed a 
cyclical theory of history which clearly owed a great deal to the writings of Ruskin, Carlyle, 
Eliot and the other conservative traditionalists who had dominated English cultural criticism 
since the 19th Century.25 Its starting point was the assumption that the birth of Christ had 
ushered in a new phase in the history of Western civilization in which “the individual had 
existed only as part of the whole”.26 The dominant culture was rigorously enforced by the 
Catholic Church, which illustrated its belief in the subordination of the part to the whole in its 
theology, rituals and sacred buildings. However, the strength of Christianity was not enough to 
prevent the eventual rise of individualism, which Paul appears to have attributed solely to 
developments in philosophy. The important figure in this regard was Descartes, whose efforts to 
put human knowledge on a sure foundation (“cogito ergo sum”) succeeded only in driving a 
dualistic wedge between mind and body. The drawbacks of individualism became apparent 
almost immediately, not least because “the individual was unable to bear alone the tragic 
consciousness of transience and death”;27 but Western civilisation responded to its crisis not by 
seeking a return to collectivism but by developing a form of “weak” individualism, the main 
aim of which was to confer a sort of spurious glamour on the idea of the suffering individual. 
Romanticism had been the main representative of this trend.28 It was only more recently, with 
the emergence of “collective associations”29 such as political parties and trade unions, that a 
yearning for genuine community had once again become prevalent throughout Western 
societies. The task of the intellectual (or so Paul seems to have implied) was to help translate 
this yearning into a culture that combined the ethos of the Middle Ages with the material 
advantages of modernity.
Although cultural conservatism, in the guise of Farleigh’s theory of the “three realities”, was the 
most rarefied of the intellectual interests which kept West’s individualism in check during the 
early to mid-1920s, there was also a more demotic influence at work -  popular fiction. For 
several months towards the end of 1925 and the beginning of 1926, West was treated for
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tuberculosis at a sanatorium in Switzerland.30 (He had first been diagnosed with TB while a 
student at Dublin.) One night, in an effort to banish his feelings of claustrophobia, he borrowed 
a copy of The Three Hostages by John Buchan and immediately became immersed in it. 
Whereas the literary novel tends to impose a rigid separation between its characters and its 
intended readers, West now found himself “living vicariously” through the character of Richard 
Hannay.31 The self-styled individualist had merged his consciousness with that of an imaginary 
English spy. This experience, presumably repeated on many occasions with other works of 
popular fiction, seemed to confirm West’s belief that the communitarian ideal was better served 
by popular culture than by the culture of the bourgeoisie. It also stimulated a long-standing 
interest in commercial writing which culminated in two remarkable essays on the detective 
novel, published in Left Review in 1938 (see Section Three).
In 1926, after five years of comparative rootlessness, West was appointed to the position of 
Lektor in English at Basle University.32 The most decisive phase of his development was now 
underway. In the period up until 1935, when he resigned his university position and returned to 
England, he at last found the strength to abandon his Freudo-Spenglerian prejudices and return 
to the communitarian values of his youth. The culmination of this process was his decision to 
join the Communist Party after settling in Stepney. It was personal tragedy which appears to 
have been the catalyst for West’s retreat from individualism. After a traumatic engagement to a 
Swiss woman named Sonja was brought to an end by his fiancee’s suicide, he seems to have 
concluded that the relationship was effectively destroyed by individualism. By imagining that 
personal redemption could somehow be achieved through a romantic relationship, he and Sonja 
had retreated so far into themselves that neurasthenia became all but inevitable. Badly affected 
by Sonja’s death and tempted by the thought of suicide himself, West could only summon the 
strength to go on by returning with increased conviction to the cardinal insight of his pre- 
Ruhleben days -  the human spirit can only flourish in strong communities.33 The long years of 
individualist misery were thereby laid to rest, though at the cost of great personal suffering.
If West’s conversion to communism was essentially a consequence of his return to 
communitarian values (a point we shall return to in a moment), there were nevertheless a 
number of other factors which helped to draw him towards the communist movement in the first 
place, and which arguably throw a lot of light on the popularity of revolutionary politics 
amongst young intellectuals in the 1920s and 1930s. West seems to have been familiar with a 
range of Marxist and Marxisant arguments for most of his adult life. In his early weeks at 
Ruhleben, even before he had joined the Dramatic Society and read Nietzsche, he was informed 
by an inmate called Thompson of what amounted to the orthodox Leninist explanation for the 
outbreak of the war: “ ...Britain wasn’t fighting Germany for moral reasons. She wanted to
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smash a business competitor”.34 He perhaps had cause to remember this critique of imperialism 
when, serving as an assistant to Flinders Petrie on an archaeological dig in Egypt in 1921-1922, 
he found himself discomforted by the colonial arrogance with which his English colleagues 
treated the contents of Egyptian graves.35 Yet it appears that he was only persuaded to take 
politics seriously by the breakdown of liberal values which afflicted European society from the 
mid-1920s onwards.36 The General Strike of 1926 made a particular impression on his mind. 
Convinced that the strike had been deliberately provoked by the British government,37 he now 
seems to have come to the view (presumably without reading the developing literature on 
fascism) that economic dislocation was being used throughout Europe to justify the suppression 
of democratic liberties. Although One Man in his Time failed to give a clear impression of his 
motives at this time, he perhaps concluded that the freedom he valued as an academic could 
only be safeguarded by a political movement that was capable of restoring economic order. At 
first he put his faith in the social-credit movement, whose doctrines (specifically those of 
Raymond Soddy) he had heard expounded by a speaker in Hyde Park.38 Yet in the Spring of 
1929, shortly after incorporating Soddy’s ideas into a series of lectures on the novels of 
Galsworthy, he was challenged by a communist student at Basle to describe the way in which 
the principles of social credit could be translated into concrete policies. Realising that it was not 
possible to do so, he accepted the student’s invitation to attend a communist meeting on the 
economic policy of the USSR.39
Once West had been drawn into the orbit of communism, there seem to have been three things 
(other than its evident commitment to collective values) which sustained his interest. The first 
was the sheer suggestiveness of the Marxist interpretation of history. Preparing for a course on 
“The English Family in Life and Literature” in 1929, he read The Origins o f the Family, Private 
Property and the State by Friedrich Engels and was immediately impressed by the panoramic 
ingenuity with which it explained the historical process.40 (His translation of the book would be 
published in 1940). The second was the reputation that communists had acquired for defending 
civil liberties. Having been drawn into politics by a fear of authoritarianism, West was struck by 
the way that ordinary people seemed automatically to assume that communists would be heavily 
involved in any form of agitation against fascism. When the Reichstag was burned down in 
1933, he was part of a small crowd in Basle which gathered around a newspaper office to read 
about the news: “Der Reichstag brennt!”.41 A rumour immediately began to circulate that 
communists were to blame. Since the respectable citizens of Basle were wholly opposed to 
communism, West perhaps saw their willingness to believe the rumour as a sort of negative 
affirmation that it was only the communists who could now be relied upon to safeguard 
democracy.42 The third factor which predisposed him to communism was of a more historical 
nature. He seems to have ascribed great importance to the realisation that communism was not a
purely modem movement (in the sense of embodying an entirely novel set of values) but one 
which had its roots in a venerable tradition of popular revolt. In an extraordinary passage which 
immediately rings bells for any reader of Rabelais and his World by Mikhail Bakhtin, West 
described the experience of attending Lent Carnival in Basle and being exposed to images of 
rebellion which dated back to the Middle Ages: “ ...huge rectangular lanterns slowly advanced 
upon us. Carried on long poles by animal figures, preceded and followed by masked drummers, 
they displayed on their painted and illumined sides savage caricatures of the Basle Government 
(for the town was an independent Canton), the leaders of the political parties, rich and notorious 
citizens and their wives and mistresses. The people shouted and clapped and hooted”.43 West’s 
enthusiasm for the historical roots of communism was perhaps a reaction to the ahistorical 
evolutionism of his Nietzschean period, when he presumably believed that the individual could 
transform himself without reference to the past.
Yet in the final analysis (and to make the point for the last time) the whole of One Man in his 
Time converged on a single proposition -  Alick West became a communist because he believed 
that his dream of human community could only be realised in a socialist society. When West 
returned to England in 1935, equipped with a letter of introduction from a leading Swiss 
communist, he settled in the Stepney district of London and immediately applied for 
membership of the CPGB. His early experience of life in the Party was one of extreme 
contrasts. On the one hand, picked out straightaway as a man of intellectual and literary gifts, he 
was offered a place on the editorial board of Left Review, encouraged to write for the Party press 
and given extensive lecturing responsibilities at Marx House. On the other hand, mindful of the 
assumption that “the first role of intellectuals who have joined the Party is to forget they are 
intellectuals and act as Communists” (Rajani Palme Dutt),44 he willingly undertook many of the 
more onerous duties of Party membership -  chalking slogans on walls, speaking at sparsely 
attended Branch meetings, selling the Daily Worker outside factories and underground 
stations.45 In a couple of extraordinary passages, the first describing the production of the Daily 
Worker and the second evoking a speech by Harry Pollitt46 in the Kingsway Hall, West made it 
clear that he was drawn to the CPGB not merely because of its attachment to communitarian 
values but because it had somehow prefigured the community of the future in its own internal 
culture:
We found the premises [of the Daily Worker] in a drab side-street, and went up a dark flight o f 
stairs into a big loft with bare boards, crowded with small tables, and men sitting at them and 
moving quickly between them and standing in intent conversation amidst the rattle o f 
typewriters. Always when I  came to the head o f the stairs... I  fe lt on the brink o f an absorbed 
urgency o f people working with a pressure which this old building could hardly 
support....These men, each with his own responsibility, all had their energy bent on the paper 
fo r  tomorrow and on the revolutionary fu tu re f1
1 went to a meeting at the Kingsway Hall called by the committee which had been set up to 
demand the release o f Dimitrov, whose trial was soon to begin at Leipzig. The hall was packed 
to the roof. I  had been to theatres and concerts in the Albert Hall; now fo r  the first time I  was 
one o f a body ofpeople who wanted not only to see and hear but to do. The excitement and unity 
mounted, and there was a storm o f applause when Harry Pollitt got up from his seat on the 
platform and stepped forward, and in dead silence began. Never had I  seen such a man, nor 
heard such oratory. Drawn towards him, the whole hall, tier upon tier o f  people, became a 
great wave curving over to break, as his impetuous, unconquerable voice soared and struck and 
rang, “Fightfascism  ”.48
If passages such as these revealed the extent of West’s loyalty to the CPGB, it was also true (as 
we shall see in Section Three) that his doubts about the Party’s strategic direction were already 
taking shape, prompted in the main by its support for the idea of a Popular Front against 
fascism. I would suggest that these conflicting feelings were reflected in West’s work of the 
1930s in two ways. Although there are traces of rebelliousness in Crisis and Criticism, the 
major work of theory which he published in 1937, the book must ultimately be regarded as an 
innovative but uncontroversial attempt to extend the insights of Soviet theory. However, if we 
look at West’s shorter writings (especially the contributions to Left Review), we find that many 
of them were implicitly shaped by a deep hostility to the Popular Front. These are the issues 
which are up for examination in the next two sections.
2 CRISIS AND CRITICISM
Crisis and Criticism was organised around an argument which directly related to West’s 
preoccupation with collective experience. According to West, recent literary culture had been 
thrown into crisis by its cautious rejection of individualist ideas about the nature of creativity.49 
Many of the leading writers and theorists who had come to prominence in the period since the 
Great War (notably Eliot, Herbert Read and D.H. Lawrence) had questioned the idea that the 
literary work is primarily an expression of the personality of an individual author, and had tried 
instead to describe creativity in more collaborative or collective terms. Eliot, for instance, had 
spoken of the writer’s duty to assimilate his sensibility to that of the “tradition” of European 
literature; whereas Read had tried to revive the Keatsian doctrine of “negative capability”. The 
basis of this theoretical shift was the emergence of a definite strain of collectivism in English 
culture as a whole, characterised by incipient feelings of social solidarity and the “thrill of 
metaphysical awe”50 which goes with them. Yet the revolt against aesthetic individualism did 
not mean that the literary intelligentsia had undergone a conversion to Marxism. When writers 
such as Eliot, Read and Lawrence tried to modify or discard the idea of individual creativity, 
they did so by introducing new critical assumptions which tended to reinforce their support for 
bourgeois society. West blamed this problem -  the failure of the literary intellectuals to realise
that their taste for collectivism would only find its logical culmination in a commitment to 
communist politics -  on what he saw as the most glaring deficiency in Marxist writings on 
culture: the absence of a theory of aesthetic value. In Crisis and Criticism, therefore, he set out 
to do three things: first, to examine the crisis in literary studies in greater detail; second, to 
suggest a Marxist theory of aesthetic value which emphasised the idea of an unconscious 
identification between the writer and the process of production; and third, to trace the 
continuities between his own critical project and that of the English Romantics in the early- 
nineteenth century. We shall examine each of these themes in turn. Although many of West’s 
arguments had their roots in Soviet theory, there was nothing especially unorthodox about the 
highly innovative ways in which the Soviet influences were developed. As such, Crisis and 
Criticism provided further proof that orthodoxy was no necessary barrier to critical ingenuity.
2.1 West’s theory of cultural crisis
As we saw in Chapter Two, Soviet writers such as Bukharin, Gorky and Zhdanov invoked a 
bewildering variety of causes when trying to explain the “crisis” in modem culture. One of the 
things which distinguished their more interesting British counterparts was a preference for 
monocausal explanations.51 Christopher Caudwell blamed the lack of vitality in modem culture 
on the so-called “bourgeois illusion of freedom”, which holds that freedom can only be 
achieved outside society and not within it.52 Although Alick West’s theory of cultural crisis was 
not worked out as meticulously as Caudwell’s, nor applied to as many areas of activity, it shared 
the same inherent simplicity -  literary culture has been plunged into confusion by the growing 
recognition that creativity is primarily collective and not individual. Another factor which 
distinguished West from the Soviet theorists was his less upbraiding tone. Whereas the Soviet 
writers associated the crisis with a catastrophic collapse of standards, West seemed to regard it 
as the by-product of a conceptual shift which Marxists would be broadly advised to welcome. If 
literary intellectuals are indeed moving beyond individualism and embracing a collectivist 
understanding of creativity, then it surely follows (or so the argument went) that they are ripe 
for conversion to communist politics. The task of the Marxist critic is not to expose bourgeois 
culture to a series of unflattering comparisons with the developing “proletarian” alternative, but 
rather to show how the nascent anti-individualism of men like Eliot, Read and Lawrence can 
only find its logical culmination in a commitment to communism.53 In the early chapters of 
Crisis and Criticism, West applied these ideas to three individual writers (Eliot, Read and I.A. 
Richards) and one artistic movement (surrealism). Since the relationship between Marxism and 
cultural conservatism is a recurring theme in this thesis, I shall focus here on West’s insightful 
account of Eliot’s literary criticism.
We have seen in Chapter One that Eliot’s approach to literature was itself a response to the 
perceived existence of cultural crisis.54 As a defender of “classicism” against “romanticism”, he 
believed that the classical virtues arose naturally in the hierarchical societies of the past, only to 
be destroyed by the debased values of the modem era. If the modem writer wishes to produce 
work of any consequence, he has no choice but to suppress his own personality and identify 
with the “European mind” which found expression in the literature of the past. This account of 
the proper relationship between “tradition” and the “individual talent” was seen by West as one 
of the most significant retreats from literary individualism ever to occur in English culture. 
Falling back on his stock explanation for the growth of communitarian feeling in the capitalist 
countries, he described it as a manifestation of the yearning for collective experience which had 
entered mass consciousness as a result of the October Revolution. Yet for all that, West insisted, 
it would be wrong to see Eliot’s doctrine as a sort of staging post on the road to communism. It 
is actually a deeply reactionary response to the decline of liberal civilisation. Apart from the fact 
that Eliot was obviously invoking the certainties of the past in order to undermine the 
democratic values of the present (a point which West’s friend Douglas Garman had already 
made in the pages of Left Review),55 this was largely for two reasons. The first was that Eliot 
persistently discussed the idea of tradition in either non-political or inadequately political terms. 
His decisive move was to ascribe the superiority of pre-modem culture to the fact that the 
“European mind” still remained “homogeneous”, thereby imbuing the writer with a distinctively 
classical concern for aesthetic and intellectual coherence. But when he tried to account for this 
background of moral, religious and racial unity, he tended to deviate wildly between political 
and theological explanations. In some of his earlier critical writings, such as The Sacred Wood 
from 1920, he appeared to recognise that the classical sensibility was at least partially rooted in 
the static and hierarchical structures of the feudal mode of production. But in later works, 
notably The Use o f Poetry and the Use o f Criticism (1933), his frame of reference was almost 
wholly non-political. The collapse of the classical virtues was now attributed to the 
“fragmentation” of the European mind, which had itself been caused by the downgrading of 
religion in the 17th Century. The central point was that these interlocking processes were 
ascribed less to political developments than to the operation of malign spiritual forces. In the 
final analysis -  and West recounted this point with some incredulity -  the unravelling of 
European literature was viewed by Eliot as the work of the Devil.56
These remarks were supplemented by a subtle account of the way in which Eliot avoided 
political analysis in his essays on individual authors. West’s example was the section on 
Wordsworth’s poetry in The Use o f Poetry and the Use o f  Criticism. Eliot was especially 
concerned with Wordsworth’s famous “principle of poetic diction”, enunciated in the Preface to 
Lyrical Ballads in 1798, which held that the duty of contemporary poets was to experiment with
“the language of the middle and lower classes of society”.57 As West implied, this sort of 
statement was potentially a source of considerable danger to a depoliticising critic like Eliot, 
since ultimately it could only be understood by referring to the political beliefs of its author. If 
we want to know why Wordsworth tried to experiment with a style of language that had 
previously been dismissed as wholly unpoetic, we have no choice but to invoke his sympathy 
for the French Revolution and his dismay at the effects of industrialism on the English 
countryside. So how was Eliot able to deal with Wordsworth’s principle while simultaneously 
steering clear of any substantive discussion of politics? On the one hand, West seemed to argue, 
by resorting to a sort of critical sleight of hand. At one moment he acknowledged that 
Wordsworth’s poetry was indeed to be understood in political terms (his specific call was for 
the investigation of its “purposes and social passions”);58 while at the next he suddenly turned 
his attention to purely literary matters, pointing to the conformity between Wordsworth’s desire 
to “imitate” the language of the lower classes and Aristotle’s doctrine of mimesis. The reference 
to “social passions” appeared to satisfy the need for a properly historical analysis, whereas 
Eliot’s sole actual concern was to displace political considerations onto aesthetic ones.59 
Moreover, the attempt to depoliticise Wordsworth’s poetic theory was reinforced by Eliot’s use 
of what can perhaps be called the archetypes of English authority. Shortly after raising the non­
issue of Wordsworth’s indebtedness to Aristotle, Eliot wrote that “It was not from any 
recantation of political principles, but from having had it brought to his attention that, as a 
general literary principle, this would never do, that he [i.e. Wordworth] altered them” [i.e. his 
poetic ambitions].60 According to West, the point about this passage was that it employed the 
distinctive tone of the “schoolmaster” or “bank manager” (note the “this would never do”) and 
therefore bypassed its readers’ critical faculties by invoking the spectre of “traditional 
authority”. Eliot had advanced his case not by making an argument but by exploiting the strain 
of deference at the heart of English culture.61
The issue of critical authority was also central to the second element in West’s critique of Eliot. 
For West, one of Eliot’s most distinctive habits as a critic was that he often made magisterial 
judgements on other writers without referring to the textual evidence. His essays were full of de 
haut en bas evaluative passages which referred to writers but not to their work. At one point in 
The Use o f Poetry and the Use o f Criticism, to use West’s own example, Eliot remarked that 
John Keats’s scattered observations on poetry were clearly evidence of genius, though only 
because Keats had been a young man when he made them. Not only was this passage a signal 
instance of damning with faint praise, it also failed to identify what Eliot found acceptable in the 
Keatsian view of poetry and what he thought was missing from it. The anomaly in this sort of 
critical behaviour was that it completely reversed the desired relationship between “tradition” 
and “individual talent” which Eliot had outlined in his theoretical writings. Instead of
suppressing his own personality and making himself receptive to an alien sensibility, Eliot was 
deliberately eliding the work of another writer in order to justify his pose of critical superiority. 
(There are interesting parallels here between West’s remarks about Eliot and Harold Bloom’s 
later work on “the anxiety of influence”.)62 The implication was that his behaviour was thus 
more consistent with the bourgeois individualism he claimed to loathe than with the 
communitarian impulses he professed to represent.63 West’s verdict on the passage about Keats 
was one of the most scathing of his career: “The style subordinates Keats to Mr. Eliot. Mr. Eliot 
does indeed extinguish his personality in dogmatic appeals to received ideas; but it is Keats, not 
himself, who is sacrificed”.64
West’s remarks about Read, Richards and Surrealism were more exiguous than his comments 
on Eliot. The only book of Read’s which he examined was Form in Modern Poetry from 1932. 
Written before its author had become the leading figure on an anarchist left that also included 
the likes of George Woodcock, Alex Comfort and Marie-Louise Bemeri,65 its main thesis (at 
least according to West) was that the writer should strive to make his sensibility as malleable 
and discontinuous as possible, on the grounds that this is the only way of making himself 
receptive to the two most important creative forces -  “negative capability” (in the Keatsian 
sense) and the unconscious mind. For West, the problem with this argument was that its break 
with aesthetic individualism was more apparent than real. By emphasising the importance of 
mental capacities that might otherwise seem alien to the creative mind, Read’s real purpose was 
to put the old idea of the individual personality on a broader and more interesting footing, not to 
locate the origins of creativity in sources outside the individual writer.66 Although the 
theoretical writings of I.A. Richards can be seen as one of the main influences on Crisis and 
Criticism (a point to which I will return in due course), West was more interested in Chapter Six 
in the experiments in “practical criticism” which Richards had famously conducted while 
teaching at Cambridge. As is well known, Richards’s method was to distribute unsigned pieces 
of poetry and prose to his students and then to ask for their immediate responses. The famously 
anomalous results, which (to use an example that amused George Orwell)67 saw the light verse 
of “Woodbine Willie” being rated more highly than the poetry of John Donne, convinced 
Richards that the audience for serious literature had undergone a dreadful coarsening of taste. 
West’s concern was that when Richards tried to explain this lack of receptivity to literary art, he 
focused more on secondary symptoms (such as the fear of appearing sentimental) than on their 
real cause -  the prohibition on communal feeling that lies at the heart of capitalist culture.68 
Surrealism was subjected to an even less rigorous critique. In a series of rather perfunctory 
remarks, West acknowledged that the purpose of surrealism was to create the psychological 
preconditions of socialist revolution by promoting a synthesis between “perception” (objective 
reality) and “representation” (dream). The main flaw in this project was that it smacked of
philosophical idealism. By insisting that political changes would follow on inevitably from the 
transformation of the individual sensibility, as if the mind exercised a direct and mysterious 
influence on the world around it, the surrealists were guilty of ignoring the cardinal Marxist 
belief that being determines consciousness.69
How convincing is West’s theory of cultural crisis? Perhaps its most serious defect is the 
inflexibility with which it approaches the opposition between individualism and 
communitarianism. Despite insisting that the ideas of Eliot and his contemporaries were 
inherently reactionary, West seems to have built his theory around the following assumptions: 
(1) capitalism is necessarily individualist, (2) socialism is necessarily communitarian, (3) it is 
not possible for any society to achieve an admixture of individualism and communitarianism. 
This enabled him to imply that any deviation from individualism on the part of the literary 
intellectuals could be regarded as either an actual or potential challenge to bourgeois society, 
regardless of its precise ideological content. The obvious weakness with this chain of reasoning 
is that it overlooks the extent to which bourgeois ideology (assuming the term to be meaningful) 
has usually sought to maintain social cohesion by balancing an emphasis on individualism with 
an account of the characteristics that bind human beings together. When West wrote about 
Eliot’s attempt to harness the idea of tradition to the defence of capitalism, he gave the 
impression that this was somehow a unique innovation in the history of modem thought. But the 
whole conservative tradition to which Eliot belongs has been preoccupied with specifying the 
ways in which the public authorities can offset the potential anarchy of market institutions by 
inculcating a sense of what Maurice Cowling has called “moral solidarity” .70 Nor is there any 
recognition in West’s work of the way that other branches of bourgeois ideology, notably the 
various forms of post-Enlightenment liberalism, seek to ground the idea of individual freedom 
in an overarching conception of universal human nature. West might have been justified in 
supposing that Eliot, Read and Richards were all unusually hostile to bourgeois individualism; 
but he was wrong to imply that any body of thought which emits a whiff of communitarianism 
can necessarily be regarded as a threat to the stability of capitalism.
This obviously raises the question of why a thinker of West’s subtlety should have adopted such 
an undialectical approach in the first place. On a personal level, West’s misunderstanding of 
bourgeois ideology was perhaps related to the guilt he experienced in the 1930s because of his 
attitude to fascism. In a remarkably self-revelatory passage in One Man and His Time, West 
admitted that he had often felt attracted to the doctrine of group identity that lay at the heart of 
fascist ideology. Still influenced by Paul Farleigh’s theory of the Three Realities, with its 
emphasis on how medieval societies were bound together by their submission to theocratic rule, 
he seems to have recognised that the fascist version of communitarianism embodied a sort of
hierarchical and “mystical” grandeur that was simply absent from its communist equivalent. 
And yet, instead of confronting his feelings directly, he “remained silent even to myself’ in the 
hope of overcoming his shame.71 It seems possible that by overstating the element of 
individualism in bourgeois ideology, and by denying that any system of thought could defend 
market institutions by appealing to collective values, West was partly motivated by the desire to 
overcome his unorthodox ideological yearnings by consigning fascism to the realm of 
theoretical impossibility. He came close to admitting as much when recalling his father’s 
response to Crisis and Criticism:
When my father read the book, he said that it had no centre. I  think he was right, inasmuch as I  
had not penetrated to what fo r  me was at the heart o f  the conflict. For I  only described an 
imaginary bourgeois intellectual torn between socialism and an ideology prior to fascism. When 
I  spoke o f the uneasiness about “F ’ and “we ”, I  said nothing about the fascist “we ” nor about 
its power to release collective emotion. This was the real intellectual and political issue, and the 
book was weakened because it did not face it?2
If we try to identify the wider influences on West’s theory of cultural crisis, it becomes clear 
that in some respects West was simply giving a novel twist to an idea which had circulated 
widely among literary intellectuals in the first few decades of the 20th Century. As John Carey 
has pointed out in The Intellectuals and the Masses (1992), there was widespread concern in 
this period that individualism was under threat from the “herd mentality” of the masses. 
Terrified that the advent of mass literacy had destroyed the foundations of a hierarchical society, 
writers as diverse as T.S. Eliot, H.G. Wells and Virginia Woolf all foresaw an age in which 
“natural aristocrats” like themselves would be swallowed up by the dionysian excesses of mass 
culture. At the heart of this body of opinion was the tendency to conflate mass consciousness 
with the mentality of the crowd. Convinced that working men and women are always motivated 
by the sort of group instincts which co-ordinate the behaviour of large crowds, regardless of 
whether or not they are physically united with other people, the intelligentsia seemed incapable 
of thinking about modem society without surrendering to paranoid fantasies about bloodthirsty 
canailles whipped up by savage demagogues. The origins of this version of cultural crisis can 
therefore be traced outside Britain to several continental texts which aimed to provide a 
“scientific” understanding of crowd psychology, notably Gustave Le Bon’s The Crowd (1895), 
Sigmund Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis o f  the Ego (1921) and Elias Canetti’s 
Masse und Macht?3 By agreeing that individualism was indeed under threat from the new forms 
of group consciousness, West was arguably seeking to convert his fellow intellectuals to 
Marxism by pandering to their most virulent prejudices, pausing only to enter one all-important 
caveat -  the death of individualism is a good thing.
Staying with the issue of the wider influences on West’s theory of cultural crisis, it is also worth 
examining Christopher Pawling’s throwaway claim in his book on Caudwell that “Crisis and 
Criticism is clearly a reply to [I. A. Richards’s] Principles o f Literary Criticism”.74 Although the 
links between the two writers are by no means as clear as Pawling implies, except in the 
obvious sense that they both ascribe great importance to the analysis of literary form, there is 
perhaps a sense in which their respective theories of cultural crisis are bound together by a 
shared concern with integration. Richards believed that the crisis of modem culture had largely 
been caused by the decline of religious faith (this was obviously not an original position) and 
that its most terrible effects were at the level of personal psychology. Once it became impossible 
to think of the world as the organic creation of a divine intelligence, it was more or less 
inevitable (or so Richards argued) that the individual mind would begin a long descent into 
incoherence. To be modem is to feel that one’s every “impulse” is somehow at loggerheads with 
all the others. Displaying a faith in art that Frank Kermode has rightly described as “messianic”, 
Richards insisted that one of the main solutions to the problem of mental incoherence is to 
become a more sensitive reader of poetry. Because poetry has a “coenaesthetic” function (that 
is, it arranges disparate impulses into cohesive wholes), it serves as a model of mental efficiency 
from which the individual reader can learn to transform self-division into unity.75 Just as West 
believed that modem literary intellectuals were obsessed with replacing the chaos of 
individualism with the order of community, so Richards believed that their primary function 
was to encourage a similar act of integration at the level of the individual sensibility. As we 
shall when we examine his remarks about romanticism, West often took a curiously indirect 
approach to acknowledging his main influences, mentioning them in print but eliding the ideas 
which had affected him most deeply. This arguably makes it all the more significant that the 
chapter on Richards in Crisis and Criticism makes little reference to his theoretical principles, 
limiting itself (as we have already seen) to his experiments in practical criticism.
The crudity of West’s approach to the relationship between individualism and 
communitarianism also distorted his understanding of socialism. Obsessed with the belief that 
socialism would enable the individual to merge his identity with that of society as a whole, West 
overlooked the more compelling idea that one of the main objectives of socialism is actually to 
construct a new and higher form of individualism on a collectivist base. This tended to put him 
at odds with the vision of the future disseminated by his own party. When the CPGB tried to 
justify its hostility to capitalism in the 1930s, it was careful to point out that revolutionary 
change would benefit the individual citizen as well as the collectivity. Apart from abolishing 
poverty, promoting the rational application of advanced technology and restoring dignity to 
labour, Socialism would also (or so the argument went) lead to a dramatic reduction in the 
length of the working day and thereby enable the individual to use his spare time more
creatively. At the heart of For Soviet Britain (1935), the only formal programme that the CPGB 
published in the first 30 years of its history, was the claim that “ever increasing comfort and 
leisure” could only be achieved once the rule of capital had come to an end.76 There is some 
evidence that it was this aspect of the Party’s vision which most appealed to its working-class 
supporters. Socialism seems to have been regarded as the only social order in which a Millian 
ideal of personal autonomy might at last be realised. George Orwell captured this vividly, 
though also somewhat condescendingly, when he wrote in The Road to Wigan Pier that “To the 
ordinary working man, the sort you would meet in any pub on Saturday night, Socialism does 
not mean much more than better wages and shorter hours and nobody bossing you about...His 
vision of the Socialist future is a vision of present society with the worst abuses left out, and 
with interest centring round the same things as at present -  family life, the pub, football, and 
local politics”.77 By portraying the desire for personal autonomy as if it were invariably an 
instance of bourgeois selfishness, West proved himself wholly out of touch with the instincts of 
the working people for whom he claimed to write.
On a more rarefied level, West’s hostility to individualism undermined his conviction that 
socialism might ultimately precipitate a new phase in the evolution of human nature. It was 
common for Marxist intellectuals in the inter-war period to argue that ordinary people would be 
able to develop “Promethean” capacities once full communism had been established. J.D. 
Bernal, Leon Trotsky and Ernst Bloch were among the writers who predicted that “socialist 
man” would possess the ability to bring his outer and inner worlds almost completely under the 
sway of his own will. Yet most of these writers also recognised that the transformation of man 
into superman presupposed a new mood of radical introspection on the part of the individual, 
since the highest stages of human evolution do not occur automatically but depend on a 
conscious effort to heighten biological, intellectual, emotional and aesthetic potentialities. The 
argument received its simplest formulation in the work of Leon Trotsky. In the final chapter of 
Literature and Revolution (1924), one of the most sustained and lyrical pieces of utopian 
speculation in the Marxist tradition, Trotsky set out to refute the claim that economic 
collectivism tends necessarily to “degenerate man into a sentimental, passive, herd animal.”78 
The great virtue of collectivism, Trotsky implied, is that it hastens the development of forms of 
advanced technology that enable human beings to exercise total control over their environment. 
The inevitable consequence is that the individual then seeks to exercise the same level of control 
over his own nature.79 Although the quest for self-mastery will certainly involve “collective 
experiments”80 to alter mankind’s genetic composition (a disconcerting reminder that an interest 
in eugenics was as common on the radical left as it was on the fascist right during the early part 
of the 20th Century), it ultimately depends on the individual taking responsibility for his own 
evolution. Once he has learned how to aestheticise his everyday movements, he must undergo
an arduous process of “psycho-physical training”81 that enables him to bring semi-voluntary and 
involuntary biological procedures (e.g. breathing, digestion, the circulation of the blood) and 
involuntary areas of conscious experience (e.g. emotion) under the dominion of his own will.82 
When man has thus begun to “harmonise himself in earnest”,83 his latent powers will be fully 
unleashed: “The average human type will rise to the heights of an Aristotle, a Goethe, or a 
Marx. And above this ridge new peaks will rise”.84 At first sight, West seems to fit neatly into 
this evolutionary trend in socialist thought. As befits a man who believed that self-division is 
more or less impossible in a communitarian society, he predicted in his essay “New People” 
(1947) that socialist culture would “kindle in everyone...something of the spirit of 
Prometheus”.85 But what was conspicuously missing from his work was any account of how this 
evolutionary leap might be brought about. Apparently too suspicious of individualism to 
countenance the sort of spiritual labour outlined by Trotsky, he was content to create the 
impression that human self-transcendence would result more or less automatically from the 
establishment of a workers’ state. The consequences of this failure of nerve were perhaps more 
severe than might otherwise have been supposed. As one of the few intellectuals in the British 
Party who believed that the purpose of creating a new society is to unleash humanity’s dormant 
powers, West was especially well placed to oppose the idea that socialism would necessarily 
come to grief on the caprices of human nature. Since Hobbesian pessimism about the human 
condition has been one of British conservatism’s most powerful weapons against Marxism, 
West’s unwillingness to take the evolutionary high ground was no minor matter.
2.2 West’s theory o f  aesthetic value
If bourgeois literary criticism had indeed moved away from individualist theories of creativity, 
then why had its leading exponents failed to translate their taste for collectivism into a 
commitment to communist politics? West’s answer to this question was very simple -  they had 
been put off by the absence in Marxist literature of a theory of aesthetic value. Although 
Marxism had done a great deal to illuminate the relationship between art and society, it had 
failed to say much about (1) the ability of literary texts to convey aesthetic pleasure, and (2) the 
criteria by which good writers can be distinguished from bad ones. According to West, this 
failure of understanding was partly the result of a philosophical misconception. Many Marxists 
had mistakenly come to believe that speculation about aesthetic matters was the sole preserve of 
the Idealist school of philosophy, presumably (though West did not make this clear) because of 
the importance of aesthetics to the great school of German Idealism which began with 
Baumgarten and later embraced the likes of Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.86 There 
was also a political aspect to the problem. Since it was common for reactionary movements to 
conceal their true nature behind public spectacles of intense grandeur, it was understandable that
many Marxists should have conflated aesthetic experience with the defence of capitalist 
society.87 The latter point would have seemed especially forceful at the time of a confident and 
expanding fascism, which (in Walter Benjamin’s famous observation) owed much of its success 
to the fact that it had “aestheticised politics”.88
It is therefore unsurprising that the core of Crisis and Criticism was an extended attempt to 
formulate a Marxist theory of aesthetic value, specifically in the context of literature. The theory 
had four main elements:
• A preparatory attempt to use anthropological data to show that language and poetry both 
had their origins in the economic activity of primitive societies.
• The argument that the impulse to write is rooted in the writer’s identification with the 
energies which fuel production.
• An adaptation of the Soviet emphasis on the unity of form and content which holds that the 
aesthetic power of literary form can only be realised if the writer appreciates the forces in 
society which lead to economic progress.
• An account of literature’s social function.
Let us begin with the anthropological dimension of the argument. In our survey of the historical 
element in Soviet cultural theory (Chapter 2), we saw that Maxim Gorky attached great 
importance to identifying the characteristics that linked Socialist Realism to myth.89 The desire 
to establish this link perhaps reflected the belief that human culture was somehow purer at the 
dawn of its existence than at any time since. Gorky’s remarks were probably influenced by the 
much more dramatic anthropological speculations of G.V. Plekhanov, who tried in his 
Unaddressed Letters (1895) to substantiate the base/superstructure metaphor by claiming that 
art had grown directly out of the economic requirements of primitive societies. Art, Plekhanov 
argued, originally took the form of collective rituals in which men and women tried to sharpen 
their skills as hunters by imitating the movements of wild animals.90 Although the British 
Marxists of the 1930s were probably unfamiliar with Unaddressed Letters, not least because it 
was only translated into English as late as 1953, some of them developed anthropological ideas 
which often read like an extension of Plekhanov’s.91 Most importantly, Christopher Caudwell 
and Alick West both argued that it was not merely art but also language itself which had its 
origins in the primitive economy. The strategic motivation behind these ideas seems clear
enough. By proving (or seeming to prove) that the emergence of art and language was 
inseparable from economic factors, Caudwell and West were trying to legitimise the more 
urgent task of analysing contemporary literature in terms of its social function.
The anthropological sections of Crisis and Criticism took the form of a critical summary of 
recent work by a number of prominent linguists, anthropologists and cultural historians, many 
of whom were also cited in the equivalent chapters of Caudwell’s Illusion and Reality92 Chief 
among them were Ludwig Noire, R. Paget, G.A. de Laguna, N. Marr (a Soviet thinker) and Karl 
Bucher. As proof of the claim that language was initially developed in response to problems in 
the sphere of production, West referred to Noire’s work on the distinctive nature of linguistic 
signification in primitive societies. One of the most salient features of primitive languages, 
Noire had claimed, was that their frame of reference was almost wholly economic. The majority 
of nouns denoted aspects of the physical environment that had already been transformed by 
human labour, and usually combined a reference to an object with an indication of the sort of 
labour which had been practised upon it: “ ...[primitive] language describes the things of the 
objective world not as being forms, but as having been formed; not as active beings that 
exercise an effect, but as passive beings on whom an effect is exercised”.93 Nor was it simply 
the case, West went on to imply, that the main effect of the invention of language was the 
consolidation of existing methods of working. In a passage which anticipated Raymond 
Williams’s argument that language should be regarded not merely as a part of the superstructure 
but also as one of the forces of production,94 he claimed that the emergence of speech 
precipitated a major transformation of the primitive economy. It did so by allowing human 
beings to congregate in bigger groups than ever before. Proof of this was furnished by Marr’s 
observation that in certain primitive languages there were no verbs which referred simply to the 
act of speaking, only verbs which characterised speech in terms of integration into a broader 
social group: “The word for “speaking” in Grusinian [Georgian]”, West wrote, “literally means 
“being Scythian”...That is, speaking is social existence in a particular mode”.95
The general argument was supplemented by some speculative remarks about the precise 
circumstances in which language had emerged. According to West, drawing heavily on the 
work of Paget, there were two reasons for supposing that the decisive occurrence was probably 
the invention of tools. The first was that the use of tools made it significantly more difficult to 
communicate through gestures, which had previously been the established method of co­
ordinating economic activity.96 The second was that the new ways of working had “refined the 
powers of distinguishing and grasping”,97 thereby giving rise to a more complex and 
differentiated conception of the natural world than had existed earlier. It thus became urgently 
necessary to evolve a means of communication that was sufficiently adaptable to convey the
new sense of nature’s diversity.98 If this eventually took the form of words, West wrote, it was 
probably because “pantomimic gestures of the tongue”99 had always been an important 
accompaniment to human labour. When primitive man undertook some complex task, he would 
often roll his tongue around his head in order to increase his concentration — this established a 
link between economic efficiency and orality (that is, the capacity to produce sounds from the 
mouth) whose ultimate consequence was the birth of language.100
West’s brief comments on the role of poetry in primitive societies formed an important bridge 
between his anthropological concerns and his ideas about the relationship between form and 
content in literature. Following the lead of Karl Bucher, whose Arbeit und Rhythmus was one of 
the few theoretical works he identified by name, West suggested that poetry (or, more precisely, 
the sort of metrical chants which often accompanied primitive labour) had its origins in “the 
regularly repeated movements of the body in work”.101 When employed in an economic context, 
its purpose was to liberate supplies of collective energy which might otherwise have gone 
untapped. By imposing a new regularity on individual actions and by “co-ordinating the action 
of one individual with others”,102 poetry engendered a ferocious sense of group resolve which 
enabled primitive societies to scale heights of economic achievement which had previously been 
beyond them.103 This emphasis on poetry as a transformational force was an early sign of 
West’s impatience with the “reflectionist” element in Marxist thought, with its tendency to 
regard literature and the arts as little more than elegant props for the existing social order.104 As 
with Caudwell, Fox and most of the other aestheticians in the world communist movement 
(though arguably with a much greater sense of theoretical clarity) West’s interest was in the idea 
of literature as a force which points humanity towards a better future. This brings us on to the 
second element in his argument.
Having prepared the ground for a materialist theory of aesthetic value by arguing that poetry 
performed a directly economic function in primitive societies, West now turned his attention to 
the question of how literary texts can convey aesthetic experience. At the heart of his 
explanation was an attempt to link the expressivity of texts with the productive capacities of the 
wider society. Its point of departure was a startling proposition about the origins of literary 
inspiration. An individual is moved to write, West implied, because he is drawn towards the 
majesty of the economic process by powerful feelings of identification, which imbue him with 
the desire to transform the human sensibility in much the same way that production transforms 
the environment.105 When a writer tries to restore our experience of the world to a state of rude 
sensual health -  to “defamiliarise” it, in Shklovsky’s phrase -  he does so by unconsciously 
striving to emulate the protean energies that enable human beings to shape the external world in 
accordance with their own wishes:
The good writer does not take fo r granted. In some way, o f  which at present we know very little, 
he actively feels the productive energy o f society and identifies himself with it. He realises, not 
necessarily consciously, but perhaps through the alternations o f energy and fatigue, that neither 
the world nor our living in it are mere plain facts. They are the facts to make songs
about With this sense in his body o f the productive energy which alone continues the
existence o f us and our world, the writer’s language is quickened. His whole writing expresses 
that participation in social energy through which he feels the life o f the world.106
Literary form, the source of a text’s aesthetic power, is as much rooted in economic procedures 
as the writer’s original impulse to create. It can best be understood as the result of an 
unconscious effort to mimic the techniques of production at the level of language -  or, more 
precisely, to mimic the states of mind which accompany economic activity. The emotional 
states and intellectual procedures which characterise the labour process are broadly similar 
under any system of production, and have their precise parallels in the formal arrangements that 
confer aesthetic significance on works of art.107 This idea was initially explored in relation to the 
flow of energy during work. According to West, the individual is unable to sustain the same 
level of energy throughout the whole of the working day -  periods of intense activity are 
invariably superseded by periods of comparative disengagement. This is partly for biological 
reasons (or so one assumes) but also because the majority of people have a preference for 
consumption over production -  the result of being excluded from economic activity during their 
earliest years. The different stages in the flow of economic energy are associated with different 
attitudes towards membership of the broader social group. The worker will regard himself as an 
integral member of society when he is fully committed to his particular task; but is likely to 
experience feelings of either rebellion or exclusion during periods of lesser activity. The crucial 
point is that this set of tensions (tensions between “energy and stasis”, “acceptance and 
rebellion” and “inclusion and exclusion”) provides the basis for the binary patterns which 
structure the presentation of emotional states in all forms of literature. The heightened 
sensibility that we associate with great literature is nothing, in the final analysis, except the 
everyday experiences of the ordinary worker evoked in primary colours.108
The argument was then extended to matters of a more cognitive nature. In a passage which 
recalled Marx’s famous description of the architect who “raises his structure in his imagination 
before he erects it in reality”,109 West implied that there are two related forms of intellectual 
activity which allow production to occur. The dispassionate investigation of external reality, 
oriented towards the question “how does it all work?”, is balanced by the more subjective 
attempt to anticipate the ways in which knowledge can be used to humanise the environment -  
to transform it, that is, in accordance with human needs. West’s belief was that this fundamental 
distinction is reflected by literature’s central devices, some of which (e.g. non-figural imagery)
make a direct reference to the external world, whereas others (e.g. comparative imagery) seek to 
describe the “human and non-human in terms of one another”. The continual alternation 
between the two modes was what West held responsible for much of literature’s power.110
West’s argument about form was saved from reductionism by his willingness to acknowledge 
what can perhaps be called the relative autonomy of form. He appeared to argue that there are 
two characteristics which are present in literature but absent from the economic processes in 
which it is rooted. The first is a capacity for reconciling opposites. Whereas economic activity is 
always characterised by the sort of emotional “conflicts” to which we have just referred 
(conflicts between energy and stasis, acceptance and rebellion and inclusion and exclusion), 
literature usually makes a virtue of fusing its disparate elements into a cohesive whole.111 
Secondly, it also displays a feel for ambiguity which is unequalled in any other form of 
communication. A genuine work of literature deliberately activates the multiple denotations 
attached to a whole range of individual words, though not in such a way as to sabotage the 
reader’s ability to extract a continuous meaning.112 The effect of these characteristics is subtly to 
alter our understanding of social organisation. By flirting with verbal anarchy while retaining a 
fundamental coherence, literature “conveys the sense of power to achieve organisation and to 
use its power.”113 And by reconciling affective states that would otherwise be in conflict, it 
“gives a sensation of a more harmonised organism than the social organism actually is”114 (this 
is presumably to be admired for prefiguring the social harmony that will exist under 
communism). If the formalist assumptions which dominated academic criticism in the 1930s 
were a clear influence on the whole of West’s thinking (a point to which I will return in due 
course), this was nevertheless the only part of his argument which evinced a clear debt to 
specific British thinkers. It was I.A. Richards, excoriated in Chapter Six of Crisis and Criticism, 
who popularised the idea that poetry’s central characteristic is that of “coenaesthesis” (that is, 
the ability to reconcile conflicting impulses); while the notion of ambiguity had been 
increasingly influential in critical circles since the publication of William Empson’s Seven 
Types o f Ambiguity in 1930.115 West presumably chose to rework these ideas, albeit without 
acknowledgement, in order to establish some common ground with an intended readership of 
“bourgeois intellectuals”.
The third element in West’s aesthetic theory provided a criterion by which literary works could 
be evaluated. It may be correct to characterise literary form as a sort of verbal correlative of the 
states of mind which prevail during production; but it is also clear that not all works of literature 
are as effective as others in using their formal resources to express a compelling aesthetic 
vision. What is it that distinguishes the successful work from the less successful one? In order to 
answer that question, West proposed a highly unusual variation on the doctrine of the unity of
form and content. As we have seen in Chapter Two, this doctrine was held by the Soviet 
theorists to encompass two related beliefs: (1) that the nature of a work’s form is ultimately 
determined by the nature of its content, and (2) that a work’s form should never strive for 
“autonomy” but should always function as a more-or-less “transparent” bearer of meaning. 
West’s innovation was to reformulate the first of these beliefs in the light of the similarities he 
perceived between writing and production. Since literary form has its origins in the writer’s 
identification with productive activity, it follows (or so the argument went) that its aesthetic 
power will only be fully realised in those works that display an understanding of the inherently 
dynamic nature of the economic process. “Literature”, West wrote, “gives us not only the sense 
of the social organism, but of the changing social organism...sensitiveness to the process of 
social change characterises all great literature”.116
The writer’s understanding of society will only be suitably dynamic, West continued, if he is 
able to identify the forces in his own age which must ultimately lead, either in the short or long 
term, towards a complete transformation of the economic system. He must be able to evoke the 
continuous development of the productive forces (technology, scientific knowledge, labour 
power etc.) as well as to describe the process of “class war” which pushes this development 
forward.117 At the same time, West seemed to imply, it is not necessary for the writer to refer 
directly to any of these things. Many of the greatest works of literature, including the shortest 
lyric poems, have represented the dynamism of economic affairs in wholly symbolic or 
allegorical form. West’s example was Milton’s Paradise Lost, conceived as a lengthy 
meditation on the rise of capitalism, in which Heaven served as a symbol of declining feudalism 
and Paradise as a symbol of the emerging bourgeois order.118 Nor is it the case that the forward 
movement of society can only be depicted by writers whose political opinions are consciously 
progressive: “A work may talk revolution; but if it does not show revolution through society’s 
creative movement, it is not fulfilling its function as literature...a work may talk reaction; but if 
it conveys the sense of the social movement it condemns, the manifestly reactionary work is 
more valuable than the manifestly revolutionary.”119 By emphasising this point, West was 
aligning himself with an important tradition of Marxist criticism, beginning with Marx and 
Engels themselves and stretching forward through the likes of Lukacs and Marcuse, which is 
suspicious of “tendentiousness” in art and seeks instead to emphasise the potential 
subversiveness of aesthetic form as such.120 It has sometimes been suggested that endorsement 
of this tradition was one of the main ways in which the communist aestheticians of the 1930s 
implicitly distanced themselves from the element of crude sloganeering in much Soviet or 
Soviet-inspired art.121 If this argument seems especially plausible in the case of West, it is 
perhaps because of the complete absence from the theoretical -  as opposed to critical -  sections 
of Crisis and Criticism of any reference to a work of Socialist Realism.
West’s emphasis on the dynamism of the artist’s vision, linked as it was to a broader attempt to 
reformulate the orthodox account of the relationship between form and content, prepared the 
ground for the remarks about literature’s social function that served as a capstone to his 
aesthetic theory. The ultimate purpose of literature, West now argued, has been to stimulate 
political action by disseminating a more compelling vision of social change than has been 
available elsewhere: “Because literature, as content and form, expresses and is social change, it 
hastens it. Literature is therefore propaganda.”122 The thing which distinguishes literature from 
other forms of discourse, making it more effective as an instrument of political persuasion, is its 
habit of depicting social change in a manner that is simultaneously even-handed and 
disinterested. In the first place, West implied, the literary imagination is set apart by its sense of 
inclusivity. It works by casting a balanced eye across both the hegemonic and emergent 
elements in a social formation, identifying as much with the former (God in Paradise Lost, for 
instance) as with the latter (Satan in the same poem).123 Only then, having registered the divided 
loyalties which necessarily exist when an established way of life is under threat, will it begin to 
guide the reader towards a less equivocal identification with the forces of change.124 It does so 
by freeing our perception of social evolution from narrowly personal or utilitarian 
considerations. When literature is working its magic upon us, we cease to ask “what does this 
mean for me?” and begin to perceive the sheer grandeur of the technological and class forces 
which are pushing society forward. This stimulates our desire to make a contribution to their 
further development. The argument at this point took the form of a partial critique of Bukharin’s 
remarks about the idea of “disinterestedness” in art. Taking issue with Bukharin’s rejection of 
the entire Kantian tradition in aesthetics, West resorted to a vivid analogy in order to illustrate 
his belief that the idea of disinterestedness should not be simply discarded but retained in a 
modified form:
...if, instead o f merely waiting fo r the train to come, as trains always do come, we look down the 
tunnel, feel the wind begin to blow out o f it, then see the gleam from the approaching train, the 
sense o f excitement may make us momentarily forget whether we are waiting fo r a Highgate or 
a Golders Green train. In that sense, we are disinterested. The train is not a given object, by 
which we travel to Highgate, which we consume. We look at it without reference to our desire to 
get to a particular station. But it is untrue to say that it exists fo r  us only in an intellectual way, 
without any reference whatever to desire or will. We see it with a sense o f exhilaration that 
there should be any trains at all, with a feeling o f the social energy that has created them. We 
do not want only to use trains, but to take part, in our field, in the activity that produces them. 
The element o f truth in Hegel’s idea is that in an aesthetic experience we do not desire as mere 
consumers; but we do desire as producers, and this desire, though not necessarily the only one, 
is dominant}25
Since our account of West’s theory of aesthetic value has extended over several pages, it might 
be worth reminding ourselves of its central arguments:
• Language and poetry both have their origins in productive activity. They arise in primitive 
societies in response to economic needs.
• The desire to write is rooted in powerful feelings of identification that draw the writer 
towards the economic process.
• Literary form, the source of aesthetic value, is unconsciously modelled on the emotional 
states and cognitive strategies that characterise production under any social system.
• Literature possesses qualities of ambiguity and coenasethesis which sharpen our awareness 
of the potential coherence of the economic system.
• Literature’s aesthetic power can only be fully realised if a work evokes the economic 
processes (i.e. the “development of new productive forces and class-war”) which push a 
society towards wholesale reorganisation. This is what we mean by the unity of form and 
content.
• Because of its ability to evoke social change in a way that is free of crude partisanship and 
the petty utilitarianism which tends to dominate everyday life, literature is a powerful means 
of encouraging participation in the political process.
Each element in West’s theory of aesthetic value is open to criticism, beginning with his 
anthropological speculations about the origins of language and poetry. As Robert Sullivan has 
pointed out in his book on Caudwell, the idea that language and poetry both arose in response to 
economic needs has a respectable anthropological pedigree, appearing for the first time in E.B. 
Tylor’s Primitive Society in 1871.126 As such, it would be going too far to follow the lead of 
Rene Wellek and simply dismiss it as a convenient fiction or “phantasy”, conjured into 
existence to buttress Marxist preconceptions.127 It is nevertheless clear that this is an area in 
which certainty is simply impossible -  all theories about the roots of human communication are 
ultimately the product of informed speculation and nothing else.128 The perspectives which West 
shared with Caudwell and Plekhanov can reasonably be criticised for overstating economic 
considerations and ignoring or eliding other possible reasons for the emergence of language and 
poetry.129 For example, there seem to be many anthropologists and linguists who insist that 
language had its roots either in genetics (a sort of natural propensity to operationalise the “deep 
structures” of an innate grammar)130 or in a straightforward love of mimesis (the desire to
imitate the sounds of birds and wild animals).131 The interesting thing from a historical point of 
view is that alternatives to the Plekhanov/Caudwell/West thesis were occasionally proposed in 
the 1930s by other English Marxists, notably by W.H. Auden in his important essay “Writing” 
(1932).132 It has often been argued that members of the so-called “Auden group” were tom for 
much of the Thirties between two incompatible conceptions of art. On the one hand, traumatised 
by the rise of fascism and the threat of war, they tried to create a “parabolic” form of writing 
that could be used to convey important political truths to the public. On the other hand, indebted 
to the legacy of European Romanticism, they instinctively believed that the main purpose of art 
is to evoke the private moods of the gifted individual.133 The striking thing about “Writing” was 
that it provided an account of the origins of language which aimed to legitimise both these 
perspectives. If we wish to identify the “first language”, Auden suggested, we must point to the 
purely “expressive” sounds that existed before the emergence of language proper -  that is, 
sounds such as “ow”, “coo” and “ee-ah” that directly expressed emotion without referring to 
definite signifieds.134 This primitive form of language was partly a response to the urgent need 
to co-ordinate economic activity; but it also reflected a deep-seated desire to reinforce feelings 
of intimacy by laying bare the speaker’s inner world: “ ...it was used to express the feelings of 
the speaker; feelings about something happening to him (the prick of the pin), or attitudes 
towards other things in the world (the other hungry dog; the darling baby).”135 However, when a 
more authentic form of language finally superseded the older system of semi-articulate noises, 
the reason for the change was more existential than economic. At a certain point in their 
development, Auden wrote, primitive societies lost the “telepathic” sense of person-to-person 
intimacy which bound them together. Remembering the heightened sense of belonging that 
usually resulted when they communicated through sounds, primitive men subsequently came to 
feel that the group consciousness of the past could somehow be recaptured if only their 
language was elaborated into something more systematic and genuinely referential. Language 
thus emerged from the desire of primitive man to “recover the sense of being as much part of 
life as the cells in his body are part of him.”136 Although these arguments were much sketchier 
than those of either Caudwell or West, they provided interesting early evidence of the way that 
the Marxist Auden (the one who emphasised the economic reasons for the birth of language) 
would eventually be drowned out by the Romantic Auden who primarily saw language as a key 
player in the drama of the human soul.
There is a sense in which the core of West’s theory -  his assertion that literature arises from the 
feelings of identification that draw the writer towards the process of production — is undermined 
by one of its own premises. When he insisted that the feelings of identification between writer 
and society are “not necessarily” conscious, West arguably did two things: (1) he reduced his 
argument to the status of an unverifiable hypothesis; and (2) he cast doubt on their explanatory
power by failing to assign them a suitably prominent role in the writer’s conscious existence. If 
the awe which the writer experiences in the presence of “social energy” is really so fundamental 
as to spur him into writing, one might at least expect it to make some sort of impression on his 
conscious mind -  there is, after all, no ethical or cultural reason that would obviously justify its 
suppression. The suspicion that West’s analogy between literature and production is therefore 
somewhat forced, though perhaps not wholly misleading, is underscored by the relative paucity 
of his remarks about literary form. While Crisis and Criticism makes some interesting 
suggestions about literature’s use of figurative and non-figurative language and its capacity to 
express emotion, it fails to indicate how a whole range of other formal devices can plausibly be 
related to the nature of the labour process. In what sense, for instance, is it possible to see 
rhythm, tone and texture as verbal correlatives of the states of mind that characterise human 
labour? On the credit side, however, it should also be noted that West’s emphasis on the 
unconscious roots of creativity was of pioneering significance in terms of the development of 
Marxist theories of culture. A number of Marxists had tried to integrate psychoanalytic ideas 
into their work by the time that Crisis and Criticism was written; but West was one of the first 
to reject the idea that the unconscious mind is merely a repository of anti-social impulses (as in 
the Freudian orthodoxy) and to see it instead as a crucible of progressive intuitions. In the 
period after the War, especially during the great flowering of Western Marxism between 1945 
and 1970, this idea became central to various forms of Marxist theory. Since we know that the 
work of the thirties aestheticians was familiar to many of the Western Marxists, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that West’s theory of literature exercised a distant influence on such writers 
as Ernst Bloch (who saw the unconscious mind as the locus of the utopian imagination)137 and 
Herbert Marcuse (who saw the “desublimation” of the Freudian eros as one of the main 
objectives of political revolution).138
Viewed from another perspective, West’s theory can perhaps be seen as a conscious attempt to 
update (and hence to displace) an earlier account of the nature of creativity. As George Steiner 
has recently pointed out in an important series of books and essays, notably Real Presences 
(1989),139 there has been an entire movement in Western aesthetics which regards creativity as 
the product of the artist’s tendency to identify with the mind of God. Convinced that his own 
powers are as demiurgic as those of his creator, the artist conjures aesthetic worlds of his own 
(or so the argument goes) in order to assuage his disappointment at not being responsible for the 
act o f divine inspiration which created the universe. Whether or not he sets out to explore 
religious ideas, he identifies so completely with God at the moment of creation that his work 
necessarily embodies a sense of the numinous. It is important to remember that traces of this 
theory can be detected in the work of many of West’s contemporaries. Looking back towards 
the end of his life at his experience of writing, it was D.H. Lawrence (the subject of West’s last
essay) who wrote that “I always feel as if I stood naked for the fire of Almighty God to go 
through me -  and it’s rather an awful feeling. One has to be so terribly religious to be an 
artist.”140 The similarities which link West’s ideas to those of the earlier tradition are surely 
clear enough. There is the same emphasis on the artist seeking to emulate an external source of 
creativity (God on the one hand, production on the other), and the same insistence that the artist 
has no choice but to refer to certain subject matters. The idea that Marxism often functions as a 
substitute religion has been greatly overplayed; but this is arguably a clear case of a Marxist 
writer preserving the structure of a religious doctrine while changing its substantive content.
Even if West’s understanding of the nature of creativity were wholly convincing, the 
observations about the unity of form and content which flow from it would still be problematic. 
By insisting that the expressive power of literary form can only be activated when the writer 
evokes the forces of economic progress in his own age, West is obviously placing drastic 
limitations on what the writer can be expected to achieve. Implicit in West’s theory is the 
assumption that no successful work of literature can ever evoke social stasis or decline (where 
does this leave Swift, Gibbon and Dickens?) or even the forces of economic progress from an 
earlier age. This makes it all the more ironic that three of the writers who have won most praise 
from Marxist critics, namely Shakespeare, Scott and Balzac, each created epic works about 
social transformations that occurred before they were bom. The other main problem with West’s 
theory relates to its account of the effects of literature on the reader’s conscious understanding 
of economic processes. When form and content work in unison, West argued, three things tend 
to occur: (1) the forces of economic progress are perceived in comparatively “disinterested” 
form, (2) productive energies which clash in everyday life are portrayed as part of a continuum, 
and (3) ambiguities of meaning remind us of the miraculous way in which the economy unites 
diverse individuals in a common effort. What is missing from this account is any explanation of 
why a work’s content should be perceived as distinctively economic in the first place. Given 
that social realities are often portrayed in literature in a highly refracted form (as West implicitly 
acknowledged), there would seem to be no particular reason why the reader should look beyond 
a work’s manifest content to the economic forces that inspire it. The point can be illustrated by 
referring to two of the theorists who influenced West. When I.A. Richards spoke of literature’s 
capacity to reconcile opposites, he interpreted the impulses that submit to reconciliation not as 
forms of productive energy but as “instincts” that might otherwise threaten mental coherence. 
Similarly, when William Empson drew attention to the proliferation of ambiguities in poetry, he 
saw them primarily as an expression of disparate impulses in the poet’s personality. There was 
no attempt to relate them to disparate individuals coming together in a common act of economic 
creativity. In a culture which has tended since the 19th Century to regard literature as the record 
of personal psychology, these ideas are likely to seem rather more plausible than West’s.
To the majority of West’s contemporaries, however, the philosophical integrity of his ideas was 
probably a lot less important than their wider political function. As has often been pointed out, it 
seems clear that the strategic ambition behind Crisis and Criticism was to provide Socialist 
Realism with some sort of philosophical justification.141 If it is indeed the case that the most 
powerful literature is that which successfully evokes the forces of economic progress, West 
seemed to be saying, then it follows that the Socialist Realists are the most important writers of 
the age -  Marxist content is the condition of significant form. By the same token, modernism 
has been condemned to aesthetic poverty by the reactionary opinions of its main exponents. 
West tried to illustrate this argument in the two notorious chapters which brought Crisis and 
Criticism to an end. These consisted of an extended comparison between Joyce’s Ulysses and 
The Gates o f  a Strange Field by Harold Heslop, one of the few genuine proletarians to write 
socialist fiction in the 1930s.142 Whereas Heslop’s book was complimented on its unusual 
vitality, Joyce was condemned (though not without receiving a great deal of incidental praise) 
for his failure to translate his anti-clericalism into a wholehearted opposition to capitalism and 
imperialism. If Ulysses displayed a lack of formal coherence which prevented it from achieving 
genuine greatness, it was Joyce’s ignorance of Marxism that was ultimately to blame.143 
Although the chapter on Joyce was often a lot more insightful than this brief summary would 
suggest (it was later described by the non-Marxist critic Stanley Edgar Hyman as “absolutely 
first-rate”),144 West’s encomium to Heslop is still occasionally cited as the ne plus ultra of 
thirties dogmatism. Unsurprisingly, it was omitted from the new edition of Crisis and Criticism 
that was published in Britain after West’s death.145
2.3 Romanticism as a precursor of Marxism
We have seen in Chapter Two that the Soviet theorists often tried to legitimise Socialist Realism 
by portraying it as the culmination of a whole series of prestigious cultural forms. These ranged 
from the fertility myths of ancient society to the novels of Tolstoy and the paintings of Repin 
and Yaroshenko. It is less often realised that the Soviet theorists also employed a similar 
strategy to confer historical legitimacy on their own work, usually by invoking non-Marxist 
writers from the 19th Century who had explored the relationship between art and society from a 
radical perspective. It was common for Soviet writers to claim direct descent from Belinsky, 
Chemyshevsky and Dobrolyubov, each of whom had combined a taste for realism in the arts 
with a commitment to anti-czarism in politics.146 Yet in Britain, even during the Popular Front 
when interest in the history of English radicalism was at its height (see Chapter Six), it was only 
Alick West who showed any real interest in relating Marxist criticism to a wider tradition of 
aesthetic thinking. According to West, Marxist criticism should essentially be seen as a
recapitulation (albeit at a much higher level of political sophistication) of the ideas developed by 
the main Romantic theorists in the late-18th and early 19th Centuries.
West’s starting point was the assumption that the Romantics had a similar relationship to their 
theoretical predecessors as his own generation of Marxists had to theirs. Whereas the Marxists 
were trying to build on the undeveloped strain of collectivism in writers such as Eliot, Read and 
Richards, the Romantics tried to extend the inchoate collectivist insights in the work of 
“Augustan” critics such as Pope, Warburton and Hurd.147 For much of the 18th Century, West 
claimed, English intellectuals had been preoccupied with the issue of the diversity of human 
taste. Faced with a revival of scholarly interest in mediaeval, Scandinavian and biblical 
literature, combined with a “growing acquaintance”148 with the culture of non-Westem countries 
such as China and India (the result of the growth of imperialism), the leading Augustans 
distanced themselves from the orthodox assumption that aesthetic standards are of 
transhistorical or “timeless” significance. They did so by forging a relativist form of criticism 
which employed sociological assumptions to justify the fundamental tenet that each age has 
aesthetic standards of its own. Because literature always bears the imprint of its social 
environment, it follows that tastes will change with each significant transformation o f the social 
structure -  it makes no sense to judge the work of one age according to the standards of 
another.149 Although West accepted that these ideas were a significant advance on the aesthetic 
individualism of the sixteenth century, he also claimed that the Augustans failed to develop a 
properly historical understanding of human personality. When they wrote about the relationship 
between the individual and society, they still assumed that personality is essentially shaped 
outside society and that the social influences on the individual are therefore of purely secondary 
importance.150 In other words, they failed to challenge what Christopher Caudwell had called 
the “bourgeois illusion of freedom” -  the assumption that the individual is ultimately free of 
social determinations. This was the theoretical weakness which the Romantics tried to put right.
Although West ranged widely in his account of Romanticism, referring at various times to 
theoretical statements by Blake, Wordsworth and Shelley, his argument was chiefly based on a 
highly unconventional interpretation of Coleridge’s writings on literature and aesthetics. 
According to West, Coleridge regarded literature as a force which mediates between man and 
God. The ultimate goal of the poet is to transfigure his personality by achieving direct 
communion with the mind of God, but this state of “individuation” can only be reached after a 
long process of spiritual endeavour. If the poet is to stand any chance of success, he must firstly 
acquire a basic sense of the numinous by looking beyond everyday experience towards the 
“organic unity” which represents the main evidence for God’s presence in the world. This 
process is itself a gradual one. To use the sort of evangelical language which West had
encountered during his boyhood, spiritual wisdom does not begin with a premature quest for the 
divine oneness at the heart of all creation. Its real starting point is the attempt to identify the 
traces of organic unity in purely local forms of experience.151
It was this emphasis on organic unity, West argued, which allowed Coleridge to make a decisive 
break with the ideology of aesthetic individualism. In the first place, it forced him to dismantle 
the opposition between society and the individual which had survived unscathed in the work of 
his Augustan predecessors. Since the idea of organic unity implied that the entire universe is 
bound together by a network of mutually determining relationships between its constituent 
elements, it no longer made sense to attribute a fixed nature to the individual and thereafter to 
describe the influence of social factors as purely contingent.152 In Coleridge’s work, the self is 
wholly shaped by its dialectical interactions with the social environment: “But for my 
conscience, that is my affections and duties towards others, I should have no self.”153 In West’s 
opinion, Coleridge expressed this recognition by insisting that the primary function of literature 
is to evoke the forms of organic unity which operate in society -  or, as he liked to call it, the 
“body politic”.154 Seen from this perspective, the role of the writer is to lay bare the mode of 
interaction that unites society’s diverse elements into a cohesive whole. Yet West rejected the 
idea that Coleridge was trying to project a misleading unity onto a social system that remained 
deeply conflictual. At the heart of his work, he argued, was the recognition that social cohesion 
is regularly being undermined by the conflict between opposed forces.155 These forces were 
often described in highly abstract terms. Coleridge once distinguished between the 
“intederminable, but yet actual, influences of intellect, information [and] prevailing principles” 
(what we might now call the hegemonic ideology)156 and “the regular, definite and legally 
recognised powers” (established political institutions).157 He also distinguished between “latent 
or dormant power” (which appears to mean the will of God) and “actual power” (the sources of 
temporal authority).158 Yet in his more concrete moments he made it clear that the main 
responsibility for the threat to social cohesion lay primarily with the growth of capitalism.159 
The problem with the market system, he once wrote, is that it contravenes “the sacred principle 
recognised by all laws, human and divine, the principle, indeed, which is the the groundwork of 
all law and justice, that a person can never become a thing, nor be treated as such without 
wrong”.160 The responsibility of literature, in circumstances such as these, is to demonstrate that 
social unity can only be maintained in spite of, not because of, the commercial forces which 
dominate the age.
West was not suggesting that Coleridge or any other of the English Romantics had been 
revolutionary socialists avant la lettre. Because Romanticism emerged at a time when a 
disorganised proletariat was confronted by a powerful alliance between the aristocracy and the
industrial middle classes, it was more or less inevitable that its anti-capitalist instincts would be 
diverted into a series of political cul de sacs.161 But it is surely clear why West should have 
perceived so many similarities between Romantic theory and his own contribution to Marxist 
aesthetics. Where the Romantics were responding to the emergent collectivism of the late 
Augustan period, West was responding to the emergent collectivism of men like Eliot, Read and 
Lawrence. Where the Romantics (or at least Coleridge) believed that the purpose of literature is 
to reflect the organic unity at the heart of society, West proposed that literature’s aesthetic 
power derives from deep feelings of identification which bind the writer to the economic 
process. And where the Romantics thought that capitalism poses an incalculable threat to social 
cohesion, West believed that the highest task of literature and literary theory is to hasten the 
abolition of capitalism and the establishment of a new society in which human solidarity can 
flourish. However, there is still one question that needs to be answered. To what extent did West 
convey an accurate impression of Coleridge’s ideas? There is a case for saying that his chapter 
on Coleridge was ultimately vitiated by one serious omission. Although Coleridge’s theoretical 
and critical writings are notoriously digressive, most commentators have agreed that the core of 
his aesthetic system is the doctrine of imagination outlined in Chapter Thirteen of Biographia 
Literaria (1817). According to Coleridge, the essence of imaginative activity is the attempt to 
recreate the initial act by which God created the world. Conceived as the driving force behind 
all genuine poetry, imagination is a “repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act o f creation in 
the infinite I AM.”162 Far from being a form which mediates between man and God by evoking 
the temporal evidence of God’s existence, poetry reflects the brief moments in which the poet 
gropes towards an understanding of the demiurgic powers that resulted in the creation of the 
universe. I have already suggested that ideas of this sort (that is, ideas which regard the root of 
creativity as the artist’s desire to identify with the mind of God) might well have been the 
primary influence on West’s own understanding of the creative process. The fact that the 
doctrine of imagination was elided in Crisis and Criticism163 only serves to reinforce this 
impression -  as we have seen, West was the sort of writer who often performed bizarre acts of 
expurgation on his most powerful influences. Yet the issue of West’s fidelity to his sources is 
not really important. The crucial point about his work on Romanticism is that it represented the 
most sustained attempt in the 1930s to legitimise Marxist criticism by invoking a non-Marxist 
theoretical tradition. As we shall see in Section Four, West’s taste for non-Marxist ideas was to 
be of increasing importance as his relationship with the Communist Party became more 
strained.
3 OPPOSING THE POPULAR FRONT? WEST’S OTHER WRITINGS FROM THE 
1930S
Crisis and Criticism was by no means the only work of Marxist criticism that West published in 
the 1930s. Apart from contributing the important essay “On Abstract Criticism” to Betty Rea’s 
symposium 5 on Revolutionary Art, he also wrote 15 essays for Left Review, four essays for 
Labour Monthly and seven articles for the Daily Worker.164 If Crisis and Criticism was a largely 
orthodox book, extending the insights of Soviet theory in innovative directions but rarely 
seeking to challenge them, much of this other writing served notice that West had already 
developed doubts about the CPGB’s strategic orientation, especially its commitment to the so- 
called Popular Front strategy. As he later admitted in One Man in his Time, West could never 
quite escape the feeling that “Popular Frontism” undermined the very objectives which had 
brought him into the Party in the first place. By insisting that communists should temporarily 
subordinate the struggle for socialism to the broader effort to establish a united movement in 
defence of bourgeois democracy, the CPGB was guilty (or so West believed) of sabotaging the 
communitarian passions which drove its members forward.
We reassure those who believe only in bourgeois democracy that the government o f the Spanish 
Republic is not communist. But the movement we ask them to support is directed to a different 
democracy than theirs. “We communists", the Manifesto said, “scorn to conceal our aims”. We 
conceal ours fo r the sake o f unity, and all we achieve is a false unity with Gollancz and the Left 
Book Club; and by that compromise we take away from our own aim its power to inspire real 
unity.165
When read in the light of passages such as this, several of West’s occasional pieces from the 
1930s suddenly take on a new significance. Especially important are the essays and reviews in 
which West expressed an uncompromising critique of several of the literary and artistic groups 
which communist intellectuals were seeking to entice into the Popular Front. We shall 
concentrate in what follows on his attacks on (1) progressive Christians, (2) left-wingers in the 
Scrutiny group, (3) the Auden circle, and (4) the surrealist movement. Although West was never 
explicitly critical of Party policy, it seems clear in retrospect that one of his objectives was to 
problematise the idea of a Popular Front by attacking nearly all its non-communist supporters. It 
was as if he could only maintain his public support for the Party by channelling his doubts into 
cultural criticism.
West’s first attack on the Christian element in the Popular Front was prompted by two letters by 
Eric Gill which appeared in Left Review in June 1935.166 Although Gill was a Catholic 
distributist whose social radicalism owed more to Ruskin, Carlyle and G.K. Chesterton than to 
any socialist writer, he was nevertheless the most prominent non-Marxist artist associated with
the Artists’ International Association (AIA).167 His two letters were originally published in the 
Catholic Herald after the AIA was attacked by one of the paper’s critics for disseminating 
“Marxist propaganda”. The letters were republished in Left Review because they were held to 
represent “currents of thought among English intellectuals which ought not to be ignored.”168 
Gill’s main concern, in response to the claim that the ALA had corrupted art by linking it with 
politics, was to defend the idea that great art is necessarily a form of propaganda. If we examine 
the works of art that have dominated the English imagination, including the Gothic cathedrals of 
the middle ages and the “effigies of eminent politicians in Westminster Abbey and Parliament 
Square,”169 we find that they all expressed a distinctive view about how society should be 
organised. If artists abandon social themes and engage only with their personal concerns, they 
end up producing work that expresses little more than a blasphemous form of “self-worship”.170 
In order to reinforce his insistence that there is no meaningful distinction between the aesthetic 
and the political, Gill condemned the prevailing definitions of art for creating the impression 
that artistic activity is “performed in vacuo”.171 Instead of limiting our idea of art to such forms 
as painting, literature and music, we should try to acknowledge that all forms of human labour 
(including cooking a Christmas cake and manufacturing a gas oven) encompass the element of 
creative endeavour that is the hallmark of the artist’s sensibility.172
West’s response to Gill was concerned with what he seemed to regard as the hidden agenda not 
merely of the two letters but of the entire Christian faction in the Popular Front.173 Progressive 
Christians, West implied, devote much of their energy to identifying the assumptions which 
communism and Christianity have in common, and in so doing risk obscuring the more 
important assumptions which divide the two ideologies one from another. Gill showed that he 
was typical of this tendency by implying that Catholic artists and communist artists are 
ultimately bound together by the “expression of collective emotion in protest against bourgeois 
exploitation and individualism.”174 By emphasising the emotional similarities between the two 
camps, he was guilty (or so West argued) of ignoring the crucial differences in ideology that 
distinguish Socialist art from devotional art. Whereas Socialist art embodies a Marxist 
understanding of bourgeois society and emphasises the need for proletarian revolution, Catholic 
artists are unable to pursue Marxist insights because “the Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic 
Church has declared Socialism incompatible with Catholic piety.”175 West detected a similar 
concern to elide the differences between Catholicism and Marxism in Gill’s attempts to widen 
the definition of art. There is much truth in the idea that “art” and “craft” are both areas of 
activity in which human beings can experience aesthetic pleasure; but it is equally true that the 
artist directly reflects social relations (that is, society is one of his manifest subject matters) 
whereas the craftsman does not. Gill’s attempt to conflate art and craft was bound up with his 
belief that the crucial element in a work of art is not social vision but emotion, and therefore
reinforced his dangerous assertion that the cultural politics of Catholicism and Marxism are 
basically the same.176 At the same time, West pointed out, there is always a danger that an 
unbalanced concern with the emotional dimension of art will end up inspiring precisely the sort 
of solipsistic aestheticism that Gill had rightly condemned.177 West would later explore some 
similar ideas in his review of Christianity and the Social Revolution, the famous symposium 
from 1935 in which a number of Marxist intellectuals (e.g. John Lewis and W.H. Auden) joined 
with their Christian counterparts (e.g. John MacMurray and Karl Polanyi) to assess the 
relationship between their respective creeds.178
The small number of Marxists who wrote for Scrutiny in the early 1930s had abandoned the 
journal by the middle of the decade.179 But Scrutiny retained the loyalty of certain intellectuals 
who aimed to reconcile a Leavisite understanding of cultural history with a commitment to 
socialist politics. The most important of these was probably L.C. Knights, whose study Drama 
and Society in the Age o f Jonson came out in 1937.180 West’s hostile review of this book, 
strangely entitled “Ben Jonson was no sentimentalist” (Left Review, September 1937),181 was 
another sign of his scant willingness to treat potential allies in the Popular Front with much 
comradely feeling. Not even mentioning the fact that Knights had a history of activism on the 
left, West argued that the main purpose of his book was to provide a sketch of Elizabethan and 
early-Jacobean culture that substantiated the reactionary Leavisite account of how the decencies 
of pre-modem society had been disastrously overtaken by the barbarism of emergent capitalism. 
It tried to achieve this (or so the argument went) by portraying Jonson as a dramatist who 
ruthlessly criticised the new market order by invoking the luminous standards of feudal Britain: 
“His [i.e. Knights’s] main conclusion is that the dramatists brought to bear on the significant 
economic developments of their time...a traditional morality inherited from the Middle 
Ages”.182 By portraying pre-modem England as a lost paradise of civilised values, Knights was 
guilty of grossly idealising feudal society and creating the impression that a return to the “small 
community” was modem culture’s “only hope”.183 West’s response to all this was to reject the 
idea that Jonson had ever been quite the hard-line traditionalist whom Knights described. 
Although many of Jonson’s plays are critical of capitalism, they also embody a Renaissance 
man’s optimism about the creativity, energy and grandeur which commerce brings in its 
wake.184 One of the best examples of this self-divided approach to Elizabethan society is found 
in Volpone.185 When Volpone disguises himself as an old man in order to wheedle presents out 
of credulous visitors who hope to inherit his wealth, he is undoubtedly intended to satirise the 
dishonesty on which the free market is based. But Jonson portrays him with such humour and 
affection that he simultaneously strikes us as a powerful model of personal dynamism. 
Referring to the scene in which Volpone bursts out laughing while rehearsing the role of an old 
man, West wrote that “Its mood seems to me to be not the steady recognition of human
limitations, based on the traditional morality of ‘the mean’, but the laughter of a young man at 
the decrepitude of age; and beneath the laughter, the memento mori, not of Catholicism, but of 
the Renaissance.”186 Other examples of the loveable capitalist rogue in Jonson’s plays are the 
“two swindlers” in The Alchemist and Sejanus and Tiberius in Sejanus.187 Nor was it the case 
that characters who portrayed the feudal virtues were always portrayed in a favourable light. 
Although Justice Overdo is resolved to expose the “enormities of the age” in Bartholomew Fair, 
he is thwarted by the “discovery that his own wife has been recruited by a pimp and become ‘a 
twelvepenny lady’”.188 If Jonson felt a keen regret at the passing of the feudal age, West 
implied, he also knew that capitalism was simply too progressive for the clock to be turned 
back.
Knights felt sufficiently traduced by West to send a brief letter of response to Left Review, 
published under the title “Mr. Knights Replies to Alick West” in October 1937.189 Denying that 
he had either romanticised the middle ages or failed to recognise the combination of modem and 
pre-modem elements in Jonson’s work, Knights nevertheless argued that a Jonsonian attempt to 
assess the present by the standards of the past was potentially of great importance to left 
politics. It is perfectly true, he acknowledged, that the establishment of a socialist society is now 
“necessary and desirable”: “I hope Mr. West didn’t think me a Distributist.”190 But socialists 
need to recognise that the danger of alienation is likely to exist in any large-scale industrial 
society, whether it be capitalist or socialist. There is always the possibility that the individual 
will be so overwhelmed by the realities of mass organisation that he loses his capacity to 
establish deep human relationships. It is in this context that the example of the small 
communities of the past can be of such value, since it serves to remind us of the sort of face-to- 
face relationships in which intimacy can flourish. The culture of the past can best be 
“possess[ed]” through the medium of “great literature”, so long as the reader exercises enough 
“sensitiveness” and “critical ability”.191 Although these arguments were reminiscent of A.L. 
Morton’s earlier attempt to reconcile Leavisism with Marxism (see Chapter One), they appear to 
have made little impact on West. He never replied to Knights’s letter.
Although the writers who belonged to the so-called “Auden group” were among the most 
prestigious participants in the Popular Front, their work was not always received with 
enthusiasm by the CPGB’s intellectuals. At various times in the 1930s it was either attacked or 
damned with faint praise by the likes of Edgell Rickword, Montagu Slater and Christopher 
Caudwell. The distinctive feature of West’s critique of the Auden group, which he outlined in a 
brief but highly compressed review of Rex Warner’s novel The Wild Goose Chase (Left Review, 
November 1937),192 was that it primarily focused on the group’s use of form. Anxious that they 
should play their part in mobilising their readers against fascism and the threat of war, Auden
and his associates had repeatedly employed the conventions of the parable in their efforts to 
imbue modem literature with an element of political didacticism. Yet the implicit point of 
West’s piece was that the parable is basically unsuited to the effective dissemination of 
revolutionary ideas. The Wild Goose Chase is chiefly the story of George, a young man from 
The Convent (symbolising “culture in very inverted commas”),193 as he cycles through the 
countryside in search of the Wild Goose. The main action occurs when George falls in with the 
“country people” and leads their revolution against the Town (seen by West as “representing 
imperialism”).194 While accepting that Warner was “a good story-teller with a good story”,195 
West pointed to several reasons why his novel failed to work as a manual of revolution. In the 
first place, presumably because parables tend to eschew the accumulation of detail in favour of 
rapid narration, there is no account of the process by which the country people were politicised. 
This has the effect of limiting our identification with the revolutionary cause: “Because the 
work necessary to get the country people on the march is not felt, the reader’s sense of their 
achievement is lessened”.196 There is similar evidence of oversimplification in Warner’s 
portrayal of George’s personality. As a product of the Convent with its pretentious traditions of 
“arty talk”,197 George is making a complete break with his past when he resolves to go over to 
the side of the people. But Warner presents his conversion as if it were simply a matter of 
abandoning one set of convictions and acquiring another, conveying none of the ambivalence 
that necessarily acts as a brake on revolutionary enthusiasms. At the same time there is a curious 
tension between George’s motivations and those of the people he leads. When the people revolt 
against the domination of the Town, they do so in order to create a society based on 
communitarian feeling. Their leader, on the other hand, only becomes a revolutionary because 
he sees it as an opportunity to catch up with the Wild Goose, which West interprets as the 
symbol of an essentially private quest for spiritual transcendence. The implication was that 
Warner’s main achievement was to write a novel which exemplified the intelligentsia’s 
continuing difficulties in identifying with the cause of revolution. If residues of bourgeois 
ideology remain in his work, it is probably (or so West hinted) because his conscious intentions 
were subtly undermined by the historical associations that parable brings in its wake. Noting 
that the particular idea of transcendence to which Warner subscribed was one which emphasised 
the benefits of irrationalism and “the delightful blood”, West observed that The Wild Goose 
Chase was sometimes reminiscent of “D.H. Lawrence at his worst”.198 The parable, he seemed 
to suggest, is simply too bound up with the reactionaiy wing of English modernism to be 
appropriated for radical ends.
If West was comparatively unusual in attacking radical Christians and left-wing members of the 
Scrutiny group (though not so unusual in attacking the Auden circle), he was only one o f a large 
number of communist writers who inveighed against surrealism. The disdain in which
surrealism was held by orthodox communists, regardless of the fact that it was ostensibly part of 
the cultural wing of the Popular Front, can probably be explained in two ways: first, it was an 
unambiguously modernist form and therefore offended against one of the main tenets of Soviet 
theory; and second, there were occasions in the 1930s when British surrealists seemed close to 
displacing the communists as the leading force in radical culture, especially in the field of the 
visual arts.199 The latter point is especially worth emphasising. Shortly after the Artists’ 
International Association (AIA) adopted a Popular Front policy in 1936, its communist stalwarts 
probably came to seem hidebound and dogmatic in comparison to new surrealist recruits such as 
Herbert Read, Roland Penrose and Roger Roughton. The communist counter-attack was led by 
West, Anthony Blunt and A.L. Lloyd,200 each of whom wrote fiercely critical articles in 
response to the famous surrealist exhibition at the New Burlington Galleries in July 1936. The 
surprising things about West’s article, entitled “Surrealisme in Literature” and published in Left 
Review in July 1936, were its complete disregard of surrealist doctrine and its uncharacteristic 
note of aesthetic puritanism. According to Andre Breton, surrealism’s undisputed leader and 
chief ideologue, the main purpose of a surrealist work is to synthesise external reality with the 
“superior reality” of dreams.201 Starting from a broadly Freudian perspective, he insisted that 
dreams were essentially an expression of the “marvellous” desires which human beings had 
banished from their conscious minds but which would nevertheless form the basis of everyday 
life in the revolutionary societies of the future. By employing techniques such as “automatism”, 
defined by Breton as the “[the dictation of] thought... in the absence of any control exercised by 
reason, exempt from any aesthetic or moral concern”,202 the surrealist artist can begin the 
process of reintegrating unconscious desire into our waking lives, thereby placing a strain on the 
capitalist system that will ultimately result in revolution. Although West would go some way 
towards engaging with these ideas in his rather inadequate remarks on surrealism in Crisis and 
Criticism (see the previous section), he chose to ignore them altogether in his article in Left 
Review, claiming instead that surrealism should basically be understood as a systematic attempt 
to undermine the stability of language. By forcing words into highly unusual contexts (West 
quoted Breton’s observation that “ ...a nose is perfectly in its place beside an armchair”),203 
surrealists aim to defamiliarise language by weakening the established relationships between its 
denotative and connotative levels. This subversion of language is seen as the first stage in the 
subversion of the wider society. Having misrepresented the surrealist project in this way, West 
appeared to suggest that its radical credentials were suspect for at least three reasons: (1) the 
surrealists had tended in practice to substitute the subversion of language for the subversion of 
the existing order,204 (2) there is necessarily an element of hidden conservatism in the surrealist 
outlook, since it is only possible to generate verbal shocks if settled linguistic conventions 
remain in place,205 and (3) the “senselessness”206 which surrealists regard as a precursor of 
revolution is more accurately seen as a cause of political impotence: “If a man is consciously
fighting the bourgeois world with all his power and not only with the liberty of words, he either 
never experiences that sudden sense of disorientation, or he considers it a momentary weakness, 
not the highest vision.”207 West was presumably unaware that some of these arguments could 
also be deployed against aspects of the Soviet orthodoxy, specifically the view that progressive 
art should combine an element of “realism” with an element of “revolutionary romanticism”. By 
attacking the idea that the denotative and connotative levels of language should be prised apart 
by using words in unusual contexts, he was effectively saying that art should be realistic and 
nothing else, since (as even a cursoiy inspection of Soviet art makes clear) it is impossible to 
portray the future in a utopian light without undermining the connotations of a whole host of 
everyday words. Although the theoretical sections of Crisis and Criticism show that West was 
actually quite comfortable with the visionary dimension of Socialist Realism, it is noticeable 
that a preference for realism over revolutionary romanticism was a pronounced feature of a 
great deal of English communist art in the 1930s. This is especially true of much of the work 
produced by the visual artists associated with the AIA, including the so-called “Three Jameses” 
(James Boswell, James Fitton and James Holland),208 many of whom favoured dour portraits of 
industrial decline and domestic poverty to upbeat anticipations of the socialist future. There is 
perhaps a sense in which the suspicion of utopian art was an unintended consequence of the 
orthodox attack on modernism. Because many of the leading modernists strove to draw 
attention to the “non-mimetic” status of language, there were probably a lot of communists who 
came to believe, at least subliminally, that any departure from naturalism represented a grave act 
of compromise with the doctrines of the cultural enemy. This feeling was perhaps especially 
strong in England, where (as I have pointed out in the Introduction) the anti-mimetic theories of 
the modernists had already been described as immoral and irreligious by writers such as G.K. 
Chesterton. Another important cause of the unspoken hostility to utopianism might well have 
been the continued influence of nonconformity, whose attack on the aesthetic indulgences of 
High Anglicanism was part of a wider ethic of self-denial to which many British communists 
remained wholly committed.
The other area in which West showed considerable independence of mind during the 1930s was 
the analysis of mass culture, though in this case his unorthodoxy had nothing to do with his 
suspicion of the Popular Front. The serious investigation of forms such as film, popular 
literature and advertising had scarcely got underway by the time West was writing and tended to 
be dominated either by members of the Scrutiny right (e.g. F.R. Leavis)209 or mavericks on the 
non-communist left (e.g. George Orwell).210 There was nevertheless a series of stock arguments 
to which communist writers tended to adhere. The basic assumption was that the popular arts 
are condemned to ideological and aesthetic poverty by the economic circumstances in which 
they are produced. Because the culture industries are owned by very rich men whose main
concern is to safeguard the capitalist system, it follows (or so the argument went) that its 
products will primarily be concerned to brainwash their target audience into an acceptance of 
the existing order.211 West implicitly challenged this view in a two-part essay on detective 
fiction which appeared in 1938 in the January and February editions of Left Review?12 Perhaps 
conscious of the way that a critical attitude towards mass culture can easily spill over into a 
condemnation of the masses themselves (a point that would later be emphasised by Raymond 
Williams in the famous “Conclusion” to Culture and Society),213 he portrayed detective fiction 
as a complex and rewarding form that should not simply be dismissed as what Philip Henderson 
had called “pabulum for the lower middle classes.”214 Tracing the origins of the form to the late- 
18th Century, his first strategy was to characterise the detective novel as an outgrowth of the 
technical developments which revolutionised “serious” fiction at about this time. More 
precisely, he claimed that detective fiction had been made possible by (1) the abandonment of 
first-person forms of narration by novelists such as Samuel Richardson, which enabled the 
writer to create an air of mystery about the ultimate fate of his characters,215 (2) the “new quality 
of suspense” engendered by the “ ...alternation between depths of boredom and heights of 
ecstasy” in the work of such poets as Pope and Young,216 and (3) the appearance in Horace 
Walpole’s novels of an emphasis on “serendipity” (that is, the ability to make far-reaching 
deductions on the basis of scanty physical evidence) which allowed detectives to be portrayed as 
prodigies of intellectual flair.217 Having thus linked this ostensibly “mass” form to the sphere of 
high culture, West then went on to demonstrate that its political sympathies had undergone 
important shifts in the course of the previous 150 years, disproving the idea that it had always 
been a straightforward vehicle of bourgeois ideology. In many of the detective novels that 
appeared in the period between about 1790 and 1820, notably William Godwin’s Caleb 
Williams (which H.N. Brailsford has described as a dramatisation of the anarchist doctrines 
contained in Godwin’s Political Justice),218 there is a persistent tendency to portray the criminal 
as superior to, though not necessarily victorious over, the detective who seeks to bring him to 
justice. Far from being a knee-jerk expression of the desire for law and order, these novels 
“share in the confused revolutionary and reactionary feeling of the romantic movement”.219 It 
was only during the 60 or so years after 1840 that detective fiction expressed a more 
conservative outlook, with writers such as Collins, Poe and Doyle seeking to palliate the 
“bourgeois fear of revolution”220 by writing books in which the detective was always an object 
of veneration. However, more recent work (such as that of Chesterton and Edgar Wallace) once 
again displays an element of ideological ambiguity. Although the modem detective novel is by 
no means as seditious as its Godwinian forebear, it does tend to create the impression that 
criminals are more interesting than the forces of law and order. This is partly because the 
criminal characters are often swathed in mystery until their guilt is established in the closing 
stages of the narrative; but also because the individual detective has been superseded by “mass
investigation by the police”.221 Moreover, it is difficult to admire the police when the majority 
of crimes are now solved not with the aid of deductive ingenuity but through chance: “...a  man 
repairing telephone wires happens to look into the window of a room where the criminals think 
themselves unobserved, and his evidence gives a vital clue.”222 In a passage of great subtlety, 
West seemed to suggest that this emphasis on chance also conveys a valuable lesson about the 
relationship between human beings and their environment. By drawing our attention to the 
inability of the criminal to erase all evidence of his guilt from the areas in which he moves, it 
serves to remind us of the overwhelming importance of environmental influences on the human 
condition -  in this sense, West implied, modem detective fiction is a thoroughly materialist 
form.223 On the other hand, in order to prove the point that the modem thriller writer is not so 
much a thoroughgoing subversive as someone who seeks a productive tension between 
hegemonic and emergent forms of thinking, the essay concluded on a rather pessimistic note:
The social function o f the detective story now is not so much to relieve and reassure, as in the 
middle period, as to divert a confused desire fo r  social change into safe channels. It keeps it 
concerned with crime, and with a police force that has nothing to do but arrest murderers, 
never makes a baton charge, and always wins, because the very structure o f society is its ally 
and the enemy o f the criminal. Ignoring the real function o f the law and the police, and the real 
struggle against them, detective stories are finally dull, even though one cannot lay them 
down...But the significance o f the shift o f  interest back to the criminal must also be kept in 
mind. Millions read the detective story, not because they are decaying with capitalism, but 
because they want to live and don 7 know how. The detective story is also a sign o f revolt 
against decaying capitalism, while endeavouring to make that revolt harmless.224
As we saw in Section One, West first became interested in popular fiction after reading John 
Buchan’s The Three Hostages in a Swiss sanatorium and finding that he was able to “live 
vicariously” through the central character.225 The most surprising omission from “The Detective 
Story” was therefore any consideration of the “subject positions” which popular fiction offers to 
its readers. If West had paid closer attention to his experiences in Switzerland, he might have 
concluded that elite novels seek to hold the reader at a distance whereas popular narratives 
invite his close involvement -  an insight which Pierre Bourdieu has taken up in his seminal 
account of the cultural relationship between “dominator” and “dominated” classes. A more 
serious defect with West’s essay is its failure to attempt a theoretical explanation for the 
polysemic characteristics which it implicitly ascribes to the popular arts. The outlines of a 
theoretical account of polysemy were nevertheless sketched by the poet Charles Madge, one of 
the two founders of the Mass Observation movement, in a remarkable essay which possibly 
influenced West’s account of detective fiction (it appeared a few months earlier) and which 
certainly proved that West was not alone among British communists in his opposition to mass- 
culture theory. In “Press, Radio, and Social Consciousness”, published in Left Review in June 
1937 and later included in C. Day Lewis’s symposium The Mind in Chains (1938), Madge
argued that modem popular culture is a sort of hybrid formation which balances the ideas of the 
ruling class against the sensibility of the masses. According to Madge, it is perfectly true that 
elite domination of the culture industry means that films, newspapers and radio programmes are 
all saturated in bourgeois ideology. However, the need to secure a large audience means that the 
same forms must also reflect what Madge called “mass-wish”226 -  that is, the lurid complex of 
erotic and violent impulses which exists just below the surface of the working-class mind in 
most industrial societies. The presence of this “sensational and vulgar”227 material tends to 
compromise the media’s ability to win support for the existing order, and for three reasons. In 
the first place, Madge argued, it is impossible for the conventions of bourgeois society to seem 
quite so natural and ineluctable when refracted through the “queer poetry”228 of media 
sensationalism: “The newspaper-reader is temporarily in the state described by Coleridge as a 
‘willing suspension of disbelief ...it means that we regard it [i.e. the news] not as objective fact, 
but as poetic fact. It also means that when we stop reading, the news ceases to have the same 
hard, inescapable force that the objective fact has; it becomes a poetic memory, affecting our 
feelings but not our actions.”229 By appealing to desires which would otherwise have remained 
suppressed, the media also creates “formidable psychological reserves of dissatisfaction”230 
which must one day subvert the ethic of self-denial on which capitalism depends. Moreover, in 
its endless search for new sources of sensationalism, it frequently dredges up material which 
serves only to portray the existing system in a more morbid light than ever: “Even when 
ostensibly benevolent, capitalism cannot help being the bearer of evils; and even when, vice 
versa, it is simply out to win a big circulation, the newspaper cannot help being a good 
influence, and eventually an influence subversive of itself. Though it may carry political 
propaganda and exploiter-class advertisement on one page, on another it will print the story of a 
starving unemployed family, simply because it is a good human story. The class-basis of the 
proprietors determines the politics; the class-basis of the readers at least helps to determine the 
rest of the news.”231 If the work of writers such as West and Madge scarcely represents the last 
word on the nature of popular culture, it is nevertheless of some historical importance because it 
tends to undermine one of the founding myths of Cultural Studies. Nearly everyone who has 
surveyed the history of Cultural Studies insists that radical writing on popular culture was 
almost entirely crude and reductive in the period up to the 1970s,232 not least because it 
portrayed the working-class audience as “passive dupes”233 in the face of an all powerful culture 
industry. What a reading of West and Madge demonstrates is that ideas about polysemy and 
active consumption long predate the attempts of such writers as Stuart Hall, Dick Hebdige and 
John Fiske to dismantle the assumptions of mass-culture theory.234
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4 THE CAUTIOUS DISSIDENT: WEST IN THE POST-WAR YEARS
West’s suspicion of communist policy did not come to end once the era of “Popular Frontism” 
had passed. For much of the period between the defeat of fascism in 1945 and his death in 1972, 
West seems to have been convinced that the CPGB had shamelessly abandoned the 
revolutionary policy of its early years for a “reformist” accommodation with British capitalism. 
Although he chose not to leave the Party and continued serving as an English teacher at the 
Soviet Embassy in London throughout the 1940s and 1950s,235 he now saw himself as 
something of a communist dissident. If much of his work in this period was shaped by the 
cultural orthodoxies that had taken root in the 1930s, parts of it can also be interpreted as a 
coded (and sometimes not so coded) attack on the whole direction in which world communism 
was heading. The purpose of this final section is to illustrate this reading of West’s later work 
by glancing at: (1) the essays from the period 1947-1951 which contrasted an instrumental 
approach to culture with the idea of cultural revolution, (2) the attempt in The Mountain in the 
Sunlight and elsewhere to recuperate writers whom communist orthodoxy had condemned, and 
(3) the rejection in the late essay on D.H. Lawrence of the entrenched belief in cultural crisis.
The political developments to which West was responding can be summarised fairly briefly. 
After the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, the world communist movement adopted a 
“polycentric” strategy which recognised that socialist revolutions would invariably take 
different forms in different parts of the world. The strategy developed by the CPGB had a 
number of interlocking components. Rejecting the insurrectionary approach of its 1935 
programme For Soviet Britain, the Party argued that the “all-round strengthening of Socialism 
and the tendencies and developments towards it throughout the world”236 (i.e. the Soviet 
colonisation of Eastern Europe) now made it possible for socialism to be established in Britain 
through a combination of parliamentary action and extra-parliamentary mass mobilisations. It 
was envisaged that the transition to a new society would be overseen by a radical Labour 
administration, buoyed by the support of a disciplined phalanx of communist MPs. Since it was 
not considered possible to abolish capitalism immediately, it was argued that the first duty of 
such a government would be the implementation of an intermediate programme to shift Britain 
in a radical direction. The policies at the core of the intermediate programme were those of 
extended public ownership, demand management, decolonisation, planned trade and 
constitutional reform. This vision of how socialism might be achieved, first outlined by Harry 
Pollitt in his book Looking Ahead (1947), formed the basis of the various editions of the 
CPGB’s programme The British Road to Socialism (BRS) that were published between 1952 
and 1977.237
Although the BRS paid lip-service to the ideal of moving beyond capitalism, there were many 
British communists who feared that an intermediate programme of left-Keynesian reforms now 
represented the height of the CPGB’s ambitions. The thing that distinguished West from other 
critics was that he interpreted the “surrender to reformism” in predominantly cultural terms.238 
The communist movement had compromised its revolutionaiy principles, he now believed, 
because it had lost sight of the profound cultural transformations which the establishment of a 
socialist society would make possible. Communists had largely forgotten that the primary goal 
of socialism is to eliminate individualism and restructure human consciousness along 
communitarian lines, and had therefore lost their main motivation for abolishing capitalism 
rather than merely reforming it. Matters were compounded by the fact that communists were so 
intent on seeing culture as an instrumental force (that is, as something which could be utilised in 
the struggle against existing social relations) that they had become virtually incapable of seeing 
it as an end-in-itself:
At the school [a CPGB school on culture in 1953]239 I  said that culture...heightens our 
consciousness o f the world we want to win and our energy to win it. In this sense it was true that 
culture is a weapon in the fight fo r  socialism. But the truth depended on the greater truth that 
socialism is a weapon in the fight fo r culture. For our final aim was not the establishment o f a 
political and economic structure, but the heightening o f human life. Without this recognition, 
the slogan became a perversion o f the truth, since it degraded culture into a means to a political 
end. It seemed to me that the political end itself was thereby perverted, and that this was the 
weakness o/The British Road to Socialism....4/ a meeting o f the Cultural Committee, o f which I  
was a member, I  said that since the enrichment o f human culture was our final aim, the Cultural 
Committee should have equal standing with the Political Committee in the leadership o f the 
Party. The proposal met with no response, and I  said no more.240
Having failed to win the support of his colleagues, West proceeded to give disguised expression 
to his dissatisfaction with the Party’s approach to culture in a series of articles between 1947 
and 1953. In “New People”, published in Communist Review in November 1947, he gave his 
fullest account of his vision of socialist culture, stressing that the communitarian outlook of the 
classless societies of the future would provide the basis for a “promethean” transformation of 
human nature.241 In “Marxism and Culture”, written for an edition of The Modem Quarterly 
which marked the 100th anniversary of the first publication of the Communist Manifesto (Spring 
1948), he ostensibly celebrated the cultural achievements of the British revolutionary movement 
over the course of the previous century; but actually (or so it could be argued) poured implicit 
scorn on its instrumental approach to culture by identifying only five writers whose work had 
contributed to the struggle against capitalism. Significantly, none of them was a Socialist Realist 
-  not even Robert Tressell rated a mention.242 In one article, a brief contribution to the so-called 
“Caudwell Discussion” in The Modem Quarterly, West even came close to making an outright 
attack on the Party leadership. The Caudwell Discussion was the vigorous debate about the
The other noticeably unorthodox element in The Mountain in the Sunlight was West’s attempt, 
specifically in his comments on Walter Pater, to identify a strain of radicalism in the work of 
writers whom communists had usually dismissed as worthless.259 As we have seen in Chapter 
Two, the emergence of the art-for-art’s sake movement in the late-19th Century was regarded by 
the Soviet theorists at the moment at which bourgeois culture began its long slide towards the 
outright decadence of modernism. As the author of Historical Studies in the Renaissance 
(1873), famously described by Wilde as the “golden book”260 of British aestheticism, Pater 
might therefore have seemed an unlikely candidate for inclusion in the radical tradition; but 
West insisted that his work nevertheless contained “contradictionfs]”261 which made it “worth 
study.”262 The main argument was that Pater, in spite of his reputation for rejecting “society” in 
favour of a private world of aesthetic sensation, often practised a form of historical criticism 
which forced the reader’s attention away from aesthetic artefacts towards the social forces 
which help to shape them. For instance, one of Pater’s main themes was the emergence in 
modem art of what he called a “relative spirit” -  that is, the recognition that moral and aesthetic 
standards are historically variable.263 After claiming that the relative spirit first found expression 
in the H^-Century cathedral of Amiens, he argued that it arose more or less naturally from the 
quasi-communist outlook of the people who built it: “ ...those lay schools of art, with their 
communistic sentiment, to which in the thirteenth century the greatest episcopal builders must 
needs resort, would in the natural course of things tend towards naturalism”.264 In passages such 
as these, West seemed to be saying, Pater not only belied his aestheticism but implicity defined 
communism as the modem period’s most vital cultural trend.265
The publication of The Mountain in the Sunlight was followed by another period of comparative 
silence, punctuated only by occasional essays on such figures as John Osborne, Swift, Adam 
Ferguson and Kafka.266 The final stage of West’s career effectively began with the publication 
of One Man in his Time in 1969. The distinguishing feature of this stage, which lasted until 
West’s death in 1972, was the willingness to move beyond what Lenin might have called the 
“Aesopian” language of his earlier works to outright criticism of the world communist 
movement. The main themes of One Man in his Time were those which have framed my 
presentation of West’s work throughout this chapter. Because the world communist movement 
have forgotten the yearning for community which attracts people to communism in the first 
place, it has created a situation in which the depredations of Stalinism become inevitable -  the 
only solution is a reassertion of the communitarian vision by the movement as a whole. The 
point was underscored in an important companion piece to One Man and his Time which West 
prepared in the last months of his life. In this piece, an essay on D.H. Lawrence that was 
eventually published in a posthumous edition of Crisis and Criticism issued by Lawrence and 
Wishart in 1975, West at last expressed his doubts about the critical orthodoxies which had
denying the reality of “inner energy”, Comforth was failing to recognise that literature not only 
reflects the present but also anticipates the future: “ ...poetry...makes an image of the future 
reality which through the exercise of his labour-power and -  in class society -  through the class 
struggle he [i.e. man] will bring into existence”.252 As we have already seen, West had argued in 
Crisis and Criticism that a writer can only harness the aesthetic potential of literary form if he 
evokes the progressive elements in a given social formation; but he now seemed to be claiming 
that one of the main functions of literature is to evoke the mental atmosphere (to use George 
Orwell’s phrase) of the society that will come into existence when the progressive elements in 
the present have worked their revolutionary course. He would make it clear over the next 20 
years that what he particularly valued in literature was its vision of human community.253
After his contribution to the Caudwell Discussion appeared in The Modern Quarterly in the 
Summer of 1951, West remained comparatively silent until the publication of his third book in 
1958.254 Consisting of five closely observed chapters on the work of Bunyan, Defoe, Walter 
Pater, Oscar Wilde, J.B. Priestley and Jack Lindsay, The Mountain in the Sunlight could easily 
be mistaken for a more or less orthodox attempt to identify a radical tradition in English 
literature; but -  again -  it is more accurately regarded as a further veiled attack on the cultural 
politics of international communism. In the brief theoretical remarks which opened the book, 
some of them stimulated by F.R. Leavis’s hostile response to Jack Lindsay’s study of Bunyan 
(see Chapter Six),255 West made it clear that he now regarded literature as one of the most 
powerful transmitters of precisely the sort of communitarian consciousness which official 
communism had evacuated from the revolutionary process. Since all societies have their roots in 
close co-operation between disparate individuals, it follows (or so West implied) that a yearning 
for the “unity of free and conscious association”256 is one of the most enduring of human 
impulses. The sense of heightened fraternity is at its greatest at moments of social crisis and 
revolution, regardless of the fact that they rarely result in a sustained increase in social 
cohesion.257 Moreover, in a passage which closely resembled the discussion of 
“disinterestedness” in Crisis and Criticism, West argued that the intensity with which literature 
evokes the feeling of fraternity stimulates our desire to “transform the given unity of conflict 
into the voluntary unity of brotherhood”258 -  that is, to create a society in which human 
solidarity is the overarching concern. In defiance of the crudely instrumental approach of the 
Soviet theorists, West was therefore suggesting that literature not only precipitates the desire for 
change but also fixes our attention on the transformation in consciousness which a socialist 
society must ultimately seek to establish. What had merely been implied in the essay on 
Caudwell was now made explicit.
merits of Christopher Caudwell’s work which erupted when Lawrence and Wishart issued a 
new edition of Illusion and Reality in 1948.243 It was essentially a symptom of the 
disagreements that undermined the Party’s cultural work in the period after the war. In 1947, 
shortly after Andrei Zhdanov had reaffirmed the main principles of Soviet cultural policy in a 
series of hardline speeches, the CPGB established a National Cultural Committee (NCC) with 
the aim of co-ordinating the work of its growing body of artists, writers and musicians. 
Although the NCC contained a number of the Party’s most talented intellectuals, including Jack 
Lindsay, Margot Heinemann and West himself, it was dominated by machine politicians whose 
understanding of radical cultural activity was quite different from that of the creative workers 
they sought to instruct. Whereas the group of intellectuals around the journal Our Time had 
been trying to create a progressive cultural movement along pluralist lines, eschewing the 
opposition between modernism and Socialist Realism which had dominated the work of the 
1930s, NCC members such as Emile Bums and Sam Aaranovitch insisted on a rigid adherence 
to the Zhdanovist orthodoxy.244 When Maurice Comforth initiated the Caudwell Discussion 
with a fiercely critical article in the Winter 1950-51 edition of The Modem Quarterly,245 he was 
widely seen as opening a new front in the undeclared war between the two groups. As the 
CPGB’s National Organiser, a post he held in spite of his philosophical brilliance (he had once 
been a research student of Wittgenstein’s), Comforth was perceived as the voice of Party 
authority whose demolition of Caudwell was effectively a warning to Party “creatives” that they 
should toe the NCC line. This alone was enough to ensure that Caudwell’s work was defended 
by over 20 of his admirers, including Arnold Kettle, Alan Bush and George Thomson. In his 
original article, probably one of the crudest he ever wrote, Comforth made four main allegations 
against Caudwell’s writings: (1) they misunderstand the Marxist account of social change,246 (2) 
their sub-Freudian account of the clash between “instinct” and “environment” conveys an 
excessively static conception of human nature,247 (3) they fail to specify the precise relationship 
between literature and society,248 and (4) their analysis of cultural crisis is too one-sided, relying 
too heavily on the so-called “bourgeois illusion of freedom” as an explanation for the spiritual 
poverty of the modem age.249 However, when West responded to the article, he focused on a 
passage in which Comforth berated Caudwell for referring to mankind’s “inner energy”.250 
According to West, Comforth’s dislike of the phrase implied a disabling nervousness in the face 
of the human capacity for aesthetic experience: “Maurice Comforth appears to me to fight shy 
of subjective activity”.251 West’s immediate intention was to show that the reference to “inner 
energy” was consistent with a Marxist account of human personality; but, if one reads these 
passages in the light of his wider critique of world communism, it becomes clear that what he 
probably had in mind was the failure of senior communists such as Comforth to remain inspired 
by a non-rational vision of the communitarian culture of the future. There was also a passage in 
which West seemed to signal an important development in his understanding of literature. By
shaped the communist view of art since the 1930s.267 At one level, “D.H. Lawrence” simply 
extended the arguments about the communitarian dimension of literature which West had put 
forward in The Mountain in the Sunlight. In language of a surprisingly Heideggerian nature, 
West argued that the “impulse” of Lawrence’s work was “the consciousness of our participation 
in being”268 -  that is, the consciousness that human beings are bound to each other by 
indestructible ties. Convinced that our grip on “being” has been loosened by the destruction of 
settled rural communities, Lawrence devoted much of his work (or so West argued) to analysing 
the inadequate means by which human beings have tried to sustain a sense of community in the 
industrial age. Sexual love, religion and the nuclear family all come in for attack in novels such 
as Sons and Lovers and The Rainbow?69 What was genuinely new about West’s essay was his 
attempt to discuss this communitarian understanding of literature in relation to the entrenched 
communist belief in cultural crisis. If a writer like Lawrence was able to give such powerful 
expression to the experience of community, West seemed to be arguing, then the idea that 
“bourgeois” culture is mired in crisis is surely false. Interestingly, as if it were only possible to 
emphasise the sheer unorthodoxy of what he was saying by exposing the weaknesses of 
Britain’s most respected communist critic, he illustrated his argument by pointing to a 
“contradiction”270 which threatens to undermine the theory of cultural crisis developed by 
Christopher Caudwell. On the one hand, West pointed out, Caudwell dismissed the literature of 
the modem age because of what he regarded as its excessive individualism. By investing in a 
“bourgeois illusion of freedom” which holds that the individual can only achieve personal 
fulfilment when he is liberated from social ties, most forms of literature since the Renaissance 
have reflected the “loneliness”271 which necessarily occur when human beings suppress their 
gregarious instincts.272 On the other hand, there is also a brief passage in Caudwell’s writings 
which seems to explore a more nuanced view:
He [Caudwell] says also that the individualism o f bourgeois poetry does not express merely the 
individualism o f the particular poet; ‘it expresses the collective emotion o f its era ’. According to 
this interpretation, bourgeois poetry is not bourgeois in the sense that it speaks only fo r  the 
bourgeoisie; it is bourgeois in the sense that it is the expression o f bourgeois society?13
Although these insights go unexplored in Caudwell’s writings, West seemed to regard them as a 
tacit recognition that modem literature is not really in crisis at all -  at least in the sense of being 
aesthetically substandard -  but is actually one of the most powerful means we have of 
dissolving individualism in a radiant vision of community. Once we have absorbed this view, 
we can restore literature to the place where it belongs -  at the heart of communist politics: “In 
literature there is the consciousness of life, and for this reason the revolutionary movement can 
learn from literature. It has more to leam than it has yet done”.274 West’s essay on Lawrence 
seems to have received little attention at the time of its publication, nor has it seemed especially
significant to subsequent writers.275 Yet its importance to a history of Marxist criticism in 
Britain is surely obvious. It marks the moment at which the orthodoxies of the 1930s were 
finally abandoned by one of their most distinguished exponents.
4 CONCLUSION
The work of Alick West bears out the revisionist argument that British communists often 
responded to the influence of Moscow with an intriguing mixture of loyalty and dissidence. On 
the one hand, Crisis and Criticism was an innovative but largely orthodox development of some 
of the main categories of Soviet cultural theory. It was especially noteworthy for its response to 
(1) the idea of cultural crisis, (2) the doctrine of the unity of form and content, and (3) the idea 
that Marxist criticism should build on the “radical tradition” in bourgeois culture. On the other 
hand, much of West’s other work can be interpreted as an implicit protest against the 
degeneration of the world communist movement, specifically its abandonment of a 
communitarian vision of the human future. Most obviously, many of West’s essays and review's 
in the 1930s attacked the very people whom the communists were seeking to entice into a 
popular front against fascism. Moreover, the element of dissidence in West’s writings became 
more explicit in the post-war period. Towards the end of his life, when he had come to believe 
that all literature served to express the communitarian impulse, West launched an outright attack 
on the Soviet doctrine of cultural crisis. This corresponded to the wider confession of dissidence 
in the great autobiography One Man in his Time.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RALPH FOX: POSITIVE HEROISM IN THE SOCIALIST NOVEL
It is common for Ralph Fox’s The Novel and the People (1937) to be grouped with Alick West’s 
Crisis and Criticism and Christopher Caudwell’s Illusion and Reality as one of the three 
founding texts of Marxist literary theory in Britain. Yet the insistence on classifying Fox as a 
theorist has arguably had a distorting effect on our understanding of his work. Only a handful of 
writers have devoted more than an odd sentence to The Novel and the People, and many of them 
have focused primarily on Chapter Two (“Marxism and Literature”) in which Fox made a rather 
half-hearted effort to defend the base/superstructure metaphor against charges of reductionism.1 
This obscures the fact that The Novel and the People was actually the most prescriptive work of 
Marxist criticism to be published in Britain in the 1930s.2 Its central argument, implied 
throughout but never explicitly stated, was that the novel is the literary form which can most 
easily be adapted to the aesthetic of Socialist Realism. Effectively a form of “modern epic” in 
which heroic individuals seek the wholesale transformation of their material circumstances, the 
novel provides the only setting (or so it was implied) in which the “positive heroes” demanded 
by Soviet theory can be convincingly delineated. Fox underscored his case with a dramatic 
though implicit argument about the danger of fascism. Since the novelist “expresses his 
country” more completely than any other artist, his books are often used by foreigners to gauge 
the spiritual health of the country in which they originate. Because the British novel has 
undergone a rapid decline in the period since the early 19* Century, it has played its role in 
convincing the fascist powers that Britain is little more than a decadent civilisation in need of 
outside assistance. If the communists fail to resuscitate the novel by transforming it into a 
vehicle of Socialist Realism, they will therefore have made an inadvertent contribution to 
strengthening international fascism in its “drive to war”.3
This chapter tries to demonstrate that The Novel and the People can only be properly understood 
if Fox’s prescriptive intentions are continuously borne in mind. Section One examines the 
argument that the novel is best regarded as a “modem epic”. Section Two looks briefly at Fox’s 
account of the history of the novel, emphasising his comments about the development of the 
heroic individual. Section Three is primarily concerned with the solutions that Fox proposed to 
the creative difficulties which (in his opinion) the revolutionary novelist invariably has to face. 
Section Four moves beyond The Novel and the People to briefly examine some of the other 
cultural writings from the 1930s. More generally, I will seek to advance an argument about the 
relationship between Fox’s work and the broader Marxist tradition. Although Fox was
151
ostensibly the most orthodox of British Marxist critics, there were several arguments in The 
Novel and the People that were inconsistent not merely with Soviet theory but with the 
fundamental principles of Marxism itself. In particular, I will claim that (1) Fox’s account of 
characterisation in the novel was incompatible with materialist assumptions about the 
relationship between the individual and his environment, (2) his understanding of the idea of 
cultural crisis differed markedly from that of the Soviet theorists, (3) his advocacy of a non- 
tendentious approach to revolutionary writing was not (in spite of his own claims) continuous 
with that of Friedrich Engels, and (4) his insistence that the socialist novel should be written in 
the language of the modem working class failed to take account of the inherently “dialogic” 
nature of language in class-divided societies. The strain of unorthodoxy in The Novel and the 
People was undoubtedly the product of many different influences, but chief among them (as I 
hope to show) were several contemporary trends in non-Marxist cultural theory. By failing to 
identify the irreducibly “bourgeois” elements in these non-Marxist trends, Fox allowed his work 
to be contaminated by them in ways of which he was presumably unaware. In contrast to some 
of West’s writings, which implicitly expressed their author’s conscious opposition to the 
direction in which the world communist movement was heading, The Novel and the People thus 
betrayed a strain of what can perhaps be called unconscious dissidence. As such, it provided 
further evidence that the relationship between Soviet and British criticism was rarely one of 
absolute consonance.
1 FROM ODYSSEUS TO ROBINSON CRUSOE: “THE NOVEL AS EPIC”
Although the Soviet theorists regarded a “positive hero” as an indispensable feature of any work 
of Socialist Realism (see Chapter Two), they never defined their idea of positive heroism with 
much clarity. It is nevertheless clear that the majority of Soviet writers employed a similar 
formula when devising their main characters. Positioned at the centre of the narrative and 
offered to the reader as a possible object of identification (or at least of emulation), the positive 
hero was the character in the book who displayed the greatest ability to contribute to the onward 
march of social progress. If the steel had to be tempered (as in the famous novel by Nikolai 
Ostrovsky) or some other aspect of “socialist reconstruction” had to be pushed forward, it was 
invariably the positive hero who precipitated the necessary changes. He was portrayed as being 
at once entirely representative and dauntingly exceptional. On the one hand he embodied all the 
most obvious characteristics of the particular social group (usually the working class) whose 
collective power the artist wished to affirm; yet he also prefigured the well-nigh superhuman 
level of personal development which the individual might be able to achieve in the communist 
society of the future. He was someone for whom manual labour and intellectual activity were 
largely continuous, not the paired terms of an irreconcilable contradiction. With his synoptic or
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“totalising” grasp of the various elements in the existing historical conjuncture, he gestured 
towards an age in which common ownership and material abundance would enable the 
individual to experiment with a diverse range of economic roles. The outward signs of his 
distinction were usually a statuesque physique and a permanent expression of serene 
thoughtfulness, the latter suggesting that his formidable resources of intellect were continuously 
being applied to the business of creating a better future.
The central assumption of The Novel and the People was that the hero in the “bourgeois” novel 
provides a basis on which the socialist writer can profitably build when shaping the positive 
heroes in his own work. Starting from the premise that the novel is merely the latest in a long 
line of “epic” forms, Fox developed his case by comparing the typical protagonist in a Greek 
epic (specifically the Odyssey) with the typical protagonist in the realist novels of the 17th, 18th 
and 19th Centuries (specifically Robinson Crusoe).4 In a passage which recalled Marx’s famous 
comments on classical culture in the “Introduction” to the Grundrisse (1857),5 Fox argued that 
the Greek epic was the product of a society in which “the individual does not feel himself in 
opposition to the collective, any more than he feels himself in conflict with nature.”6 Odysseus 
was not an isolated being but the exemplar of a wider community. Denied any sense of history 
by the unchanging structures of the classical economy, his aim was to restore a former state of 
equilibrium (in Tzvetan Todorov’s phrase) rather than establish new conditions of existence. 
Taking it for granted that the natural world was the creation of divine forces which required 
continual propitiation, he aspired only to a modus vivendi with his environment and not to a 
position of dominance. The protagonist in the bourgeois novel is driven by more ambitious 
goals. Estranged from both his environment and the rest of humanity by the reified structures of 
the market, Robinson Crusoe (who played the same exemplary role in The Novel and the People 
as in the work of the early economists)7 pursued his quest for redemption without reference to 
the needs of other people. He did so not merely by seeking a wholesale transformation of his 
personal circumstances, thereby reflecting the sudden awareness of historical change which 
capitalism had brought in its wake, but also by bending nature to his own will:
The novel deals with the individual, it is the epic o f  the struggle o f the individual against 
society, against nature, and it could only develop in a society where the balance between man 
and society was lost, where man was at war with his fellows or with nature...Robinson 
renounced the past and prepared to make his own history, he was the new man who was ready 
to command nature, his enemy. Robinson’s world is a real world, described with a vivid and 
understanding feeling fo r the value o f material things.8
Although the bourgeois hero’s individualism is simply too uncompromising to be consistent 
with the socialist vision, his belief in the possibility of wholesale change through the domination 
of nature makes him a valuable model (or so Fox implied) for the positive hero in the
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revolutionary novel. The socialist writer can also learn from the great technical strides which 
bourgeois writers have taken in their portrayal of character. Whereas the pre-modern epic was 
concerned only with actions, the greatest novelists have always combined a record of action 
with a detailed account of their characters’ inner lives. Paraphrasing E.M. Forster, whose 
influential distinction between “flat” and “round” characters had been drawn as recently as 
1927, Fox argued that “the great feature which distinguishes the novel from the other arts is that 
it has the power to make the secret life visible.”9 It is especially important that the socialist 
writer should be able to move easily between the subjective and objective aspects of human 
experience, since this is the only (or at least the best) way of showing that history is pushed 
forward by conscious choices and not by a purely mechanical response to external stimuli.10
The most surprising thing about this account of positive heroism was that it tended to create the 
impression that the relationship between the individual and his environment is essentially a 
contingent one. By portraying the hero as someone who invariably succeeds in shaping his 
world according to his own desires, Fox seemed to be reinforcing the belief that human nature is 
ultimately free from the influence of material circumstances.11 It goes without saying that this 
belief is wholly at odds with the materialist axioms of Marxism. The unorthodox cast of Fox’s 
remarks was perhaps a symptom of the difficulties which Marxists faced in adapting 
“bourgeois” forms to the aesthetic of Socialist Realism. If we accept the argument that the novel 
had its roots in the rise of individualism, then it follows (or so a number of literary theorists 
have insisted) that its characters will usually be portrayed as “floating free” from the 
environments in which they live. When Fox failed to indicate how a socialist novel might 
illustrate the opposing belief that the relationship between human beings and their environment 
is actually a mutually constitutive one, he was therefore illustrating the virtual impossibility of 
making a clean break with an entire aesthetic tradition. Because E.M. Forster was one of the few 
theorists of the novel whom Fox invoked in the whole of his book, there is a case for saying that 
it was Forster’s Aspects o f the Novel (1928) that was primarily responsible for reinforcing an 
orthodox (or non-Marxist) idea of characterisation in Fox’s mind.12 The two chapters on 
character in Aspects o f  the Novel are best regarded as a disguised expression of the longing for 
human intimacy which permeated the Bloomsbury group, and which received its clearest 
formulation in Forster’s famous remark that “ ...if  I had to choose between betraying my 
country and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country.”13 Their 
main argument is that the novel serves to deepen our sensivity to other people by revealing 
everything about its characters’ inner lives. Our relationship with real people is invariably 
compromised by our ignorance of what they are truly thinking and feeling; but when we read a 
novel we are able to achieve total communion with someone else’s (admittedly fictional) soul. 
What is sometimes overlooked is that Forster used these ideas about character to justify the
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novelist’s habit of driving a wedge between the individual and his environment. Quoting the 
“interesting and sensitive French critic who writes under the name of Alain” (Emile Auguste 
Chartier), Forster insisted that a form which specialises in the depiction of inner states will 
invariably prefer the “pure passions” to “external causes” as an explanation for its characters’ 
behaviour.14 The famous distinction between flat and round characters also played its part in 
advancing this argument. Recognising that the unfettered portrayal of character is usually 
impossible, not least because a novel’s protagonists are sometimes put at the disposal of the 
developing narrative, Forster argued that the great virtue of round characters (i.e. many-sided 
characters who surprise the reader with their continuous transformations) is that they are 
sufficiently unpredictable to lessen the sense of disjuncture when they are placed in incongruous 
circumstances. The whole emphasis is on the novelist protecting his characters from 
environments that might undermine their aesthetic integrity. To understand why Fox should 
have taken these ideas so seriously (assuming he did), we have to remember that Forster was an 
enthusiastic supporter of the Popular Front who enjoyed considerable popularity among 
communists in the 1930s. It seems to have been common for Marxist intellectuals to approach 
his work less critically than that of other liberal writers, even if this resulted (as it clearly did in 
the case of the Novel and the People) in a willingness to absorb perspectives that were 
fundamentally un-Marxist. It was one of the more curious ways in which the fringes of the 
liberal tradition served to domesticate British Marxism during the years of the Popular Front.15
It is worth noting that Christopher Caudwell, the only other British Marxist from the 1930s who 
theorised about the novel in any depth, also believed that a distantiated relationship between 
characters and their environment is one of the crucial features which distinguishes the novel 
from the other arts.16 Caudwell regarded the novel as a product of the cultural crisis that has 
afflicted bourgeois society since the period of primitive accumulation in the 16th Century.17 
Intent on identifying a single cause that could explain the whole of this crisis, he insisted that all 
the problems of capitalist culture derive from the so-called “bourgeois illusion of freedom”.18 
The heart of the bourgeois illusion is the belief that human beings only achieve true freedom 
while operating independently of social constraints. Self-fulfilment can only occur when the 
individual retreats into a Millian paradise of personal autonomy. One of its main corollaries is 
the belief that human nature is not fundamentally affected by environmental influences: “ ...the 
bourgeois... (believes himself to be) self-determined and completely cognizant of the laws 
determining his environment, which laws do not, he thinks, determine his being.”19 Caudwell 
argued that the function of the novel is to reinforce this subject/object “dualism” by creating 
fictional worlds which the reader can observe but never feel part o f  Whereas a poem invites the 
reader to project himself into its distinctive verbal universe, novels give the impression of being 
“self-contained” entities to which imaginative entry is simply impossible.20 Novelists have
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usually achieved this effect by doing two things: (1) portraying their alternative worlds in 
substantial detail and linking each element of the narrative in an extended linear sequence,21 and 
(2) ensuring that “every chink is stopped up” by relating events from the perspective of what 
literary theorists might now call an “omniscient narrator”.22 As far as the comparison with Fox 
is concerned, the important point is that Caudwell assumed that the line of demarcation between 
the novel and its reader would invariably be paralleled within the novel itself, specifically by a 
rigid opposition between the characters and their environment. The characteristics of the people 
we encounter in novels are never determined by the world in which they live, nor are they 
significantly affected by their changing circumstances as the narrative unfolds. In his 
description of Moll Flanders, Caudwell noted that “She [Moll] exists in herself; the world in its 
fugitive contacts with her is simply environment. She is hard, free, and isolated.”23 Caudwell 
has often been criticised for treating every work of English literature since the 16th Century as if 
it were simply an expression of the bourgeois illusion of freedom. But at least his monomania 
has the virtue of forcing us to ask a question which The Novel and the People only hints at. If 
the novel is indeed a form that owes its very existence to the culture of bourgeois individualism, 
can it ever be successfully used to express a Marxist perspective? More precisely, is it 
necessarily the case that the characters in a novel will be portrayed in isolation from their 
environment?
This is obviously not a matter which can be discussed in any detail here; but it is worth noting 
that Marxists have tended to divide into two camps when considering the role of 
characterisation in the novel. A number of Marxist novelists have tried to strip the form of some 
of its most salient characteristics, notably its reliance on sharply individualised protagonists, in 
an effort to circumvent its perceived individualist bias. Much of this experimentation occurred 
in the countries of “actually existing socialism”. A number of novels that were written in the 
USSR in the 1920s (i.e. before the introduction of Socialist Realism) eschewed individual 
heroes in favour of a sustained examination of the collective behaviour of the masses. 
Commenting on The Iron Flood by Alexander Serafimovich, a novel of 1924 which follows a 
band of refugees as they move across the Caucasus during the Civil War, the critic Jurgen RChle 
noted that “There is no hero, only the mass, no psychology, only the power of history, no 
introduction and no ending, no background and no embellishments. There is only the march, 
moving on like a force of nature.”24 It has even been suggested that the majority of people 
depicted in later Soviet novels also lacked individualised characteristics, notwithstanding the 
emphasis on positive heroism in orthodox Soviet theory after 1934. In her recent essay 
“Socialist Realism with Shores” (1997), Katerina Clark argued that many of the books that were 
described as “novels” in the USSR would more accurately be regarded as reversions (conscious 
or otherwise) to earlier narrative forms, specifically the parable. Just as the protagonists in
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Christian parables had a “vertical” relationship with God which guided them through their 
“horizontal” relationship with unholy earthly circumstances, so the positive heroes in the Soviet 
novel had a vertical relationship with the Communist Party that enabled them to revolutionise 
the social structures to which they were horizontally related. One of the consequences of the 
revival of parabolic conventions was that protagonists tended to exhibit the same characteristics 
across a vast range of different books: “ ...by the mid-1930s, a single, conventionalized system 
of signs was already evident in virtually all novelistic depictions of positive heroes.”25 However, 
if the disappearance of individualised characters in these and other novels (examples could be 
multiplied) suggests that Caudwell was right in saying that the conventional novel can never 
transcend its subject/object dualism, it is nevertheless clear that other Marxists see no such 
limitations in the novel’s basic forms. The most distinguished representative of this group is 
obviously Georg Lukacs, whose work can in some ways be seen as a sort of half-way house 
between Soviet and Western Marxism. While Lukacs accepted that a dualistic relationship 
between the individual and his environment was a central feature of the modernist novel, he 
famously believed that the great virtue of the “realist” tradition (exemplified by the work of 
Balzac and Tolstoy) was precisely that it laid bare the social forces that shape human nature. 
The argument was rooted in a distinctive account of the way that capitalist society reproduces 
itself. If working people seem largely unwilling to challenge the market system, it is partly 
because the ongoing process of “rationalisation” (in the Weberian sense) imbues the individual 
worker with a sense of increasing disconnection from the system as a whole. By depicting 
individual characters as a seamless part of the social “totality” (that is, the network of 
homogeneous but contradictory relationships which spreads outwards from the economic sphere 
to encompass the whole of society), the realist novel is able to counter the effects of 
rationalisation by portraying human nature as an effect of social relationships. Far from being a 
form which invariably reproduces the perceived gap between subject and object, the novel is 
potentially one of the most powerful forces of integration.26
2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HEROIC INDIVIDUAL
Fox supplemented his theoretical observations with a brief account of the novel’s historical 
development. Although this part of The Novel and the People has sometimes been dismissed as 
a mosaic of random observations which gives “very little information” and “nothing for the 
student to underline”,27 its primary purpose was to indicate the ways that the portrayal of the 
heroic individual has altered over the course of the last 400 years. Fox was especially concerned 
with (1) the invention of the heroic individual in the 17th Century, (2) the politicisation of the 
novel in the 18* Century, (3) the slow decline of the novel in the 19th Century, and (4) the 
“death of the hero” in the modernist novel.
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The core assumption was that the pioneering work of Rabelais and Cervantes provided the 
novel with two archetypes of heroic individualism which later writers would aim to synthesise.28 
In Gargantua and Pantagruel (a book which has exercised an enduring fascination for Marxist 
critics)29 Rabelais created heroes who derived an explosive energy from their immensely 
permissive attitude towards physical pleasure. Driven forward by the injunction “Do what you 
will!”, the Rabelaisian hero bludgeons his world into submission by indulging his appetite for 
food, drink and sex. The role of Cervantes was to provide the novel with a sort of countervailing 
refinement. Don Quixote’s most important characteristics are a subtle line in irony (which he 
uses to distance himself from his world) combined with the ability to enter into deep personal 
relationships. When Rabelais’ elemental power was synthesised with Cervantes’ more rarefied 
form of subversion, the great age of the heroic individual was bom.30 Both writers also went a 
long way towards breaking down the barriers between poetry and prose, not least in the way that 
they endowed their characters with a sort of visionary lustre. Nor has their work ever been 
bettered: “They were universal geniuses and no work equal in stature to theirs has since been 
written in that variegated prose fiction which we call the novel.”31 They owed their pre­
eminence not merely to the fact that they lived through the most dramatic years in the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism (a characteristic they shared with Shakespeare) but also to their 
status as “men of action” who had first-hand experience of the individual’s transformative 
power.32
Having located the origins of heroic individualism in the work of Rabelais and Cervantes, Fox 
shifted his attention to English fiction in the first half of the 18th Century. He argued that the 
flowering of the novel at this time was made possible by the emergence of a materialist strain of 
English philosophy in the wake of the English Revolution, especially in the work of John 
Locke.33 Since the novel is primarily concerned with the struggle between the individual and his 
environment, it tends to be the case (or so it was implied) that the novelist will gain much 
inspiration from a philosophy which emphasises the dependence of mind on matter. Fox 
reserved most of his praise for Henry Fielding, whom he seemed to regard as the first writer to 
appreciate the political significance of the novel. At one level, this was a matter both of content 
and of Fielding’s involvement in practical politics.34 At a time when primitive accumulation had 
reached new heights of barbarism and English imperialism was intensifying its “horrible” and 
“immoral” offensive against India, Fielding cast a disenchanted eye across the behaviour of the 
ruling class and made a powerful case for the rights of the individual in respect of the state. Yet 
Fox also seemed to believe that there was a political dimension to Fielding’s experiments with 
form, specifically his habit of interspersing his narratives with lengthy chunks of discursive 
prose. Although this aspect of Fielding’s work has been extensively criticised, especially by
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exponents of art-for-art’s-sake who regard it as a violation of aesthetic autonomy, it should 
actually be seen as part of a laudable effort to transform the novel into an instrument of social 
agitation by imbuing it with an element of propagandist clarity: “ ...if  the sermons were all 
removed, the social criticism would be there just the same, implicit in the story, and we should 
have lost some of the best essays in the English language.”35 The implication was that Fielding 
had been so inspired by the dynamism of his heroes, especially Jonathan Wild, that he had 
effectively tried to harness it to everyday political affairs.36 On a less positive note, Fox also 
recognised that the 18* Century novel was partly responsible for triggering a long-term decline 
of the form, not least in the way that it frequently upset the balance between subjective and 
objective elements that had characterised the work of Rabelais and Cervantes. Whereas 
Fielding, Daniel Defoe and Tobias Smollett were largely interested in writing about events, 
Laurence Sterne and Samuel Richardson tended to ignore events altogether and retreat into the 
inner lives of their characters. In the case of Sterne, whose Tristram Shandy was described as 
the first “relativist” novel, the preoccupation with subjective experience led not merely to an 
attack on linear narrative but also to a view of the world which was practically solipsistic. If the 
work of Fielding and other “objective” novelists had been inspired by philosophical 
materialism, then the Stemean school of fiction derived much of its credibility from the idealism 
of Bishop Berkeley.37
Notwithstanding the many Marxist critics who have approached the greatest achievements of 
19* Century fiction in a spirit of reverence, Fox saw the period after 1750 as one of prolonged 
decline in which the novel gradually lost most of its epic qualities. The hallmark of the decline 
was a failure of nerve in describing the human environment. Instead of portraying an awful 
reality which the heroic individual proceeded to transfigure, the majority of novelists now 
depicted the world in a curiously sanitised fashion. Fox argued that the process of decline took 
very different forms in England and France. There were at least three ways in which the English 
novelists of the 19* Century fell short of the realistic standards that Fielding had set them. 
Charles Dickens engaged with the most important contemporary realities but viewed them 
through a prism of sentimentality.38 Jane Austen took a more “critical” and “ironical” approach 
but described only those portions of reality (notably the “world of sheltered gentility”) which 
she personally found congenial.39 And Walter Scott, despite his unrivalled ability to evoke 
fundamental historical changes, “ran away from it [i.e. contemporary Britain] altogether into the 
idealized and romanticized past.”40 The immediate cause of what Fox called “The Victorian 
Retreat” was the transformation of the British economy which had occurred since the 1750s. 
Once the Industrial Revolution had polluted the landscape, widened inequalities of wealth and 
transformed labour itself into a commodity, it was simply too painful for the bourgeois novelist 
to devise stark environments for his heroes to overcome.41 But the situation was made worse by
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the growth of a mass audience for the novel, epitomised by the thousands of ordinary Britons 
who rushed to buy the monthly instalments of Dickens’s stories as they appeared in periodicals. 
Whereas the Augustan novelists were able to write freely about British society because they 
knew that their work would only be read by an educated elite, their Victorian counterparts 
(anxious to retain their class privileges) were crippled by the assumption that there are “things 
you cannot say to the masses if you are a decent middle-class man.”42 Although Fox would 
presumably have repudiated the idea that the growth of a mass reading public must invariably 
lead to the decline of artistic standards, there were still passages (“ ...the novelist was to be 
tormented by his public, by that great mass of the semi-educated or self-educated lower middle- 
class or self-educated working class”)43 in which he came perilously close to sounding like a 
sort of poor man’s Ortega y Gasset, bemoaning the effects of mass literacy on the pristine 
culture of the bourgeoisie.
The situation in France was somewhat different. The French Revolution, combined with the 
revolutionary wars that succeeded it, made it virtually impossible for French novelists to either 
ignore or sanitise contemporary affairs for much of the period between 1789 and 1848. Reality 
had to be directly faced. The result was that novels of genius were still being produced in France 
at the time when Scott, Austen and Dickens were squandering Fielding’s legacy in Britain.44 In 
a passage that quoted extensively from Engels’s famous argument about Realism in his 1888 
letter to Margaret Harkness, Fox wrote enthusiastically about Balzac’s ability to transcend his 
royalist sympathies and produce a rich portrait of the inevitable triumph of the bourgeois 
revolution: “ ...Balzac was politically a legitimist; his great work [i.e. the Comedie Humaine] is 
a constant elegy unto the irreparable decay of good society; his sympathy is with the class that is 
doomed to extinction. But for all that his satire is never more cutting, his irony more biting than 
when he sets in motion the very men and women with whom he sympathizes most deeply -  the 
nobles. And the only men of whom he speaks with undisguised admiration are his bitterest 
political antagonists, the Republican heroes of the Cloitre-Saint-Merri, the men who at that time 
(1830-36), were indeed the representatives of the popular masses.”45 But the impact of the 
French Revolution on the development of the novel was by no means wholly positive. The 
events of 1789 might indeed have created the passionate interest in politics that allowed Balzac 
to do his greatest work; but they also released the sort of utopian expectations which can never 
be realised in the confines of bourgeois society. This engendered a creeping sense of 
disillusionment which imbued most of the French novelists who came to prominence after 1848 
with a deep loathing of all forms of politics.46 The representative figure in this regard was 
Gustave Flaubert, whom Georg Lukacs famously condemned as the assassin of authentic 
realism in a series of books which provide an interesting point of comparison to The Novel and 
the People. Fox implied that Flaubert’s emphasis on the “god-like objectivity of the artist” was
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actually intended to prepare the way for a complete break with the representation of external 
reality. By conceiving of reality in essentially synchronic terms, Flaubert was able to exorcise 
his hatred of society by portraying it as if it were “static and fixed”.47 This, in turn, enabled him 
to hold out the prospect that the novel of the future would be “a book about nothing , a book 
without any attachment to the external world, which would support itself by the inner strength 
of its style, just as the world supports itself in the air without being held up.”48 If none of 
Flaubert’s contemporaries managed to create a self-reflexive novel along exactly these lines, 
some of them (notably the Goncourt brothers) nevertheless succeeded in producing books 
whose sole concern was the artist’s interior life. The vogue for the novel of sensibility was 
reinforced by at least three wider developments: first, the acceleration of rationalisation in 
industry, which encouraged the artist to regard himself as a narrow specialist in the area of 
consciousness;49 second, the emergence of psychoanalysis;50 and third, the pre-eminence 
throughout the 19th Century of Idealist philosophers such as Kant and Hegel.51
The crisis of the novel eventually came to a head (or so Fox argued) in the early decades of the 
20th Century. The most striking characteristic of modernist fiction was its complete 
abandonment of the hero, even the sort of etiolated hero who featured in Madame Bovary.52 
English modernists have contented themselves either with self-regarding displays of knowledge 
(Huxley), poetic evocations of passing moods (Lawrence) or demeaning efforts to capture the 
lavatorial underbelly of “ordinary” life (Joyce).53 It is hardly surprising that bourgeois novelists 
have failed to respond imaginatively to the heroic example of the modem proletariat, since the 
cultural gap between the upper and lower classes is still too vast to allow mutual 
comprehension. But neither has any novelist tried to base his protagonists on the scientists and 
“millionaire rulers” who represent the main examples of heroism in bourgeois culture.54 The 
“death of the hero” has not only been precipitated by the internal history of the novel, but also 
(and more importantly) by the state of capitalist society as it approaches its final crisis. If a 
modem novelist tried to depict the external world being transformed by an individual hero, he 
would risk drawing attention to the only change which can now rescue society from its present 
state of decay: the overthrow of capitalism. It follows that the epic qualities of the novel can 
only be revived by the growing number of writers who have made a conscious commitment to 
Socialist Realism.
There are a number of obvious objections to this brisk survey of the novel’s history. For every 
hero or heroine who combines the physical exuberance of Rabelais with a Cervantean gift for 
irony, there are several who clearly do not. Most of Fox’s attempts to locate individual novels in 
their historical context were marred by reductionism. His hostility to contemporary writing was 
rooted in an absurd conflation of modernism and moral degeneracy. But the most surprising
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thing about the historical section of The Novel and the People was the way it departed from 
orthodox accounts of the cultural crisis of capitalism. Although the Soviet theorists had argued 
that capitalism was inimical to cultural excellence from the moment of its inception, they also 
insisted that the degeneration of the arts only truly began in the second half of the 19th 
Century.55 They also took it for granted that the greatest bourgeois novels were written in the 
first 50 years of the 19th Century, specifically by pioneering realists such as Balzac and Tolstoy. 
When Georg Lukacs tried to develop these assumptions in his work on the realist tradition, he 
famously identified 1848 as the moment at which the “totalising” ambitions of realism were 
superseded by naturalism’s obsession with surface appearances. Fox also traced the onset of 
decadence to the period after 1848 in his account of the French novel, yet in his much longer 
account of the literature of his own country he took the unprecedented step of arguing that the 
novel had reached its apogee in the Augustan period and subsequently gone into a slow decline. 
There was nothing specifically un-Marxist about this preference for Defoe and Fielding over 
Scott and Dickens; but it was so much in conflict with the norm as to require some explanation. 
We can speculate that there were perhaps two main reasons for Fox’s lack of orthodoxy. The 
first might well have been a desire to parallel the anachronistic tastes of many working-class 
readers. As Jonathan Rose has pointed out in his pathbreaking study The Intellectual Life o f  the 
British Working Classes (2001), it has been common for the reading habits of working people to 
lag several decades behind those of their middle-class counterparts, which presumably meant 
that there were still thousands of proletarian autodidacts in the inter-war period who revered 18th 
Century literature but knew practically nothing about the writers who came afterwards. This 
extreme literary conservatism had its roots in a nexus of economic, commercial and educational 
circumstances. Because the majority of working-class readers were simply too poor to buy new 
books in the period before the emergence of paperbacks, they often had to limit themselves to 
what they could find in second-hand bookshops and market stalls. Even in the 1920s and 1930s, 
when Victorian literature was no longer modish enough to escape being discarded by fashion­
conscious readers, it seems likely that it was still far easier to locate second-hand copies of the 
Augustan and Victorian classics than anything more recent. Although many publishers issued 
cheap editions of the classics in an attempt to cater to the mass market, they were limited in 
their freedom of manoeuvre by the 1911 Act which stipulated that a book only went out of 
copyright after its author had been dead for 50 years. Rose illustrates the effect of this Act by 
pointing out that J.M. Dent was only able to issue an Everyman edition of Middlemarch in 
1930, a full 58 years after its original date of publication. There is also evidence that teachers in 
working-class schools were often wedded to a self-constructed canon that rarely went “beyond 
the Victorians”.56 Since Fox was deeply involved in the working-class education movement, 57it 
seems reasonable to suggest that his account of the novel’s history was intended to appeal 
(consciously or otherwise) to the literary prejudices of his target audience. Nor is it fanciful to
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suggest that his perception of proletarian tastes owed a disproportionate amount to the example 
of one man. The great T.A. Jackson (1879-1956) was one of the few working-class intellectual 
to exercise much influence in the CPGB in the 1930s, and many of his middle-class 
counterparts would presumably have derived their understanding of proletarian autodidacticism 
primarily from him.58 Jackson was a famously erudite man whose literary tastes ranged from 
Homer to Sholokhov (though not to Huxley, Mauriac or Joyce); but he always insisted that 
“Mentally speaking I date from the early 18th Century.”59 His love of Augustan culture could be 
traced to his early experiences of reading the books in his childhood home: “A fine set of Pope, 
an odd volume or two of the Spectator, a Robinson Crusoe, Pope’s translation of Homer, and a 
copy of Paradise L o st”60 In his essays on 18th Century fiction he praised Defoe for supporting 
the rights of Dissenters; described Swift as a pioneer of Irish nationalism; commended Sterne’s 
ability to disregard class distinctions in his judgements on human character; took pleasure in 
Fielding’s relaxed approach to personal morality (especially in the light of Richardson’s 
puritanism) and discerned a Hogarthian facility in Smollett’s evocations of “low life”.61 In 1937 
he was one of the three men who edited the tribute volume Ralph Fox: A Writer in Arms after 
Fox was killed in Spain.62 If his “talent for preaching Marxism in Burkean prose” (Rose’s 
suggestive description)63 was not the source of Fox’s conviction that the working class was 
more at home in the Age of Enlightenment than in the 20th Century, it surely did a great deal to 
reinforce it.
The other possible explanation for Fox’s unorthodox approach to the history of the novel was 
the presumably unconscious influence of D.H. Lawrence. Although Lawrence was categorised 
in The Novel and the People as one of the modernist writers most responsible for the “death of 
the hero”, I would suggest that Fox gave the impression in many sections of the book that he 
was effectively recasting Lawrence’s ideas in Marxist terms. There are two ways in particular in 
which the work of these otherwise very different writers seemed to coincide. As we have 
already seen, Fox believed that the hero of a novel should ideally be a person of great physical 
bearing who succeeds in achieving a wholesale transformation of his material circumstances. In 
his essay “Why the Novel Matters” (posthumously published in 1936, the year in which The 
Novel and the People was being written), Lawrence argued a similar case while advancing his 
distinctive ideas about the relationship between sexuality and human evolution. Lawrence 
believed that there is something intrinsic to the narrative form which forces novelists to invent 
characters who live in a continuous state of “flow and change”. The novel is therefore full of 
people who call on every last ounce of physical vitality in order to cope with the flux of their 
everyday existence: “ ...my body, me alive, knows, and knows intensely. And as for the sum of 
all knowledge, it can’t be anything more than an accumulation of all the things I know in the 
body...Let us learn from the novel. In the novel, the characters can do nothing but live.”64 By
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forging a close association in the reader’s mind between bodily health and the possibility of 
change, the novel goes a long way (or so Lawrence implied) to reminding us of the crucial role 
of sexuality in the process of human evolution. It can thus be regarded as the most “moral” of 
literary forms. The other area in which there are clear parallels between Lawrence and Fox is 
the analysis of cultural crisis. Both men seemed to regard the decline of the arts as the 
consequence of an unwillingness to confront unpleasant or disconcerting physical realities. Fox 
argued that the onset of industrialism made it too unpleasant for novelists to depict undesirable 
material circumstances, thereby depriving the hero of the impetus he required to demonstrate his 
genius for self-transformation. Similarly, Lawrence put the blame for falling artistic standards 
on a squeamishness about the human body. In his great essay “Introduction to his Paintings”, 
written at the instigation of P.R. Stephensen in 1929, he effectively argued that the problem 
with modem culture is that artists are so neurotic about sex that they no longer portray the body 
in appropriate physical detail. Moreover, he agreed with Fox that the novel degenerated sharply 
after the 18th Century. Whereas Fielding, Swift and Smollett retained an earthy concern with 
physiological processes, the romantics ushered in an era in which “physical consciousness gives 
its last song in Bums, then is dead.”65 This preference for the 18th Century was continued in 
Lawrence’s comments about painting. The works of “Watteau, Ingres, Poussin and Chardin 
have some real imaginative glow”;66 but the English landscape painters tried completely to 
banish human beings from the work of art (“ ...landscape is always waiting for something to 
occupy it”)67 while the main objective of the modem abstractionists is to sever the last ties 
between painting and physical reality. It is perfectly possible that the parallels between the 
critical ideas of Lawrence and Fox were purely coincidental; but several admiring references to 
Lawrence in The Novel and the People suggest that Fox was familiar with far more of his work 
than might otherwise be supposed. Ostensibly committed to the orthodox view that Lawrence 
was little more than a reactionary modernist, he nevertheless described Sons and Lovers and The 
Rainbow as a “brilliant beginning” and applied the adjectives “strange, beautiful and mystical” 
to the poems and stories.68 He also emphasised the fact that Lawrence was one of the few 
successful English writers to emerge from the working class.69 This suggests that the influence 
of Lawrence on Fox was probably direct.
3 PROBLEMS OF REVOLUTIONARY FICTION
The account of Socialist Realism that brought The Novel and the People to its conclusion was 
the longest piece of prescriptive writing to be produced by a British communist in the 1930s. 
Acknowledging that Socialist Realism was still in its infancy and that no writer (with the partial 
exceptions of Mikhail Sholokhov, Andre Malraux and Ralph Bates) had so far managed to 
apply its principles with complete success, Fox made a brief attempt to list the characteristics
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which a revolutionary novel might ideally possess.70 Its primary goal would be to revive the sort 
of totalising grasp of history that Fielding had introduced into the novel, presumably by 
focusing on the transition from capitalism to socialism and the various stages in the 
development of post-capitalist society. Social change would be analysed and not merely 
described, with the aim of laying bare the “essence” (i.e. the fundamental political significance) 
of any given character or situation. The narrative would pivot around the activities of a positive 
hero, usually a member of the working class, portrayed as a representative of his wider social 
group. And as much importance would be attached to the inner lives of the characters as to the 
structure of “external” events, since this is the best way of showing how human personality is 
shaped by (and in turn shapes) material circumstances.71 If these remarks were 
uncharacteristically vague, it was probably because Fox was less interested in defining the ideal 
work of Socialist Realism than in confronting the difficulties which prevent it being written. 
There are two main problems, he seemed to imply, which have prevented the socialist novel 
from achieving the epic qualities of its bourgeois predecessor. The first is the tendency of 
socialist writers to overcompensate for the individualist bias of earlier novelists. Aware that the 
ultimate goal of their work is to steer the working class towards a revolutionary perspective, 
they have too often treated their characters (especially their positive heroes) as if they were 
merely ciphers of Marxist ideology and not unique individuals with distinctive characteristics 
and ambiguous motivations. This failure of characterisation has been compounded, secondly, by 
the dominant stereotypes of working-class life. Unable wholly to abandon the prejudice that 
working people have been condemned to a position of social inferiority by a tendency to behave 
passively, it is unsurprising (or so Fox implied) that socialist writers have never created the sort 
of vibrant proletarian characters who can function credibly as makers of history.
Much of The Novel and the People was devoted to a consideration of how these difficulties 
could be overcome. It is especially important (or so the argument went) that the revolutionary 
novelist should not allow “tendentious” writing to spill over into outright propaganda. Quoting 
again from Engels’s letter to Margaret Harkness, Fox insisted that a novel’s message must 
“never obtrude...it should appear quite naturally from the circumstances and the characters 
themselves.”72 If the writer surrenders to the temptation to “preach” his socialist message, he 
will end up creating characters who seem more like walking megaphones than authentic human 
beings: “It is only too easy to substitute lay figures for men and women, sets of opinions for 
flesh and blood, ‘heroes’ and ‘villains’ in the abstract for real people tortured by doubts, old 
allegiances, traditions and loyalties, but to do this is not to write a novel.”73 At the same time, 
however, it is also essential that the injunction to create complex characters should not be taken 
too far. While the novelist should undoubtedly portray the feelings of ambivalence which afflict 
the individual at times of great social upheaval, he must also leave the reader in no doubt that
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his revolutionary heroes are steadfast in their commitment to change. There should, in 
particular, be no contradiction between the hero’s political vision and the quality of his 
sensibility. He should always be endowed with a poet’s capacity to derive inspiration from his 
everyday life, since a sustained attachment to the “poetry of revolution” can only be nurtured by 
a continuous supply of “earthly satisfaction”.74 The novelist should also make it clear that the 
hero’s militant outlook is all of a piece with the traditions of his native country. Invoking the 
examples of Zachariah Coleman (Mark Rutherford’s hero in The Revolution in Tanner's Lane) 
and Tyl Ulenspiegel (Charles de Coster’s hero in The Legend o f Tyl Ulenspiegel), Fox noted 
that both characters are continuously related back to the revolutionary traditions of England and 
Belgium respectively. Coleman is portrayed as the successor to the Puritans, the Wesleyan 
miners, the Luddites and the Chartists; whereas Ulenspiegel seems to share many of his 
characteristics with the subversive characters who are dotted through the folklore of Flanders.75 
The importance that Fox attached to this strategy reflected the depth of his commitment to the 
central strand in the cultural politics of the Popular Front, namely the attempt to prove that each 
country possessed radical traditions which had prepared the ground for the emergence of 
modem communism.76
If revolutionary novelists wish to have plausible models on which to base their leading 
characters, Fox went on to argue, they should open their eyes to the many cases of real-life 
heroism that the communist movement has inspired. As David Margolies has pointed out, his 
argument seems to have been influenced by a speech on the role of the positive hero which 
Georgi Dimitrov delivered to the Soviet Writers’ Union in 1935.77 Speaking two years after his 
famous acquittal in Nazi Germany on charges of burning down the Reichstag, Dimitrov had a 
more instrumental idea of positive heroism than the one explored at the Soviet Writers’ 
Congress in 1934. Whereas Bukharin and fis colleagues regarded the positive hero as a means 
of prefiguring the transformations of human nature that would allegedly occur in a communist 
society, Dimitrov saw him more as a device for sucking readers into the plot (and hence the 
book’s ideological universe) by providing them with a potent object of identification and 
emulation. He also made an important point about the way that novelists should present their 
characters. Perhaps influenced by the growing interest in structuralist narratology among a 
number of Soviet intellectuals, he argued that the novelist should always aim to foreground the 
hero’s positive qualities by counterposing them against the “negative” traits of a less-principled 
character. Having made these general observations, he then asked why no revolutionary novelist 
had so far recognised the dramatic potential of his own story: “I may be permitted to express a 
certain astonishment that this Leipzig trial, this enormous collection of material, invaluable 
stock-in-trade of revolutionary practice and thought, has not been studied or utilized.”78 Fox 
responded to the challenge by trying to imagine a novel in which Dimitrov was the central
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character. He implied that the great merit of Dimitrov’s story was that it exemplified the sort of 
dramatic reversal of fortune that often defines the contours of an epic narrative. At the 
beginning, taken into custody for a crime they never committed, the main suspects were reduced 
to a state of whimpering degradation by the brutality of their gaolers. It was only Dimitrov who 
saw the experience as a test of his spiritual and intellectual resources. In the months leading up 
to his trial he acquired a detailed knowledge of German law, improved his command of German 
in order to represent himself in court, surreptitiously alerted foreign communists to the nature of 
his plight and strengthened his “mastery of life” by immersing himself in Shakespearean texts. 
The trial itself provided an extraordinary example of the inversion of established hierarchies (to 
use Bakhtin’s phrase) in which Dimitrov humiliated the Nazi prosecutors and provoked Herman 
Goering into shouting “Wait until I get you out of the power of this court!”79 If Fox made a 
strong case for seeing the Leipzig trial as what Samuel Hynes has called the “scenario for a 
strong political novel”,80 it was nevertheless surprising that he seemed to regard Dimitrov more 
as an isolated colossus than as a “type” of the revolutionary workers:
After the trial the three Bulgarian prisoners met in a common cell fo r  the first time and 
Dimitrov summed up the struggle they had made. “There were four o f us, Communists -  four 
armed fighters. Torgler is a deserter, for he threw down his rifle and ran from the field  o f battle. 
You two did not throw down your rifles, you remained in position, but you did not shoot, and I  
had to shoot alone all the time. ” He shot alone, but his fire was strong enough to subdue the 
enemy’s and finally to rout him?1
More surprising than Fox’s strictures against preaching in the novel were his extended remarks 
on the appropriate use of language. “The art of writing good prose”, he insisted, “is largely the 
lost one of calling things by their right names”,82 by which he appeared to mean that writers 
must strive at all times to employ language that is both immediately comprehensible and free of 
unnecessary ambiguities. If this was simply a partial restatement of the Soviet emphasis on the 
unity of form and content, it was nevertheless linked to a much more unorthodox claim about 
the inherent superiority of plebeian speech. In any society that is divided into classes, Fox 
appeared to argue, it is likely to be the common people who employ language most clearly and 
expressively. Since productive activity depends on their ability to co-ordinate the efforts of large 
numbers of individuals, they must go out of their way (or so it was implied) to ensure that each 
sentence conveys a precise and immediate impression of their intentions. On the other hand, the 
language of the ruling class is always being robbed of clarity by the need to obscure the true 
nature of an unjust social order. In a passage that might well have influenced the thesis of 
George Orwell’s great essay “Politics and the English Language” (1946),83 Fox observed that 
“the evolution of our language has been towards this bloodless, blameless ideal of the BBC, an 
evolution conditioned by the fear of the truth of life that is the most striking feature of the 
intellectual existence of our class society.”84 The purity of plebeian speech, he went on to argue,
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has tended to ensure that the greatest works of English literature owe a considerable stylistic 
debt to the language of ordinary people. Literary historians have obscured this fact by 
emphasising the influence of the King James Bible; but the point which needs to be grasped is 
that the style of the King James Bible was itself based on the “ordinary speech” of the 
Elizabethan masses. By insisting that socialist writers should also resort to everyday language in 
an effort to achieve the necessary degree of clarity, Fox was not merely engaging in proletarian 
one-upmanship (important though this was) but also seeking a solution to the cardinal problems 
of portraying the positive hero. Because working-class habits of speech are shaped by a 
predominantly active relationship to external reality, it therefore follows (this at least was the 
implication) that their use in the novel will galvanise the writer into creating characters who 
completely lack the passivity that is wrongly attributed to the proletarian way of life. Although 
Fox recognised that the language of the British workers had lost some of its lustre in the early 
decades of the 20th Century, he nevertheless emphasised that sources of linguistic renewal could 
be detected in some unlikely places. At a time when the left (as well as some sections of the 
right) were beginning to condemn American popular culture as a synthetic and demobilising 
imposition on the “authentic” culture of the masses,85 Fox endorsed the “living style” which he 
encountered in the work of the “hard-boiled” American novelists. Another model of stylistic 
virility was provided by Rudyard Kipling, whose reactionary politics could not conceal the fact 
that he was “soaked... in the folk speech of England and America”.86
Fox’s defence of proletarian language was perhaps derived from a controversy that had blown 
up among Marxist critics earlier in the decade. Shortly after the British Section of the Writers’ 
International was established in 1934, a number of sympathetic writers, critics and academics 
were asked to comment on its founding statement in Left Review.87 The most vigorous 
intervention was made by the novelist Alec Brown, formerly one of the main contributors to 
The Calendar o f Modern Letters, who addressed the issue of how revolutionary literature could 
be made more appealing to working people. Nearly every important writer in the English 
tradition, with “rare” exceptions such as Bunyan and Defoe, had alienated ordinary readers by 
employing the incomprehensible “jargon” of the ruling class. If socialist writers were to stand a 
better chance of communicating with their target audience, they had no choice but to turn their 
backs on the example of the English canon and submit to “the proletarianisation of our actual 
language”.88 Brown summarised his proposal in three upper-case slogans which have since 
become synonymous with the worst excesses of Stalinist aesthetics:
LITERARY ENGLISH FROM CAXTON TO US IS AN ARTIFICIAL JARGON OF THE RULING 
CLASS; WRITTEN ENGLISH BEGINS WITH US
WE ARE REVOLUTIONARY WORKING-CLASS WRITERS; WE HAVE GOT TO MAKE USE 
OF THE LIVING LANGUAGE OF OUR CLASS
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ALLUSIVE WRITING IS CLIQUE WRITING: WE ARE NOT A CLIQUE™
These startling sentiments were endorsed in a much more thoughtful essay by J.M. Hay (March 
1935), whose ideas about proletarian language were often identical to those that subsequently 
featured in The Novel and the People. Hay argued that the most important lesson which the 
writer can learn from working people is that meaning is more clearly conveyed by concrete 
words than by abstract ones. Concrete words predominate in everyday speech for broadly 
economic reasons, and evince a polysemic quality that tends to make them inherently poetic: 
“The concrete word is rooted deep in the practical acts of everyday life and has, because of its 
practical roots, developed a wide range of secondary associations which give it colour and 
psychological force.”90 But Hay also recognised that Brown was being too simplistic in 
assuming that proletarian language could be straightforwardly adapted for use in the novel. The 
problem with everyday speech, he implied, is that it lacks the grammatical resources which 
allow complex thoughts to be easily expressed. The true goal of the socialist writer is thus to 
combine a proletarian vocabulary with the complex structures that only exist in great works of 
literature. Brown’s ideas received a much more scornful response from other contributors to the 
debate. Douglas Garman and Montagu Slater attacked Brown for advocating the rejection of the 
entire literary tradition, with Garman (Brown’s former editor at The Calendar o f Modem  
Letters) suggesting that the function of the revolutionary critic is to use Marxism to explain the 
literature of the past and thereby render it useful to a new generation.91 Hugh MacDiarmid 
argued that any attempt to proletarianise language would end up reinforcing the terrible 
linguistic deprivation which capitalism imposes on ordinary people, and that the true aim of 
revolutionary art is to employ the “entire jargon...of Marxism” to raise the workers to a new 
cultural level.92 Lewis Grassic Gibbon, writing in the month before his untimely death, insisted 
that membership of the Writers’ International should only be open to “revolutionists” who 
“have done work of definite and recognized literary value.”93 If Fox’s version of linguistic 
fundamentalism escaped such criticism, it was probably because the publication of The Novel 
and the People coincided almost exactly with his death in Spain. He was now a martyr to be 
honoured; not a promising critic whose work was up for debate.
Nevertheless, there are two aspects of the prescriptive sections of The Novel and the People 
which require further comment. The first is Fox’s insistence that the socialist writer should 
eschew deliberately “tendentious” writing in favour of a more balanced survey of social 
realities. Although Fox invoked Engels’s letter to Margaret Harkness in support of this position 
(he could also have invoked the similar letter of 1888 to Minna Kautsky),94 it is clear that his 
hostility to tendentiousness differed from that of Engels in significant ways. When Engels 
advised radical writers to avoid approaching the novel as if it were merely an instrument of
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propaganda, he did so because he believed that a less hectoring approach would have a 
beneficial effect on the quality of their work. In the first place, he argued, it would ensure that 
socialist novels were primarily concerned with exploring the deficiencies of the existing system, 
not to sketching speculative portraits of the socialist future. This would have the effect of 
drawing in readers who were open to a critique of capitalism but not yet convinced that an 
alternative system was feasible. Secondly, an absence of tendentiousness would prevent writers 
from imbuing their socialist characters with an unrealistic degree of moral or intellectual virtue. 
Yet the obvious point about The Novel and the People was that it openly advocated the very 
things which Engels found distasteful, especially in its insistence that the main duty of Socialist 
Realism is to show positive heroes ushering in the new revolutionary age. As writers such as 
Phil Watson have implied, it is therefore tempting to argue that Fox’s opposition to 
tendentiousness was more a matter of strategy than aesthetics.95 Quietly appalled by the 
increasingly totalitarian nature of Soviet cultural politics, perhaps he was trying (or so the 
suggestion goes) to register an implicit critique of an overbearing system that imposed 
intolerable restrictions on freedom of speech in its efforts to ensure that the Party line was 
correctly transmitted. If this is true, it means that The Novel and the People was one of the only 
works of the 1930s to call the entire principle of partiinost into question. It should nevertheless 
be noted that in some of his other writings, especially his essay “Abyssinian Methods” {Left 
Review, November 1935) and his eulogy on Maxim Gorky, Fox came close to characterising the
Soviet cultural system as a sort of foolproof mechanism for the production of artistic
06masterpieces.
The second noteworthy aspect of the prescriptive sections of The Novel and the People is Fox’s 
approach to language, specifically his related claims that (1) the novel has characteristically 
been written in the language of working people, and (2) the socialist novel should be written in 
the language of the modern working class. If these arguments now seem too dated to be worth 
considering directly, it is nevertheless clear that the assumption which underpins them is still 
prevalent in the cultural politics of the left and needs to be examined. When members of the 
“working-class writing movement” or the radical theatre call for the “language of the class” to 
be given a more prominent role in radical art, or when they commend writers such as James 
Kelman and Irvine Welsh for their skilful use of proletarian vernacular, they seem to imagine 
(as Fox did before them) that it is somehow possible to create an alternative linguistic space 
from which all “bourgeois” impurities would be excluded. But can this in fact be achieved? The 
obvious starting point for a critique of the cruder forms of linguistic populism is the “dialogical” 
theory of language developed by Mikhail Bakhtin in the 1920s.97 At the core of Bakhtin’s 
theory is the recognition that each language is subdivided into a series of different “speech 
types”, and that the variety of speech types broadly correspond to fundamental social divisions.
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Working people use language differently from their employers, just as men use language 
differently from women and people of colour use language differently from whites. Since the 
existence of “heteroglossia” (Bakhtin’s term for the internal divisions of linguistic communities) 
is invariably seen as a threat to social cohesion, there are “centrifugal” forces in every age 
which seek to unify language by universalising the grammatical, syntactic and semantic habits 
of the dominant groups. The “official” language of the ruling class is held up as an ideal to 
which the rest of us must aspire. The main consequence of these centrifugal pressures is that our 
every “utterance” is implicitly situated in relation to other speech types, usually in a way which 
benefits the exponent of the more prestigious speech types. Whenever a worker employs the 
language of his class, the smoother linguistic habits of people further up the social scale 
establish a sort of spectral presence above his own utterance which admonishes him for his 
linguistic inferiority. Language can thus be regarded as one of the most powerful means of 
reinforcing social divisions. The corollary of Bakhtin’s theory is that it is simply impossible to 
create forms in which proletarian language stands alone.98 Even if a radical novelist could 
construct his work entirely from the vernacular of the lower orders (and not even virtuoso 
pasticheurs such as Welsh and Kelman have achieved that), it would still be impossible to 
prevent the reader from situating the language against the other speech types from which it 
derives its social meanings. This is not to say that Fox was entirely wrong in encouraging 
socialist writers to experiment with the language of their target audience. It was Bakhtin himself 
who recognised that the novel is often peculiarly well-suited to challenging the linguistic 
hierarchies on which the status quo depends. But this challenge can only occur if the novelist 
takes a fairly promiscuous approach to the depiction of disparate social voices. Because it is a 
form in which the “the internal stratification of any single national language” is “artistically 
organized”, the novel potentially enables us to distance ourselves from the dialogical 
relationships between the various speech types and reorder them in a consciously progressive 
manner.99 The role of the socialist writer is therefore to create hybrid forms in which the vigour 
of working-class language is used to satirise the more formal stylings of bourgeois speech; it is 
not (as Fox would perhaps argue) to try and create a sense of linguistic self-containment by 
employing proletarian vernacular to the exclusion of everything else.
Why should Fox have believed that a non-dialogic novel written in proletarian language was 
possible in the first place? This is obviously an issue on which we can only speculate; but it is 
reasonable to suggest that there were at least four factors which weighed on Fox’s mind when 
he addressed the question of language. The first was the debate in Left Review to which we have 
already referred. The second was the extraordinary popularity among working-class readers of 
“hardboiled” detective novels by the likes of Dashiell Hammett (a member of the American 
Communist Party), Raymond Chandler and James M. Cain. As Ken Worpole has pointed out in
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his important essay on the reception of detective fiction by British readers, it was the ability of 
the hardboiled novelists to capture the language of the American streets that convinced many 
ordinary Britons that fiction was an area in which they could legitimately take an interest. 
William Keal, described as a “retired trade-union and labour movement militant”, told Worpole 
in an interview that “I read H.G. Wells, Arnold Bennett, all those people, but they weren’t my 
kind of people. You always had the edge of class; and what intrigued me about the American 
writers -  of course they had a class system as well -  but they were talking the way we 
talked... What came through with the Americans was really a brutal and realistic attitude in 
language.”100 The point about this “brutal and realistic attitude in language” was that it was so 
unusual, so obviously a manifestation of proletarian defiance, that it must have convinced 
hundreds of working-class readers that the genteel language of the bourgeoisie could simply be 
excluded from the novel by sheer force of expression. Given that the hardboiled novel was 
singled out for praise in The Novel and the People, this was surely something of which Fox was 
aware.101 The third influence on Fox was arguably the distinctive culture of the British working 
class. In their sustained attempt in the 1960s to identify the “peculiarities” of British history, 
Perry Anderson and Tom Nairn famously argued that working people in Britain differ from 
their European counterparts in possessing a “corporate” and “hermetic” culture which 
effectively constitutes an “alternative moral universe”. Traumatised by the brutality it 
encountered at the moment of its formation, the working class has persistently turned inwards 
and asserted its difference from the bourgeoisie in order to ensure its psychic survival.102 By 
arguing that the novel has always been characterised by a more-or-less exclusive reliance on 
proletarian language, Fox might very well have been recasting this mentality in literary terms. 
By contrast, the fourth influence on his thinking about language was quite possibly the tradition 
of cultural conservatism. As we have seen in Chapter One, there was a preoccupation with the 
idea of linguistic homogeneity among many of the cultural conservatives who dominated 
literary culture in the inter-war period. When writers such as Eliot and Leavis tried to justify 
their belief that premodem societies were culturally superior to the modem industrial 
democracies, they often argued that premodern writers had benefited from the existence of a 
unified literary culture based on a common language. Since English was subsequently 
fragmented into a number of different speech types by the coming of industrialism, one of the 
main duties of the poet (at least according to Eliot) was to “purify the dialect of the tribe”.103 
Although Fox’s predilection for the language of the working class was a world away from the 
elitism of Eliot or Leavis, it is easy to see how the work of the cultural conservatives might have 
reinforced his belief in the possibility of linguistic unity. If so, it was one of the more bizarre 
examples of the interchange between Marxism and conservatism which extended throughout the 
1930s.104
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4 OTHER WRITINGS
Fox was an extremely prolific writer but only a fraction of his work was devoted to cultural 
themes. Apart from The Novel and the People and a series of articles in the Daily Worker, the 
only other cultural writings of the 1930s were an essay on Marxist literary theory in the 
symposium Aspects o f  Dialectical Materialism (1934), a eulogy for Maxim Gorky published in 
the house magazine of Martin Lawrence (later Lawrence and Wishart) and nine essays in Left 
Review}05 Much of this work is of purely ephemeral significance; but two aspects of it need to 
be noted if we require a rounded impression of Fox’s critical project: (1) his implicit response to 
the charge that Marxism compromises the prestige of the arts, and (2) his analysis of the nature 
of ideology in periods of systemic crisis.
Many of the intellectuals who flirted with Marxism in the 1930s were ultimately put off by what 
they seem to have regarded as its tendency to devalue the arts.106 Because of its habit of relating 
developments in culture to the prevailing economic circumstances, Marxism was widely 
charged with infiltrating a spirit of grubby utilitarianism into the temple of aesthetic experience. 
The interesting thing about Fox’s general writings on Marxist cultural theory, especially his 
contribution to Aspects o f  Dialectical Materialism (“The Relation of Literature to Dialectical 
Materialism”), was their implicit attempt to refute this charge by showing how the most 
elevated ideas about art can be incorporated into a Marxist aesthetic. One of Fox’s strategies 
was to pander to the mood of residual romanticism which prevailed among many literary 
intellectuals. Although the work of Hulme, Eliot and other “classical” writers had done much to 
undermine the dominance of romanticism, it was still common for many literary theorists 
(among them John Middleton Murry, Herbert Read and G. Wilson Knight) to endorse the sub- 
Words worthian view that art represents an agonised struggle by an individual genius to express 
his “unique” vision. If this emphasis on uniqueness seemed incompatible with Marxism, 
particularly with the view that art has its roots in the shared experiences of society, Fox 
nevertheless tried to retain the main elements of romantic individualism in modified form. The 
artist by no means resides in an aesthetic universe of his own making, since his basic subject 
matter is the social relations into which he is bom; yet the essence of art is its maker’s attempt 
to imbue these common materials with something wholly idiosyncratic: “On the forge of his 
own inner consciousness the writer hammers out reality, beats it out madly by the violences of 
thought, if I may steal a phrase from Naomi Mitchison. The whole process of creation, the 
whole agony of the artist, is in this violent conflict with reality.”107 Fox displayed similar 
ingenuity in his brief discussion of the historical status of aesthetic values. Many intellectuals in 
the 1930s believed that Marxist aesthetics implied a rejection of the belief that art provides 
universal insights into the nature of the human condition. If art is indeed conditioned by the
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social relations of its day, then it surely follows (or so the argument went) that it can only 
investigate forms of human behaviour which exist for specific periods. Fox responded by 
drawing a rigid distinction between the ideological and the affective dimensions of art. The 
ideas which art expresses are indeed historically specific, but the emotional responses that form 
its core remain remarkably constant throughout time and space: “ ...because they deal with 
human passions, human emotions, with the experiences of flesh and blood, works of art have a 
value for all time, a meaning for all time.”108 The argument was buttressed by the audacious 
claim that a commitment to Marxist politics might ultimately lead to a deepening of art’s 
universality. Since the dawn of the capitalist age, Fox implied, writers and artists have been 
haunted by the ideal of global expressivity. The creation of a world market, combined with the 
resulting disappearance of “national onesidedness” (Marx’s phrase), has nurtured the belief that 
art should reflect the experience of living in a world society. Yet every attempt to express the 
new forms of global consciousness have necessarily been stymied by the national rivalries that 
are endemic to capitalism. By seeking to absorb the various regions of the world into a highly 
integrated system of planned production, the communist movement will therefore establish 
conditions in which the artist’s dream of total communication can at last be realised.109
Fox’s most original piece of cultural criticism was probably the essay on T.E. Lawrence which 
he published in Left Review after Lawrence’s death in 1935. Proving that his interest in heroism 
went beyond purely literary matters, Fox wanted to know why Lawrence was effectively the 
only person in England to be elevated to heroic status in the period since the Great War. His 
answer was that Lawrence embodied in extremis the Janus-faced characteristics of capitalist 
society in crisis. Ostensibly a servant of the ruling class, he nevertheless held a number of 
beliefs which objectively undermined the stability of the existing system. After being sent to the 
Near East to advance the interests of British imperialism, specifically by fomenting revolt 
against the Ottoman Empire, he developed a romantic attachment to the forces of pan-Arab 
nationalism. And although his obsession with aeroplanes might have seemed like an 
endorsement of capitalist technocracy, he actually believed that improvements to technology 
were most likely to result from the ingenuity of working people: “To me it is the multitude of 
rough transport drivers filling all the roads of England every night, who make this the 
mechanical age. And it is the airmen, the mechanics, who are overcoming the air, not the 
Mollisons or Orlebars.”110 Whether or not this interpretation of Lawrence’s career was correct, 
the important thing about it was its implications for the theory of bourgeois ideology. By 
insisting that only someone as radically self-divided as Lawrence could have effectively 
symbolised British capitalism in its post-war decline, Fox seemed to be implying that a period 
of systemic crisis invariably gives rise to ideological formations which do as much to subvert 
the existing order as to legitimise it. His essay can thus be seen as part of the wider attempt by
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British communists to challenge the belief that ideology simply consists of a straightforward 
representation of the opinions of the ruling class. Insofar as it concerns itself with the ideology 
of imperialism, it also anticipates the preoccupation with self-undermining imperial 
representations which dominates the work of such “post-colonial” critics as Homi Bhabha. Its 
subtlety suggests that Stanley Edgar Hyman was probably justified in saying that Fox’s literary 
essays evinced an “aesthetic sensibility capable of breaking through the fetters of his straight 
political criticism, had he lived.”111
5 CONCLUSION
The main purpose of Ralph Fox’s writings on literature was to endorse and expand the Soviet 
notion of the “positive hero”. Fox seems to have regarded the novel as the literary form best 
suited to the depiction of positive heroes, not least because it has always portrayed the 
relationship between the individual and his environment in “epic” form. However, in spite of his 
evident commitment to the world communist movement, Fox developed a theory of the novel 
that was not merely unorthodox but positively un-Marxist. This was partly because he tried to 
supplement Soviet theory with ideas drawn from the English critical tradition, without ever 
trying to rid them of their most distinctively “bourgeois” elements. Most obviously, his 
approach to the issue of characterisation in the novel was profoundly influenced by the 
individualist assumptions underpinning E.M. Forster’s Aspects o f  the Novel Fox’s writings 
therefore demonstrate how the collision between Soviet and English thought occasionally 
resulted not in the enrichment of Marxism but in the subversion of its main principles.
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CHAPTER FIVE
AUTODIDACTICISM AND ORTHODOXY: NOTES ON CHRISTOPHER
CAUDWELL
The work of Christopher Caudwell has been analysed at length in a number of books and 
articles, most obviously in the distinguished monographs by David Margolies, Christopher 
Pawling and Robert Sullivan.1 Much of this writing has tried to relate Caudwell’s ideas to the 
vast number of predominantly Western thinkers whose work he cited in the bibliography to 
Illusion and Reality (1937). My purpose in this very brief chapter is to indicate how CaudwelPs 
work can also be interpreted in accordance with my broader thesis about the relationship 
between Soviet and British criticism. I shall argue that Caudwell owed as much of a debt to 
Soviet ideas as either West or Fox, in the sense that the main assumptions of his work were all 
derived from the 1934 Writers’ Congress, but that he significantly modified (or even subverted) 
these ideas by refracting them through the sort of intellectual assumptions which tend to 
characterise the autodidactic mind. When he made use of ideas from the Western tradition, as he 
did on innumerable occasions, it was usually in such a way as to throw his autodidacticism into 
relief. I shall illustrate these arguments by looking at the two most important elements of 
Caudwell’s work: (1) his theory of poetry, and (2) his theory of cultural crisis.
Anyone who wishes to understand the culture of the world communist movement must address 
the issue of autodidacticism, since communist parties throughout the world were uniquely 
successful in producing large numbers of worker-intellectuals who had received little or no 
formal education.2 Many of these autodidacts only displayed their erudition in conversation or 
debate, which helps to explain why the British Communist Party was once renowned for the 
excellence of its orators, but a certain proportion also made careers for themselves as journalists 
and writers. If we read the work of such influential self-taught Marxists as William Paul, T.A. 
Jackson and Caudwell himself, it rapidly becomes clear that a handful of distinctive intellectual 
characteristics tend to predominate. The first is a pronounced taste for intellectual drama. 
Perhaps because they have never been obliged to absorb ideas in order to achieve an academic 
qualification, autodidacts often seem to differ from professional intellectuals in experiencing a 
sort of naked wonder when engaging with the history of human thought. This arguably means 
that they tend to assess ideas more by aesthetic than by cognitive criteria. If an idea is exciting 
or dramatic enough to send a shiver down the spine, it is likely to be better received by an 
autodidact than an idea which merely purports to identify the truth. One aspect of this search for 
intellectual drama is a liking for monocausal explanations. Whereas the trained thinker usually
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emphasises the complexity of the natural and human worlds, drawing our attention to the variety 
of causes which precipitate any given effect, autodidacts tend to favour theories which reduce 
immense clusters of events to a single cause. (This doubtless helps to explain why a resolutely 
“totalising” theory such as Marxism should have been so popular among the self-taught 
intellectuals of the 19th and 20th Centuries). By a curious paradox, however, it is rare for an 
autodidact’s theories to be entirely consistent. Because of his voracious appetite for knowledge 
and a distinct lack of caution in traversing disciplinary boundaries, he is likely to advance an 
argument by drawing in thinkers from a bewildering variety of intellectual traditions, regardless 
of the fact that their main ideas are often incompatible with his own. Moreover, since 
monocausal explanations are notoriously difficult to defend successfully, his work is often 
characterised by what Jung might have called “enantiodromia” -  that is, the tendency of 
“everything eventually [to go] over into its opposite.”3 At a certain point in his argument, 
apparently unaware of what he is doing, he will begin to expound a thesis which is diametrically 
opposed to the one he claims to be advancing, only to return to his original position a few 
paragraphs later. As such, there is a sense in which the combination of “blindness and insight”4 
that Paul de Man identified in all intellectual work is especially well illustrated in the writings 
of the self-taught.
One way of approaching the work of Christopher Caudwell is to see it as an autodidact’s 
response to Soviet theory, though it is necessary to emphasise at once that Caudwell had a range 
of knowledge that that was unusual even by the standards of other self-taught communists. Let 
us begin with his theory of poetry, expounded at length in Illusion and Reality and arguably the 
most important element of his work.5 As we have seen in Chapter Two, one of the central 
aspects of Bukharin’s contribution to the 1934 Congress was his opposition to the idea of 
“disinterestedness” in art. Recognising that art which displays no traces of “desire or will” 
(Hegel) is unlikely to mobilise people to create a better world, Bukharin rejected the entire 
Kantian tradition in philosophical aesthetics and declared that the essence of art is actually the 
expression of “active militant force”6 in the face of external reality. There is a case for saying 
that Caudwell’s theory of poetry was a dramatisation of this already dramatic idea.7 Where 
Bukharin emphasised the role of primitive feeling in the arts, Caudwell went one better and 
described poetry as a manifestation of our “instincts” -  that is, the anarchic cluster of desires 
with which we are bom and which are “incompatible” with our physical environment. 
Influenced by thinkers from the psychoanalytic tradition (Freud, Adler and Jung -  a nice 
illustration of the autodidact’s eclecticism) as well as modern behaviourism,8 Caudwell argued 
that the world represented in poetry is not a reflection of reality but a paradisical vision of the 
human environment transfigured by instinct -  in other words, poetry shows us what the world 
would be like if it were capable of meeting our innate desires.9 At the same time, probably
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drawing on the ideas of I.A. Richards,10 Caudwell also insisted that poetry is more of an 
“expressive” medium than a “referential” one. When we read or hear a poem, even one which 
we already know, our sense of its “objective referents” is altogether vaguer than our awareness 
of the feelings which it brings to the surface.11 Caudwell explained the link between poetry and 
instinct by developing an ingenious theory about the nature of rhythmic language.12 The point 
about poetry’s use of rhythm is that it induces a mood of “physiological introspection” which 
directs our attention to the “natural periodicities” in our own bodies -  the beating of the heart, 
the ebb and flow of respiration and so on. Once we have retreated into our bodies, we become 
aware once again of the instinctual drives which needed to be sublimated before our life in 
society could begin: “In emotional introversion men return to the genotype, to the more or less 
common set of instincts in each man which is changed and adapted by outer reality in the course 
of living”.13 Moreover, since an awareness of our instincts reminds us of the things we have in 
common with other human beings, poetry is a necessarily collective force. Even when a poet 
writes alone, he is inspired by a ferocious sense of group consciousness into taking an active 
approach to external reality -  this is why poetry always transfigures our world rather than 
simply reflecting it. Caudwell thus believed that the function of poetry is ultimately an 
“adaptive” one. By depicting a world which has been remade in the image of our most 
uncompromising desires, poetry convinces us that it is possible for our instincts to receive some 
kind of expression in our everyday lives, and therefore contributes to the whole process of 
sublimation which transforms unrealistic desires into realistic ones.14
If all this talk of instincts, genotypes and adaptation was only vaguely compatible with Soviet 
theory, Caudwell veered towards outright unorthodoxy with the theories of language and poetic 
form which buttressed his ideas about poetry. Perhaps recognising that he had tended to make 
poetry seem curiously remote from everyday life, not least by claiming that it prioritises 
expression over reference, Caudwell seems to have ascribed great importance to showing that
the poet’s use of language is ultimately not so dissimilar to everyone else’s. As such, he
developed a theory of language which held that all forms of speech and writing combine a 
reference to the external world with an element of emotional expression.15 Whenever language 
is used, even in a scientific context, it always tells us something about the “common perceptual 
world” (that is, the complex of events and objects which exist independently of the speaker or 
writer) as well as registering a response in the sphere of the “common affective world” (that is, 
it evokes the attitude of the speaker or writer towards the events and objects to which he refers). 
This combination of reference and expression reflects the fact that language had its origins in 
economic activity. While there was nothing particularly unorthodox about these ideas, what was 
interesting was the way that Caudwell seemed to undermine his account of language’s
objectivity with the examples he used to illustrate his theory. Speaking of the common
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perceptual world, he placed less emphasis on what already exists than on private images which 
an individual might wish to make available to other minds:
The word is spoken and heard. Let us call the parties to this act speaker and hearer... The 
speaker wishes to change the hearer’s perceptual world so as to include the thing the word 
symbolises. For example, he may say, "Look, a rose! ” He wishes the hearer to see a rose, or be 
aware o f the possibility o f  seeing one. Or he may say, “Some roses are blue in which case he 
wishes to modify the hearer’s perceptual world to the extent o f including blue roses ...What, 
then, has been the result o f  this transaction? A blue rose, which was in the speaker’s perceptual 
world, but not in their common perceptual world or in the hearer’s perceptual world, has been 
formed in the common perceptual world and introjected into the hearer’s perceptual world. 
Hence both the hearer’s perceptual world and the common perceptual world are changed. 
Thus, i f  now the speaker says, “A blue rose is scentless ’’, the sentence will have a meaning it 
would not have had before, because blue roses now exist in the common perceptual world o f  
speaker and hearer.16
The impression which Caudwell created with these examples, no doubt inadvertently, was that 
language is not to be regarded as a “reflection” of reality (as Bukharin had insisted and as the 
theory of Socialist Realism demanded) so much as a signifying system that tells us more about 
the structure of the human mind than about the properties of the object world. (It is interesting 
that Saussure’s Cours de linguistique generale was listed in the bibliography to Illusion and 
Reality, though it was not referred to directly in the text). This is perhaps one of the things that 
Maurice Comforth had in mind when he claimed over ten years later that Caudwell’s ideas were 
tainted by philosophical idealism.17 Even more unorthodox were Caudwell’s remarks about the 
nature of poetic language. In his efforts to explain the priority of expression over reference in 
poetry, Caudwell sketched a theory of poetic form which appeared to owe a great deal to what 
David Lodge has called “modern symbolist poetics”.18 The basic argument was that poetry is 
more concerned with the emotional connotations of language than with the properties of the 
world around us -  or, to put it more precisely, it yields its effects by enhancing the “affective 
associations”19 of language (that is, the “latent content contained in the original word”)20 rather 
than the things to which it refers (that is, the “portions of external reality which the words 
symbolise”).21 By bringing together words which tend to resonate at the same emotional 
frequency, or by juxtaposing words whose emotional “tones” are sharply opposed, the poet 
interposes a layer of affective material between the reader and the poem’s content.22 The 
interesting thing about this theory was its wholesale incompatibility with Soviet ideas about the 
unity of form and content. Whereas the Soviet writers insisted that literary form should always 
serve as a sort of transparent medium for the transmission of ideas and images, Caudwell’s 
argument was that a disjuncture between form and content is absolutely crucial to the way that 
poetry works. This belief in the autonomy of poetic form perhaps helps to explain the note of 
modernist experimentation in his own creative writings, especially his poetry, which
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nevertheless stood in sharp contrast to the orthodox denunciation of modernism in books such 
as Illusion and RealityP
When we turn our attention to Caudwell’s theory of cultural crisis,24 we find a classic example 
of the autodidact’s preference for explaining complex phenomena in terms of a single cause. As 
we saw in Chapter Two, the Soviet theorists invoked a bewildering variety of factors when 
trying to account for the “decadence” of capitalist culture, ranging from the joyless nature of 
labour in a market system to the modernist preoccupation with the underbelly of modem life. 
An important aspect of the Soviet argument was the claim that bourgeois literature only 
descended into outright decadence with the rise of the art-for-art’s sake movement, which 
encouraged writers to turn their backs on the social world and retreat into a private universe of 
moral and aesthetic experimentation. There is perhaps a sense in which Caudwell’s decisive 
move was simply to extend the critique of art-for-art’s sake to the whole of capitalist society. 
According to Caudwell, who developed his theory in considerable detail in Studies in a Dying 
Culture (1938) and Further Studies in a Dying Culture (1948), the root cause of all forms of 
cultural decline under capitalism is what he famously called the “bourgeois illusion of 
freedom”.25 This is the view that human beings can only flourish when operating independently 
of wider social influences:
The illusion is that man is naturally free -  ‘naturally ’ in this sense, that all the organisations o f 
society are held to limit and cripple his free instincts, and furnish restraints which he must 
endure and minimise as best he may. From which it follows that man is at his best and noblest 
when freely working out his own desires?6
Although the bourgeois illusion is not quite the same thing as Mill’s preference for the “private 
sphere” over the public world of institutions, not least because the demand for individual 
freedom can often acquire institutional expression (Caudwell cited the structure of capitalism 
itself), it still pivots around the basic contrast between individual judgement (good) and 
collective purpose (bad). Caudwell’s attack on the bourgeois illusion was rooted in a stimulating 
attempt to outline a Marxist definition of freedom. Apart from pointing out that freedom from 
social ties is of little use if the individual is too poor to exploit his freedom (a staple Marxist 
argument which he nevertheless pressed home with great rhetorical flair),27 Caudwell insisted 
that human beings can only be described as free if they possess two related powers. The first is 
the ability to think about the reasons for their actions. If, when responding to an external 
stimulus, we are able to ask ourselves “why am I doing this?”, we open up the possibility of 
transcending our habitual responses and identifying new courses of action. However, since we 
are always responding to external stimuluses in one fashion or another (here we come to 
Caudwell’s second point), we must also seek to maximise our freedom by so ordering our
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environment that we are largely unaffected by unwanted external pressures. There is no such 
thing as a state of pure freedom, merely a situation in which human beings effectively choose 
the environmental forces which impose restraints (though not absolute restraints) on their 
freedom of manoeuvre.28 This is why Caudwell put great store on Marx’s famous observation 
that “freedom is the recognition of necessity”. Moreover, in a development of the argument 
which made his reasons for opposing the bourgeois illusion absolutely clear, Caudwell insisted 
that freedom as he understood it can only be achieved through the medium of collective 
economic action: “The essential feature of society is economic production. Man, the individual, 
cannot do what he wants alone. He is unfree alone. Therefore he attains freedom by co­
operation with his fellows.”29 By making us suspicious of collective action (and by diverting our 
attention from the issue of why capitalism is unable to adequately transform our physical 
environment) the bourgeois illusion drains the life out of modem culture by separating human 
beings from their only source of salvation. It should be clear even from this brief summary that 
Caudwell’s argument can best be seen as a contribution to the venerable debate about the 
relative merits of “positive” and “negative” conceptions of liberty.30
Caudwell showed great ingenuity in his attempts to implicate the bourgeois illusion of freedom 
in the decline of such diverse areas of modem culture as love, psychology, religion, beauty and 
physics. Most ingenious of all were his efforts to relate the bourgeois illusion to the entire 
history of modem English literature, both in Chapters IV to VI of Illusion and Reality and in the 
great essay Romance and Realism?1 As is well known, Caudwell argued that the bourgeois 
illusion was first dragged into literature by the conflict between feudalism and emergent 
capitalism in the 16* Century. In order to undermine the communitarian values of the feudal 
age, the writers of the Elizabethan period fashioned characters who embodied an extreme form 
of individualism -  proud, amoral and frenzied heroes such as Doctor Faustus who believed that 
the transcendence of human limitations can only be achieved through ruthless loyalty to 
instinct.32 Writing about Shakespeare,33 whom he otherwise credited with greater insight into the 
deficiencies of bourgeois individualism than most of his contemporaries, Caudwell noted that 
“His characters know only one law -  to be the thing they are; and to be the thing they are is to 
call into existence, like a magic lantern projection of the soul on the universe, all the 
phantasmagoria of events and forces that is reality and, revolving around them, is their tragedy 
or comedy, and claims them or saves them.”34 Moreover, the representation of extreme 
individualism did not end with the Elizabethans but has continued in modified form for most of 
the period since — it is this, more than anything else, which explains the decline of English 
literature in the capitalist age. Although Caudwell’s survey of the history of English literature is 
extremely well known, not least because it has been singled out for virulent criticism by 
subsequent Marxist writers, there is a noticeable silence in the academic literature about the
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moment when Caudwell temporarily abandoned his main thesis and proceeded to argue the 
precise opposite of what he had been arguing before. In his comments on the century or so 
between the Restoration and the rise of romanticism (what used to be called the “Augustan” 
period), Caudwell accepted that the main purpose of literature became the inculcation of the 
forms of behaviour most acceptable in an established bourgeois society.35 Instead of depicting 
extreme individualists who routinely ignored the standards of the wider society, writers such as 
Dryden, Pope and Defoe specialised in the creation of “types” -  that is, highly stylised 
characters who exemplified a recognisable form of social behaviour. Each type was evaluated 
by the standards of the “bourgeois gentleman”, who was implicitly held up to the reader as the 
acme of what “reasonable and fashionable men and women should be”.36 If a character’s 
behaviour conformed to the bourgeois ideal (which very rarely happened) he was treated with 
sympathy -  if not, he was subjected to the most unremitting satire. Augustan literature thus 
became a sort of behavioural manual in the struggle for capitalist hegemony. Caudwell did not 
explicitly endorse this tradition, but neither did he relate it to the wider theme of cultural crisis. 
As such, his account of Augustanism tends to read like a rare example of critical equanimity in 
the midst of coruscating anguish about the bourgeois illusion of freedom. We perhaps get the 
feeling that Caudwell has inadvertently cast himself in the unlikely role of the Dr. Johnson of 
the revolutionary left, rejecting the representation of exceptional people and admiring only work 
in which “sublimity is produced by aggregation.”37 It is an interesting example of the 
inconsistencies which beset the autodidactic mind when monocausal explanations are suddenly 
transformed into their opposites.
NOTES
1 David N. Margolies, The Function o f Literature: A Study o f Christopher Caudwell’s Aesthetics 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1969); Christopher Pawling, Christopher Caudwell: Towards a 
Dialectical Theory o f Literature (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1989); Robert Sullivan, Christopher 
Caudwell (London: Croom Helm, 1987). For a useful survey of writing on Caudwell, see H. Gustav 
Klaus, “Changing Attitudes to Caudwell: A Review of Critical Comments on the Author, 1937-87” in 
David Margolies and Linden Peach (eds.), Christopher Caudwell: Marxism and Culture (London: 
Goldsmiths College, 1989).
2 The classic study of communist autodidacticism in Britain is Stuart Macintyre, A Proletarian Science: 
Marxism in Britain 1917-1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
3 This is the definition of enantiodromia contained in the glossary of Frieda Fordham, An Introduction to 
Jung's Psychology (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1966) p. 146.
4 For introductions to de Man’s work, see, inter alia, Martin McQuillan, Paul de Man (London: 
Routledge, 2001); Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism (London: Methuen, 1983) Chapter Eight; 
Raman Selden and Peter Widdowson A Reader’s Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory, second edition 
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993) p. 150f.
5 For Caudwell’s theory of poetry, see, inter alia, Margolies, The Function o f Literature, passim; David 
N. Margolies, “Christopher Caudwell and the Foundations of Marxist Criticism”, Marxism Today, May 
1967, pp. 149-155; David Margolies, “Left Review and Left Literary Theory” in Jon Clark, Margot 
Heinemann, David Margolies and Carole Snee (eds.), Culture and Crisis in Britain in the Thirties 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1979) pp. 77-81; Christopher Pawling, Christopher Caudwell, pp. 24- 
120; Robert Sullivan, Christopher Caudwell, Chapter Four; Francis Mulhem, “The Marxist Aesthetics of 
Christopher Caudwell”, New Left Review, Number 85, May/June 1974, pp. 37-58; Maurice Comforth,
186
“Caudwell and Marxism”, The Modem Quarterly, Volume Six Number One, Winter 1950-51, pp. 16-33; 
Rene Wellek, A History o f Modem Criticism, Volume Five: English Criticism 1900-1950 (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1986) pp. 142-143.
6 Nikolai Bukharin, “Poetry, Poetics And The Problems Of Poetry In The USSR” in Maxim Gorky et al., 
Soviet Writers’ Congress: The Debate on Socialist Realism and Modernism (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1977) p. 197.
7 Margolies, Pawling and Sullivan all recognise the influence of Bukharin on Caudwell, but, with the 
possible exception of Margolies (who devotes a chapter to it) they appear to regard it as somewhat 
incidental. Moreover, they focus on the emphasis which the two thinkers share on the ability of art to 
convey ideas in sensual or emotional form. My argument here is that Caudwell was also (and perhaps 
more centrally) influenced by Bukharin’s argument about the quality of the emotion which art serves to 
express. See Margolies, The Function o f Literature, p. 85f; Pawling, Christopher Caudwell: Towards a 
Dialectical Theory o f Literature, p. 98f; Sullivan, Christopher Caudwell, p. 97.
8 For the influence of behaviourism on Caudwell, see, inter alia, Pawling, p. 81f.
9 Christopher Caudwell, Illusion and Reality: A Study in the Sources o f Poetry ( London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1977) pp. 143-144 passim
10 For the influence of Richards on Caudwell, see Mulhem, op cit., pp. 54-55.
11 Caudwell, Illusion and Reality, p. 141 passim.
12 Ibid. pp. 139-142.
13 Ibid., p. 140.
14 Ibid., pp. 174-177.
15 Ibid., pp. 159-171. For another account of Caudwell’s theory of language, see, inter alia, Mulhem, op 
cit., p. 45f.
16 Ibid., p. 160.
17 Comforth, op cit., pp. 23-28.
18 David Lodge (ed.), 20th Century Literary Criticism: A Reader (London: Longman, 1972) p. 202.
19 Caudwell, “Illusion and Reality”, p. 227.
20 Ibid., pp. 235-236.
21 Ibid., p. 236.
22 Ibid., pp. 235-242.
23 David Lodge makes a similar point in 20fh Century Literary Criticism, p. 202.
24 For Caudwell’s theory of cultural crisis, see, inter alia, Margolies, The Function o f Literature, 
especially Chapter Four; David N. Margolies, “Christopher Caudwell and the Foundations of Marxist 
Criticism”, Marxism Today, May 1967, pp. 149-155; David Margolies, “Left Review and Left Literary 
Theory” in Jon Clark, Margot Heinemann, David Margolies and Carole Snee (eds.), Culture and Crisis in 
Britain in the Thirties (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1979) pp. 77-81; Christopher Pawling, 
Christopher Caudwell, p. 53f passim’, Robert Sullivan, Christopher Caudwell, Chapter Five; Francis 
Mulhem, “The Marxist Aesthetics of Christopher Caudwell” in New Left Review, Number 85, May/June 
1974, pp. 37-58; Maurice Comforth, “Caudwell and Marxism”, The Modem Quarterly, Volume Six 
Number One, Winter 1950-51, pp. 16-33; Rene Wellek, A History o f Modern Criticism, Volume Five: 
English Criticism 1900-1950 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986) pp. 142-143; Helena Sheehan, Marxism and 
the Philosophy o f Science: A Critical History (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993) p. 350f.
25 Caudwell’s most accessible discussion of the bourgeois illusion of freedom is in the “Foreword” to 
Studies in a Dying Culture (London: John Lane The Bodley Head, 1938).
26 Caudwell, Studies in a Dying Culture, pp. xx-xxi.
27 Ibid., p. 195f.
28 Ibid., p. 205f.
29 Ibid., p. 211.
30 David Margolies expands on this point in his chapter on the bourgeois illusion in The Function o f 
Literature. See p. 49f.
31 Christopher Caudwell, Romance and Realism: A Study in English Bourgeois Literature, edited by 
Samuel Hynes (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970).
32 Caudwell, Illusion and Reality, p. 85f; Caudwell, Romance and Realism, p. 40f.
33 For Caudwell’s account of Shakespeare, see, inter alia, Pawling, p. 59f.
34 Caudwell, Romance and Realism, pp. 40-41.
35 Ibid., p. 52f.
36 Ibid., p. 53.
37 Quoted in Rene Wellek, A History o f Modem Criticism 1750-1950, Volume One: The Later Eighteenth 
Century (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970) p. 86.
187
CHAPTER SIX 
“THE PAST IS OURS”: THE ENGLISH RADICAL TRADITION AND THE POPULAR 
FRONT
As we saw in our brief account of Shelley’s Socialism by Eleanor Marx and Edward Aveling, 
the desire to identify a radical tradition in English culture1 has been a part of Marxist criticism 
in Britain since its earliest days. It is therefore unsurprising that the English communists should 
have provided a full-scale account of the radical tradition in their work of the 1930s. Although 
some of this work was a response to the project outlined at the 1934 Writers’ Congress, 
specifically the demand that communist intellectuals should trawl through history in search of 
“precursors” of Socialist Realism, the most important stimulus was the political strategy which 
the Comintern pursued after the abandonment of the Class Against Class line.2 Between 1933 
and 1939 (and again between 1941 and 1943) the Communist International instructed its 
member parties to devote their main efforts to resisting the advance of fascism, specifically by 
joining with social democrats, liberals and even moderate conservatives in the defence of 
constitutional democracy. One of the main components of the new strategy was the attempt to 
demonstrate that each country possessed radical traditions which were consonant with the 
politics of communism. The CPGB’s cultural workers were told that they should try to 
reconstruct the entire history of English radicalism, not only in its political dimension (the long 
tradition of plebeian revolt) but also in its more cultural aspects (the various attempts by writers 
and intellectuals to express their disaffection with the status quo). This chapter seeks to examine 
the resulting body of work. Section One identifies the general characteristics which the 
communists ascribed to the radical tradition. Section Two tries to show how a rather scattered 
crop of books, essays and articles can be fitted together to provide a coherent account of the 
development of English radicalism, in spite of the fact that the CPGB’s intellectuals were never 
working with a shared chronological framework. Section Three asks whether the investigation 
of English radicalism was undertaken along orthodox lines, and examines two theoretical 
initaiatives which grew out of it -  one by Edgell Rickword, the other by Jack Lindsay.
1 THE ANATOMY OF ENGLISH RADICALISM
The Cl began to prioritise its work against fascism in 1933, long after the disastrous 
consequences of the so-called Third Period had become apparent to everyone except the 
organisation’s most influential figures. When the Executive Committee of the Cl met in 
Moscow in June 1933, shortly after Hitler’s accession to power in Germany, it judged that the
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most effective way of resisting fascism would be for communists to join with social democrats 
in a “United Front” to defend civil liberties. There was no longer any question of socialists 
outside the communist tradition being dismissed as “social fascists”. Two years later, at the 
Seventh World Congress of the Cl in Moscow, the policy was significantly widened to 
encompass the idea of a “Popular Front” against fascism. This was envisaged as an alliance not 
merely between communists and social democrats but also between liberals, moderate 
conservatives and other representatives of “bourgeois” politics who wanted democracy to 
survive. If we want to understand why the politics of the Popular Front exercised so powerful an 
influence on cultural Marxism in Britain, we have to look briefly at the famous report which 
Georgi Dimitrov (the new head of the Cl) delivered to the Congress under the title The Working 
Class Against Fascism. Defining fascism as “the open terrorist dictatorship of the most 
reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital”,3 Dimitrov 
argued that its main purpose was to rescue capitalism from the threat of revolution by abolishing 
democracy, suppressing the labour movement, sharpening the exploitation of the colonial 
peoples and reshaping culture along militaristic lines. Since the abolition of bourgeois 
democracy posed an incalculable threat to the future of the communist movement, it was 
therefore obvious (or so Dimitrov implied) that the defence of constitutional government and its 
related liberties was of greater immediate importance than the struggle for socialism. It was this 
consideration which justified the idea of a Popular Front. Yet there were at least two difficulties 
which communists would need to overcome if their credibility as opponents of fascism was not 
to be undermined. In the first place, the world communist movement had usually approached 
the whole idea of bourgeois democracy in a spirit of hostility. Having so often dismissed 
parliamentary government as the fraudulent shell of an exploitative social system, it was not 
immediately clear how communists could expect to be taken seriously when they called for its 
defence. Secondly, communists had done very little to challenge world fascism’s highly 
successful attempt to rewrite history in its own image. According to Dimitrov, one of the main 
reasons for the success of the fascists was that they had consistently portrayed their approach to 
politics as the culmination of their respective national traditions. The Italian fascists presented 
themselves as successors to Garibaldi; their French counterparts identified Joan of Arc as the 
progenitor of Gallic fascism; while even the American fascists made inroads into public 
consciousness by identifying themselves with the rebel forces in the War of Independence.4 By 
failing to respond to these blatant distortions of history, communists had fatally neglected the 
element of patriotism in modem politics.
Dimitrov went on to suggest that a single cultural strategy could help to solve both these 
problems. Communists, he argued, should now give priority to (1) bringing the long history of 
popular radicalism in their respective countries to the attention of the public, and (2) showing
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how the militancy of the common people had made a central contribution to the emergence of 
political democracy:
Communists who do nothing to enlighten the masses on the past o f  their people... in a genuinely 
Marxist spirit, who do nothing to link up the present struggle with the people’s revolutionary 
traditions and past ...voluntarily hand over to the fascist falsifiers all that is valuable in the 
historical past o f the nation.5
Being upholders o f Soviet democracy, we shall defend every inch o f the democratic gains which 
the working class has wrested in the course o f years o f  stubborn struggle, and shall resolutely 
fight to extend these gains...How great were the sacrifices o f the British working class before it 
secured the right to strike, a legal status for its trade unions, the right o f  assembly and freedom 
o f the press, extension o f  the franchise and other rights! The proletariat o f  all countries has 
shed much o f  its blood to win bourgeois-democratic liberties, and will naturally fight with all its 
strength to retain them.6
It was these passages, more than any others, which established the context in which the British 
communists attempted to reconstruct the history of the English radical tradition.7 The attempt 
was undertaken in a fairly diverse range of books, essays and articles. Edgell Rickword tried to 
capture the general characteristics of English radicalism in his introductory essay to A 
Handbook o f  Freedom, the anthology of radical quotations which he edited with Jack Lindsay in 
1939 (its title was later changed to Volunteers fo r  Liberty).* He also contributed another general 
essay, “Culture, Progress, and English Tradition”, to C. Day Lewis’s influential symposium The 
Mind in Chains (1937).9 The history of plebeian revolt was traced in A.L. Morton’s A People’s 
History o f  England (1938)10 and in Jack Lindsay’s pamphlet England My England (1939).11 
One of the main themes in the next section is the tension between Morton’s scrupulous 
historical research and Lindsay’s more propagandist approach. Three of the most important 
radical writers (Bunyan, Dickens and Morris) were the subject of book-length studies by Jack 
Lindsay,12 T.A. Jackson13 and Robin Page Amot14 respectively. There was a series of essays on 
these and other writers, including Shakespeare, Spenser, Overton, Swift, Paine and Blake, 
published in Left Review between 1934 and 1938.15 Lindsay analysed Shakespeare in A Brief 
History o f  Culture (1938)16 and John Strachey glanced at More, Winstanley and Morris in The 
Theory and Practice o f Socialism (1936).17 The English Revolution 1640, edited by Christopher 
Hill, appeared at the end of the decade and contained Rickword’s important essay on John 
Milton.18 Jack Lindsay explored the theoretical significance of the investigation into English 
radicalism in a series of books and essays.19 The Daily Worker ran a series of brief articles on 
the history of the radical tradition under the title “The Past is Ours”.20 There were also a number 
of brief references to the radical tradition in a host of other publications.
The logical place to start is Edgell Rickword’s account of the general principles underpinning 
English radicalism in “On English Freedom”.21 At the heart of the radical tradition, Rickword
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argued, was a long history of plebeian revolt which began in the Middle Ages and stretched 
forward through the English Revolution to encompass such modern movements as Owenism, 
Chartism and industrial unionism. According to Rickword, the central point to grasp is that the 
thousands of ordinary people who contributed to this history were ultimately bound together by 
a shared political outlook, even though the immediate economic demands (to use Lenin’s 
phrase) which prompted them into action were usually quite different. The overriding feature of 
popular rebellion has been an awareness of exploitation. The peasants of the Middle Ages knew 
that the manorial system was little more than a form of legalised theft, while the worker under 
capitalism sees very clearly (in spite of the reifying complexity of the market order) that his 
employer’s profits are actually the fruits of his own unpaid labour.22 The crucial result is that 
popular rebellion has always been directed, either explicitly or implicitly, not merely towards 
marginal economic improvements but towards the establishment o f a classless society based on 
common ownershipP When the English people rise up against their rulers, Rickword wrote, 
they are basically asserting “a common human right which can only find satisfaction in social 
equality, the demand so to modify the state system that the way will be clear for free and equal 
collaboration in the productive life of the community.”24 Although the people have often tried to 
legitimise their political ambitions by claiming that a communist society has already existed in 
England, specifically in the period between the departure of the Romans and the arrival of the 
Normans,25 the real reason for the durability of the communist impulse is the “communal nature 
of labour”26 under both feudalism and capitalism. Moreover, while it is perfectly true that the 
English have yet to succeed in establishing a classless society, this does not mean that the 
history of popular revolt is primarily a record of glorious defeats. Apart from securing a series 
of economic concessions which have done much to improve the standard of living, its successes 
in the field of civil liberties have been of epochal significance. Because the common people 
have always recognised that the state’s primary function is to serve the interests of the ruling 
class, they have had no choice but to balance their struggle for economic justice with a sustained 
campaign for such crucial democratic rights as freedom of speech, trial by jury and freedom of 
assembly.27 In opposition to what Herbert Butterfield had recently called the “Whig 
interpretation of history”, which explained the establishment of democracy in terms of 
enlightened government by the commercial elite, Rickword therefore argued that the people’s 
struggle for freedom was the sole cause of the comparatively liberal institutions which now 
existed in England. The political lessons were clear. When the communists called for a Popular 
Front to defend “bourgeois democracy” against the threat of fascism, they were not (as their 
Trotskyist critics claimed) promoting a dangerous diversion from the class struggle so much as 
honouring the English people’s most important political achievement.
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Rickword then shifted his attention to the scores of writers, artists and intellectuals who have 
supported the English people in their struggles against authority. He argued that the masses have 
never been stirred into action by ideas introduced to them from outside. The role of intellectuals 
in the radical movement, though often of immense significance, has always been one of 
clarification and stimulation rather than outright leadership.28 Radical intellectuals have been 
responsible either for giving clear expression to aspirations which the masses might only have 
expressed inchoately, or else for reviving political energies by imbuing those aspirations with a 
sort of visionary lustre: “ ...in the combinations of recalcitrant journeymen, in the staunch 
bearing of farm labourers in the felon’s dock...(we find) the seed of all the formulations of the 
rights of man and the rhapsodies of the poets on the theme of liberty.”29 Rickword even came 
close to suggesting that the relationship between the intellectuals and the masses had been the 
single most important influence on the nature of modern thought. During periods in which the 
working people’s staunch common sense has attracted the support of the intelligentsia, or so it 
was argued, philosophy and its offshoots have been predominantly optimistic and rationalist. It 
is only during periods of intellectual elitism (or so it was implied) that modem thought has been 
plunged into irrationalist gloom.30 Writing in the journal Poetry Nation Review in 1979, E.P. 
Thompson implied that it was precisely this emphasis on the debt which intellectuals owe to 
ordinary people (so different from Leninist orthodoxy) that made Rickword one of the most 
trenchant critics of the CPGB’s many lapses into authoritarianism in the post-war years.31
Rickword’s vigorous brand of radical patriotism raised difficult questions about the origins of 
national character. Anxious to avoid the taint of biological determinism, he was swift to deny 
that the common people’s taste for rebellion was somehow encoded in their genes.32 If their 
“independent turn of mind”33 has now been raised to the level of an instinct, it is surely because 
their “innate”34 responses have been powerfully conditioned by centuries of class struggle: “The 
plain necessity of having to work and fight through long centuries for advantage has fixed the 
strain, and has ingrained that deep suspicion of the bosses which Froissart noted as making us a 
nation very difficult to rule”.35 But it was not entirely possible for Rickword to avoid the sort of 
English exceptionalism that occasionally marred the work of William Morris. English radicals, 
he implied, have always been distinguished from their foreign counterparts by a suspicion of 
abstraction. They have invariably fought for “some specific form” of freedom and been 
unconcerned with “freedom in the abstract”.36 Aside from suggesting an almost Adomian 
sensitivity to the way that instrumental reason can be bent to authoritarian purposes, it is 
possible that Rickword’s empiricism had an influence on George Orwell’s much more 
distinguished meditations on Englishness (written about a year later) which also placed a radical 
construction on the idea that “the English are not intellectual”.37 The question of the influence of 
cultural Marxism on Orwell’s work is one which has yet to be adequately explored.
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As we shall see in the next section, there were occasional discrepancies between the ideas 
explored in “On English Freedom” and those which appeared in more specific accounts of the 
history of English radicalism. Although many writers tried to substantiate the claim that popular 
revolt had always been fuelled by communist ambitions, there were others (A.L. Morton was 
the main example) who took a more realistic perspective on the historical motivations of the 
English people. Nor was it the case that radical writers and intellectuals were always portrayed 
as precisely reflecting the wider concerns of the plebeian movement. In order for a writer to be 
identified as a member of the radical tradition, it was usually enough for his work to contain a 
critical account of a certain aspect of the capitalist order. Of all the writers whom the 
communists analysed in the 1930s, it was really only More, Milton and Bunyan who might 
reasonably be said to have clarified and expanded the concerns of the people. There was also an 
extremely important feature of communist writing on English radicalism which Rickword failed 
to even mention. By insisting that popular revolt has been a continuous or near-continuous 
feature of British life since the end of the 14th Century, the historians of the Popular Front period 
were arguably undermining the orthodox Marxist assumption that each mode of production is 
legitimised by its own political, legal and ideological “superstructure”. Their response, 
repeatedly demonstrated in practice though never explicitly stated, was the argument that in 
each period the dominant ideology contains elements which can be repositioned for radical 
ends. If such crucial ideologies as Christianity and liberalism have functioned throughout the 
course of the last 600 years to reinforce support for the existing order, they have also (or so the 
argument went) furnished many of the assumptions which have underscored popular revolt. 
When Margot Heinemann suggested that the work of such writers as Rickword, West and 
Lindsay anticipated many of the concerns of “Gramscian” Cultural Studies, it might well have 
been this emphasis on the self-divided nature of ideology which she had in mind.38
2 THE SECRET HISTORY OF ENGLISH RADICALISM
Although most of the writers who explored the history of English radicalism shared the 
assumptions which Rickword outlined in On English Freedom, it would be wrong to describe 
them as an entirely homogeneous group. Most obviously, they never developed the sort of 
shared chronological framework that would have made their individual studies part of a 
genuinely collective act of historical investigation. If their individual studies are examined in 
toto, however, it becomes clear that they can be pieced together into a coherent narrative in spite 
of the existence of minor differences of emphasis. This narrative can be broadly divided into 
five periods, which can be summarised as follows:
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• cl380-cl500. The age of peasant revolts against the manorial system, inspired by residual
elements of radical egalitarianism in Christian doctrine (Langland).
• cl500-cl610. The age of peasant revolts against primitive accumulation and emergent
capitalism, inspired by the democratic impulses that fuelled the Reformation (More, 
Spenser, Shakespeare).
•  cl610-cl660. The emergence of modern communism and religious dissent in the wake of
the English Revolution (Milton, Bunyan, Winstanley, Richard Overton).
• cl660-cl760. A period of political quietism in which the spirit of dissent was kept alive by
isolated intellectuals (Swift).
• cl760-cl900. The birth of the labour movement and the emergence of scientific socialism
(Paine, Blake, Dickens, Morris).
The names in brackets refer to the writers and intellectuals who were regarded in the 1930s as 
the leading radical spokesmen of their respective eras. Other names, such as those of Bacon, 
Defoe, Wordsworth, Shelley and Hazlitt, would be added to the list by later communist writers. 
Our task now is to look in detail at how these five periods in the history of English radicalism 
were portrayed.
2.1 The Peasants’ Revolt and the Crisis of Feudalism
The first phase of popular radicalism encompassed the peasant insurrections which swept 
England in the 14th and 15th Centuries. The most important of these was obviously the Peasants’ 
Revolt of 1381, though the so-called “Cade Rebellion” of 1450 also received its share of 
attention. The English communists, while recognising that the late Middle Ages saw the 
beginning of what was sometimes called the “transition to capitalism”, usually ascribed the 
tensions of the period to problems arising from a still-dominant feudalism. There was an 
interesting contrast between the respective approaches of Jack Lindsay in England My England 
and A.L. Morton in A People’s History o f England. According to Lindsay, whose techniques 
were more those of the pamphleteer than the historian, the Peasants’ Revolt was primarily an 
expression of a longstanding hostility towards the rigidly hierarchical structures of feudal 
society. Already angered by the wholly unaccountable manner in which the feudal lords had 
exercised their power, the peasantry was provoked into outright rebellion by the introduction of 
a penal taxation regime (specifically the Poll Taxof l381 ) in the  wake of the war with France.39 
Morton, on the other hand, placed more emphasis on the structural changes which had helped to 
transform the feudal system in its final period of dominance. In the century or so before the 
Peasants’ Revolt, a number of developments had served to loosen the ties which bound the serf
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to the lord of the manor. These included the introduction of “commutation” (the replacement of 
labour services by the payment of a wage), the Hundred Years’ War and the extensive 
cultivation of new land. The crucial feature of the last two decades of the 14th Century was 
therefore an attempt by the ruling class to shore up a set of hierarchies which had already begun 
to dissolve.40 When the government introduced its Poll Tax, it was motivated not only by 
military considerations (important though these were) but by the need to undermine the 
peasantry’s new sense of independence by depriving it of most of its wealth. It was this, more 
than any longstanding sense of social resentment, which ultimately precipitated the mood of 
plebeian insurgency that drove the likes of John Ball and Wat Tyler.
Yet if Morton insisted that the events of 1381 were stimulated by the demand that the 
independence of the peasantry should be reinforced and not undermined, he appeared to agree 
with Lindsay that their ultimate goal was the establishment of a sort of communist Arcadia. “He 
demanded the freeing of all enslaved Englishmen”, Lindsay wrote in a reference to John Ball, 
“but he was too clear-sighted not to see that there could be no peace or happiness settled in the 
world until classes were altogether abolished”.41 It was usual to ascribe the peasantry’s 
communist values to a subversion of religious ideology. It was suggested, in the first place, that 
the poor in the Middle Ages were deeply influenced by a residual element of radical 
egalitarianism in Christian doctrine.42 According to this argument, Christianity had been a 
communist religion at the very moment of its inception. The ambition of its early followers was 
to create a society in which “the lowly shall be exalted and the mighty cast into the dust”;43 but 
since the political realities of late antiquity were incompatible with this sort of uncompromising 
radicalism, the early Christians were later obliged to moderate their communist ambitions by 
projecting them into the world hereafter. Equality and universal brotherhood were now 
presented as a feature of the Kingdom of Heaven, not as values which might reasonably serve as 
the foundation of a transformed social order. Once this had occurred, it was relatively easy for 
later generations to transform Christianity into the main ideological buttress for European 
feudalism. Yet its subversive potential had not been entirely erased. It still contained enough 
traces of its egalitarian origins to be a potent weapon in the hands of the dispossessed. The 
communist writers of the 1930s sometimes emphasised the political implications of 
Christianity’s main creation myths, especially that of the Garden of Eden.44 Because the 
relationship between Adam and Eve had been an entirely equal one, it was natural (or so it was 
implied) for many Christians to assume that God’s work on earth could only be achieved if 
economic and political hierarchies were swept away. This was the assumption that underpinned 
the famous couplet of John Ball’s, quoted by Rickword and Lindsay in A Handbook o f  
Freedom, which later provided William Morris with the text of an influential etching:
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Whan Adam dalf, and Eve span,
Wo was thanne a gentilman?45
Lindsay and Morton both agreed that the egalitarian element in medieval Christianity found 
institutional expression in the emergence of the Lollards, led by John Wycliffe. But whereas 
Lindsay was content to portray Lollardry as a communist doctrine, rooted in the “new message” 
that “only those should eat who worked”,46 Morton saw it as a more ambiguous phenomenon.47 
He argued that the Wycliffe heresy contained two main elements. On the one hand, appalled at 
the way in which church leaders now ranked among the most important landowners of the age, 
Wycliffe called for church property to be held in common and not to be treated as a source of 
surplus value. On the other hand, anticipating the emergence of Protestantism by nearly 150 
years, he argued that the distinction between clergy and laity should be loosened and that the 
more mystifying Christian rituals (especially communion based on the doctrine of 
transubstantiation) should be abandoned. Morton fully accepted that these ideas had a number 
of progressive consequences. The emphasis on common ownership of church property was 
undoubtedly an influence on the wider peasant demand for the abolition of classes; while the 
attempt to loosen church hierarchies was directly -  if not solely -  responsible for the first 
English translation of the Bible. Yet he also insisted that Lollardry had been easily recuperated 
by the English establishment. As a result of his association with John of Gaunt, the nobleman 
who effectively ruled England during the childhood of Richard II, Wycliffe had refused to 
extend his doctrine of common ownership to economic affairs as a whole. And after a lengthy 
period of state repression, culminating in the abortive Lollard rising at St Giles’ Fields in 1414, 
most of Wycliffe’s successors seemed happy to tone down their theological radicalism and 
espouse a “bourgeois and democratic” emphasis on “poverty and thrift”.48 If the attempt to show 
that the dominant ideology can often be bent to radical purposes was one of the main 
intellectual procedures of the Popular Front period, then this was a rare example of a communist 
intellectual, scrupulous in his use of historical evidence, demonstrating that radical ideology is 
equally susceptible to corruption from above.
It was accepted that the radical movements of the 14th and 15th Centuries had been swiftly 
suppressed by the state and had not resulted in any short-term changes to the structure of 
English society. However, it was also implied (in line with the shibboleth that popular rebellion 
was solely responsible for the existence of “English liberty”) that the Peasants’ Revolt had 
fatally undermined the power of the ruling class and had therefore hastened the transition to 
capitalism.49 The peasants were thus portrayed as playing a decisive role in the creation of a 
society in which a limited conception of democratic rights was allowed to prevail. More 
interesting was the communist analysis of why the peasants’ wider demands had not been
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realised. In defiance of the view that peasant rebellions tend to be “vast, shapeless, anonymous, 
but irresistible movements” (the phrase is Eric Hobsbawm’s),50 both Lindsay and Morton 
(though especially the former)51 argued that the political fortunes of the peasantry were 
inextricably related to the quality of its leadership.52 When Wat Tyler was able to impose a 
measure of coherence on the rebels from Essex, Kent, East Anglia and the Home Counties who 
poured into London in June 1381, there was every possibility that the great Revolt would 
succeed -  things only fell apart when Tyler was executed during his famous meeting with 
Richard II at Smithfield. “After that”, wrote Lindsay, “with the leader gone, it was not difficult 
to bewilder and browbeat the commons and get them dispersed”.53 Such was the emphasis on 
leadership that it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the history of peasant insurgency was 
being rewritten, consciously or otherwise, to conform with the sacrosanct Leninist distinction 
between “vanguard” and “mass”.
The analysis of the cultural aspects of medieval radicalism had scarcely got underway by the 
1930s. There was an occasional reference to William Langland (seen as a sort of poetic tribune 
of the revolutionary peasants)54 as well as to the “class conscious” ballads of the 14th Century;55 
but the only cultural form to be analysed in any depth was religious iconography. The central 
document in this context was F.D. Klingender’s essay “The Crucifix: A Symbol of Mediaeval 
Class Struggle”, published in Left Review in January 1936. In this piece, which referred 
primarily to continental art but whose argument was said to be relevant to the whole of Western 
Christendom, Klingender’s aim was to show how the ideologies of the feudal aristocracy, the 
emergent bourgeoisie and the disaffected peasantry were successively reflected in medieval 
representations of the Crucifixion. Because the purpose of medieval Catholicism was to 
legitimise secular hierarchies by portraying humanity as wholly subordinate in its relationship 
with God, it was not considered appropriate, or so Klingender implied, for the art of the Church 
to emphasise the suffering of Christ at the moment of his death.56 If we examine early examples 
of the crucifix, such as the Imervard Crucifix that was placed in Brunswick Cathedral in the 12th 
Century, we therefore encounter a Christ figure who radiates divine authority rather than secular 
anguish. Although his arms are extended in line with the horizontal beam of the cross, he 
nevertheless appears to be standing on his feet and gazing resolutely outwards. With his “erect 
head and wide open eyes”, he clearly represents the “lord whose magic potency must be 
solicited with ritual action and incantation.”57 It was only with the start of the long transition to 
capitalism that a more agonistic image of the Crucifixion began to be used. Since the 
bourgeoisie needed to legitimise the idea of market competition, they (or at least the religious 
artists who unconsciously absorbed their outlook) began to conceive of Christ’s behaviour in the 
final hours of his life as the expression of a sort of yearning individualism. The crucifixes which 
emerged in the 13th and 14th Centuries, typified for Klingender by those at the Cathedrals of
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Cologne and Numberg, depicted a man whose anguished glimpses of transcendence grew 
entirely out of his retreat into an inner world. Christ was nailed to the cross, his body was 
ravaged by suffering and his eyes were sometimes (though not always) cast towards Heaven.58 
The lasting impression was of the “Passion of Christ, the terrible conflict of the lonely human 
being, during the last twenty-four hours before his death, when he must choose between his life 
and his cause”.59
Klingender recognised that the emotional intensity of the bourgeois crucifix often appealed 
strongly to the lower orders, but he did not regard it as the main expression of the radical 
impulse in medieval iconography. He pointed instead towards a number of crucifixes, 
exemplified by the one at the Isenheim altar in Colmar Cathedral by Mathias Grunewald, which 
appeared directly to reflect the outlook of the “peasant-plebeian movement”60 in its 
revolutionary clashes with the ruling class. In some very compressed remarks on Grunewald’s 
crucifix, Klingender implied that there were at least four ways in which it embodied a 
revolutionary outlook.61 In the first place, it used anatomical detail to identify God with the 
interests of the poor -  Christ’s appearance was clearly that of a peasant. Secondly, it presented 
the crucifixion of Christ in terms of the peasantry being physically tortured by the ruling class. 
Christ was flanked on his right by a magisterial figure, clearly of noble origin, who held a Bible 
in his one hand (presumably symbolising the law) and pointed an accusing finger with the other. 
Thirdly, it emphasised the indestructibility of the revolutionary impulse. Although the death of 
Christ represented the temporary defeat of the plebeian movement, there was a figure in the 
foreground (confidently identified by Klingender as a “revolutionary”), who was depicted rising 
from the grave. Finally, it seemed so devoid of genuine spirituality that it practically invited its 
audience to redefine the idea of transcendence in purely secular terms:
The death o f  Christ...was no longer the sacrifice o f  the son o f  God: it was the torture there, and 
at that moment o f the peasant masses, the fiendish terror meted out in those years to the heroic 
leaders o f the peasant revolt...Thus the problem o f  salvation was stripped o f  its mystic, 
transcendental cloak -  it was now solely the problem o f  earthly emancipation from class 
suppression, its achievement was the task o f the suppressed masses themselves.62
Klingender’s remarks about medieval iconography illustrated the ingenuity with which the 
British communists could tease out elements of radical sensibility in the art of the past. This 
ingenuity was to be deployed at greater length in the analysis of subsequent periods.
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2.2 The Age of Enclosure
The second period of popular radicalism to which the communists addressed themselves 
(though it is worth repeating that they were never guided by a shared chronological framework) 
encompassed the various acts of peasant insurgency that occurred in England between the 
beginning of the 16th Century and the start of the English Revolution. The most important were 
the Pilgrimage of Grace (1536), the Devon and Cornwall Rising (1549), the Norfolk or “Kett” 
Rebellion (1549) and the Midlands Rising of 1607. Although these and other rebellions were 
described as having the same goal as those from the earlier period (that is, the establishment of a 
communist society administered by the peasants), it was recognised that they were set apart by 
the very different circumstances in which they occurred. Whereas the medieval rebellions were 
caused by tensions inherent in the manorial system, the later events were ascribed to 
dislocations resulting from the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The central claim was 
that the peasants had been provoked into insurrection by the enclosure of common lands, or 
what Marxists (in line with the terminology used in Volume One of Capital) often called 
“primary accumulation”.63 The purpose of enclosure was said to be twofold: (1) to force the 
peasantry to sell its labour power to the new capitalist employers, and (2) to increase the amount 
of land that could be integrated into the new market system. The result was grinding poverty for 
a significant section of the peasantry and England’s first experience of mass unemployment. 
Morton also pointed to a couple of other factors which had hardened the mood of plebeian 
discontent. The first was Henry VH’s decision to prevent the nobility from keeping “retainers”, 
on the grounds that they were a potent source of conflict between the various elite groups which 
aspired to control the state. In an interesting echo of Marx’s contempt for the 
“lumpenproletariat”, Morton argued that the abolition of retainers had swollen the ranks of the 
unemployed with a group of “proud, idle, swashbuckling ruffians”64 (quite unlike their more 
conscientious peasant counterparts) who tried to remedy their poverty not by seeking work but 
by resorting to crime. Secondly, the problem of unemployment had substantially worsened after 
thousands of monastic servants found themselves without an income after the dissolution of the 
monasteries in the 1530s.65
Religion was held to be as important in explaining the communist values of the 16th Century 
peasants as it had been in explaining the similar values of their medieval counterparts; but the 
emphasis now was less on the egalitarian roots of Christianity than on the rise of Protestantism. 
Protestantism was usually interpreted by the Marxist writers of the 1930s as an attempt to adapt 
Christianity to the needs of emergent capitalism.66 Where medieval Catholicism had 
promulgated a “magical” conception of the relationship between man and nature, not least in its 
doctrine of transubstantiation, the early Protestants adopted a proto-rationalist outlook that was
199
better suited to an age of science. Where Catholicism shored up the hierarchical structures of 
feudal society by promoting a top/down relationship between clergy and laity, the Protestants 
tried to parallel the looser relationship between capitalist and worker by speaking in terms of a 
“priesthood of all believers”. And where the Catholic idea of personal responsibility was 
unconcerned to relate Godliness to a capacity for hard work, Protestantism responded to the 
disciplines of the new market society by developing its famous “work ethic”. The point which 
the English communists made was that the new religious ideas were all susceptible to what 
Perry Anderson would later call “inflection to the left”. In his great book on Bunyan, to which 
we shall return in the next section, Jack Lindsay noted that it was common for the early 
Protestant ideologues to be led by their religious convictions into a hatred for the ruling class. 
Angered by the pretensions of the Catholic clergy and convinced of the link between diligence 
and piety, men such as Bishop Latimer, Thomas Becon and Robert Crowley all argued that it 
could never be acceptable for one group of people to live off the labour of another.67 Crowley, 
whom Lindsay quoted, wrote as follows:
They [i.e. “the men o f  law, the gentlemen, the lords ”] take our houses over our heads, they buy 
our grounds out o f our hands, they raise our rent, they levy great (yea unreasonable) fines, they 
enclose our commons. No custom, no law or statute can keep them from oppressing us in such 
sort that we know not which way to turn to live. Very need therefore constraineth us to stand up 
against them. In the country we cannot tarry but we must be their slaves and labour till our 
hearts brast, and then they must have all. And to go to the cities we have no hope, fo r  there we 
hear that these insatiable beasts have all in their hands,68
Insofar as the peasant rebellions of the early-modern period were intended not merely to resist 
enclosure but to establish a classless society, it was because ideas such as Crowley’s had filtered 
down from the Protestant elite to the common people. Moreover, there were occasions when the 
peasants actually bested their medieval counterparts by managing to establish an alternative set 
of political institutions. Lindsay pointed out that the Norfolk rebels had set up a people’s court, 
based at the so-called “Oak of Reformation” in Mousehold, where landowners were put on trial 
for enclosing the common lands.69 Seventy years later, during the Midlands rising, the rebels 
instituted a system of communal farming after tearing down the fences that had excluded them 
from the fields.70 Both these experiments were swiftly suppressed, but they provided evidence 
(or so Lindsay implied) that English radicalism was rooted in something far more substantial 
than a purely destructive attitude towards the status quo. It is worth emphasising how 
unorthodox these arguments would have seemed to the majority of British historians in the 
1930s. The more conventional understanding of the peasant risings was that the events of 1536 
and 1549 (though not necessarily of 1607) were primarily intended not to advance an economic 
objective but to halt the Reformation in its tracks. Far from being the consequence of Protestant 
scepticism towards existing elites, they actually reflected a streak of extreme religious
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conservatism on the part of a peasantry which remained overwhelmingly Catholic. The 
Pilgrimage of Grace was seen as a straightforward act of opposition to the dissolution of the 
monasteries, while the rebellions of 1549 were related to the efforts of the Protectorate (1547- 
1553) to introduce a genuine element of Protestant doctrine into a Reformation that had 
previously been concerned more with organisational matters than with theological 
fundamentals.71 The English communists tried to resist this orthodoxy in one of two ways. 
Either they ignored it altogether (this was Lindsay’s approach in England My England) or else 
they resorted to the argument that the peasant risings had been Catholic “in form” but “popular” 
in content.72 Although the peasants felt obliged to formulate their grievances in the language of 
the dominant religion, their actions were entirely directed towards radical ends. Morton was 
able to partially justify this view by pointing out that the Norfolk Rising had been free of 
Catholic influence and had begun with an act of economic insurgency (an attack on enclosed 
land at Attleborough on June 20th) rather than a confrontation with the clerical authorities.73
Just as unorthodox as the interpretation of the peasant risings was the attempt to assimilate a 
number of 16th Century intellectuals to the radical tradition. The three writers who were singled 
out in the 1930s were Thomas More (seen as a critic of emergent capitalism and an early 
exponent of English communism), William Shakespeare (seen as a disillusioned commentator 
on the alliance between the bourgeoisie and the absolutist state) and Edmund Spenser (seen as a 
prescient analyst of poetry’s incompatibility with market institutions). More’s work was 
examined briefly by Edgell Rickword in “Culture, Progress, and English Tradition”74 (1937) 
and more extensively by John Strachey in The Theory and Practice o f  Socialism (1936), a 
remarkable introduction to Marxism that was published by the Left Book Club as one of its 
monthly “Choices”. Most conventional accounts of More’s life and work have been powerfully 
influenced by the circumstances of his death. Because of his execution in 1535 after refusing to 
swear an oath of allegiance to Henry VIII, he has usually been regarded either as a stern 
defender of the Catholic faith (hence his subsequent canonisation) or as an early exponent of 
religious tolerance. Strachey’s tactic was to ignore More’s religious side altogether and portray 
him as a purely political figure. According to Strachey, who was chiefly interested in the ideas 
contained in Utopia (1516), More was primarily important because he identified the dislocations 
caused by early capitalism and understood how a communist society would be able to eliminate 
them. There were two aspects of the new bourgeois order which he found especially repellent: 
enclosure (which linked his concerns to those of the peasant movement)75 and what Marx would 
later call “commodity fetishism”.76 Enclosure, he implied, was not to be regarded as a necessary 
element in the transition from one economic system to another, but rather as an act of organised 
theft whose ultimate consequence would be the breakdown of social order. When the peasantry 
was deprived of the ability to eke out a living on its own account, it would resort to crime before
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willingly selling its labour power to one of the new capitalist employers.77 In Part One of 
Utopia, in which the book’s protagonist Raphael Hythloday gives a jaundiced account of the 
state of contemporary England, More wrote as follows:
Away they [i.e. the people displaced by enclosure] trudge, I  say, out o f  their known and 
accustomed houses, finding no place to rest in. All their household stuff, which is very little 
worth, though it might well abide the sale: yet being suddenly thrust out, they be constrained to 
sell it fo r  a thing o f nought. And when they have wandered abroad till that be spent, what can 
they then else do but steal, and then justly pardy be hanged, or else go about a begging. And yet 
then also they be cast in prison as vagabonds.78
Strachey also seems to have been impressed by the rhetorical techniques which More developed 
to satirise the practice of enclosure. Noting that animals now grazed on enclosed land while 
human beings were allowed to starve, More wrote a famous passage in which he accused the 
ruling class of callously inverting a set of humane priorities which had proved their worth over 
centuries: “ ...they throw down houses; they pluck down towns, and leave nothing standing, but 
only the church to be made a sheep-house.”79 Perhaps Strachey admired this form of address 
because it anticipated the modem rhetorical trick of portraying socialism as nothing more (and 
certainly nothing less) than the restoration of common sense. Rather less convincing was the 
claim that More could also be regarded as an early critic of commodity fetishism. According to 
Strachey, More was deeply troubled by the way that commodities seem to acquire a life of their 
own when placed for sale on an unplanned market, thereby convincing human beings that 
economic affairs are largely determined by non-human forces beyond their control. He 
expressed his discomfort by envisaging a utopian society in which silver and gold, the two main 
mediums of exchange, were treated with contempt: “ . ..of gold and silver they [ie the Utopians] 
make chamber pots, and other vessels that serve for most vile uses -  thus by all means possible 
they procure to have gold and silver among them in reproach and infamy.”80 Ingenious though it 
was, this interpretation (in which Utopia’s disdain for silver and gold was seen as a direct 
consequence of its opposition to alienated labour) would not command the support of most 
other commentators on More’s work. A more conventional interpretation would emphasise 
More’s dislike of materialism, specifically the claim that his main reason for opposing 
capitalism was that it ruthlessly subordinates the cultivation of spiritual values to the acquisition 
of material wealth. By portraying a society in which it was more usual to defecate on precious 
metals than use them for ornaments, he was therefore expressing a deeply ascetic vision of life. 
Human beings, he believed, should have everything they need to survive but nothing more.
More’s asceticism suggests that his conception of the ideal society was not only quite different 
from Marx’s (it could scarcely have been otherwise in the early 16th Century) but also contained 
elements to which Marxists would be deeply opposed. This perhaps explains why Strachey
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seemed unwilling to give a detailed account of the structure of Utopian society. He followed 
Rickword, Lindsay and Morton in describing Utopia as a communist society in which the means 
of production were held in social ownership, but the less congenial aspects of More’s outlook 
(the emphasis on asceticism, the belief in the regimentation of leisure, the support for 
imperialism or the dislike of non-believers) were completely disregarded.81 There was merely a 
token reference to two of Utopia’s more progressive features, one relating to its conduct of 
international affairs and the other to its treatment of crime. In the first place, Strachey pointed 
out, Utopia had a definite advantage over its rivals when it went to war. Because its internal 
affairs were stable and there was no question of popular revolt (not least because the people 
governed themselves) it could afford to expedite its military engagements by encouraging the 
citizens of enemy countries to overthrow their respective governments.82 Secondly, its treatment 
of criminals was underpinned by an enlightened rejection of the more degrading forms of 
punishment. The small number of Utopian citizens who broke the law were not sent to prison 
but forced to do useful work in the community, thereby acquiring (or relearning) an appropriate 
sense of social responsibility. Writing at a time when Stalin’s show trials were about to begin 
and thousands of Soviet citizens had already been wrongfully executed or sent to labour camps, 
Strachey insisted that “We have a development of this system in the Soviet Union today, where 
punishment consists of the retraining of the individual by constructive work, either in an 
institution or in the outside world, but with a loss of civil rights. How striking it is that More 
foresaw that in a classless society, based on common ownership, where there is no question of 
one man’s work competing with another’s, this solution of the question of punishment (for it is 
little else) would become possible.”83 It was a comment worthy of inclusion in Sidney and 
Beatrice Web’s notoriously deluded Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation? (1935).84
The attempt to portray William Shakespeare as a member of the radical tradition was primarily 
made by Jack Lindsay, first in an essay in Left Review (“William Shakespeare”, July 1937) and 
later in a couple of chapters in his book A Short History o f Culture (1939).85 At a time when 
scholarly work on Shakespeare was dominated by G. Wilson Knight’s “spatial” investigations 
of the canon’s “burning core of mental or spiritual reality”,86 Lindsay made no attempt to 
describe Shakespeare either as a partisan critic of early capitalism or as a man of communist 
sympathies. His more modest claim was that Shakespeare had been a supporter of the capitalist 
system who later came to loathe its tendency to weaken social cohesion. The radical element in 
his work was therefore its growing sense of disillusionment with the new market order. The 
more specific argument was that Shakespeare’s work can only be understood against the 
backdrop of the alliance between the emergent bourgeoisie and the absolutist state which 
existed in England between the mid- 15th and early 17* Centuries. For most of this period, 
Lindsay claimed, the state had generally acted in the interests of the bourgeoisie. It had removed
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barriers to trade, reformed the established church and given its cautious blessing to the process 
of enclosure. This was the context in which Shakespeare conceived his early support for 
capitalism. Anxious that English society would be atomised by the emergence of market 
institutions, he nevertheless came to believe that the absolutist state could use its authority to 
create a countervailing sense of social solidarity. However, when the alliance between the 
Crown and the bourgeoisie began to break down (a process which began in the mid-16* Century 
and reached its crisis point in the Jacobean period) Shakespeare was forced to the conclusion 
that there was no force on earth that could prevent capitalism from spreading its individualist 
poisons. At this point, though he could offer no alternative to the existing system, he effectively 
became a tribune of the radical sensibility.87
According to Lindsay, Shakespeare’s early optimism about the alliance between Crown and 
bourgeoisie was reflected in most of the plays of the 1590s. In Romeo and Juliet he sketched a 
portrait of two determined individualists who defied feudal restrictions (represented by the 
wishes of their respective families) but still managed to achieve a perfect sense of spiritual 
communion -  proof that the new market values were no barrier to social cohesion.88 In a number 
of his comedies he satirised the main genres associated with medieval high culture, showing that 
it was not necessary to recreate the past in order to preserve a sense of national unity. Love’s 
Labour’s Lost was an attack on the “courtly love college”,89 A Midsummer Night’s Dream 
subverted the courtly masque90 and As You Like It attempted a camivalesque inversion of the 
values of pastoral.91 Shakespeare’s purpose in the history plays was to underscore his belief that 
the maintenance of social cohesion depended entirely on the continued strength of the absolutist 
state. By surveying the process of state formation over the previous 300 years, he wished to 
mythologise the moment at which England had been rescued from political division by the 
emergence of a strong centralised monarchy.92 If this meant that Magna Carta was written out of 
history altogether (on the grounds that it represented a destabilising victory for the regions over 
the centre)93 it also involved the portrayal of Henry V as a “fully successful king” who 
“achieves national unification and is yet democratic and anti-feudal in his attitude”.94 Yet even 
in these early plays, Lindsay went on to argue, there were plenty of signs that Shakespeare was 
beginning to have doubts about the nature of capitalist society. In Richard II, for instance, John 
of Gaunt’s famous evocation of England (“this earth, this realm...”) was unexpectedly followed 
by an anguished assault on the predominance of commercial values. England, he said, is:
now leased out, I  die pronouncing it, 
like a tenement or pelting farm,
England, bound in with the triumphant sea, 
whose rocky shore beats back the envious surge 
o f watery Neptune, is now bound in with shame
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with inky blots and rotten parchment bonds.95
According to Lindsay, passages such as this embodied the dawning recognition that the 
absolutist state was ultimately quite powerless to mitigate the consequences of capitalist 
individualism. This became the political assumption that preoccupied Shakespeare in the work 
of his maturity.96 In the plays which he wrote in the opening years of the 17* Century, notably 
Julius Caesar, Hamlet, King Lear, Othello and Macbeth, he struggled to understand why neither 
the bourgeoisie nor the Crown had managed to construct an alliance that might have rescued 
England from commercial anarchy. His answer, shaped as it was by an unavoidable absence of 
historical perspective, was that human beings possess a “blind principle of self-destruction”97 
that invariably corrupts their strivings for wealth and power. This lugubrious doctrine was 
especially well illustrated in King Lear. When Lear invited his three daughters to compete for 
his estate, he inadvertently encouraged them to set aside their feelings of filial devotion and 
engage in a brutal struggle for material advantage. Having started the crisis, he then proved by 
his descent into madness that he had been too corrupted by decades of power to be able to 
restore order.98 Although Shakespeare’s disillusionment with the alliance between Crown and 
bourgeoisie would ultimately lead to the “screaming anarchism” of Timon o f Athens,"  there 
were still occasional signs that he was beginning to identify new sources of political hope. In 
Antony and Cleopatra he wrote admiringly about the same feudal impulses which he had 
denigrated in his work of the 1590s, holding up the relationship between the lovers as a model 
of what the human spirit had achieved before the introduction of the cash nexus.100 More 
significantly, he also began to reveal a new sympathy for the political aspirations of the masses. 
In Coriolanus, written (as Lindsay noted) just after the Midlands Rising of 1607, Shakespeare 
endowed the people with a level of political insight and purity of motive that was denied to the 
other characters:
Care for us! ...Suffer us to famish and their storehouses crammed with grain. Make edicts fo r  
usury, to support usurers. Repeal daily any wholesome act established against the rich, and 
provide more piercing statues daily to tie up and restrain the poor. I f  the wars eat us not up, 
they will; and that’s all the love they bear us.
The Gods know I  speak this in hunger o f bread, not in thirst fo r revenge.101
Yet ultimately, Lindsay implied, neither nostalgia for feudalism nor a nascent faith in the 
masses was enough to rescue Shakespeare from a paralysing political despair. In his final plays 
he retreated from politics into an aesthetic universe of his own making. Cymbeline and A 
Winter’s Tale tried to revive the conventions of pastoral, while the Tempest was a lengthy 
meditation on the nature of creativity.102 “After that”, wrote Lindsay in one of the dramatic
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observations which peppered his best work, “there was nothing for him to do unless he was 
willing to play with hack-work. He had his competence and retired.”103
The most unlikely writer to be credited with radical instincts by the English communists was 
Edmund Spenser, the subject of a subtle essay by Alick West in Left Review (“The ‘Poetry’ in 
Poetry”, April 1937). As the author of The Faerie Queene, a lengthy allegory on the greatness 
of Elizabeth I, Spenser is usually regarded as the most inveterately monarchist of English poets. 
West made no attempt to revise our understanding of Spenser’s politics, but instead drew 
attention to an element of cultural critique in his work that had previously been overlooked. At 
the heart of many of Spenser’s poems, he implied, was a prescient understanding of why 
capitalist society is “inimical” to the writing of great poetry. In a passage which probably owed 
something to the ideas of Christopher Caudwell (but which also recalled the anthropological 
sections of his own Crisis and Criticism) West theorised the opposition between capitalism and 
poetry in two ways. In the first place, the poetic impulse is compromised under capitalism 
because poetry is a fundamentally collective form which is now called upon to express 
individualist assumptions. When poetry emerged in primitive society its purpose was to use 
rhythmic language to bind people together while they worked -  its role in an age of markets is 
to express the poet’s sense of his own isolation from others.104 This tension between collective 
form and individualist content induces a sense of futility in the poet which serves only to 
undermine his creativity.105 His creativity is further undermined (this was West’s second point) 
by the disjuncture between capitalism’s indifference to aesthetic values and poetry’s obsession 
with the transformation of sensibility. Of all the forms of literary expression, West implied, it is 
poetry which works most tirelessly to restore the vitality of our sense impressions. Yet under 
capitalism, which is “concerned with the quantity of exchange-value in the commodity, not with 
the quality of its use-value; and ...operates through the anarchy of free competition”,106 the poet 
is confronted by a public who have been so deprived of aesthetic stimulation in their work that 
their capacity to experience pleasure has dwindled almost to nothing. He therefore tries to 
“compensate’* for the philistine limitations of the age by “being determinedly poetical in 
particulars”,107 producing work in which the individual image is smothered beneath language of 
a self-conscious elegance and density: “the poem as a whole, for which capitalism has no use, 
tends to disintegrate into ‘poetical’ phrases.”108 Spenser, West implied, had an intuitive 
understanding of these matters which he occasionally dramatised in verse. The argument was 
illustrated with a detailed analysis of Spenser’s poem Prothalamion, which contained a typically 
ornate fantasy about the poet watching a “Flocke of Nymphes” responding to two swans gliding 
down the Thames.109 The two most relevant verses read as follows:
Efstoones the Nymphes, which now had Flowers their fill,
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Ran in all haste, to see that silver brood,
As they came floating on the Christal Flood.
Whom when they sawe, they stood amazed still,
Their wondering eyes to fill,
Them seem’d they never saw a sight so fayre,
O f Fowles so lovely, that they sure did deeme 
Them heavenly borne, or to be that same payre 
Which through the Skie draw Venus silver Teeme,
For sure they did not seeme,
To be begot o f  any earthly Seede,
But rather Angels or o f Angels breede:
Yet were the bred o f Somers-heat they say,
In sweetest Season, when each Flower and weede 
The earth did freshen aray,
So fresh they seem’d as day,
Even as their Brydale day, which was not long:
Sweete Themmes run softly, till I  end my Song.
Then forth they all out o f  their baskets drew,
Great store o f  Flowers, the honour o f the field,
That to the sense did fragrant odours yield,
All which upon those goodly Birds they threw,
And all the Waves did strew,
That like old Peneus Waters they did seeme,
When downe along by pleasant Tempes shore 
Scattred with Flowres, through Thessaly they streeme,
That they appeare through Lillies plenteous store,
Like a Brydes Chamber flore:
Two o f those Nymphes meane while, two Garlands bound,
Offreshest Flowres which in that Mead they found,
The which presenting all in trim Array,
Their snowy Foreheads therewithall they crownd,
Whil ’st one did sing this Lay,
Prepar ’d against that Day,
Against their Brydale day, which was not long:
Sweete Themmes runne softly, till I  end my Song.uo
Although Prothalamion was originally intended to celebrate a wedding, West believed that 
there are several ways in which it can also be read as a sort of self-reflexive meditation on the 
limitations of poetry in the capitalist age. The above verses are organised around an implicit 
comparison between the original function of poetry and the function of poetry in Spenser’s time. 
Captivated by the sight of two swans floating down the Thames, a “Flock of Nymphes” pay 
tribute to their beauty in a ritual that is essentially collective in nature -  they sing, dance, bear 
flowers and so on. “The scene”, West wrote, “is a ‘literary’ description of poetry as it was 
originally sung and acted.”111 Yet the poet who observes the ritual is completely isolated from 
the things he records. Unable to join the nymphs in their celebration of the spirit of nature, he 
exemplifies the inability of the bourgeois artist to experience the sort of group consciousness 
which lies at the heart of great poetry. The resulting sense that one type of poetic consciousness
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is now being superseded by another, with disastrous results for poetry, is also reflected at a 
more formal level, specifically in the tension between the “I” who speaks in the verses (“A 
Flocke of Nymphes I chaunced to espy”) and the “I” who speaks in the refrain (“Sweet Themmes 
runne softly, till I end my song”). Whereas the former communicates a feeling of isolation, the 
latter seems to have temporarily recaptured some of the group spirit that has otherwise been 
sacrificed to market values.112 But the relationship between the verse and the refrain is not 
entirely one of contrast. In a passage of what might now be called deconstruction (in Derrida’s 
sense of the term) West argued that Spenser’s intention was to show antithetical forms of 
individual and collective awareness beginning to leak into each other: “the two tones affect one 
another...The poem is neither wholly marriage song, nor wholly personal expression. Like the 
‘I’, it is indeterminately between the more ‘individual’ and the more ‘social’ Spenser.”113 
Presumably West admired this blurring of categories because it proved that the yearning for 
social integration can never be entirely suppressed, even in a society which encourages its 
members to think of themselves as self-determining atoms.114 At a time when capitalism was 
still in its infancy, Spenser’s genius (and the source of his radicalism) was the ability to 
diagnose the problems which all bourgeois poets had been forced to endure. In a laconic piece 
of partisan rhetoric at the end of his essay, West suggested that it was only recently, with the 
emergence of the communist movement, that the poetic impulse had begun to revive: “The older 
poems were not poems of phrases. Nor are the new ones.”115
2.3 The English Revolution
If the first two stages in the history of English radicalism were seen as the direct result of 
economic changes, then the third stage (roughly between 1640 and 1660) was usually described 
as the unintended consequence of developments in high politics. All the main strands in the 
plebeian radicalism of the 17th Century were traced to the influence of the English Revolution. 
The Revolution was widely interpreted by British Marxists as a “bourgeois revolution” of the 
sort which Marx and Engels had analysed in their writings on European history -  that is, as a 
straightforward contest for state power between the emergent bourgeoisie (represented by 
Parliament) and the feudal aristocracy (represented by the Crown). Its purpose was to free the 
new capitalist order from arbitrary restrictions imposed by the absolutist state. Yet it was also 
recognised that many of the revolutionaries were driven by a fervent desire to renew the 
Protestant impulse. In the period since the Reformation, or so it was argued, the leaders of the 
established Church had lapsed back into authoritarianism. The aim of groups such as the 
Puritans, the Presbyterians and the so-called “anarchists of religion”116 (Quakers, 
Congregationalists and so on) was therefore to challenge ecclesiastical power and restructure the 
relationship between clergy and laity along more egalitarian lines.117 The idea of bourgeois
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revolution was explored most fully in Morton’s A People's History o f  England (especially 
Chapters VII, VIII and IX) and Christopher Hill’s early essay “The English Revolution 1640” 
(1940).118 It was only later that British Marxists would propose a much more sophisticated 
Marxist interpretation of the events of the Cromwellian era, seeing them (in the words of Perry 
Anderson) as a “clash between two segments of a landowning class, neither of which were 
direct crystallizations of opposed economic interests, but rather were partially contingent but 
predominantly intelligible lenses into which wider, more radically antagonistic social forces 
came into temporary and distorted focus.”119
However, although the communists expended a lot of energy trying to prove that the English 
Revolution was indeed of bourgeois origins, they also argued that the demand for parliamentary 
and ecclesiastical reform caused ideological tremors which spread outwards from the elite 
groups and galvanised the common people. The result was a series of popular movements, some 
political and some religious, which used the principles of the Revolution as the starting point for 
a sweeping attack on the privileges of the bourgeoisie, the aristocracy and the clergy. In the 
1930s, long before the bewildering variety of radical sects which Hill examined in The World 
Turned Upside Down (1972) were widely known, the only political movements to be singled 
out for analysis were the Levellers and the Diggers. It was Jack Lindsay who provided the 
simplest and most dramatic account of these movements in England My England. The 
Levellers, he argued, were the last representatives of rural communism ever to achieve influence 
in Britain. Strongly plebeian in origin, they struggled to convert Cromwell and his army to a 
radical programme of constitutional reform (including outright abolition of the monarchy, 
biennial parliaments and religious freedom)120 because they thought it would lead to precisely 
the sort of communist society which the English peasants had been intermittently trying to 
establish since 1381.121 By contrast, the Diggers marked the emergence of a distinctively 
modern type of communism. When they established their famous commune on St George’s Hill 
in Surrey in 1649, their aim (or so Lindsay argued) was to create a network of egalitarian 
communities that would harness scientific knowledge to the task of boosting production.122 
Morton and Hill were both more circumspect than Lindsay. They argued that the Levellers were 
better understood as a movement of “small independent men”123 (tenant farmers and the like) 
who aimed to challenge the dominance of the bourgeoisie by ensuring that the lower-middle- 
class had a voice in Parliament. At no time did they embrace communist values or consist 
primarily of workers and peasants. Convinced that the emerging proletariat was likely to do the 
political bidding of its employers, they even argued that the parliamentary franchise should be 
extended to every adult in Britain with the exception o f  wage earners. Insofar as the Levellers 
deserved their place in the radical pantheon, it was because (1) their hostility to the bourgeoisie 
inspired a small amount of independent working-class protest in London and elsewhere, and (2)
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their programme of constitutional reform (embodied in The Demands o f the People) anticipated 
that of the Chartists by nearly 200 years.124 However, there was one point on which Lindsay, 
Morton and Hill could all agree. Without the influence of the Levellers, they insisted, Cromwell 
would never have been persuaded at the end of the 1640s to eschew the path of class 
compromise and institute a genuine republic. The regicide of Charles I was more the product of 
pressure from below than a reflection of the settled political will of the bourgeois 
revolutionaries. The Diggers proved to be more contentious. Morton and Hill both argued, 
contra Lindsay, that the experiment on St George’s Hill had very little to do with the emergence 
of modem communism. Although leading Diggers such as Gerrard Winstanley placed a novel 
emphasis on the need for working people to acquire scientific knowledge (an issue we shall 
return to in a moment) their vision of the good society was practically identical to that of the 
earlier peasant communists.125 A third perspective on the Diggers was provided by John 
Strachey, who implied in The Theory and Practice o f  Socialism that the extent of their political 
ambition had sometimes been overstated. Far from seeking to operate across the whole of 
Britain, their more modest goal was to establish a series of communist colonies on areas of 
common land which had yet to be enclosed.126 Strachey’s remarks were rooted in the 
misconception that the original Digger colony had been based on one of the few remaining 
pieces of common land in Surrey, whereas in fact (as Lindsay and Hill pointed out) it was 
constructed entirely on waste ground.
The argument was then extended to the issue of religious radicalism. Just as the bourgeois 
exponents of parliamentary rule were inadvertently responsible for stirring the masses into 
political action, so the Protestant revolutionaries inspired the creation of a network of 
“dissenting sects” which served as a major stimulus to working-class revolt over the next 150 
years. At first sight, or so it was argued, the aims of “establishment” groups such as the Puritans 
and Presbyterians were comparatively modest. The Puritans, inspired by the Calvinist doctrine 
of predestination and convinced of their status as God’s “elect”, merely wanted the right to 
disregard ecclesiastical rulings on matters such as church ritual, preaching methods and the 
observance of religious festivals. The Presbyterians wanted to restructure the established 
Church along the lines of the Scottish kirk. Yet the real significance of both these groups was 
that they injected an element of democratic idealism into religious debate which revolutionised 
the organisational forms of popular religion. Composed primarily of working-class and petty- 
bourgeois congregations, the main Dissenting groups (Quakers, Baptists, Congregationalists 
etc.) operated on the assumption that the main duty of the clergy was to carry out the wishes of 
the laity. In doing so they ensured that egalitarian values were to survive unscathed throughout 
the long period of political stasis between the suppression of the Levellers and Diggers and the 
emergence of the modem labour movement. Although the writers of the 1930s were largely
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uninterested in exploring the “fine tale of the dissenters”127 (Lindsay’s phrase) they nevertheless 
implied that Dissent was best regarded as a sort of temporary displacement of communist values 
onto the sphere of religious organisation.128
The various strands in 17th Century radicalism were reflected by the group of writers to whom 
the communists devoted individual studies. There was one Leveller (Richard Overton), one 
Digger (Gerrard Winstanley), one radical Protestant who helped create the intellectual climate 
in which Dissent could flourish (John Milton) and one bona fide  Dissenter (John Bunyan). The 
work of Overton and Winstanley, though not examined in detail, was seen as important because 
it contained the first real element of ffeethinking (if not outright atheism) in the history of 
radical doctrine.129 Overton, the most important of the Leveller pamphleteers, was the subject of 
an essay which Montagu Slater contributed to the first issue of Left Review under the 
pseudonym “Ajax”.130 Much of the piece was taken up with a brisk account of Overton’s arrest 
by Cromwell’s Council of State in 1649, his imprisonment in the Tower of London with John 
Lilbume and his subsequent acquittal at a legendary treason trial.131 Yet its implicit point was 
that Overton had a streak of hedonism in his personality which made him unflaggingly hostile 
to the bourgeois ideal of self-denial, and which marked him out as an early example of what can 
perhaps be called the radical clown. During his period in the Tower, for instance, he wrote a 
pamphlet urging his fellow Levellers to recognise the political benefits of drinking: “My 
Brethren of the Sea Green order [i.e. the Levellers], take a little wine with your water and I’ll 
take a little water with my wine and it will temper us to the best constitution.”132 He then 
described alcohol as “the preserver of being and motion and the original of that habit of 
laughter.”133 Slater seemed to think that the point of all this boozy exuberance was that it 
provided Overton with a compelling persona which he could use in his attacks on the existing 
order. Though always intellectually rigorous, his critique of the dominant ideology was 
invariably freighted with a seasoned drinker’s irreverence and good humour. His most important 
book, Man Wholly Mortal, was a withering assault on the doctrine of human immortality. It was 
often argued at the time that the soul could survive death because the responsibility for creating 
new life was shared between human beings and God, with the latter intervening at the moment 
of conception to endow the newly created human with a soul. Yet if this were so, Overton 
argued, then human beings would be capable of producing “angelic entitie[s]” much superior to 
themselves, and this is clearly not the case: “No! Man in his kinde begets corruptible [sic] man, 
begets nothing but what is corruptable, not half mortal, half immortal, half angel, half man, but 
complete man, totally mortal.”134 Quite a sophisticated point about the weakness of dualist ideas 
was thus expressed in the form of a joke. More broadly, Slater implied, the significance of 
books like Man Wholly Mortal was that they symbolised the moment at which the radical 
tradition began to detach itself from its Christian roots. Aware that the promise of an afterlife
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has frequently been used as a specific against secular change, Overton was making a conscious 
effort to ally English radicalism with the tradition of philosophical materialism. From this point 
on the tension between radical Christianity and militant atheism becomes central to the story of 
British radicalism.
A similar theme informed John Strachey’s brief remarks on the work of Gerrard Winstanley, the 
most famous member of the Diggers. According to Strachey, Winstanley’s great significance 
was that he developed a predominantly secular conception of the nature of working-class 
education. In his book The Law o f  Freedom, produced after the collapse of the experiment on St 
George’s Hill, he insisted that the proper role of the clergy was to instruct ordinary people in the 
first principles of science, economics and politics -  there should be no room for irrelevant ideas 
about God, Heaven or the nature of the afterlife. Although the whole argument was justified in 
religious terms (“To know the secrets of nature is to know the works of God; and to know the 
works of God within the Creation, is to know God himself...”),135 Strachey nevertheless 
regarded it as sure proof that Winstanley had made the transition from Quakerism to 
“magnificently expressed materialism.”136 As such, his main relevance to the radical tradition 
was that he anticipated the Marxist conviction that social liberation can only occur once the 
common people have consciously rejected the lure of religion.137
If the English communists saw Overton and Winstanley as pioneers of the link between 
philosophical materialism and political radicalism, they nevertheless regarded John Milton and 
John Bunyan as the last great representatives of progressive Christianity. Both, so the argument 
went, exemplified the mood of democratic idealism which revivified the Protestant vision in the 
early 17th Century and led to the emergence of Dissent. An essay on Milton by Edgell Rickword 
appeared in The English Revolution 1640, a book of essays edited by Christopher Hill to mark 
the 300th anniversary of the outbreak of the Civil War. Rickword virtually ignored Milton’s 
poetry and concentrated instead on his work as a pamphleteer and politician in the 20 years 
between the establishment of the Long Parliament (1640) and the Restoration (1660).138 At the 
heart of the essay was an account of the religious pamphlets which Milton wrote towards the 
beginning of the period, especially The Reason o f Church Government urged against 
P rela try f9 According to Rickword, most of these pamphlets were a response to the Bill 
introduced by Parliament in 1642 to abolish episcopacy. Inspired by the Bill’s attempt to restore 
Protestant values to the established Church, especially its insistence that the principle of divine 
ordination should now be revoked, Milton set out to explore a model of church organisation that 
was far too radical for either the Puritans or the Presbyterians (though not the Dissenters) to 
consider. His basic argument was that congregations should have the right to elect and remove 
their ministers, on the assumption that religious officials are otherwise inclined to indulge “their
212
ostentation, their belly-worship, their fostering of superstitious rites, and, basically, their 
association with the State power” (Rickword’s paraphrase).140 Moreover, he saw very clearly 
that a relationship of accountability between clergy and laity would only be sustained if certain 
other reforms were also granted. At various times in the 1640s he called for the disestablishment 
of the Church of England, an end to priestly interference in the private affairs of the individual 
(including the relaxation of the divorce laws), complete liberty of action for all Protestant sects 
and complete freedom of speech. In his Speech for the Liberty o f Unlicensed Printing (1643), 
more commonly known as Aeropagitica, Milton anticipated the Millian argument that freedom 
of discussion is the essential precondition for discovering the truth.141
Between 1649 and 1660, Rickword went on to point out, Milton made a concerted effort to 
translate his religious convictions into political action. Apart from defending the 
Commonwealth in a stream of pamphlets, notably The Tenure o f  Kings and Magistrates and 
Eikonoklastes, he was appointed Secretary for Foreign Tongues in 1640 and thus became 
central to the new government’s relationship with foreign regimes.142 There were two aspects of 
Milton’s political career that Rickword seemed to find especially significant. In the first place, 
simply by devoting his time to the business of high politics, Milton proved that political 
engagement was no barrier to artistic excellence -  or, more precisely, he showed how a writer 
might “fit himself for a supreme creative effort by many years of intellectual and moral 
preparation.”143 Rickword even hinted that the poems of the 1660s and 1670s would never have 
been written if their author had not spent 20 years “immersed utterly” in the social struggle. 
More important still was the epochal contribution to political theory which Milton allegedly 
made after the regicide of Charles I in 1649. Defending Parliament against the charge of 
barbarism, Milton argued that no government could be legitimate unless it somehow rested on 
the consent of the people. In one fell swoop, Rickword appeared to be claiming, he had coined 
an idea which put the wishes of ordinary people at the heart of political debate, not because of 
its originality but because of the circumstances in which it was uttered:
It has been said that Milton’s thesis is “in line with the main developments o f liberal political 
theory throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance” and that he “says nothing that had not 
been said a hundred times ”. But to assert popular sovereignty in general, and in such particular 
circumstances as the public and ceremonial (for it could not be called legal) decapitation o f  a 
king whose legitimacy was indisputable, this is as different as chalk from cheese... But that the 
lower orders...should not have quietly killed Charles but deliberately challenged popular 
opinion by the appeal to right and justice, that was what made the ruling classes o f  Europe 
realize that something new had entered their circle o f calculation.144
What was the source of this incendiary emphasis on the will of the people? The other crucial 
element in Rickword’s essay was the claim that Milton’s religious and political outlook was
213
partly the result of his fascination with science and scientific method. The most important 
influence in this respect was Francis Bacon’s writings on the philosophy of science, especially 
The Advancement o f Learning, which Milton first encountered while still a schoolboy at St 
Paul’s. Milton was especially interested in Bacon’s attack on the deductive method and his 
related account of the role of induction in the accumulation of scientific knowledge. As is well 
known, Bacon had argued that it is not possible to draw accurate conclusions about the physical 
universe by applying the laws of formal logic to so-called “first principles”. The only reliable 
source of scientific knowledge is the scrupulous observation of abundant data, much of it 
derived from experimental procedures, with a view to identifying universal laws, processes and 
“latent schematicisms”. Milton was also impressed by the note of scientific triumphalism which 
runs through Bacon’s work. Once the inductive method has been applied systematically to the 
investigation of nature, Bacon predicted, human beings will be able to exercise complete control 
over their environment. Although Rickword did not make it entirely clear how Bacon’s 
philosophy had affected the political culture of the English Revolution, there were probably 
several ways in which ideas such as these helped to reinforce the egalitarian cast of Milton’s 
mind. By implying that wisdom could be acquired through something as simple as observation 
(as opposed to the tortuous processes of formal logic) Bacon seemed to suggest that it would be 
safe to devolve power from an intellectual elite to the community as a whole. And if it was 
indeed the case that science could enable human beings to liberate themselves from the 
elements, the society which resulted would surely be one in which personal autonomy took 
priority over government control.145 There were even occasions, Rickword implied, when 
Milton seemed to be groping towards the cardinal Marxist insight that freedom entails the 
recognition of necessity. More prosaically, Milton's adherence to Baconian philosophy also led 
to some early insights into the intransigence of authority. At both school and university (he 
attended Christ’s College, Cambridge between 1625 and 1632) his education was dominated by 
the assumption that the mark of an educated mind was the ability to use the syllogistic 
procedures handed down by Aristotle and the medieval Christian philosophers. “The method”, 
wrote Rickword, “of testing the qualifications of students then in use was by means of public 
debate, in Latin, of course, in which one candidate would defend and another attack a given 
proposition according to the rules of the prescribed system of logic.”146 When Milton dismissed 
all this as “degenerate learning”147 and urged his teachers to adopt the Baconian method, he 
received a scornful response which permanently cured him of the belief that those who wield 
the greatest power are also possessed of the finest minds. Rickword’s argument at this point was 
probably influenced by the unusual intellectual culture of inter-war communism. At a time 
when communists liked to claim that their belief in socialism was rooted not merely in a 
specific understanding of history (i.e. historical materialism) but also in a universal philosophy 
derived from scientific data (i.e. dialectical materialism), it was doubtless reassuring to point out
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that John Milton himself had justified his political beliefs with reference to scientific 
principles.148
The writer who most powerfully expressed the Dissenting ethos which Milton had helped to 
shape was undoubtedly John Bunyan. Jack Lindsay’s book John Bunyan: Maker o f Myths 
(1937) was by far the most distinguished attempt in the 1930s to analyse the work of an 
individual member of the radical tradition. Employing ideas drawn from both Marxism and 
psychoanalysis to relate Bunyan’s personal history to the economic, political and religious 
trends which existed in Britain at the time of the English Revolution, it is the sort of book -  
typical of Lindsay -  that effortlessly holds a range of themes in play at the same time. However, 
it is most profitably approached as a study of the relationship between Christianity and 
communism -  or, more precisely, as an attempt to balance an optimistic understanding of 
Christianity’s radical potential against a more cautious recognition of the way that supernatural 
beliefs often blunt the desire for change. On the one hand, Lindsay argued, Bunyan was one of 
the many thinkers whose communist instincts have been both shaped and reinforced by 
Christian doctrine. On the other hand, his support for a broadly Calvinist interpretation of the 
metaphysical foundations of Christianity (specifically the doctrine that the will of God can only 
be fulfilled in the kingdom of Heaven) ensured that large portions of his work were taken up 
with a vigorous defence of bourgeois ideology. The argument can only be fully understood if 
we take a closer look at three elements in Lindsay’s book: first, its account of Bunyan’s 
conversion to Christianity; second, its examination of Bunyan’s attitude towards the dominant 
ideology in 17th Century Britain; and third, its analysis of the way that Bunyan’s suppressed 
desire for revolution constantly undermined the more fatalistic aspects of his thought.
The account of Bunyan’s conversion to Christianity, based on the early sections of Grace 
Abounding (1666), took up most of the first 100 pages of Lindsay’s book.149 Its purpose was to 
demonstrate the sheer durability of the radical element in Christian doctrine. Bunyan, or so it 
was argued, rejected Christianity as an adolescent because it appeared to conflict with his 
egalitarian prejudices, but later returned to it when he realised that communist values were 
central to the Christian ethic. Lindsay analysed the formation of Bunyan’s radical outlook in a 
way which deftly interweaved the personal and the political. Bom in 1628 in a village near 
Bradford, Bunyan belonged to a family which had endured an appreciable loss of status in the 
period since the birth of capitalism. Most of his ancestors had been yeoman farmers, yet his 
immediate relatives (including his father) were reduced to working as “chapmen and tinkers”. 
Lindsay argued that Bunyan’s hatred of inequality stemmed from the humiliation he must have 
experienced while living among people who knew only too well that his family had fallen on 
hard times.150 It was powerfully reinforced by the behaviour of his own father, who caused a
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minor scandal in July 1644 by remarrying within a month of his second wife’s death. The young 
Bunyan interpreted this “betrayal” as a confirmation that authority was nothing but a byword for 
moral degeneracy.151 Two years later he began a period of service with Cromwell’s New Model 
Army which inclined his thoughts in a political direction. Inspired by the sense of community 
which prevailed among his fellow soldiers, exposed (or so Lindsay speculated) to the radical 
egalitarianism of both the Levellers and the Independents, he at last began to feel that it would 
be possible to create a society in which all hierarchies had been swept away.152
The main consequence of this early rebellion was that Bunyan violently rejected the Christian 
culture of his elders.153 The idea of God, he now came to believe, was simply a metaphysical 
hoax intended to bolster the credibility of temporal authority. Nor was he the sort of man to 
keep his heretical views to himself. For a number of years he went out of his way to offend 
believers with scandalous displays of impious behaviour. He became, in Lindsay’s vivid phrase, 
an “insensate blasphemer and swearer.”154 And yet, within weeks of being discharged from 
Cromwell’s army in 1647, he was plunged into a period of intense religious anxiety which 
culminated some years later (in the early 1650s) in his conversion to the brand of Dissenting 
Christianity that he preached for the rest of his life. In one of his more ingenious atempts to fuse 
Marxist and Freudian perspectives, Lindsay suggested that Bunyan’s yearning for a 
reconciliation with Christianity was symptomatic of the problems which adolescents tend to 
encounter in a class-divided society. Adolescence, or so it was argued, is a period in which the 
advent of physical maturity makes it necessary for the individual to be fully integrated into 
society. The problem is that class societies are simply too heterogeneous for complete 
integration to be possible, with the result that the adolescent is oppressed by a sense of being 
both inside and outside the social group. The consequence is what Bunyan called a “compulsion 
to think.”155 Anxious to understand a world that has not fully accepted him, the adolescent 
embarks on an obsessively cerebral attempt to divine the meaning of existence. Driven back on 
his undeveloped intellectual resources, wholly indifferent to everything except his own 
thoughts, he begins to regard himself as the “centre of the universe”.156 Crucially, Lindsay 
argued, this engenders a prolonged state of cosmic paranoia in which everything seems like the 
product of divine intervention. When Bunyan turned back to Christianity, therefore, he was 
seeking to contain his religious intuitions in a doctrinal framework that would prevent them 
threatening his sanity.157
Bunyan’s behaviour during the period of his conversion was that of a man on the verge of a 
complete nervous breakdown. Tramping furiously through the village of Elstow, where he now 
lived with his wife, he endured “brain-storms of seething heat and intolerable anxiety”158 in 
which he wrestled with the malign supernatural forces that appeared to be preying upon him.
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Lindsay suggested that two episodes in particular were crucial to his eventual reconciliation 
with Christianity, chiefly (as we have already implied) because they convinced him that the 
Christian vision was wholly consonant with his egalitarian instincts. The first occurred when 
one of his imagined “tempters” tried to incite him to “sell and part with this most blessed Christ, 
to exchange him for the things of this life, for anything.”159 According to Lindsay, the important 
thing about this demoniacal temptation was that it forced Bunyan to focus on the suspicion of 
commercial values which lies at the heart of Christian teaching. Appalled that anyone should 
sacrifice his faith in Christ in order to acquire earthly wealth, he tried to protect himself against 
mortal sin by invoking the passage in the Bible in which Christ declares that “the land shall not 
be sold for ever, for the land is mine.”160 The second episode occurred when Bunyan became 
preoccupied with the parable of Esau.161 His special concern was with the way that Esau had 
defied his father’s wishes through the “selling of his birthright.”162 Quoting passages from 
Lilbume, Crowley, Francis Trigge and Gerrard Winstanley, Lindsay argued that the idea of 
selling a birthright was widely used by Seventeenth-Century radicals as a metaphor for the 
private ownership of the means of production, as when Winstanley complained that:
Before they [i.e. the common people] are suffered to plant the waste land for a livelihood, they 
must pay rent to their brethren fo r it. Well, this is the burden the Creation groans under; and 
the subjects (so-called) have not their Birthright Freedom granted them from their brethren, 
who hold it from them by club law, but not by righteousness.163
When Bunyan came to interpret the parable of Esau, therefore, he saw it not merely as a 
meditation on the nature of parental authority (though it was certainly that) but more 
importantly as a representation of God’s anger at the institution of private property and the 
existence of classes. It was in this context that his conversion to Christianity became possible. 
The young rebel who had dismissed Christianity as a prop of the ruling class was now able to 
return to it, primarily (or so Lindsay argued) because he had been able to convince himself that 
his communist convictions were an accurate reflection of God’s will. Yet the argument now 
took a twist which sharply distinguished it from other communist writings on the radical 
potential of the Christian tradition. Lindsay insisted that Bunyan’s interpretation of the parable 
of Esau was not quite enough to make him a fully-fledged convert -  there was still one thing 
that stood in the way of faith. Having satisfied himself that Christian values were indeed shaped 
by egalitarian concerns, Bunyan now began to worry that they could never serve as the basis o f  
earthly behaviour. At a time when the challenge of the Levellers and the Diggers had just been 
brutally suppressed, he saw no prospect that English society would ever abandon its 
exploitative, hierarchical and impious ways. Surely, he began to ask, it is simply not possible to 
be a Christian while doubting the practicality of the Christian ethic? His anxiety on this score 
was finally brought to an end when he experienced an auditory hallucination, much less
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menacing than the ones which had plagued him for years, telling him that “Thy righteousness is 
in heaven.”164 From this point on (or so Lindsay argued) he came to believe that the purpose of 
Christianity was to prepare human beings for the life hereafter, where God’s values would reign 
unchallenged. It was simply not possible to promote the observance of Christian values in the 
here and now, since original sin had reduced human society to a state of irredeemable 
decadence. The centrepiece of Bunyan’s subsequent work was therefore the rigid antithesis 
between “Grace” and “Law”. Grace, in this context, means the ability to recognise God’s 
purpose in the midst of ungodly circumstances, whereas Law signifies the corrupt organisation 
of earthly society.165
According to Lindsay, it was this aspect of Bunyan’s faith which exemplified the big problem 
with radical interpretations of Christianity. Although an egalitarian reading of the Bible has 
done a great deal to crystallise opposition to social injustice, there is always a danger that 
radical Christians will retard political change by becoming fixated on the otherworldly 
dimension of their creed. One of Lindsay’s main concerns was therefore to draw up a balance 
sheet of what Raymond Williams might have called the “emergent” and “hegemonic” aspects of 
Bunyan’s Christianity. On the positive side, it is certainly true that Bunyan has exercised a 
radicalising influence on successive generations of working people. After joining the 
Independent Church in Bedford in 1653 and embarking on his life as a preacher, he became a 
strengthening influence on a dissenting culture which aimed to dissolve the hierarchy between 
clergy and laity and allow ordinary people to disseminate the Christian message for themselves. 
Without the force of his contribution, Lindsay implied, English dissent might well have diluted 
its commitment to democratic values and been reabsorbed into the established Church.166 Nor 
did his understanding of Grace serve to lessen his anger at earthly injustice. While he 
undoubtedly thought of capitalism as the price to be paid for original sin, much of his work 
(including his sermons) was crammed with denunciations of commerce, inequality and the 
greed of the ruling class.167 However, on the negative side, Bunyan’s distinction between Grace 
and Law made him troublingly ambiguous in his attitude towards capitalism. All the dissenting 
groups of the 17th Century were preoccupied by the issue of how Christians should behave in a 
society which they knew to be corrupt. There were several groups, exemplified by the early 
Quakers, which believed that the prevalence of moral decay implied a positive duty to 
transgress the standards of the wider society. Yet Bunyan seems to have believed that one of the 
functions of religion was to specify standards of behaviour that would “reconcile” the believer 
with the unavoidable realities of earthly life. It was this, Lindsay suggested, which effectively 
made him one of the main ideologists of early capitalism. Especially important was his 
emphasis on the virtues of “thrift”, which corresponded to the economic imperative of 
subordinating personal consumption to the accumulation of capital. In his allegory The Life and
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Death o f  Mr Badman (1680), which traced the fortunes of a spendthrift tradesman who 
“mouldered away” after a life of excess, he created one of the main sourcebooks of petty- 
bourgeois morality in the 17th and 18th Centuries.168 By refusing to believe that the kingdom of 
Heaven could be established on earth, Bunyan had not merely unbent the springs of resistancee 
-  he had gone a long way towards creating the ideas which allowed capitalism to flourish.169
Nevertheless, it was a testament to the fundamental optimism of the Popular Front period that 
Lindsay ultimately allowed his respect for the radical tradition to smother his anxieties about the 
limitations of Christian communism. If we look at the majority of Bunyan’s writings, he argued, 
we find that the element of religious fatalism is persistently subverted by an irrepressible desire 
for social revolution. Pilgrim’s Progress, the book which E.P. Thompson later called “one of 
the...foundation texts of the English working-class movement”,170 is ostensibly an illustration of 
the distinction between Grace and Law. Christian’s anguished journey to the Celestial City is an 
allegorical representation of the ghastliness of earthly existence and the glory of Heaven. Yet 
the book is full of passages which brush against the grain of its declared theological position.171 
In the first place, Lindsay argued, Christian’s progress towards redemption is usually 
characterised in terms of the trauma of birth.172 Travelling in darkness, he makes his way 
through a succession of “valleys and narrow places”173 (suggestive of the womb) before he 
finally emerges into the brilliant sunlight of the Celestial City:
Apply this analysis to his [ie Bunyan’s] allegory, and the allegory’s meaning is transformed. 
The world o f  light is not the land o f death. It is the future o f fellowship. The tale tells o f the 
passage from privation and obstruction to light and joy  and plenty. The heaven-symbol is 
brought down from beyond-death; it becomes a symbol o f what earth could be made by 
fellowship.174
There is also a crucial moment at which Christian’s personal quest is suddenly transformed into 
something more collective.175 At the end of the book, when he is about to cross the river that 
will take him to the Celestial City, he is joined by his wife and two small children. The children 
are instructed to stay on the bank but his wife accompanies him on the swim towards paradise. 
At this point, Lindsay argued, Bunyan effectively “confessed his sense that something was 
wrong about the idea of death as the goal of life”,176 and held out the hope that human beings 
might still achieve redemption while united in the here and now. Lindsay also detected 
something highly progressive in the techniques which Bunyan employed.177 He argued that 
Pilgrim’s Progress was clearly rooted in the “pulpit style”178 that was central to medieval 
popular culture. In its use of simple language, its personification of moral qualities and its 
reliance on “homely metaphor and illustration”,179 it echoed the methods which had been used 
over centuries to transmit the Christian message to ordinary people. And yet, by achieving a
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level of expressivity that was simply absent from earlier examples of the tradition, it 
exemplified the process by which a reviled popular form can be “canonised”180 into something 
of high artistic significance. Moreover, the fact that the pulpit style had been passed down from 
generation to generation on a largely oral basis (printed texts like Way to Paradise were 
exceptions to the rule) hinted at the sheer durability of plebeian culture.181 Finally, Bunyan’s use 
of a popular style also enabled him to achieve a balance between “extreme individual originality 
and mass content”.182 The conventions which he employed had already appeared in thousands of 
religious declamations, but this did not prevent him from exploring a novel theological 
perspective and conveying a lively impression of his own sensibility. There was perhaps a 
foretaste here of some of Raymond Williams’s much later theoretical writings, especially 
Marxism and Literature (1977), which interpreted literature as a “form of material production” 
that anchors individual expressivity in a pattern of shared conventions.183
2.4 Swiftian Subversions
The third phase in the development of English radicalism encompassed the period between the 
Restoration (1660) and the Industrial Revolution.184 It was portrayed by both Lindsay and 
Morton as something of a political hiatus. Neither the development of primitive forms of trade 
unionism, nor the continued adherence of the dissenting sects to the ideal of direct democracy, 
could conceal the fact that popular revolt was at a premium. It was a view of the late- 17th and 
early-18th Centuries that would prevail among British Marxists until at least the time of E.P. 
Thompson’s revisionist Whigs and Hunters (1975). Yet at the height of these bleak years, or so 
the argument went, there was one writer who kept the best traditions of the dissenting 
intellectual alive. Jonathan Swift, the subject of brief essays in Left Review by Edgell Rickword 
(March 1935) and Rex Warner (June 1937), might at first have seemed an unlikely recruit to the 
radical tradition. As a Protestant cleric of solidly aristocratic background who served the Tory 
government of Lord Oxford as a propagandist, he was regarded by many literary intellectuals as 
a typical representative of Augustan conservatism. And yet, as Michael Foot has pointed out, 
Swift has generally been more admired by the British left (from Hazlitt and Cobbett through to 
Orwell, E.P. Thompson and Foot himself) than by his counterparts on the right.185 Rickword and 
Warner, while not denying Swift’s Toryism, argued that his sensibility was sufficiently 
“various” to encompass a powerful element of scepticism towards the developing capitalist 
system.186
Their main claim was that Swift had been one of the first writers to identify the ways in which 
capitalism gives rise to war, imperialism and abuses of state power. Not even the most apolitical 
of critics could have denied that Swift was indeed an opponent of these things. For instance, it
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was widely known that his pamphlet on The Conduct o f  the Allies (1710) had played a central 
role in bringing the War of the Spanish Succession to an end, that he had persistently 
condemned Walpole for manipulating Parliament and that he had been one of the earliest and 
most vigorous advocates of Irish independence. The novel feature in Rickword and Warner’s 
argument was the claim that Swift possessed a sort of proto-Marxist awareness that war, 
imperialism and tyranny are ultimately caused by the free play of market forces. Both writers 
resorted to a certain amount of deviouness when they tried to prove this claim. Since neither 
could find a quotation which exactly substantiated their case, they both cited the following 
passage (taken from Part Four of Gulliver’s Travels) in which Gulliver tried to describe the 
nature of English economic life to a member of the Houyhnhnms:
I  was at much pains to explain to him the Use o f Money... That the rich Man enjoyed the Fruit o f  
the poor M an’s Labour, and the latter were a Thousand to one in Proportion to the former. That 
the Bulk o f  our People was forced to live miserably, by labouring every Day for small Wages to 
make a few live plentifully.187
The only thing which this passage demonstrates is that Swift was familiar with the argument 
that capitalism rests on exploitation -  it makes no reference at all to war, imperialism or the 
destruction of civil liberties. But at a time when the CPGB, following the lead of the Comintern, 
insisted that the fascist threat to world peace and democracy was ultimately rooted in the 
general crisis of capitalism, it obviously seemed more important to claim that a great British 
writer had anticipated the arguments of the 1930s (albeit from a Tory perspective) than to worry 
too much about his actual beliefs. This makes it all the more ironic that Rickword and Warner 
should both have revelled so openly in Swift’s attacks on the Whig administrations of the 18* 
Century, since the modem Liberal Party was one of the organisations which the communists 
were trying to entice into the Popular Front.
What were the sources of Swift’s radicalism? In the first place, Rickword argued, his scepticism 
towards capitalism was obviously related to his aristocratic background. As a member of a 
ruling class that was increasingly being sidelined by the bourgeoisie, it was always likely that he 
would regret “the irresponsibility of man towards man which results when every item of 
personal worth has been translated into ‘exchange value’.”188 More interesting was Warner’s 
claim that Swift’s radicalism partly resulted from his classical education. According to Warner, 
who had graduated in Classics from Oxford and taught the subject at a number of schools, Swift 
had been greatly influenced by the Stoical assumption that human beings are fundamentally 
level-headed, group-minded and capable of sorting out their differences in a peaceable manner. 
It was this which underpinned his hatred of war, his support for the principle of government by 
consent and his conviction that no nation has the right to dominate another.189 By thus adding
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Classical philosophy to Christianity and liberalism as one of the dominant ideologies which the 
English radicals had managed to bend to their own political ends, Warner was making an 
audacious break with the more established view (first canvassed by Samuel Johnson in a 
famously splenetic essay in Lives o f the Poets) that Swift’s conception of human nature was 
actually a deeply misanthropic one.190 “This is not the record of a misanthrope”, he said in 
reference to Swift’s involvement in the campaign for Irish independence, “but of a ‘defender of 
liberty’.”191 Although he acknowledged that the Stoical idea of human nature was too static and 
“rationalistic” to be compatible with the doctrine of historical materialism, Warner also hinted 
that in some ways it provided a better foundation for radical politics than the sort of moral 
relativism to which Marxists often subscribe. In addition, towards the end of his essay, Warner 
strongly implied that Swift’s dislike of the establishment was rooted in the feelings of 
frustration which he (Swift) often experienced while dealing with politicians of inferior 
intelligence during his period as a Tory propagandist.192 This was arguably an anticipation of the 
later claim, first explored by Edward Said in “Swift as Intellectual” (1984), that Swift was 
probably the first modern writer to experience the divided loyalties which are characteristic of 
the intellectual in politics.193
Warner singled out another aspect of Swift’s work on literary grounds. If Swift’s belief in 
humanity’s powers of common sense was initially derived from the Roman Stoics, it was 
reinforced (or so Warner argued) by his admiration for the common people. In turn, it was his 
sensitivity to the common people’s distaste for theory that made him the greatest propagandist 
in the radical tradition. If we read one of Swift’s pamphlets, notably The Conduct o f  the Allies, 
we find that he held the attention of the ordinary reader by subordinating the discussion of 
general principles to a detailed consideration of the effects of politics on everyday life. “His 
pamphlet”, wrote Warner, “is a closely reasoned argument from fact, and those points, often 
comparatively unimportant, which would most frequently be debated by the man in the street, 
are dealt with most carefully of all.”194 By furnishing a model of propagandist flair which the 
modem pamphleteer would do well to emulate, Swift proved that there are lessons to be learned 
even from a conservative age.
2.5 From Liberalism to Marxism
The final period in the history of English radicalism encompassed the century or so between the 
Industrial Revolution, when the modern labour movement began to take shape, and the 
emergence of modem socialism in the last two decades of the 19th Century. Although Jack 
Lindsay made a dutiful attempt in England My England to show that the common people 
sustained their communist traditions throughout this period, the relevant section of his pamphlet
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was too perfunctory to carry much conviction.195 The more sensible approach was the one 
adopted by A.L. Morton, who confined himself to providing a broad overview of the period for 
the benefit of later Marxist writers. The great virtue of Morton’s account was that it gave a clear 
impression of the different stages which modem radicalism had passed through. These can be 
summarised as follows:
• cl760-cl800. Spontaneous protests against the new industrial system. Large sections of the
urban proletariat are drawn into political action under the leadership of left-wing liberals 
(e.g. the “Wilkesite” movement and the various organisations inspired by the French 
Revolution).196
• cl800-cl820. Popular radicalism is driven underground by the repressive legislation which
accompanied the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Occasional acts of industrial 
sabotage (e.g. the Luddite Rebellion of 1812) and occasional attempts at popular 
insurrection (e.g. the Peterloo Rising of 1819).197
• c l820-1835. The legalisation of trade unionism in 1824 leads to the temporary emergence 
of nationwide industrial unions, some of them (notably the Grand National Consolidated 
Trade Union) influenced by the socialism of Robert Owen.198
• cl 835-1850. The age of Chartism.199
• c l850-1880. The decline of working-class militancy and the formation of the “New Model 
Unions”.200
• c l880-1900. The onset of an international slump leads to the renewal of industrial 
militancy, exemplified by the emergence of “new Unionism” in the late-1880s. The 
emergence of modem socialism and the eventual formation of the Labour Party (1900).201
As has often been acknowledged, Morton’s account of these developments was one of the main 
influences on the Marxist historians who revolutionised labour history in the period after the 
war. His analysis of the diverse range of factors which shaped the proletarian response to 
industrialism was comparable to that of E.P. Thompson, who tried in The Making o f the English 
Working Class (1963) to challenge the idea that class consciousness is merely a mechanical 
response to prevailing economic conditions.202 And by writing respectfully about the more 
anarchic elements in the early labour movement (notably the Luddites) he anticipated the 
pathbreaking efforts of Thompson, E.J. Hobsbawm and George Rude to rescue the whole 
process of “collective bargaining by riot”203 (Hobsbawm) from the charge of social atavism. On 
a broader level, it is reasonable to argue that the publication of A People’s History o f England 
marked the moment at which Marxism began to displace the liberalism of the Hammonds and
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the Fabianism of the Webbs as the main intellectual force in the historiography of the British 
labour movement.204
Comparatively few writers from the late-18th and 19* Centuries were singled out for close 
examination in the 1930s. Those who were chosen showed that the radical movement had drawn 
its support from a broad range of political, intellectual and cultural milieux. There was one 
radical liberal (Thomas Paine), one romantic poet ('william Blake), the most influential novelist 
of the age (Charles Dickens) and the most distinguished member of the first generation of 
British Marxists (William Morris). An article on Paine by Samuel Mill was published in Left 
Review in May 1937 to mark the 200* anniversary of Paine’s birth. It was primarily an exercise 
in thumbnail biography, charting Paine’s career from his early days as an exciseman in Norfolk 
through to his involvement in the American War of Independence, his authorship of the Rights 
o f Man (1792) and his exile to the USA during the Pittite “reign of terror”205 in the 1790s. But 
Mill also raised two themes of broader importance. The first was the extent to which modem 
liberalism (at least in its more radical and egalitarian forms) often transmogrifies under the 
pressure of circumstances into something more closely resembling socialism. Although Mill 
recognised that Paine “was not a Socialist, for the time was not ripe for Socialism”,206 he 
nevertheless argued that Paine’s commitment to the idea of popular democracy made him a 
natural defender of workers’ rights. For instance, he began his political career as a spokesman 
for striking excisemen in Thetford (this was in 1772), exerted a profound influence on the 
formation of the London Corresponding Society and made a forceful case in Rights o f Man for 
the introduction of state pensions, universal education and unemployment benefit. It was 
another case of the dominant ideology being repositioned for radical ends, with liberalism now 
joining Christianity and classical philosophy as one of the unlikely sources from which dissident 
thinkers had drawn their inspiration. With his second theme, on the other hand, Mill clearly 
signalled his support for the more pessimistic school of Popular Front thinking about the nature 
of Christianity. He pointed out that when the British establishment attempted to destroy the 
Jacobin culture of the 1790s, one of the crucial aspects of its strategy was a calculated appeal to 
religious sentiment. Most obviously, the radical challenge to secular hierarchies was portrayed 
as a blasphemous assault on God’s dominion. Paine’s one substantial work on religion (Age o f  
Reason, 1794-1796) was an expression of Voltairean “deism” rather than outright atheism; but 
it was relentlessly described by Tory propagandists as the effusion of an ungodly degenerate. 
While Christianity is indeed broad enough to appeal to the communist imagination, Mill seemed 
to be saying, we should never lose sight of its “utilility in teaching the lower orders their station 
in life.”207
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This scepticism towards religion was continued in Randall Swingler’s essay on Blake, “The 
Imputation of Madness: A Study of William Blake and Literary Tradition”, published in Left 
Review in February 1937. Like most other commentators on English romanticism, Swingler 
recognised that Blake’s main theme was the nature of human self-transcendence. All his work 
illustrated the idea that human beings can advance to a higher stage of evolution by harnessing 
the visionary capacities of their own minds. And yet, as Hanna Behrend has pointed out, 
Swingler departed from the majority of Blake scholars by denying that this idea was in any way 
religious.208 When Blake tried to identify the mechanism of human evolution, or so it was 
argued, he focused less on mystical awareness than on the polymorphous expression of 
desire.209 If the “mental deities” which “reside in the human breast”210 are ever to be liberated, 
then the individual must open himself up to the feelings of physical rapture which his natural 
environment is capable of inspiring -  it was these to which Blake was referring in Songs o f  
Innocence and Experience when he spoke of “Love Unconfined”.211 At the same time, Swingler 
insisted, Blake was keenly aware that desire must always be harnessed by the power of reason. 
He believed that the intellect precipitates the feelings of physical longing which lie at the heart
of the visionary experience, and that it also organises the symptoms of desire and allows them to
perform their ultimate role as “unifier[s] of consciousness”.212 In other words, or so Swingler 
implied, the culminating point of the visionary experience is the ability to perceive the physical 
universe as a coherent whole. This only occurs if the pulsations which traverse the body of the 
desiring individual are enabled, by means of a conscious intellectual effort, to break through the 
barriers of the unconscious and liberate what Blake would have called the “imagination” -  that 
is, mankind’s dormant powers of holistic perception. As such, it is quite wrong to regard 
romanticism as a revolt of the instincts against the intellect. It is better understood as a longing 
for “the redemption of human nature by the reuniting of energy with consciousness.”213
Swingler went on to argue that much of Blake’s work attacked the forces in modem society 
which obstruct the process of self-realisation, specifically capitalism and religion. Where the 
former was concerned, Swingler quoted a number of stanzas which portrayed capitalism as a
spiritually barren system whose emphasis on self-denial makes it the enemy of all forms of
visionary ambition. In one of these stanzas, from the prophetic poem America, Blake strongly 
implied that one of the main problems with capitalism is that it has led to the development of 
industry:
Let the slave grinding at the mill run out into the field,
Let him look up into the heavens and laugh in the bright air:
Let the inchained soul, shut up in darkness and in sighing,
Whose face has never seen a smile in thirty years,
Rise and look out; his chains are loose, his dungeon doors are open,
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And let his wife and children return from the oppressor’s scourge...
For Empire is no more, and now the Lion and Wolf shall cease.2U
By ignoring the opposition between modernity (bad) and nature (good) which lies at the heart of 
these lines, Swingler was anticipating the tendency among Marxist writers to underplay the 
element of anti-industrialism in the Romantic sensibility. We will return to this issue when 
looking at Robin Page Amot’s work on William Morris. Swingler’s account of Blake’s attitude 
towards religion was much less reticent. Dismissing once again the view that Blake was 
essentially a mystical thinker, Swingler argued that he (Blake) saw religion as an illusory 
ideology employed by the “property owners”215 to reinforce the puritanical ethic engendered by 
capitalism.216 Yet although the rule of “Urizen”, the symbol of religion’s “imposed law”217 in 
Blake’s prophetic books, is now nearly absolute, there are several ways in which the religious 
illusion might be challenged. On the one hand, Swingler argued, Blake attached great 
importance to refuting the idea that human beings possess an innate sense of morality which can 
be regarded as evidence for the existence of God.218 Against the whole doctrine of 
transcendental mental structures, which he presumably encountered in the philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant, Blake subscribed to a thoroughgoing empiricism which held that the contents 
of the mind are ultimately derived solely from experience: “Man has no notion of moral fitness 
but from Education. Naturally he is only a natural organ subject to sense” (There is No Natural 
Religion)?19 Blake’s other main argument was that the idea of God is basically to be understood 
as an alienated expression of human potential.220 When human beings began to create deities, 
they did so by projecting their own immanent qualities onto a transcendental image which had 
no basis in fact. It follows that religion will be destroyed when (1) the anthropomorphic origins 
of the belief in God are exposed, and (2) people are encouraged to focus on the idea of God as 
an image of their own future evolution. Blake’s belief that an immersion in religious imagery 
(as opposed to religious faith) can serve as the foundation of human evolution was summed up 
for Swingler in the famous line in All Religions are One: “Therefore God becomes as we are, 
that we may be as He is.”221 Swingler was probably attracted to these ideas because of their 
similarity to those of Ludwig Feurbach, the “Young Hegelian” thinker whose work on religion 
had converted Marx to the doctrines of philosophical materialism. The post-war reader is likely 
to be reminded of the so-called “atheist Christians” of the late-20th Century, represented in 
Britain by the likes of Don Cupitt,222 who regard Christianity not as a source of metaphysical 
truth but as a storehouse of images which can enhance psychological health.
Swingler probably had a number of reasons for putting forward his highly unorthodox 
interpretation of Blake’s work. Most obviously, as he admitted in the early stages of his article, 
he wanted to make it less easy to ignore the political element in Blake’s sensibility. By insisting
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that the Blakean idea of human evolution was rooted in a secular conception of physical desire 
(as opposed to an unwordly conception of religious bliss) he was trying to demonstrate that 
Blake the visionary and Blake the critic of capitalism were both operating in the same realm. At 
one point, indeed, he came close to implying that the evolutionary scheme in Blake’s work was 
little more than an extravagant metaphor for the Marxist conception of life in communist 
society. “This”, he wrote after summarising the contents of Blake’s prophetic poems, “ ...is 
simply the psychology of Marxism”.223 When Blake envisaged humanity advancing to a new 
stage of semi-divinity, what he really had in mind (or so Swingler implied) was a non-market 
society in which the division of labour has been abolished, rationalisation has come to an end 
and the individual performs a diverse range of economic roles which satisfy both his senses and 
his intellect.224 These arguments were undergirded by the claim that Blake’s philosophical 
pronouncements had anticipated the doctrine of dialectical materialism.225 If his empiricist 
comments on the origins of knowledge were reminiscent of a materialist belief in the primacy of 
mind over matter, then (for Swingler) his emphasis on the reconciliation of “energy and 
consciousness” suggested a dialectical understanding of the unity and interpenetration of 
opposites. Blake was thus portrayed as the 18th Century prototype of what Jonathan Ree has 
called the “proletarian philosophers”.226
It was appropriate that the work of Charles Dickens should have been analysed by T.A. Jackson, 
the CPGB’s most respected “autodidact” who traced his love of reading to a youthful obsession 
with Dickens’s novels. Yet no other contribution to the history of English radicalism was 
anything like as obscure. Jackson examined Dickens’s output in a full-length book {Charles 
Dickens: The Progress o f  a Radical, 1937) and in a brief essay in Left Review (“Dickens the 
Radical”, March 1937). If the essay simply reproduced passages from the book in a more or less 
random manner, the book itself was weighed down by the sheer fertility of Jackson’s associative 
intelligence. Digressive where Lindsay’s work on Bunyan had been multi-layered,227 frequently 
unconcerned to relate lengthy accounts of individual novels to broader themes, its argument 
about the nature of Dickens’s radicalism is impossible to summarise in its entirety. However, 
two important themes tend to stand out. In the first place, Jackson implied, Dickens should be 
seen as a cultural radical with a particular interest in tracing the effects of capitalist culture on 
the treatment of children. Secondly, though not exactly a socialist,228 he also believed that the 
injustices of capitalism could be significantly palliated if power were somehow devolved to 
working people. The broader point, which Jackson misleadingly identified as the central theme 
of his book, was that the trajectory of Dickens’s populism was directly related to the wider 
fortunes of English radicalism (especially Chartism) in the period between 1835 and 1870.229
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The organising assumption of Jackson’s book was that Dickens fully realised that the cultural 
norms of Victorian society were rooted in its capitalist base.230 His understanding of capitalism 
was summarised in the famous passage in Hard Times in which Mr Gradgrind expressed his 
entrepreneurial credo: “buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest.”231 If the market 
system indeed requires a form of hoarding, then it follows (or so Dickens allegedly believed) 
that the wider culture will tend to emphasise self-denial at the expense of our more generous 
instincts. Jackson bolstered his case by pointing out that Dickens’s attack on capitalism had won 
the support of John Ruskin, who paid tribute to it in Unto this Last (I860).232 There was also a 
sense, Jackson argued, in which Dickens instinctively understood how the capitalist system 
prevents the majority of people from developing the full range of their capabilities.233 For 
instance, many of his most celebrated characters were defined almost entirely by a single tic or 
mannerism. Uriah Heep has become famous for his endless protestations of humility, whereas 
the only thing which most people remember about Mrs Micawber was her claim that she would 
“never leave Mr Micawber.”234 Noting that many of Dickens’s critics had derided this 
caricatural facility as evidence of a lack of imagination, Jackson argued that it was actually a 
very powerful means of satirising the destruction of all-round human development at the hands 
of the modem division of labour. More specifically, the thing which distinguished Dickens from 
other members of the radical tradition was his preoccupation with the effects of capitalist culture 
on the development of children. Because he believed that children are naturally exuberant, 
curious and generous, he recognised that the only way for the dominant culture to adapt them to 
its needs is to break their spirit at an early age. One of his most significant achievements was his 
demonstration that the diverse methods of education employed in Victorian Britain were all 
directed to this single end.235 In many of his novels he identified what Jackson described as a 
number of different “systems” of education -  among them the “Squeers system” (after 
Wackford Squeers), the “Pipchin system” (after Mrs Pipchin) and the “Blimber system” (after 
Dr Blimber).236 The central principle of the Squeers system was the belief that the only way to 
tame a child is to beat it regularly for several years.237 The “secret” of the Pipchin system was 
“to give them [i.e. children] everything that they didn’t like, and nothing that they did”.238 The 
Blimber system was ostensibly more “refined”, but its ultimate goal was to stifle spontaneity by 
encouraging respect for pedantry and inculcating a highly ritualised idea of personal courtesy.239 
Once we have recognised the depths of Dickens’s anguish at the modem treatment of children, 
Jackson implied, many other features of his novels begin to fall into place. Characters such as 
David Copperfield are clearly intended to advance the idea that children have rights in respect 
of their parents, with Dickens insisting that the young child has as much of a need for warmth 
and respect as for food and somewhere to live.240 And although he rejected fundamentalist 
Christianity on the grounds that its “fire-and-brimstone theology”241 was likely to traumatise the 
childish imagination, he retained a conviction in personal immortality because “he could not
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bear to part with the belief that something other than extinction awaited a bright and dearly- 
loved child.”242
According to Jackson, Dickens always believed that the only solution to the dehumanising 
effects of capitalist culture was to create a society in which ordinary people exercised more 
control over everyday affairs. It was true that he stopped short of full-blooded socialism, but he 
always believed that the warm heart of proletarian culture would have a purifying effect on 
Victorian society, obliterating the moral blindness of the bourgeois tradition with the force of its 
generosity. Jackson’s most startling argument was that it was possible to correlate Dickens’s 
attitude towards the relationship between the classes (or, more precisely, towards the likelihood 
of power being devolved to ordinary people) with the wider fortunes of English radicalism. As 
such, his work can be divided into three different stages. The first, between 1836 and 1842, was 
one of unbounding optimism.243 At a time when Chartism enjoyed mass support and it seemed 
likely that the franchise would soon be extended to male wage-eamers, Dickens wrote a series 
of novels {Pickwick Papers, Oliver Twist, Nicholas Nickleby etc) in which class hierarchies 
were treated as a purely accidental feature of modem society, soon to be replaced by a more 
fluid set of economic and political relationships. Characters who abused their power were 
invariably brought to justice, while benevolent employers such as Pickwick and Brownlow were 
held up as models of democratic virtue. There was also a certain joyous prodigality to the 
writing, with Dickens creating scores of characters (many of them proletarians) whose existence 
could not be strictly justified on the grounds of plot alone. However, the retrenchment of 
English radicalism engendered a noticeable darkening of his perspective. In the years between 
the collapse of industrial Chartism in 1842 and the failure of the Second Charter in 1848, most 
of his novels (especially Dombey and Son) began to explore the factors which prevent the 
wealthy from voluntarily surrendering their power.244 His main theme at this point was the 
nature of pride, conceived as the natural ally of hierarchy:
Dickens saw to his horror, that instead o f  expanding trade and commerce leading, via a growth 
o f Cheerybleism, to a new benevolent-equalitarian harmony, it was leading to the creation o f  
"Great” commercial houses whose heads wielded a power as great as that o f  Roman 
Emperors; and who, in their pride o f wealth and power, exacted from their connections and 
dependants a deference and obedience greater than those fo r which the Emperor Caligula had 
had his throat so deservedly cut. That this pride was in itself a selfless pride — since it was pride 
to the house in which, and to whose glory, the head himself was as subservient as were the 
humblest o f  his underlings — made it all the more shocking. As Bernard Shaw was to say, sixty 
years later, "Self-sacrifice enables us to sacrifice other people without blushing. ” It was their 
own complete self-effacement before the claims and needs o f the House, whose standing and 
honour was in their keeping, that made these financial-commercial magnates so ruthlessly 
imperious in exacting an equivalent self-effacement from all beneath their sway245
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The final stage of Dickens’s career, lasting between 1848 and his death in 1872, saw the 
growing pessimism of the second period harden into outright despair about the possibility of 
social change.246 Anguished by the collapse of Chartism and the growth of the New Model 
Unions, he now came to believe that British institutions were specifically designed to prevent 
ordinary people from exercising power. Some of the best passages in Jackson’s book dealt with 
the legendary portrayal of the legal system in Bleak House,247 seen as representative of 
Dickens’s wider analysis of the mechanisms of class rule. According to Jackson, one of the 
novel’s finest achievements was to show how the dominant institutions are able to establish a 
sort of admonitory presence in the furthest recesses of everyday life, thereby disciplining the 
individual with what Foucault might have called the “panoptical” threat of constant 
surveillance. This capacity was famously symbolised by the thick fog which hovered around the 
Chancery buildings and seeped into the souls of all the leading characters.248 Dickens also had 
an acute understanding of the way that manifest irrationalities are deliberately built into legal 
procedure in order to reinforce the power of a professional elite. The case of “Jamdyce versus 
Jamdyce” which provided Bleak House with its narrative centre (even though its complexities 
were never fully explained) dragged on endlessly because of (1) an entirely meaningless 
distinction between Courts of Law and Courts of Equity, and (2) the ability of lawyers to exploit 
obscure points of law in a manner more consistent with professional self-interest than the public 
good. “The one great principle of the English law”, Dickens wrote, “is to make business for 
itself...Viewed by this light it becomes a coherent scheme, and not the monstrous maze the laity 
are apt to think it.”249 By the end of his life (or so Jackson argued) Dickens had become so 
frustrated with the structure of English institutions that he began to countenance the possibility 
of armed insurrection. Whereas Barnaby Rudge, published in 1841 but written in 1839, seemed 
to dismiss the Gordon Rioters of 1780 as a bunch of drunkards and madmen, A Tale o f Two 
Cities (1859) portrayed the canaille of 1789 in a much more favourable light. Only a failure to 
see beyond the limitations of petty-bourgeois ideology prevented Dickens becoming the greatest 
revolutionary writer of the age -  or so Jackson implied.250
If Dickens rejected bourgeois society without ever committing himself to the idea of socialism, 
then William Morris exemplified the moment at which English radicalism was finally 
transfigured by the influence of Marxism. Yet the starting point for Robin Page Amot’s William 
Morris: A Vindication (1934) was the claim that the communist beliefs which Morris acquired 
during the last 15 years of his life had deliberately been concealed by the majority of modem 
commentators.251 Surveying the books, articles and speeches which marked the 100th 
anniversary of Morris’s birth in 1934, Amot identified the existence of what he described as two 
recurring “myths”. The so-called “bourgeois myth”, typified by a speech given by Stanley 
Baldwin at the opening of a Morris exhibition at the Victoria and Albert Museum, extolled
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Morris for his artistic genius but made no reference to his political activities.252 This was 
matched on the left by a “Labour Party and ILP myth”, originating in the work of Bruce Glasier, 
which treated Morris as a “gentle Socialist” whose politics owed more to the tradition o f ethical 
socialism than to Marx.253 Although he never really said so, Arnot clearly believed that the main 
factor underpinning these distortions was Morris’s deep nostalgia for the Middle Ages. So long 
as he was portrayed as an impractical dreamer with a hatred of industry and a love of handicraft, 
it was easy to either deny, question or merely suppress his support for an ultra-modernist 
ideology such as Marxism. The main purpose of Arnot’s book was therefore to prove that the 
influence of neo-medievalist ideas on Morris had always been greatly exaggerated.
The goal was pursued in two stages. In one chapter, entitled “How did Morris come to be a 
Marxist?”, Arnot examined the phase of Morris’s career which lasted from his graduation from 
Oxford in 1856 to his first exposure to Marxism in 1881.254 As we have seen in the Introduction, 
Morris’s ambition at this time was to combat what he regarded as the decline of high culture. 
Believing that the root cause of the decline was the inability of the factoiy system to provide 
satisfying work for the common people, he established his own furniture company with the aim 
of promoting “joy in labour”. The conventional view is that Morris, under the influence of 
Carlyle and Ruskin, believed that the destruction of pleasurable work had largely been a 
consequence of the invention of the machine. His company was therefore an attempt to 
undermine industrial society by restoring handicraft to its rightful place in the labour process. 
Arnot completely rejected this view. Morris, he claimed, was never an enemy of industrialism 
but merely an opponent of rationalisation. The modem worker has indeed been “made into a 
machine”,255 but this is because the free market tends to fragment production into a series of 
easily repeatable tasks. It has nothing to do (or so Morris allegedly thought) with anything 
inherently alienating about the industrial system. It is noticeable that Arnot tried to prove his 
case not by referring to Morris’s work but by quoting the famous passage from Volume One of 
Capital in which Marx described the process of rationalisation as a “despotism the more hateful 
for its meanness”.256 He then went on to consider the nature of Morris’s debt to Carlyle and 
Ruskin. In defiance of the view that Morris had primarily been attracted by their admiration for 
pre-industrial society, Arnot argued that what he (Morris) had actually absorbed was their “non­
proletarian Socialism”.257 The idea that there was a socialist element in the work of Carlyle and 
Ruskin is a deeply controversial one, and tends to be derived from two sources. In the famous 
chapter entitled “The Nature of Gothic” in the second volume of The Stones o f  Venice (1853), 
working on the assumption that the characteristics of the non-industrial labour process can be 
deduced from the appearance of medieval cathedrals, Ruskin argued that the element of 
irregularity in the Gothic fa9ade suggests that the medieval labourer was broadly permitted to 
follow his own devices.258 And in Past and Present (1843), Carlyle spoke of the need to balance
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the rule of “heroes” (his favoured solution to the crisis of modern society) with a new system of 
industrial relations in which workers and employers assumed joint responsibility for running 
industry.259 Both texts have been taken to imply a sort of nascent approval on the part of their 
authors for what would later be called industrial democracy. While Arnot mentioned none of 
this, he nevertheless implied that what Morris had inherited from Carlyle and Ruskin was not so 
much a sentimental attachment to the Middle Ages than a set of egalitarian assumptions about 
the need for economic reform.
Something similar was argued when Arnot turned his attention to Morris’s love for the culture 
of medieval Iceland.260 In 1871, still a decade away from his first encounter with Marxism, 
Morris travelled to Iceland and developed a deep interest in its sagas which eventually resulted 
in the original poem Sigurd the Volsung and the Fall o f  the Niblungs (1877). Many 
commentators have suggested that the engagement with the sagas simply deepened Morris’s 
medievalism, not least by forcing him to temper his rather dreamy vision of the Arthurian 
countryside with imagery drawn from a more inhospitable climate. Arnot tried to challenge this 
interpretation by proposing what was effectively a theory of Icelandic exceptionalism. For much 
of the medieval period, he argued, the rigid class structures which existed throughout the rest of 
Europe were largely absent from Iceland. Because the climate was “grim, harsh and 
terrifying”,261 men and women chose to confront the elements in non-hierarchical groups. This 
was the aspect of medieval Iceland to which Morris had been most attracted. Far from 
confirming him in a love of feudalism, Morris’s immersion in the dark world of the sagas 
simply reinforced his belief that mankind would do better to dismantle the class system 
altogether and move forward into a democratic future. “Iceland of the Sagas”, Arnot wrote, “had 
nerved Morris for the epic struggle of the classes in Britain.”262
The second part of Amot’s argument encompassed the period in which Morris had been an 
activist on the Marxist left, roughly between 1881 and his death in 1896. After surveying 
Morris’s involvement in the Social Democratic Federation, the Socialist League and the 
Hammersmith Socialist Society,263 Arnot confronted the question which has posed the biggest 
problems for anyone wishing to claim that Morris was a more or less orthodox Marxist during 
his final years. If Morris was indeed an orthodox Marxist, Arnot asked, then why did his utopian 
novel News from Nowhere (1891) depict a post-revolutionary society that was clearly based on 
handicraft rather than industry? Was this not a sign that Morris retained his love of the Middle 
Ages and secretly found the prospect of a non-industrial society more attractive than that of a 
communist one? Amot’s response was roughly as follows. If we want to understand why News 
from Nowhere was so crammed with medieval motifs, we have to refer both to Morris’s 
conception of socialism and to the nature of utopian discourse. To begin with, Arnot argued,
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Morris subscribed to a rather “unlikely”264 idea about the social experiments which might 
possibly be carried out after the establishment of a communist society. Once a new society had 
been securely built on a foundation of advanced technology, Morris allegedly believed, it was 
likely that the common people would choose to briefly inaugurate an “epoch of rest wherein 
men express their joy in labour largely through handicraft.”265 The medieval idyll depicted in 
News from Nowhere is not therefore to be seen as a reflection of Morris’s idea of socialism, but 
rather as a sort of historical diversion with which a revolutionary people might seek to refresh 
themselves before advancing to “further heights of Communist development”.266 Amot’s 
comments on Morris’s relationship to the utopian tradition were slightly more plausible. 
According to Arnot, the great utopian writers of the modem period had often tried to legitimise 
their vision of the future by invoking a mythical past. The Enlightenment thinkers of the 18th 
Century knew perfectly well that there had never been a society which embodied the 
“republican virtues” that they wished to recommend, but “when they wanted symbols of their 
dreams they evoked the ancient republics of Rome and Sparta, the toga and the Phrygian 
cap.”267 By projecting his egalitarian values onto an imaginary rural society which seemed to 
have more in common with the medieval past than with the communist future, Morris was 
merely obeying a literary convention too powerful to be ignored. Moreover, he also had a rare 
understanding of the limitations of the utopian imagination. He knew that if he tried to predict 
the forms of technology which a communist society might call into being, he would succeed 
only in describing the “machines...of a decade, or at most, two decades ahead of 1890”.268 As 
such, the dearth of technology in News from Nowhere reflected an understandable desire to 
sustain the novel’s relevance over a number of generations.
There is one other matter which needs to be briefly examined before we move on. We have seen 
how the communist writers of the 1930s ascribed the various stages in the development of 
English radicalism to a series of different causes, ranging from the breakdown of feudalism on 
the one hand to the emergence of industrialism on the other. But there were certain writers, 
notably Rickword and Lindsay, who also argued that at least one stimulus to revolutionary 
action had exercised a continuous influence on the English people since 1381. This was the 
belief that it would be possible to create a communist society in Britain because such a society 
has already existed.269 According to this argument, which by no means originated in the 1930s, 
the majority of English radicals have always believed that the countryside was organised along 
egalitarian lines for much of the period between the departure of the Romans and the arrival of 
the Normans. Convinced that the land was owned collectively and farmed by the entire 
community, not by a class of peasants who owed duty to a privileged elite, they have also 
supposed that the English Arcadia only came to an end when a small number of chieftains 
collaborated with the invading Normans to establish a feudal society. The struggle for
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communism has therefore been regarded by the common people as part of an ancient battle to 
liberate England from the effects of the “Norman Yoke”. The extraordinary thing about 
Lindsay’s discussion of this argument (though not Rickword’s) was that it affected to take the 
idea of the Norman Yoke seriously, presumably on the grounds that it might still constitute a 
powerful stimulus to working-class revolt:
A thousand years ago the fight was between the local chieftains and the village group which 
farmed the land co-operatively. The rulers fought to destroy the rights o f  the working group, to 
break up the communal ownership o f  the soil, and to grab the soil as personal property ...As the 
fight went on, the peasants lost bit by bit their communal rights, their system o f shareholding, o f  
yearly dividing up the soil and o f  sharing out all other things needed by the village community 
fo r  its work... When the Normans under William conquered England, the dice were heavily 
weighted against the peasantry, who were now subject aliens as well as a suppressed 
class ...Throughout all the centuries o f the later medieval period this struggle went on. It was 
incomparably the most important fact in the history o f  those years. So you read nothing about it 
in the history books at school. It would never do to let the English people know how the land 
was stolen from them.270
By this point in the 1930s, of course, it was quite unthinkable that the idea of the Norman Yoke 
could ever be rehabilitated. In a renowned essay which he contributed to a Festschrift for Dona 
Torr in 1953, Christopher Hill (one of Lindsay’s friends) pointed out that the working-class 
movement had abandoned it as long ago as the 19th Century, not least because the rise of 
Marxism had exposed it as a historical fiction.271 As such, the passage quoted above is simply 
an unusual reminder of the extent to which Marxist intellectuals have occasionally found it 
necessary to modify or even suppress their own convictions in the interests of populism. It was 
as if Lindsay, who trained as a classical scholar at Queensland University, was less comfortable 
with the “ruthless criticism of everything which exists” (Marx) than with Plato’s assumption 
that one of the main forms of political activity is the dissemination of “necessary myths”. 
Moreover, though the central principles of the communist account of English history were 
derived from Dimitrov, they were applied in ways which clearly owed something to indigenous 
historiographical influences. As Raphael Samuel has pointed out, the most important of these 
influences was probably the school of “people’s history” which emerged in the mid-19th Cenury. 
Broadly liberal in orientation and dominated by the likes of Thorold Rogers and J.R. Green, 
people’s history was preoccupied with (1) pointing up the moments in English history when the 
ruling class had behaved with peculiar callousness towards the lower orders, and (2) identifying 
the moments when the people had gone some way towards holding the ruling class to account. 
As such, Rogers and Green both argued that the process of enclosure represented the “central 
national tragedy” of recent history, but also insisted that the Middle Ages were a period of 
egalitarian virtue and that the Reformation had been a largely levelling movement, not simply 
an expression of bourgeois self-interest.272 As we have seen, all these arguments survived in
234
modified form in the work of the Thirties Marxists. Oddly enough, Samuel has pointed out that 
the generation of Marxist historians who emerged in the last 20 years of the 19th Century were 
also heavily influenced by people’s history, yet there is no evidence that the Thirties 
communists were even aware of their work. For instance, the bibliography of A.L. Morton’s A 
People’s History o f England contains a number of references to Rogers and Green but none at 
all to Belfort Bax or Edward Aveling.273 It remains unclear why men as erudite as Morton, 
Lindsay and Rickword should have known so little about their own ideological forebears.
3 THE QUESTION OF ORTHODOXY
As we have seen in previous chapters, it was common for the Marxist critics of the 1930s to 
respond to Soviet influences in highly unorthodox ways. At first sight, however, their writings 
on the history of English radicalism seem entirely orthodox. It is true that their attempts to 
translate Dimitrov’s exiguous historical precepts into a full-scale narrative showed considerable 
ingenuity, and that some of the main assumptions of their account (notably the unstable nature 
of ruling-class ideology) were not derived from Soviet sources. Yet there is very little in the 
work we have just surveyed which is inconsistent with the critical project outlined at the 7th 
Congress of the Communist International in 1935. It could nevertheless be argued that much of 
this work subtly undermined the CPGB’s political identity in ways which had major long-term 
consequences.274 When the Popular Front strategy was first introduced, the Party still subscribed 
to a rigidly Leninist (or Stalinist) approach to politics. It believed that socialism could not be 
established by peaceful means, that parliament was little more than a “talking shop” and that 
socialist institutions in Britain should be closely modelled on their Soviet counterparts. All these 
positions had been abandoned by the time the Party reconsidered its strategy at the end of the 
War. From 1950 right through to its dissolution in 1991, the CPGB insisted that socialism could 
be achieved through the ballot box and that parliamentary democracy should be deepened and 
not abolished in a socialist society.275 Moreover, it propagated a vision of socialism that has 
aptly been described as “far from revolutionary”.276 Although the Party continued to pay lip 
service to the ideal of moving beyond capitalism, it rapidly became clear that its real objective 
was a mixed economy in which extended public ownership, working-class militancy and 
demand management would lift the private sector out of its customary inefficiency. This shift 
from uncompromising Leninism to radical reformism was partly caused by political factors 
which had nothing to do with the critical projects of the 1930s, notably the Party’s brief 
integration into mainstream British life during the War; but there were several ways in which it 
was also shaped by the new ideas about the nature of English radicalism. The emphasis on civil 
liberties in the writings of the 1930s is of obvious relevance here. Once the communists had 
begun to describe the establishment of parliamentary government as one of the great
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achievements of plebeian revolt, it became virtually impossible to revert to an anti- 
parliamentary position when fascism was finally defeated. The Party’s embrace of reformism 
might also have been linked to the conception of communism which dominated the historical 
literature. In order to justify their argument that popular revolt in England had always been 
motivated by a desire for communism, even in the days before the rise of capitalism, it was 
necessary for writers such as Lindsay and Morton to equate communism with little more than 
common ownership of the means of production. In so doing they elided the fact that modern 
communism sees public ownership not merely as a means of securing popular sovereignty 
(though that is obviously important) but also of transcending “marketplace anarchy” through the 
systematic planning of investment and output. This might well have made it easier to defend the 
Party’s new economic policy, which (as we have seen) tended to regard a fair measure of public 
ownership as an adequate substitute for the abolition of the market. Also, it is easy to see how 
the analysis of ideology in the writings of the 1930s might have induced a fatal optimism about 
the possibilities of capitalist pluralism. If “hegemonic” ideologies such as Christianity and 
liberalism can indeed be easily reconfigured along radical lines, then socialists need have no 
worries about sustaining a radical-left critique in a society which (according to Leninist 
orthodoxy) ought still to be in thrall to the ideology of the market. The post-war history of the 
Communist Party and the Labour Left suggests that things are not so simple.
There was also a hint of unorthodoxy in two theoretical initiatives which had their origins in the 
investigation of the radical tradition: (1) Edgell Rickword’s account of the role of the artist in a 
socialist society, and (2) Jack Lindsay’s seminal attempt to characterise culture as a form of 
“productive activity”. Rickword put forward his ideas in the essay “Culture, Progress, and 
English Tradition”, published in C Day Lewis’s symposium The Mind in Chains in 1937.277 In 
the first part of the essay, which briefly surveyed the history of the radical tradition from the 
Peasants’ Revolt through to Chartism, Rickword concluded that the motivating force of English 
radicalism has always been the belief that no class has the right to live off the labour of 
another.278 He then went on to suggest that one of the most important tasks of socialism is to 
restore the artist to a position of prominence in the economic process.279 According to 
Rickword, the latest phase of capitalism has relegated the majority of cultural workers to a 
marginal role in society. By dividing each area of productive activity into a series of highly 
specialised micro-tasks, rationalisation has created a cultural climate in which the inner 
workings of the mind are regarded as the only legitimate subject matter for a work of art. Artists 
therefore experience a “sense of isolation” which invariably engenders “frustration”, “pettiness” 
and “pessimism”.280 There is also a sense in which the bifurcation of art and society has 
poisoned the central assumptions of intellectual life. When artists retreat into a world of their 
own and see no need to test the practicality of their ideas, they tend to surrender to relativism
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(the belief that “no statement is more true than another”)281 as well as the irrationalism which 
usually goes with it. Many of the leading trends in contemporary culture, including surrealism, 
psychoanalysis and modernism, combine an anguished protest against the poverty of modem 
life with a stubborn refusal to identify capitalism as the root of the problem.282
The point about socialism, Rickword continued, is that it gives a massive boost to production by 
exploiting the potential of advanced technology, with the result that quantitative considerations 
(“how do we produce enough?”) are replaced by qualitative ones (“how do we ensure that what 
we produce is beautiful?”). The consequence is a sort of Morrisian idyll in which artists are 
drawn into economic life in order to embellish the products of human labour.283 Moreover, there 
is every possibility that this process will ultimately lead to a complete revolution in the 
foundations of economic life: “In the co-operation of artists and scientists...each comes to 
understand the other’s mode of thought; it is a first step towards the realization of the essential 
unity of the aims of art and science.”284 What Rickword appeared to be claiming, in a manner 
which perhaps recalled Sir Philip Sidney’s An Apology fo r  Poetry,285 was that art and science 
both give rise to distinct and mutually exclusive forms of knowledge, and that the only balanced 
approach to objective reality is one which combines their respective methods in a higher 
synthesis. It was an argument that F.R. Leavis would scornfully reject in his famous polemic 
against C.P. Snow in the so-called “two cultures” debate of the 1950s.
More important than Rickword’s proto-Maoist musings was Jack Lindsay’s attempt to theorise 
culture as a form of “productive activity”.286 Having made a central contribution to the analysis 
of the radical tradition, especially in his work on Shakespeare and Bunyan, Lindsay began to 
argue in the late-193Os that it was not enough to simply identify the elements of progressive 
thought in the work of individual writers. The broader goal should be to identify the ways in 
which all forms of cultural activity tend to have progressive consequences. He first addressed 
the issue in A Short History o f  Culture (1938)287 and returned to it in a series of books and 
essays over the next 50 years, including Perspective fo r Poetry (1944), Marxism and 
Contemporary Science (1949) and The Crisis in Marxism (1981).288 According to Lindsay, 
Marxism has tended to obscure the progressive aspects of culture (by which he primarily meant 
the arts) in one of two ways. It has either regarded cultural activity as a reflection of the existing 
economic system (as in the base/superstructure metaphor) or it has seen it as having a purely 
extrinsic capacity for stimulating change, in the sense of raising awareness of systemic 
transformations which advances in the productive forces have already made possible. Lindsay’s 
counter-thesis was that art can often play a much more fundamental role in society, penetrating 
to the heart of the economic process and influencing the technological developments which 
push history forward. It derives this ability from the fact that it usually provides an illusory
237
reconciliation of the various contradictions which threaten the coherence of the social system. It 
takes the tensions between “inner and outer”, “personal and social” and “self and audience”289 
(as well as several others) and welds them into an aesthetic continuum. This transformation is 
primarily effected by a work’s form, or what Lindsay insisted on calling “Form”,290 which he 
interpreted as an extension of the rhythmic procedures by which the body seeks to orientate 
itself in a threatening environment. The following passage gives a good impression of the 
distinctive terminology in which Lindsay often couched his argument, much of it suggestive of 
the later work of Althusser:291
Art, we can say, is the Structure o f human process arrested and objectified at a certain 
point... the Pattern or Form is the projection o f the structure. Rhythm is the movement o f the 
process employed in bringing about this projection, and is revealed in the Pattern. The 
movement o f  projection reveals further a Dominance, the keypoint in the development leading 
to the work o f  art, which expresses the particular relation o f  inner and outer, organism and 
environment, individual and history... The keypoint, expressing and revealing the Dominance, is 
integrative. It expresses "the arrangement o f organic structure and tension so that a single 
characteristic form is developed"...Development may be defined as Decrease in Asymmetry and 
the Dominance is the relation of the Form to the Process it facilitates.292
Because of its ability to substitute “symmetry” for “asymmetry”, art has the potential to 
transfigure economic life. Inspired by the spectacle of a social order from which all traces of 
conflict have been eliminated, the individual is likely to experience a new determination to 
enhance humanity’s control of nature. He can either intensify the energy which he brings to his 
everyday tasks, or else (much more importantly) he can turn his mind to the business of 
improving the instruments of production. While it would be wrong to regard culture as part of 
the economic “base”, on the grounds that it is neither a productive force nor part of the relations 
of production, it can nevertheless be regarded as one of the main influences on technology and 
therefore as a significant indirect influence on the shape of the economic system as a whole.293 
There have been many influential theories in the 20th Century which argue that the main role of 
culture is to reconcile opposites. As such, Lindsay’s theory can perhaps be regarded as a 
Marxist response to I.A. Richards’s emphasis on the “coenaesthetic” function of art (Richards 
also influenced West and Caudwell) as well as to Claude Levi-Strauss’s pioneering work on the 
nature of myth. Gorky’s remarks about the relationship between myth and economic progress 
were another possible source of inspiration. However, as Victor Paananen has pointed out, the 
really important question is not so much who influenced Lindsay as whom Lindsay might 
himself have influenced. By treating culture as a “productive activity” with dramatic economic 
consequences, Lindsay can be seen (at least in Paananen’s opinion) as a precursor of Raymond 
Williams’s attempt to shift the attention of Marxist criticism away from finished artefacts 
towards the idea of culture as a “form of material production”. It is for this reason that he has 
been described, rightly or wrongly, as the “major British Marxist thinker between Caudwell and
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Williams”.294 If his ideas now seems rather unremarkable, it is perhaps because Marxist theory 
is no longer dominated by the Stalinist version of historical materialism (notoriously summed 
up in Chapter Four of the History o f the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union (Bolsheviksj),295 
with its dogmatic insistence on the absolute priority of the base over the superstructure.296 At 
any rate, Lindsay initially had great difficulty in getting his theory heard. When he read a 
discussion paper to a conference of communist intellectuals in 1945, the only person who 
refused to accuse him of heresy was the young E.P. Thompson.297 Thompson’s own assault on 
Stalinism would become rather better known about ten years later.
By way of conclusion, it is worth noting that historical and critical writing on the radical 
tradition has figured in the post-war history of the Communist Party in a number of interesting 
ways. Most obviously, it was central to the process by which communist historians and literary 
critics were integrated into the mainstream of academic life. When a number of the Party’s most 
distinguished intellectuals first acquired a reputation for academic excellence in the fifties and 
sixties, thus preparing the way for the academic left’s extraordinary influence in British 
universities in the period since 1968,298 it was often because of work which took its lead from 
the research of the 1930s. Eric Hobsbawm, Arnold Kettle, Margot Heinemann, Christopher Hill 
and E.P. Thompson have all acknowledged their debt to the pioneering efforts of the Popular 
Front days.299 Less happily, work on the radical tradition also played its role in the events which 
led to the dissolution of the Party in 1991.300 When the “Eurocommunist” leadership of the 
Party tried to distance itself from class politics, insisting (though never in so many words) that 
the working-class had been superseded by the so-called “new social movements” as the main 
agency of progressive change, it was considered necessary to challenge the rosy assumptions 
about proletarian militancy which most communists took for granted. Writers such as Bill 
Schwarz and Colin Mercer therefore invoked the Nairn/Anderson theses in opposition to what 
they termed the “populism” of Thompson and his acolytes, claiming, amongst other things, that 
the populist position was both dangerously complacent and inherently masculinist.301 Even 
today, however, British communists retain their interest in the radical tradition. Although none 
of the so-called “successor organisations” to the CPGB devotes much time to cultural work, 
their publications often feature articles on the more famous writers in the radical pantheon -  
Blake, Shelley and Bums seem especially favoured. Most of this work aims to popularise rather 
than break new ground, yet it can still be seen as a dignified if low-key alternative to the 
presentation of history in mainstream British culture. As Patrick Wright and others have pointed 
out, one of the main functions of “heritage culture” is to reinforce the belief that history has 
somehow come to an end. By presenting the past through the medium of museums, country 
houses and other spaces which seem remote from everyday life, the heritage industry seeks to 
persuade us that (1) significant historical change is now impossible, (2) the British past was
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characterised by complete unity between the classes, and (3) it was primarily the ruling class 
which made the greatest contribution to national greatness.302 However anachronistic their 
politics might otherwise seem, organisations such as the Communist Party of Britain,303 the New 
Communist Party304 and the Communist Party of Great Britain305 deserve some credit for 
challenging this curious blend of postmodern pessimism and conservative triumphalism. With 
their flow of articles on the periods in British history when the class struggle was at its most 
intense, most of them published in newspapers and magazines whose low production values 
make them seem anything but remote, they remind us that history has yet to reach its Hegelian 
terminus and that popular revolt is still one of the main sources of social progress. Nearly 70 
years after the 7th World Congress of the Communist International, Dimitrov’s legacy is still 
alive-just.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has examined the body of literary criticism that was produced between 1928 and 
1939 by writers who either belonged to, or were closely associated with, the Communist Party 
of Great Britain. It has tried to show how the main principles of the new “revisionist” school of 
Communist Party historiography can be applied to the CPGB’s cultural history. The guiding 
thread of the thesis has been an argument about the relationship between the Party theorists and 
the international communist movement. On the one hand, I have suggested that nearly all the 
work of the Party theorists had its roots in the influence of the international movement, either in 
the form of political directives from the Comintern (i.e. the Class Against Class line and the 
Popular Front line) or in the form of Soviet cultural theory. On the other hand, I have also 
pointed out that the British writers were never reduced simply to parroting the Soviet line. Just 
as the leaders of the CPGB had to adapt Comintern directives to local conditions, so the Party 
theorists tried to develop Soviet ideas in distinctive ways, often by drawing on broader English 
and European traditions of cultural theory. The adaptation of Soviet ideas often had remarkably 
unorthodox consequences. Whereas some writers (e.g. Ralph Fox) inadvertently produced work 
that was inconsistent with Marxist assumptions, there were others (e.g. Alick West) whose lack 
of orthodoxy seemed to be the expression of a semi-dissident perspective on the world 
communist movement. At any rate, the element of unorthodoxy in the work of the Party 
theorists goes some way towards reinforcing the revisionist argument that British communists 
were never simply the stooges of Moscow.
By relating Marxist criticism in Britain to developments in the Communist International and to 
the emergence of Soviet theory, the thesis intersects with three themes in the history of 
international communism which historians have only recently begun to address, and which will 
need to be explored in much greater detail if a balanced assessment of the first wave of socialist 
revolutions is ever to be achieved. The first is the way that the Soviet Union and its allies often 
exercised a curiously positive influence on economic, political and cultural developments in the 
capitalist world. As Eric Hobsbawm has pointed out, one of the biggest paradoxes of the 
Twentieth Century was that Soviet socialism, which inflicted such misery on most of the people 
who lived under it, nevertheless played an overwhelmingly progressive role in world affairs.1 
The defeat of fascism, the establishment of the welfare state in Western Europe, the demise of 
Western imperialism (at least in its colonial form) and the emergence of powerful labour 
movements throughout the world were all things for which the USSR could take some credit. At 
the intellectual level, the most important consequence of the October Revolution was that it 
conferred massive intellectual respectability on what used to be called “philosophical Marxism”,
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thereby paving the way for the remarkably insightful work on economics, politics, history and 
culture which has been produced by Marxist intellectuals over the last 80 years.The task facing 
historians now is to move beyond purely local studies (such as the one in this thesis) to a more 
general account of the influence of Soviet Marxism on the development of modem thought.2 It 
will also be necessary to ask how communists and other radicals were able to project a radiantly 
positive image of the USSR at a time when Stalinist depredations were at their height. British 
historians who wish to answer this question will have to pay close attention to a raft of texts 
from the 1930s, notably Sidney and Beatrice Webb’s Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation? 
(1935), Hewlett Johnson’s The Socialist Sixth o f the World (1939) and Pat Sloan’s Soviet 
Democracy (1937), in which men and women of high intelligence and considerable prestige 
ritually portrayed the USSR as “the hope of the world”.3
A closely related theme is that of the influence of what we might call Comintern Marxism on 
subsequent trends in Marxist thought, especially those which developed outside the confines of 
the world communist movement. The tendency of intellectual historians, exemplified in books 
such as Marxism After Marx by David McLellan, has been to emphasise the discontinuities 
between Western Marxism and what tends to be dismissed as “Stalinism”. At one level, this is 
obviously justified -  it reminds us that the Marxist tradition is as richly variegated as any of the 
other major ideologies of the modem period. Yet elements of continuity also need to be 
explored. As far as British Marxism is concerned, we have already seen how Victor Paananen 
has begun to draw attention to the similarities (remote though they sometimes are) between the 
communist criticism of the 1930s and the better regarded work of subsequent decades.4 
Although there is no room here in which to build on his remarks, I would suggest that at least 
three of the most important post-war developments in Marxist and Marxisant criticism all owe 
some kind of debt to the Party theorists:
(1) The emergence of the New Left and the birth of Cultural Studies. According to the 
orthodox view,*the emergence of the New Left was a consequence of the disillusionment 
with international communism which set in amongst British intellectuals after the 
Khrushchev revelations and the Soviet invasion of Hungary. As such, it is often argued that 
the early work of Raymond Williams, E.P. Thompson and Richard Hoggart (the three 
writers who defined the New Left’s cultural policy and in so doing invented the discipline 
of Cultural Studies) was part of a concerted attempt to move beyond the “deformations” of 
Soviet Marxism.5 There is obviously a great deal of truth in this, but what it overlooks are 
the parallels between the communist criticism of the 1930s and the founding texts of 
Cultural Studies -  especially the three books (Culture and Society, The Long Revolution 
and Communications) in which Williams laid out his proposals for cultural reform. As is
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well known, Williams argued that the New Left should strive to create a “common culture” 
in Britain that would be rooted in the communitarian values of the working class. This 
would only be possible once substantial amounts of economic and political power had been 
devolved to working people (though Williams stopped short of full-blooded socialism), and 
this would itself be dependent on the skills of “advanced communication” being extended 
to the majority. Since the greatest works of English literature embody the ideal of advanced 
communication in its most sophisticated form, and since many of them give powerful 
expression to precisely the sort of communitarian values that will underpin the common 
culture of the future, it follows (or so Williams went on to argue) that the “great tradition” 
should be stripped of its elite connotations and integrated into the nation’s “common 
inheritance”.6 If arguments such as these can legitimately be read as a sort of quasi-Marxist 
adaptation of the Leavisite (or Amoldian) emphasis on the civilising powers of high 
culture, their consonance with the critical positions of the Popular Front period also seems 
clear. There is the same belief in the instinctive radicalism of the people, in the peerless 
ability of the labour movement to extend democracy and in the basic similarities between 
the values of the great English writers and the values of the working class. Since Williams 
has admitted that he immersed himself in the writings of the English communists while a 
student at Cambridge, it is surprising that this aspect of his intellectual formation has been 
overlooked for so long.7
(2) The attack on “literature”. The most startling aspect of British Marxist criticism over the 
last 30 years has been the attempt by a number of writers, notably Raymond Williams and 
Terry Eagleton, to call the very category of “literature” into question.8 The idea that 
“Literature, in the sense of a set of works of assured and unalterable value, distinguished by
certain shared inherent properties, does not exist” (Eagleton)9 might seem a world away 
from the canonical certainties of the 1930s, but it was advanced for strategic reasons which
the Party theorists would surely have understood. At bottom, Williams and Eagleton both 
attacked the idea of literature in order to shift attention away from finished texts to the
process by which texts are created.10 Williams argued (or at least implied) that writing 
somehow prefigures the experience of unalienated labour in a socialist society, whereas
Eagleton wanted to replace English Studies with a new discipline of “Rhetoric” that would
teach students to produce politically persuasive texts of their own.11 As we have seen,
however, the habit of describing literature as a form of “productive activity” does not
originate with Williams and Eagleton but dates back in the English context to the work of
Caudwell, West and Lindsay. Since books by all three of these writers were included in the
relatively brief bibliography of Williams’s Marxism and Literature (1977), and since
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Eagleton has written briefly about both West and Caudwell, it seems reasonable to argue 
that the thirties writers exercised a direct influence on their successors.
(3) The influence of Gramscian and Althusserian ideas. The biggest influence on Marxist 
criticism over the last 30 years has been the writings of Antonio Gramsci and Louis 
Althusser. Both theorists owe their guru status to the New Left Review, which has made a 
sustained effort to bring Western Marxism to the attention of British intellectuals since the 
“palace coup” which elevated Perry Anderson to the editorship in 1962. Gramsci’s theory 
of ideology has been used to justify a relatively optimistic approach to literature, with 
writers such as Raymond Williams, Alan Sinfield and Jonathan Dollimore insisting that all 
texts contain “emergent” elements (as well as “hegemonic” and “residual” ones) which 
make them susceptible to oppositional decoding.12 Althusserian Marxism has generally 
been used for less sanguine purposes, such as the elaboration of an “anti-humanist” 
perspective which categorises literature as one of the “ideological state apparatuses” which 
reconcile us to capitalist rule.13 The Althusser/Gramsci divide has also been evident in 
Cultural Studies. A large number of writers, ranging from representatives of the so-called 
“Birmingham School” (e.g. Stuart Hall, Dick Hebdige and Dorothy Hobson)14 to the more 
recent “cultural populists” (e.g. John Fiske and Paul Willis),15 have taken the Gramscian 
view that all popular texts are inherently polysemic -  and therefore an important site of 
“cultural struggle”. By contrast, the more pessimistic exponents of Screen theory, notably 
Colin MacCabe, Laura Mulvey and Peter Wollen,16 have analysed popular culture in terms 
of Althusser’s notion of “interpellation”. There is no question that this body of work 
represents a major advance on the Marxist criticism of the 1930s, yet even here it could be 
argued (though no one has yet done so) that the reception of Althusserian and Gramscian 
ideas in Britain was powerfully conditioned by the work of the earlier writers. Take the 
example of Gramsci’s theory of ideology. Nearly everyone agrees that Gramsci’s main 
innovation was to draw attention to the “contradictory” nature of ideology, specifically the 
way that the ideas of the ruling group seek to “frame” the more subversive assumptions 
drawn from popular culture and folklore,17 but there is no particular reason why the 
contradictions of everyday consciousness should be interpreted optimistically -  many 
would argue that they demonstrate the extraordinary ability of the ruling class to “co-opt” 
the radical instincts of the workers.18 If the British Marxists of the Seventies and Eighties 
did interpret them optimistically, it was perhaps because they belonged to a radical 
subculture that was still influenced by their communist predecessors, many of whom (as we 
have seen at various points in this thesis) regarded ideologies such as Christianity and 
liberalism as unstable compounds whose radical elements can easily be disaggregated and 
put to subversive use. On the other hand, the influence of the communist critics on the
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reception of Althusser’s ideas was probably more negative. One of the things which has 
distinguished British Althusserianism from its continental and North American counterparts 
has been a deep suspicion of realism. According to MacCabe and his followers, the “effect 
of realism” in the bourgeois novel is created by the “hierarchical” relationship between the 
voice of the author and the voice of the characters, which in turn reduces the reader to a 
position of “dominant specularity” and guarantees his acquiescence in the dominant 
ideology.19 When we think back to the intolerance with which the British communists made 
the case for realism (and to the venom with which they denounced the modernist writers 
whom MacCabe so admired), it is clear that the anti-realism of the Screen theorists might 
well have been a response to an orthodoxy that was now regarded as irredeemably 
philistine.
All of which brings us on to the last theme which needs to be examined -  the internal culture of 
the communist movement. Why should so many British communists have turned to the study of 
literature in a decade as hazardous as the 1930s? Perhaps the main reason was that the world 
communist movement had one of the most obsessively cerebral cultures in the whole of human 
history.20 Committed to an ideology which purported to explain everything between the 
“transition from ape to man” (Engels)21 and the events of the present day, communists were 
astonishingly polymathic in their ambitions -  they insisted that all genuine revolutionaries had a 
duty to immerse themselves in history, science, economics, philosophy and culture. The sense 
that there was something fundamentally immoral about a lack of intellectual curiosity was well 
captured in the following observation of Lenin’s, which Christopher Caudwell almost used as 
an epigram for Studies in a Dying Culture: “Communism becomes an empty phrase, a mere 
fa9ade, and a communist a mere bluffer, if he has not worked over in his consciousness the 
whole inheritance of human knowledge.”22 What was especially remarkable was that these 
exacting standards were imposed not merely on professional intellectuals but on working-class 
communists as well. The communist parties took thousands of men and women who lacked all 
but the most rudimentary education and told them that omniscience was a perfectly reasonable 
goal -  or, as Brecht put it in his great poem Praise o f Learning: “You must know everything! 
You must take over the leadership!”23 Moreover, if the endless pursuit of knowledge was 
usually justified on strategic grounds, there was also perhaps a feeling that it was one of the few 
ways in which an impoverished present might anticipate the truly humane culture of the 
socialist future. Many communists seem to have cleaved almost instinctively to the sort of 
cultural vision which Gramsci outlined in his Prison Notebooks, where the ultimate goal of 
socialism is seen as the reconciliation of the living elements in all existing systems of thought.24 
In the reading habits of the many “worker intellectuals” who studied Freud, Bergson or Darwin 
alongside Marx, Engels and Lenin, we can detect a wish to extract the intellectual pith from
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“bourgeois ideology” and assign it to its proper position beneath what Fredric Jameson would 
later call the “untranscendable horizon of Marxism”. There even seem to have been communists 
who had an almost occult or Spinozian faith in the power of knowledge to bring about 
Promethean changes in human nature. By seeking to recreate the whole of human history in 
their own minds, they aspired to glimpse “horizons infinitely remote and incredibly beautiful” 
(the phrase is P.D. Ouspensky’s)25 that would propel them towards a higher stage of evolution. 
It was probably no accident that the following lines from Book Three of Keats’s Hyperion were 
quoted by Ralph Fox in The Novel and the People,26 even though their meaning was not dwelled 
upon:
Knowledge enormous makes a God o f  me.
Names, deeds, grey legends, dire events, rebellions,
Majesties, sovran voices, agonies,
Creations and destroyings, all at once 
Pour into the wide hollows o f  my brain,
And deify me, as i f  some blithe wine,
Or bright elixir peerless I  had drunk,
And so become immortal.21
The attempt to document the internal culture of the world communist movement has hardly 
begun, though in the British context there has been important work by Raphael Samuel,28 
Jonathan Ree29 and Stuart Macintyre.30 It is neverthless clear that the true nature of communist 
history (or, more precisely, of that portion of it which began in 1917 and came to an end with 
the collapse of the USSR in 1991) will never be understood until the “compliment to man” 
implicit in communism’s hunger for “intellectual-philosophic sustenance” is more fully 
recognised (the phrases are George Steiner’s).31 Although thousands of people had their lives 
ruined by communism, thousands of others were redeemed by it. Once we have condemned 
them for perpetrating or defending Stalinist barbarism, we must still acknowledge that the 
constituent parties of the world communist movement were among the greatest spiritual 
institutions of the Twentieth Century -  and perhaps of all time.
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